



Government of Côte d'Ivoire
United Nations Development Programme

**STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES FOR EARLY RECOVERY AND POST-CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN COTE D'IVOIRE**

PROJECT DOCUMENT

Project Summary

Since the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) in March 2007, Cote d'Ivoire has been making slow but noticeable progress along the road to peace, security and is moving closer to general elections with much needed support from the international community.

The overall objective of the requested BCPR assistance is to contribute to create a favorable environment that will help consolidate peace and security and pave the way for elections that will meet international standards. This will be achieved through interventions that promote better living conditions in conflict-affected areas and help improve the livelihoods of most vulnerable and exposed populations and by strengthening national and local capacities to prevent, mitigate and recover from the negative effects of the country's five years of conflict.

In order to move effectively into recovery and longer-term development, early recovery efforts must be well coordinated and complimentary in their approach. UNDP's assistance in Cote d'Ivoire will focus on coordination work of various ongoing as well as planned activities and will take adequate measures to improve governance functions and to restore foundations for development.

As the country is steadily moving increasingly along the path of recovery, the challenge for UNDP in Cote d'Ivoire is to adjust to the changing context by: (i) helping to *strengthen national capacities* at all levels to *plan* and coordinate the implementation of post-crisis programmes, (ii) providing support to existing or emerging structures in charge of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction; (iii) aligning itself to national priorities in (early) recovery while developing strategic/operational partnerships.

UNDP shall work closely with the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, UN system agencies and other development partners, on the one hand, to sustain the peace consolidation process, economic recovery, enforcement of human rights, and nationwide reconciliation, and on the other hand, boost development and enhance poverty reduction.

COVER PAGE

Country: Côte d'Ivoire

Intended Outcomes

1. The government substantive contribution to the recovery needs and program priorities is provided through a well coordinated (Early) Recovery Planning
2. Strengthened National Capacities to Manage Post-Conflict Recovery Processes at all levels
3. Strengthened women capacities and participation, to prevent, reduce, mitigate and cope with the impact of conflicts
4. Post-crisis socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated; crisis-affected-groups returned and reintegrated, including ex-combatants
5. Community security and social cohesion at local level restored

Expected Outputs:

- a. A coordinated approach to early recovery is developed and the groundwork for long-term recovery is laid
- b. National expertise and financial resources are secured by the Government for (at least) the next three years
- c. An operational presence of national structures in crisis-affected regions that is responsive to local demand for expertise and to community post-conflict recovery needs
- d. A successful skills transfer to local experts is ensured and an adequate level of programme funds mobilized;
- e. Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflicts
- f. Decentralization and local governance and citizen participation improved
- g. Government's expertise in (early) recovery is fully established and tapped into by other partners.
- h. Level of planning and operational capacity of national and local authorities to manage early recovery programmes and processes;
- i. Level of capacity of women, local communities and CSOs to contribute effectively in election and (early) recovery processes;
- j. Level of mainstreaming of a gender and human rights perspective into processes related to elections, governance and (early) recovery at all levels;
- k. Number and level of access to public services, employment and income-generating activities by local communities, vulnerable groups, ex-combatants, ex-militias, young people, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women;
- l. Effectiveness of solutions generated in conflict prevention and community security problems.

Executing Agency: UNDP

Programme Period: January 2009 – December 2010
Programme Component: CPR
Project Title: Strengthening capacities for Early Recovery and Post-Conflict Management in Côte d'Ivoire
Project ID: _____
Project Duration: 2 Years
Management Arrangement: DEX

Total Budget requested (2 years): \$ 10 390 992

Allocated resources:

- TRAC 113 \$ 10 390 992
- Government In Kind
- Regular (TRAC111/2): \$ 9,360,000
- Other:
 - 2 Baskets funds (for Recovery and Elections): \$ 41 135 519
 - Peace building Funds: \$ 5,000. 000

Agreed by:

ON BEHALF OF	SIGNATURE	DATE	NAME/TITLE
Government of Côte d'Ivoire		19 DEC. 2008	Monsieur Paul Antoine Bohoun Bouabré Minister of State, Minister of Planning and Development
UNDP		19.12.08	Monsieur Georg Charpentier Resident Representative

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	CONTEXT ANALYSIS	4
	a. Political and security context	
	b. Socio-economic context	
II.	RELEVANT ONGOING UNDP EFFORTS AND LESSONS LEARNED	5
	a. UNDP Country Office Cooperation Framework (2003-2008)	
	b. The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) Response: the Early Recovery Program (PARC)	
	c. PCU Institutional and Technical Support to Government programs	
	d. Managing the Transition from Humanitarian to (Early) Recovery : UNDP Sub-offices ongoing activities	
	e. UNDP Sub-offices ongoing activities	
	f. Lessons learned	
	g. Post-Conflict Unit's Exit Strategy	
III.	UNDP's EARLY RECOVERY PROGRAMME IN COTE D'IVOIRE FOR 2009-2010	11
IV.	RATIONALE FOR REQUESTING BCPR SUPPORT	12
	The Cluster Approach in Cote d'Ivoire	
	Resources Constraints of UNDP Cote d'Ivoire	
V.	MAIN OBJECTIVES	15
VI.	INTENDED OUTCOMES AND INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	15
VII.	STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMME COMPONENTS	17
VIII.	FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES	18
IX.	MONITORING AND EVALUATION	19
X.	LEGAL CONTEXT	20
XI.	RISKS	20
ANNEXES		
	ANNEX 1: Strategic Results and Resources Framework	21
	ANNEX 2: Summary Profiles for the foreseen Human Resources	28
	ANNEX 3: PCU and Operational Support Offices Structures	31
	ANNEX 4: Country Office Financial Update	35
	ANNEX 5: Basket-Funds for Elections and CPR Programmes	38
	ANNEX 6: Post-Conflict Unit Budget Portfolio – Sept. 2008	41

I. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

a. Political and security context

1. The 19th September 2002 rebellion that divided the country in two exacerbated an already fragile situation in Côte d'Ivoire since the military coup of December 1999. Following several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the crisis under the international community auspices the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) was signed on March 4, 2007 between ex-belligerent forces and political leaders, as a result of the "direct inter-Ivorian dialogue" initiated by the President. This new agreement has generated hope for the return to normalcy, the promotion of national reconciliation and the holding of general elections.
2. The OPA and its complementary amendments are centered around five key issues: (1) disarmament, demobilization of ex-combatants and dismantling of the ex militia leading to the formation of a unified army and command structure; (2) redeployment of the State administration; (3) addressing citizenship/identification issues; (4) reintegration of ex-combatants and internally displaced people and consolidation of national reconciliation and cohesion; and (5) general elections. These focus areas constitute the thrust of the new transitional government agenda led by Guillaume Soro, leader of the FAFN, as Prime Minister since April 2007. The newly-formed government has drawn a detailed road-map and a budgeted action plan in the amount of XOF 246,294.000.000 (approx. US \$547 million) that was shared with the international community and donors during the Abidjan roundtable on July 18, 2007.
3. Eighteen months after the signing of the OPA, there are better prospects for a return to peace and improved security and the country is edging closer to holding national democratic elections. The Government's most significant achievements so far include: (i) a conducive, albeit fragile, political and security environment that now prevails in most of the country, (ii) a timid but promising recovery of the economy and (iii) the beginning of the identification of the population essential for the holding of the elections. The steady progress achieved so far can be attributed to a good collaboration between President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro, the national ownership of the peace process, as well as President Blaise Compaoré's effective facilitation role.
4. In addition, the financial and technical support provided by bilateral and multilateral donors as well as the security aspects provided by the UN system have significantly contributed to the country's stability and early recovery. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and French Force Licorne play an important role in monitoring the implementation of the peace process throughout the country.

b. Socio-economic situation

5. The crisis has distorted the institutional, economic and social setting of the country, degraded the social and economic infrastructure, exacerbated poverty, corruption and impunity and torn the social fabric. It caused important losses of lives and internal displacement of people estimated by UNHCR/UNFPA to more than 700,000 IDPs. This situation has also increased the vulnerability of women, youth and children in particular, and paved the way to numerous human rights abuses including gender-based violence. Poverty has increased from 33.6% in 1998 to 38.4% in 2002 and 45% in 2005 according to the World Bank estimates. In terms of Human Development Index, the country ranked 166 out of 177 countries in 2006; the urban unemployment rate stands at about 40% of the workforce mostly made up of youth¹. According to the MICS 2006, 24% of the population does not yet have access to a source of drinking water. Nearly 2 million children could not go to school between 2002 and 2006. The prevalence of HIV/Aids within the population is 4.7% with a feminization of the pandemic (2.9% of men infected against 6.4% of women-EIS 2005).
6. Progress achieved in the implementation of the OPA has helped ease the social and political climate and has allowed the resumption of cooperation with financial partners. The World Bank has approved a USD 120 million post-conflict grant since August 2007, agreed with the Government to resume the preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper suspended in 2005, and is in the process of reactivating its portfolio of projects frozen the same year. The IMF granted \$60 million in 2007 to Côte d'Ivoire and a similar amount in 2008 under its "Emergency Post-conflict Assistance Programme". In February 2008, the African Development Bank and the Government signed a grant agreement in the amount of \$31.4 million for the rehabilitation of social facilities, restoration of rural development services and combating gender

violence. The European Union and Côte d'Ivoire have signed a programme for the period 2008-2013 that integrates the objectives of a prospective Agreement on Regional Economic Partnership.

7. UN Resolution 1721 (2007) gives the authority to the UN Resident Coordinator to help coordinate resource mobilization for the national "Programmes de Sortie de Crise". In accordance with this resolution, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire requested from UNDP to assist in putting in place an appropriate financial mechanism. Hence the setting up of the two basket funds by UNDP to (i) raise and manage donor funds for the upcoming general elections; and (ii) support the transitional programmes (Programmes de Sortie de Crise et Programme Spécial d'Urgence – PSC/PSU). As of September 2008 significant resources have been mobilized from donors (Japan, France, EU, etc.) in addition to already existing contributions (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) for strategic and technical support in partnership with other UN agencies (XOF 9.7 billion [approx. US \$20 million] for the Elections and XOF 10.7 billion [\$21 million] for PSC/PSU. (See table matrix Annex 6).
8. With a date for Presidential elections set for November 30, 2008, challenges ahead remain important. To keep this commitment and the peace process on track, the parties must do everything possible to maintain the drive of reconciliation, and sustain the dialogue and inclusiveness engendered by the OPA. Furthermore, it is essential to support the fragile political and security stability in the country with concrete progress on (i) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (ii) disarmament and dismantling of the militias groups; (iii) community rehabilitation; and (iv) reunification of the country through the full restoration of State authority. Without tangible results on these key issues, the progress achieved so far will remain fragile and subjected to the risk of serious reversals.
9. The elections cannot be expected to resolve all key issues that constituted the root cause of the crisis. Identification of the population, the reintegration of the ex-combatants and militia groups, the reform of the security sector, land tenure issues, the need for economic governance and the protection of human rights, would remain salient issues even after the elections and need national and international attention.
10. The implementation of the OPA has brought to light the necessity to accord an urgent priority to improving governance at all levels, economic recovery that benefits the poor and disadvantaged, and Cote d'Ivoire's repositioning in the West African and global scenes. It has generated a programming context that calls for quick resumption of economic activities in war-affected areas, restoration of the state authority countrywide, the fight against poverty, adjustments in national capacities for planning and economic stewardship, local governance and social cohesion, all areas where UNDP has a comparative advantage at the international level. The Cote d'Ivoire UNDP Country office must therefore position itself to take advantage of opportunities emerging from the peace and post-crisis environment.

II. RELEVANT ONGOING UNDP EFFORTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

a. UNDP Country Office Cooperation Framework (2003-2008)

11. The required assistance will come in support to ongoing efforts of the Cote d'Ivoire UNDP Country Office to build greater programme coherence around the themes of governance, poverty reduction, security, and conflict prevention and recovery
12. The ongoing country cooperation framework has two major objectives: good governance, including human rights and peace, and poverty reduction, including HIV/Aids prevention and care; these goals have been adjusted to incorporate post-crisis management and recovery. The question of gender was incorporated into programme implementation as a cross-cutting issue with a view to achieving the following results: with respect to governance, interventions have contributed to more effective functioning of democratic institutions, an improvement in government communication and a strengthening of the capacities of Parliament and stakeholders in the political life of Côte d'Ivoire. They also promoted the organization of media campaigns on reconciliation, trust and peace. In partnership with the European Union, Belgium and Canada, the programme has assisted the Civil Society Collective for Peace in the areas of peace building and social cohesion. Action taken in the areas of decentralization and local development has improved security in Abidjan and has allowed for more effective security policies at the municipal level. It has also allowed for more effective firsthand community action, increased participation of local elected officials in the crisis recovery process and greater decentralized cooperation.

15. Post-conflict support has mainly focused on the following aspects: (i) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and efforts to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; (ii) reconstruction and revival through implementation of projects on reintegration, reconstruction and community rehabilitation, the return of displaced persons and the redeployment of the State administration; and (iii) mobile courts. Donors such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden and the European Union have mobilized resources to provide strategic and technical support in partnership with the United Nations system.

b. The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) Response: the Early Recovery Program (PARC)

14. Since 2003 the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) has been supporting the Country office in financing the PCU which is a strategic entity whose main mission is to assist the Management of the Country Office to formulate and implement post-crisis programmes and projects in support of the Ivorian Government. The PCU works in collaboration with other Programme Units of the Country Office. The unit was strengthened in January 2007 with the appointment of a Principal Technical Adviser (PTA) assisted by a National Post-Conflict Advisor. This Unit is currently composed of a technical team of about thirty two staff of which 20 has been deployed in the field. (see annex 4 bis)

15. **P.A.R.C and Early Recovery.** In order to better support the Government Crisis Recovery Programmes (PSC/PSU) established under the OPA, UNDP has formulated a Reintegration, Reconstruction and Community Rehabilitation Support Programme (PARC), funded by BCPR in the amount of US\$ 3,047,360 since the end of 2007. The PARC project has been approved in September 2007 on TRAC 1.1.3 and aimed at supporting the CO in the transition phase through the strategic implementation of joint sub-offices. The objectives of the project are based on four (4) areas of intervention which focused on: (i) facilitating restoration of the basis for local governance, (ii) promoting a more secure environment, (iii) recovering the economy at grassroots level and improving access to Social Services, and (iv) promoting social cohesion and national reconciliation. More specifically, the PARC interventions fit into PCU's main activities which consist of supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants/ex-militias; the control of SALW; community rehabilitation (CR), and the reinforcement of national reconciliation and social cohesion.

16. **PCU Proximity Approach.** BCPR financial support through the PARC project allowed PCU with the establishment of regional sub-offices in Bouaké (Central region), Bondoukou (Eastern region), Guiglo (Western region) and Korhogo (Northern region), and the deployment of a DDR support team within the Integrated Command Centre (ICC) in Yamoussoukro (Centre/Political capital of the country) the national structure in charge of the implementation of the DDR agenda since the OPA.

c. PCU Institutional and Technical Support to Government programs

17. **Supporting the National Programme de Sortie de Crise (PSC).** UNDP via the PCU supported the preparation and re-drafting of the national PSC through technical assistance led by an international expert and composed of eight national consultants. This three-month exercise (Dec 07. – Feb. 08) aimed at reformulating the different axis of the PSC's with a sound budget for all defined programs to be presented to donors for appropriate funding. We now have a final document endorsed by the Prime Minister's office, which is serving as official reference document among partners.

18. **National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion.** In line with a previous engagement with regard to the initiatives for promoting social cohesion and national reconciliation, which started in September 2005 with the organization of a seminar on the theme "Decentralized Entities and the Social Cohesion Process: Prospects of Crisis Recovery in Côte d'Ivoire", PCU continues to support initiatives aiming at strengthening national reconciliation and social cohesion through two line ministries: *Ministère de la Reconciliation et des relations avec les Institutions* (MINRRI) et le *Ministère de la Solidarité et des Victimes de Guerre* (MSVG).

19. **Support to MINRRI and MSVG** consists of (i) providing financial and technical support to the organization of a nationwide seminar on "*la Formulation de la Politique de Reconciliation et Cohésion*

nationales” which now serves as an official reference document that will dictate Government future actions on the subject; (ii) supporting MSVG in the preparation of a national seminar on “*Etats Généraux de la Solidarité*” which laid down the Government’s 2008 agenda on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and War-affected populations. In addition, for capacity building purposes, UNDP posted a national expert within the MSVG since 2007 to assist in the implementation of the national reintegration program for returnees. For both ministries programs, PCU has mobilized around US \$1.5 million from a bilateral donor (FISDES2) to finance capacity building and relevant activities for the period from 2008 through 2009.

20. **Support to M.R.R.** Moreover, PCU provided financial and institutional support to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Reintegration (MRR) for the formulation of a National Policy on Reconstruction and Reintegration. This support follows previous PCU’s commitment to the Ministry since the funding of the organization of its Roundtable I and II in 2007.
21. **CNPRA.** Regarding the National Committee in charge of the Redeployment of the Administration in the entire territory (CNPRA) PCU with assistance from Sweden (SIDA) was able to (i) technically assist (capacity building) through the posting of a national expert within the program; (ii) conduct administrative offices and basic social infrastructure rehabilitation activities during 2007 in the Western region of the country and (iii) contribute to the launching of the sensitization campaign towards civil servants for their return in war affected areas namely (Center, North and West). US \$ 5 million were raised by UNDP (FISDES) for the 2008-2009 periods to support above-mentioned activities.

Supporting Peace Consolidation and Reestablishing Security

22. **DDR.** UNDP PCU continues to play a key role in the DDR process alongside the Government. PCU approach to DDR is dual. On the one hand, it provides technical support to all national involved structures to boost their capacities to respond to present challenges; on the other hand, it provides financial and logistical assistance to DDR related programs and activities with funding from donors. The PCU DDR team is composed of an international DDR Advisor, a national DDR expert and a national expert in planning and Logistics. One of the team’s major achievements was to assist ICC and involved partners in preparing and equipping the « regroupment » sites in the six designated locations to host 36.000 ex-combatants in pretty good conditions.
23. **ICC.** The Integrated Command Center is in charge of the implementation of the Disarmament and Demobilization parts of the DDR as per the APO, but has no resources albeit its important responsibilities to disarm about the 36.000 elements from the *Forces Nouvelles* and the approx. 40,000 militias. In this perspective, the PCU has been providing technical, strategic, financial and logistical support to the ICC through the presence of DDR experts in close collaboration with the DDR section of UNOCI. The team assists on a daily basis the national counterpart in the formulation of strategies and implementation of disarmament and demobilization operations of the former combatants and the dismantling of the militias or self-defense groups. This UNDP proximity strategy has contributed to enhance ICC’s response to DDR challenges through: (i) support for the preparation of strategic documents for ICC’s various operational Cells; (ii) technical assistance during planning and design of modus operandi of the DD/DDM processes; (iii) planning and deployment of equipment on the regrouping sites; and (iv) logistical support and equipment (vehicles; etc...). Thus, UNDP’s financial contribution has allowed for the relocation of ICC Headquarters in an entirely newly-rehabilitated building (funded by Japan and the European Union). This new office fully equipped now serves among other things as the venue for the four Generals (FDS; FAFN, UNOCI and LICORNE) monthly strategic meetings.
24. **Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform (SSR).** Reinforcing rule of law is one of the most important pillars of reestablishing security in post conflict settings. PCU works closely with national and international partners to overcome the challenges of successful transition towards recovery and a greater security atmosphere which will put the wellbeing of all citizens in the heart of nation’s priorities.

- 25 UNDP (PCU), UNOCI and UNPOL have been joining forces on the issue of SSR which is still very timidly addressed by Government, in order to create synergies of actions and share a global vision on various contributions to SSR targeting the Police, the Army, the Gendarmerie, Customs, etc... In this regard, a UNDP-UNPOL partnership recently (august 2008) allowed for the hiring of a forensics expert to assist national police authorities to develop a project proposal for a scientific laboratory in Abidjan to be financed by Germany. This project will contribute to reducing criminality rate in the capital city with the strengthening of police probe capacity using modern equipment and approaches.
- 26 As far as the judiciary and penitentiary sectors are concerned, the UE, Germany and France are committed to finance important capacity building and rehabilitation programmes for the period from 2009 onwards. UNDP has been working closely with these donors and been contributing to ongoing reflections on the subject with the aim to strategically identify areas where its comparative advantages can be used to consolidate and restore the justice and detention structures.
- 27 Regarding the Government's Restructuring and Rebuilding of the national army (R and R) which represent an important pillar to SSR devoted to ICC under Prime Minister's supervision, preliminary work involving ICC staff has benefited from PCU DDR trainings and seminars on the linkages between SSR and DDR.
- 28 SALW. The control of Small Arms and Light Weapons is an important element in PCU's contribution to re-establishing security and is addressed in the PARC under a specific contribution from Denmark. Indeed, fighting against the proliferation and illegal use of SALW is part and parcel of SSR for it allows the collection of weapons from the hands of illegal holders in order to restore the use of force to legitimate state bodies. Thus, in line with UNDP's previous support to Government on SALW, a working group composed of national and international experts (Prime Minister Cabinet; Integrated Command Center; WAANSA (Civil Society); ECOSAP; UNOCI, UNPOL, Force Licorne, SNU,) has been established by PCU since June 2007 and was able to prepare a study on the negative impact of SALW on communities which laid the ground for the upcoming "National Sensitization and Information campaign on the Dangers of SALW in Côte-d'Ivoire". This six-month campaign will be implemented by civil society organizations led by the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) - Côte d'Ivoire Section in close collaboration with ECOSAP and UNDP.
- 29 Moreover, the full redeployment of state administration in war-affected zones is a sine-qua- non condition to a return to normalcy and a challenge to the rule of law. UNDP is therefore providing financial and technical assistance to the National Committee for the Redeployment of the Administration (CNPRA) to (i) strengthen local governance and (ii) assist in capacity building of civil servants as well as their swift and sound return to their posts.
- 30 The recruitment of a Senior Governance Specialist will contribute to integrating various Rule-of-Law and SSR components within UNDP's core Governance framework through a coherent and coordinated approach in collaboration with PCU DDR and SSR staff as well as key national and international actors.

Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation

- 31 In line with its support to ICC (responsible for the DD), PCU has been assisting the national reintegration structures, set up after the APO namely the *Programme National de Réinsertion et de Réhabilitation Communautaire* (PNRRC) and *Programme du Service Civique National* (PSCN). This support is materialized through a technical assistance in formulating their respective programme documents through the organization of joint-seminars; but also through institutional and logistical support. While PNRRC focuses on the reintegration of ex-combatants/ex-militias and community rehabilitation, PSCN is in charge of the youth-at-risk and youngsters associated with armed groups, through "civic education" and "vocational training".
- 32 UNDP's support to reintegration programs amounts to US\$ 7 million Funds were provided by various donors (Denmark, France, Belgium, Norway, South Korea, Sweden and *Fonds Ivoirien-Suisse de Développement Social et Economique* -FISDES). (See Annexes 5 and 6)

34. In addition to own UNDP's efforts to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militias, youth at risk and youth associated with arms groups, a new US\$4 millions-initiative entitled "1000 Micro-projects" (1000 MP) led by UNOCI has been launched in August 2008 with full participation of the UNDP PCU. The project is fully funded by the Peace Building Fund (PBF) in the amount of 4 million and UNDP has been designated as implementing agency. PCU has closely collaborated with UNOCI DDR team to prepare and start implementation of the 1000 MP. UNDP sub-offices play a crucial role in the execution phase of the project as they leverage on their presence in the field and their expertise to assist national partners in taking full advantage of the 1000 MP project's benefits.

d. Managing the Transition from Humanitarian to (Early) Recovery : UNDP Sub-offices ongoing activities¹

34. The overall strategy of UNDP in terms of post-crisis management, particularly in the area of community rehabilitation and recovery, is to adopt a proximity approach focused on integrated and participatory activities with community groups and partners with a view to ensuring sustainable development. To that end, the emphasis is placed on creating synergies and complementarities between the various national actors and international partner agencies in the field. Moreover, UNDP capitalizes on the activities being carried out since 2004 through other programme units such as the community based project ABRIS/PALCP4 at grassroots level. The objective is to facilitate greater visibility of the output and results of the Country Office in the field.

35. Strengthening Field Presence (including with UN joint offices) . In order to properly address new challenges deriving from the APO and the subsequent *programme de sortie de crise*, UNDP had in its programmatic agenda 2007-2009 prepared the PARC project (funded by BCPR) which highlighted the necessity to have a stronger field presence. Using PARC resources, UNDP was able to establish since April 2008, four operational sub-offices in the strategic regions of Vallée du Bandama (Bouaké), Savanes (Korhogo), Moyen Cavally (Guiglo), and Zanzan (Bondoukou). These sub-offices serve as UN Joint offices shared with OCHA, UNICEF, FAO, IOM and UNOCI/Civil Affairs and contribute to a better coordination of actions among all that will contribute to ease the transition from humanitarian to development. Overall office costs are shared among all agencies. (See Annex 4)

36. Sub Offices HR Capacities. Each sub-office is staff with a National Coordinator assisted by an administrative assistant and a driver. However, in Bouaké and Guiglo, two Early Recovery Experts were recruited to strengthen capacities in these priority areas. In addition to this initial staffing two UNVs with previous DDR experience have been hired as DDR Officers in support to the Yamoussoukro PCU DDR team, and deployed to Guiglo (W) and Korhogo (N) to serve as focal point for DDR activities in close collaboration with the sub-offices team. (See Annex 4 bis)

37. All sub-offices are now fully operational. Although they still receive overall guidance from PCU in Abidjan, each sub-office has already developed strategic partnership with local authorities, NGOs, UN agencies and international organizations. They share the same agenda of (i) identifying local basic social rehabilitation and recovery needs; (ii) conducting a mapping exercise of existing and planned community rehabilitation projects; (ii) identifying potential implementing partners; and (iv) setting up local project approval committees – LPAC including local administrative authorities. As a result of the sub-offices preliminary work, dozens of projects have been locally approved for funding out of which seven have already received financing from the PARC project.

e. Lessons Learned

38. PCU. The most optimistic projections made 4 years ago were based on the effective completion of the DDR process under the national DDR program as well as the holding of general elections for a return to normalcy and subsequently the mainstreaming of PCU activities within UNDP's core programs. However, delays and constraints in the implementation of various peace agreements and UN Security Council resolutions due to the lack of political will have had a negative impact on the overall delivery of projects. But, since the signing of the OPA, there is a new hope to see the country get out of its 5 year-crisis with

¹ See page 41 for more details

² ABRIS/PALCP - Appui à la Base pour la Réhabilitation et l'Insertion Sociale/ Programme d'Appui à la Lutte contre la pauvreté

the re-launch of the DDR process, the improvement of security, and the holding of general elections scheduled for November 30.

- 40 PCU activities are still in progress, however few lessons can be drawn from execution to date:
 - A DDR program cannot start without a strong political will. Attempts to address DDR prior to the OPA were in vain due to the lack of strong commitment from all parties involved ;
 - Separating DD and R with two distinct national implementing bodies (CCI and PNRRC) has made it very difficult for Government, UNDP and other partners to coordinate actions and create synergies among national actors;

International partners should have been involved during peace negotiations in order to contribute to the process and eventually commit to financially support the DDR program. This would have prevented current funding problems experienced by Government in the DD as well as the R process;
 - Failed attempts to start DDR between 2004 and 2007 have put donors in a “wait and see” mode with the consequence of lack of funding in certain areas such as the reintegration of ex-combatants ;

The separation of the country in two parts controlled by belligerent forces before the signing of the OPA has prevented the deployment of development partners throughout the country (except for emergency humanitarian related activities);
 - The deployment of a DDR team within ICC appeared to have significantly contributed to improving the national counterpart capacity with regard to DDR through workshops, seminars, etc.;
 - The setting up of sub-offices has provided a greater visibility to UNDP’s role and has raised expectations from communities as well as local authorities.

Challenges Ahead

- 40 The greater challenge to the transition remains the security. This involves the completion of the DDR program including reintegration and community rehabilitation; the implementation of activities related to fighting the proliferation and illicit use of SALW; the complete redeployment of the administration; the return and reinstallation of war affected populations in their areas of origin.
- 41 However, financial resources are a key element to UNDPs success. For UNDP to be able to address those important issues the Country Office should have the capacities both financially and technically (HR) to support the Government “Programme de sortie de crise” in the short term, and the recovery programs in the medium term.
- 42 The two UNDP-managed Basket Funds have so far raised about 40 million dollars already earmarked as follows: (i) US \$20 million for Elections mobilized in 2008 and under the direct responsibility of the Elections Unit; and (ii) US \$20 million managed by PCU. These latter funds which are the result of previous UNDP’s resource mobilizing efforts, are already dedicated to specific areas of the various CPR components (i.e. Peace and Security; DDR; IDPs; Redeployment of the Administration; Community Recovery, etc.) and cannot be used otherwise.

f. Post-Conflict Unit’s Exit Strategy

- 43 Within the framework of the UNDAF and CPD 2009-2013 planned activities, UNDP’s contribution is expected at two levels: First, succeed in the implementation of the PRSP and second, complete the transition from conflict to full recovery with PCU mainly focusing on completing early recovery, and improving security situation (DDR, SSR, SALW, etc.). These roles assigned to UNDP will require an adequate response from the CO and therefore a stronger human resource capacity both within UNDP and amongst Government and national counterparts. The setting up of UNDP sub-offices provided a good opportunity to select and hire some competent national experts in addition to already existing experienced

national programme advisors. The idea now is to provide this core national team with a solid boost in Governance and Economy from senior international experts who will prepare the office to overcome challenges ahead.

44. Considering recommendations from the recent RBA/BCPR mission that refer to transforming the whole country office in one single post crisis bureau which include PCU, the hiring of additional international staff will contribute to preparing this important transition that awaits the office. This should take into account the current re-profiling exercise of the CO.

III. UNDP'S EARLY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (2009-2013) AND PCU PRIORITIES FOR 2009-2010

45. The 2009-2013 UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) for Cote d'Ivoire was prepared in parallel with the UNDAF, and its priorities, all falling within the prism of the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs, are derived from the outcomes of the PRSP's review conducted in March 2008, the national development strategy based on the MDGs and the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 priorities.
46. The UNDAF outcomes for 2009-2013 are: (a) national and local institutions and organizations of civil society are restored and good governance capacities are enhanced to better serve all sections of the population, by respecting human rights and gender equality, (b) the capacity of Government, private sector and populations, especially the most vulnerable, to create jobs and wealth and ensure food security is strengthened, (c) equitable access for all to basic social services and quality of social protection and assistance to vulnerable groups are improved, (d) water, forest and environmental resources are protected, preserved and managed in a sustainable and coordinated way and (e) peace is consolidated by strengthening public safety and the protection of people of goods and by creating conditions conducive to national reconciliation, community rehabilitation and reintegration, and respect for human rights.
47. Priority Areas for UNDP/PCU. The CO has, in close consultation with the national authorities at different levels and the civil society, identified seven priority areas of intervention, clustered around the programming pillars of poverty reduction and governance, to help address the root causes of the crisis which are mal governance and the unequal access of all to resources and the benefits of development. These areas of intervention are: (i) Support to the development and implementation of pro-poor policies integrating gender equality, (ii) Support to the national response on HIV/AIDS; (iii) Protection and sustainable management of the environment; (iv) Strengthening democratic governance, local governance and citizen participation; (v) Strengthening the capacity of national institutions and local structures in charge of reconstruction and economic recovery; (vi) Private sector development; and (vii) Support to peace consolidation and crisis prevention. The PCU focuses on points
48. *Governance and Security.* In the area of governance, the focus will be on enhancing urban security, controlling the proliferation and illicit circulation of light weapons and strengthening dialogue, reconciliation and national cohesion by setting up agreed mechanisms for conflict management and prevention in the communities affected by the crisis and in decentralized communities with the support of local committees for peace and national cohesion. The programme will also focus on local inter-communal committees for dialogue and exchange of views in order to address complaints and to promote economic projects that unify and rehabilitate the community. It will thus facilitate the provision of support for implementing micro projects for grass-roots communities through the creation of forums to promote and inculcate a culture of peace and citizenship, as well as the development of income-generating community activities. By helping to create mechanisms for the country to resume pro-poor social and economic recovery and development, and conduct processes to mend the social divisions that have deepened over the past seven years, UNDP can help set up a framework that other key stakeholders can use to support post-conflict programmes in Cote d'Ivoire in a structured manner.
49. The overall aim of the CO programme is to deliver services to the poor with visible short term impact while strengthening the ability of legitimate local authorities to drive (early) recovery interventions, and to provide development services over the longer term. Many development and relief/recovery programmes are currently implementing activities through local authorities, NGOs or CBOs. However, none of them has taken an area-based approach or seeks to systematically strengthen the capacities of the authorities. The establishment of viable local governance structures is expected to help promote peace building, directly in the form of providing a democratic space for dialogue and decision-making on resource management, and indirectly through constructive mechanisms for dispute resolution, which could

decrease tension in areas where conditions and interests of various groups diverge. The programme is also expected to serve as a catalyst for UNCT coordination on (early) recovery issues.

50. *Capacity strengthening at the national level.* The proposed programme will grant priority to strengthening capacities of national structures at the central and local levels, with a view to ensuring effective implementation and ownership of post-crisis recovery by Côte d'Ivoire. It will include support to the definition of policies and strategies that respond to the challenges faced by the country and interventions to build capacities at the central and local levels. The programme will enable UNDP and its partners to reinforce specific interventions to promote gender equality and human rights, based on the principles of participation, efficiency and transparency.
51. *Partnerships.* Special emphasis will be placed on the development of strategic partnerships and resource mobilization for (early) recovery with the assistance of governmental institutions, United Nations agencies, bilateral and multilateral partnerships, the private sector and civil society. The partnership initiated with the private sector in the context of corporate citizenship will be strengthened. Lastly, efforts will be made to promote synergy with other programmes in the country for programme coherence and in order to optimize the use of resources.

IV RATIONALE FOR REQUESTING BCPR SUPPORT

52. Alongside the Transition programme it has adopted to implement the APO, the Government of Cote d'Ivoire has undertaken to complete a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by end 2008 with the aim of meeting a decision point for Cote d'Ivoire's admission to the HIPIC scheme before the end of the year. In this context, the Government has signaled to the international community its firm intention to move the country from humanitarian assistance to early post-crisis reconstruction and development and has called on UNDP to play a strategic role in this process, beyond coordinating the funding mechanisms for the post-crisis programme and the elections.
53. Specifically, the Government expects UNDP Cote d'Ivoire to assist the country in establishing capacity for effective post-crisis governance, planning, and aid management and coordination through reinforcement of specific skills of the departments in charge of emergency and post-conflict programmes. The aim is to better equip the country to attract and use foreign post-conflict assistance, including increasing absorption as well as effectiveness, and to addressing key CPR/development objectives.
54. In the context of inter-agency collaboration on the issue of return of IDPs, there is also a demand for community-centered and community-driven solutions to reintegration and support to sustainable livelihoods, and a call has been made in this respect for UNDP to play a lead role. UNDP's contribution would be to support local authorities in collaborating with various agencies and in ensuring that services are delivered with long-term development in mind.
55. To meet these demands, the UNDP Country office needs urgently a substantial reinforcement of its substantive and operational capacity. Its current financial resource base does not allow for such reinforcement through its own means.
56. International organizations that have been providing humanitarian assistance in Côte d'Ivoire for the past six years, especially in the West, are also now requesting that efforts be multiplied to bridge the transition from relief (humanitarian assistance) to recovery (and development assistance). It has been agreed by the UNCT in Côte d'Ivoire that the existing thematic clusters, which have been geared at providing humanitarian assistance, could benefit from the addition of an early recovery cluster. There is however as yet no consensus on the substance and responsibilities of such a cluster and some agencies are wary of UNDP assuming leadership of this cluster as per the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)'s decision of December 2005 to assign to UNDP the lead role for the Early Recovery Cluster, because of its weak field presence and a questionable recent record in delivery. Timely expansion of UNDP's presence and proven capacity for post-conflict programming, and a UNDP would need a timely expansion of its presence and proven capacity for CPR programming to address a wide range of sectors - Small arms, DDR, conflict analysis, community and economic recovery and reintegration, gender issues, transitional Governance (decentralization, justice, SSR, etc.).

The Cluster Approach in Cote d'Ivoire

57. The humanitarian operation in Cote d'Ivoire is primarily focused on the western part of the country and the emphasis now is increasingly on transition, (early) recovery and capacity-building with a view towards phasing out many of the activities over the course of this year.
58. Although there is only one "cluster" in Cote d'Ivoire, most of the basic principles of the cluster approach are already being applied in all the other "Groupes Sectoriels". But to ensure high standards of predictability, accountability and partnership in all sectors, as well as greater consistency across the sectors, the Cote d'Ivoire Inter-Agency Humanitarian Coordination Committee (IAHCC) has agreed that the existing terms of reference for each of the "Groupes Sectoriels" will be reviewed on the basis of the IASC Generic Terms of Reference for Sector/Cluster Leads. Separate thematic groups for cross-cutting issues such as Gender (UNFPA), HIV/AIDS (WFP/UNAIDS) and Social Cohesion (OCHA) have been established and are now operational.
59. The following arrangements are in place for the humanitarian operation in Cote d'Ivoire:

<i>Cluster/Groupes Sectoriel/Technical Working Group</i>	<i>Lead Agency (in support of Government)</i>
Water & Sanitation	UNICEF
Education	UNICEF
Food Security and Nutrition	FAO/WFP
Health	WHO
Protection	UNHCR
Governance and Economic Recovery	UNDP

60. In accordance with agreed procedures for formalizing the use of the cluster approach, IASC ensured that there were no objections from any agencies to these arrangements taken regarding Cluster Approach in Cote d'Ivoire.
61. BCPR's support to UNDP CO is expected and comes at a time when the HC/RC's Coordination Unit is reviewing the well functioning, adequacy and rationale of the overall inter-agency and IAHCC coordination structures in light of the evolving context in Côte d'Ivoire. This evolving context is one where needs in the country are becoming more structural and dependent on medium/long term development options and where the Government and National Institutions and actors are increasingly taking responsibility and the lead to identify those options and deal with them together with external partners. Through existing Basket-Fund-supported projects, the challenge for the UNDP CO is to adjust in time to the context by strengthening national capacities at all level, providing its support to existing or emerging national structures; align itself to national priorities while developing strategic and operational partnerships and, last but not least, providing a more appealing channel to the external financing sources that are clearly being shifting from humanitarian to transition and recovery.

Resources constraints of UNDP Côte d'Ivoire

62. The crisis has prevented the UNDP Country office in Côte d'Ivoire from fully delivering on its programme objectives. As a matter of fact, shortages of financial resources, a weak field presence and crisis-related implementation constraints have drawn the country office into reducing the scope of its interventions and re-orienting its programme activities. It has faced serious difficulties in disbursing funds mobilized from donors during the crisis period, and, consequently, its ability to mobilize additional funds has been hampered over time. As a consequence of limited programme delivery over the past years, there has been a significant decrease in TRAC allocations for the next programming cycle, in particular TRAC 1. For the record, the estimate of resources that will be available from TRAC 1 and 2 for 2009-2013 stands currently at 10 million dollars. To reach a programme size that earns the respect of the partners and keeps the office visible (estimated at 20 million dollars a year with income earnings of 550,000 dollars a year), the office is compelled to sharpening its ability to mobilize significant resources (about 15 million dollars per year at least) in the face of tenacious competition for resources by other partners, notably the other UN agencies. To this end, it needs to quickly reinforce its substantive, marketing and operational capacity and to strengthen its field presence, while devising ways to improve efficiency in delivery. To achieve this, it needs additional support in the short-term.

53. The downsizing of the programme and an uneven delivery performance have caused extra-budgetary funds, which had been used to cover half of personnel cost since 2005, to nose-dive. The decrease in extra-budgetary funds, coupled with the lack of adjustment in the structure of the CO's operating costs, led to a deficit that calls for immediate action. The office has already been subjected to cuts in core posts in 2007, and is currently in a process of restructuration to adapt its functions and staff profile to the new programme challenges and to the level of income it can realistically expect to earn over the next years. It is expected that this restructuring will ultimately result in downsizing of staff, at a time where opportunities to expand the programme and position strategically UNDP in Côte d'Ivoire abound and would call for human resources capacity increase. It should be noted that other UN agencies are currently strengthening their presence in Côte d'Ivoire to take advantage of these opportunities.
64. Operational capacities at local level have been significantly increased through the establishment, with BCPR support, of four sub-offices (Bouake, Bondoukou, Korhogo and Guiglo) and the Yamoussoukro DDR Team. While basic sub-office structure, equipment and staffing have by now been put in place, sub-office capacity needs to be boosted with the right programmatic expertise and minimum programmatic and operational funds. Owing to limited availability of funds, the expertise assigned to these offices has thus far been minimal. There is however a growing demand for the services of this expertise, and it is the Country Office's view that it should anticipate demand by adding a pool of advisers that will support these offices in terms of (early) recovery strategic and programmatic guidance, monitoring and evaluation and coordination of operations.
65. The ability of the CO to mobilize seed funds for Côte d'Ivoire has been demonstrated during the current programming cycle. During 2003-2007, BCPR has provided approximately \$ 6 million from TRAC 1.1.3 funds. Since then, the CO has optimized these funds to nearly \$40 million, and through targeted interventions in governance, poverty reduction, and community reintegration and early recovery, it has been able to respond to the current crisis with a specific focus on displaced populations and war-affected communities, while laying the first stepping stones for full recovery. The flexibility of the approach adopted has caught the attention of government which decided to entrust UNDP with the responsibility to manage two basket funds for the national post-crisis recovery programme of Côte d'Ivoire and to assist in coordinating its implementation.
66. In addition to its critical role in coordination and aid effectiveness, UNDP has accepted primary responsibility for supporting two of the main UNDAF outcomes: good governance and economic recovery. These areas are deemed to be among the most important for long-term recovery in Côte d'Ivoire. They will require substantial hands-on support during the next two to four years, after which it is expected that, with adequate help and internal commitment, Côte d'Ivoire will have restored state functions and economic recovery equal to (or beyond) pre-crisis levels. The time for UNDP to invest and demonstrate value-added in Côte d'Ivoire is now, when the national and international partners are calling on its support, facilitation and leadership in key early recovery areas. Failing to respond adequately to current expectations could damage durably the country office's image.
67. After a joint mission in Côte d'Ivoire in early June 2008, the Director of BCPR and the Deputy Director for West and Central Africa of RBA have proposed to examine the modalities for an additional support from their respective Bureaux for a joint RBA-BCPR "intensive support package" that would build on the support offered to date and include new elements in line with UNDP's responsibilities within the UNDAF. This package would include:
- [...] Reinforcing UNDP technical capacity at central level through the recruitment of a Senior Economic Recovery Adviser and Senior Governance Adviser (both at L5 level);*
 - Reinforcing operational capacity in Abidjan through, among other resources, recruitment of a monitoring and reporting officer and an operations/procurement officer (both at L3/L4 level);*
 - Reinforcement of UNDP presence in joint offices at regional level, ensuring one L4 international officer to lead UNDP operations in each office, with a national officer who can assume these functions in two-years time; and*
 - Continued programme support to PARC until sufficient donor funding can be secured [...].*
- As a result of these recommendations, UNDP has prepared the present project document and identified various support levels in line with the new strategic vision.

V. MAIN OBJECTIVES

- 68 The overall objective of the requested BCPR assistance is to advance living conditions of crisis-affected-populations by strengthening national and local capacities to prevent, mitigate and recovery from the effects of violent conflicts. To this end, national structures CO in Cote d'Ivoire intend to perform as a credible and efficient provider of (early) recovery services to other humanitarian/development partners.
- 69 Therefore, it needs urgently competencies and high-level expertise in areas of post-conflict early recovery programming and management to stop-gap technically ensure that it has a strong and meaningful presence in the field
- 70 Following the crisis, in order to move effectively into recovery and longer-term development, (early) recovery efforts must be well coordinated and complimentary in their approach. But UNDP's assistance in Cote d'Ivoire will focus not only in the government coordination efforts, but also on the following two outcome areas: (i) *Ensuring improved governance functions*; and (ii) *Restoring the foundations for development*. These two outcome areas could be roughly translated to six development outcomes around which the UNDP CO will provide its support, through existing and planned projects (annexes 4 and 6) :
- i. Strengthened national capacities, with participation of women, to prevent, mitigate and cope with impact of violent conflict.
 - ii. Early post-crisis resumption of local governance functions.
 - iii. Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflict.
 - iv. Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced
 - v. Community security and cohesion restored.
 - vi. Socio-economic infrastructure restored employment generated, economy revived; affected groups returned/reintegrated.

VI. INTENDED OUTCOMES AND INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES

1. In order to strengthen national and local technical capacities, the project seeks additional expertise which consists of the following: an Economic Recovery Adviser (L5), a Governance Adviser (L5), a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (L3), Procurement and Contracting Officer (L3), Gender Advisor (L4) and 4 Early Recovery Specialists (L3) for the sub-offices. Through this expertise, the country office will assist relevant government departments and local government authorities in the formulation and follow-up of the implementation of recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation activities, in resource mobilization and partnership building. The project will also assist the government in setting-up an adequate mechanism for coordinating post-conflict assistance and ensuring that it is effectively delivered.
2. The project will help to assist Government in building national capacities through effective governance planning and management skills; and in supporting the consolidation of the peace process through leadership, human rights advocacy and crisis prevention activities. It intends to strengthen and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid coordination and management through strengthening aid coordination and management capacities of the government departments, particularly those responsible for emergency and post-conflict programmes. The project will, specifically, build organizational and management/staff capabilities and functions of the Emergency and Post-conflict Programmes Department (Prime Minister Office) and the Aid Coordination and Policy bodies (Ministry of Economy and Planning) so that the Government has a working, transparent and effective aid coordination, management and delivery system. Such strengthening will help Cote d'Ivoire to attract foreign assistance, use better the foreign assistance it is already receiving, including increasing absorption as well as effectiveness, and assist in addressing key recovery/development objectives.
3. The project will assist Government in building capacity through effective economic recovery planning and management skills and to strengthen post-conflict economic development and livelihood opportunities. It will provide policy and capacity building services to allow for quick responses to emerging recovery and development challenges. This support will be realized through the funding of consultancies services, capacity building measures, pilot and preparatory interventions and activities that

strengthen the cooperation and partnership between the national structures and UNDP. A strengthened cooperation and aid management framework will help to increase the effectiveness of national recovery and development interventions and thus directly support the Government in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

74. **Early Recovery Coordination.** UNDP CO will work in support of the Government and UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator to enhance system-wide coherence in early recovery in Cote d'Ivoire. An Early Recovery Coordination Technical Working Group has been established with focal points in each of the humanitarian coordinating clusters ("Groupes Sectoriels"). This technical coordination group is intended to ensure that early recovery approaches take into account humanitarian programmes/activities wherever and whenever feasible. This has recently been reinforced by an additional "groupe sectoriel" co-led by UNDP, and entitled "*Groupe de Travail Technique Relance Economique et Bonne Gouvernance*" to address key gap areas in (early) recovery that fall outside of existing "Groupes Sectoriels. Expected new expertise (ER experts to be hired) within the CO will play a key role in helping national structures in coordinating ER activities along with already existing staff at central level as well as in locally.
75. The ER Coordination Group specific objectives are (a) to develop a coordinated approach to early recovery and lay the groundwork for long-term recovery; (b) Guide and facilitate partners work on Economic recovery and Governance; (c) Analyze the national post-conflict strategic framework and help shape the NGOs and UN system's appropriate interventions; (d) Coordinate all ER ongoing and planned activities in a coherent manner and based of particular NGOs and UN agencies comparative advantages; (e) Facilitate national advocacy efforts for good governance and help mobilize resources. This may be done through:
 - a. Joint rapid assessments, including advocating for inclusion of early recovery in humanitarian assessments. This initial assessment will form the basis for undertaking a more comprehensive inter-agency early recovery assessment which will be co-led and coordinated by UNDP, using UN and local sub-offices network.
 - b. Analysis of early recovery opportunities. This implies that existing joint national and UN needs assessments should pay due attention not only to beneficiary needs but also to existing capacities and opportunities for early recovery. This analysis should ideally lead to the development of an Early Recovery Strategic Framework and Action Plan, resulting from the triangulation of needs, capacities and opportunities.
 - c. Coordination and the setting up an appropriate early recovery coordination mechanism (see above, pt. 75).
 - d. Information management, including the possible placing of technical staff support to work with the OCHA-led humanitarian information management system or UNOCI's Civil Affairs Section, helping to maintain its data and expanding it to include elements of importance to early and full recovery.
 - e. Strategic planning for early recovery, including the possible exploitation of the PRSP, UNDAF and CPD findings and plans, and ensuring the participation of appropriate technical staff in these assessments when they are activated in collaboration with national and international partners such as the EU Commission, World Bank and other IFIs.
76. UNDP will assist the Government of Cote d'Ivoire in areas that have experienced severe disruptions in critical national or local capacities. This will be done with regard to existing post-conflict recovery projects whose support may be captured, as specified implicitly in the UNDAF and CPD, in two Key Result Areas (KRA). Each KRA has outcomes that relate specifically to post-conflict recovery.
 - Strengthening post-crisis governance functions: (i) Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced; (ii) Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflicts.
 - Restoring the foundations for development at local level: (i) Early resumption of local governance functions to facilitate recovery; (ii) Post-crisis community security and social cohesion at local level restored; and (iii) socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated; crisis affected groups returned and reintegrated.

77. Post-conflict environments tend to be complex and characterized by, inter alia, an erosion of human and institutional capital, economic (relative) stagnation and weak rule of law. The nature of the assistance requested to restore governance functions tends to be correspondingly wider. Assistance will include programmes contributing to the restoration of security and national reconciliation. Solutions for conflict prevention will be generated through common analysis and inclusive dialogue among government, relevant civil society actors and other partners. UNDP will also develop recommendations for policies and capacity-building programmes to support reintegration and livelihood opportunities aimed at avoiding a return to conflict and reducing poverty.
78. Community empowerment will include (where necessary) establishment of various Community Development Committees (CDCs) and local sub-committees that will be legalized and trained in various aspects of integrated community recovery concept and approach including leadership, community (conflict) management, participatory planning and monitoring of local projects, revolving fund management, identification of recovery needs, development of post-conflict integrated interventions, promotion of community participation in multi-purpose program management.
79. In Cote d'Ivoire, conflicts have typically undermined human, social, physical and institutional capital at the local level. In addition to restoring livelihoods, local recovery efforts must often include a focus on reconciliation, restoring social cohesion, and creating a safe, secure environment in which recovery can take place. UNDP will support specific measures to build local and national capacities to reduce the availability of small arms and the incidence of armed violence, and support the reintegration of former combatants and other conflict-affected groups in host communities.
80. Cote d'Ivoire has several human rights challenges. Gender based violence is widespread, and there are problems linked to police racket and violence, children abuse, extended use of remand, rapes and trafficking in women. The added capacity will help to strengthen human rights awareness through capacity building and advocacy initiatives. Specific tools will be developed for the legal community and the NGO sector on human rights awareness and instruments. The project will also raise awareness for media stakeholders through targeted interventions towards media personnel. The project will seek to strengthen the capacity on reporting on human rights instruments already signed by Cote d'Ivoire, as well as raise awareness on the UN treaty body system. A special window to fund women initiatives will be set up to support livelihood and life skills-related activities.

VII. STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

81. *Community-based institutional development*: capacity development and empowerment to create enabling environment that promotes community participation and ownership of recovery programmes and political processes: promotion of good governance at community level to strengthen the conflict-solving capacities of the indigenous institutions that over the long term could serve as infrastructure for peace consolidation.
82. *Reconstructing and strengthening governance and public administration systems and institutions* at the local level are the most crucial component of post-conflict recovery because the process of reconstituting them is integral to creating an environment conducive to participatory democracy, reconciliation, peace and social cohesion. A well functioning local government has the role in managing, preventing and mediating conflict. There is a need to ensure that all civil servants at state and locality levels are redeployed and trained in the strategy and policies of conflict anticipation, mitigation, mediation and prevention and that the consciousness of the need to control conflict permeates the government ministries and agencies. The challenge at the local level is to establish a government and civil service in which conflict management, mediation and prevention are widely mainstreamed in institutions, policies, and personnel. The key to the establishment of conflict-sensitive governance institutions at this level is to give citizens both 'voice and choice' in the delivery of public services. Even though local governance institutions serve as a major means of empowerment, stakeholder participation and enhanced accountability, in the context of Cote d'Ivoire these institutions remain weak and poorly prepared to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
83. *Coordination* begins with a shared assessment and analysis of the (early) recovery needs and existing capacities and opportunities for early recovery. Having determined needs and priorities, a strategic framework for (early) recovery, will help to map out gaps, objectives, response strategies, activities and actors. Coordination and partnership building support for a broad-based partnership that provides linkage

between the communities and the state governments and local government systems to nurture steady confidence of the community and ensure sustainability of their recovery activities; and support for government/UN joint programming, ensuring programme synergy and convergence among participating UN agencies, line ministries and other stakeholders..

- 84 *Disparity reduction through pro-poor policies:* focus on vulnerable groups with emphasis on knowledge, participation and control of resources: displaced populations and returnees; gender-based discrimination; unemployed youths, including militias and youth at risk; demobilized young people; etc.
- 85 *Advocacy and social mobilization:* to promote community participation including cost-sharing; labor and material contribution; management and protection of community facilities; supervision, monitoring and reporting of programme activities.
- 86 *Service delivery* including construction and rehabilitation of facilities; supply of materials; capacity building for service provision, etc.
- 87 *Environmental protection:* mitigate natural resources and ensure their sustainable management throughout the rehabilitation of degraded natural resources basis (forestation, energy saving devices, tree replacement, soil and water conservation, access roads, fire break, ... etc), promotion of community participation and consultation in the management of natural resources and environment protection, building the capacity of local stakeholders in related issues and finally testing and validating methodologies for participatory natural resources management in pilot areas.
- 88 *Gender dimension,* which is based on Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council, will focus on responses to be provided to the differentiated needs of men and women in order to facilitate the crisis recovery and return to normalcy. It will initially involve protecting girls and women against sexual violence, which impede their psychological and moral development. Particular emphasis will be placed on care and support for victims of violence and crime, notably young girls, women and children. The programme will support the development of an intervention framework aimed at sensitizing the population on Gender-based Violence (GBV) and developing adequate methods (at the medical, psychological and social levels). It will also involve ensuring the socio-economic empowerment of women by providing them with various skills, including through networking activities between women's associations and specific organizations.

VIII. FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

- 89 Funding already available for projects activities: approximately US\$ 40 million (Basket-Funds) -see breakdown and other details in annexes 4, 5, 6, (pages 35, 38 & 41), excluding US\$ 9.600,000 from the TRAC 111 and TRAC 112 funds.
- 90 The project will directly be executed by the country office in accordance with the UNDP guidelines and procedures for direct execution. But, national recipients of contributions from the project will be associated along different stages that lead to the completion of various capacity building activities: needs assessment, analyzes and prioritization, ToRs development, recruitment of consultants or experts, management, monitoring and performance assessment of project and activities, etc. according to the modalities and mechanisms to be defined by UNDP and national counterparts (the Ministry of Economy and Planning and the Office of the Prime Minister).
- 91 Through technical workshops, equipment, consultancy services, technical trainings, study tours and experts short-assignments, the project will, specifically, contribute to build organizational and management/staff capabilities and functions of the Emergency and Post-conflict Programmes Department (Office of Prime Minister) and the Aid Coordination and Policy bodies (Ministry of Economy and Planning) so that the Government has a working, transparent and effective aid coordination mechanisms and system. Such strengthening will help Cote d'Ivoire to attract, to use and to report on foreign assistance.
- 92 The aim is not to create new structures or mechanisms, but to strengthen existing ones. UNDP CO added resources will help to support the "Comité technique de supervision et de suivi des programmes de sortie de crise" (CTSS-PSC)), and his Secretariat, lead by the Office of Prime Minister and the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator to enhance system-wide coherence in early recovery programmes in Cote d'Ivoire. In this regard, the project will assist in apply as much as possible strategic

recommendations and decisions related to the recovery process, taken by the CTSS-PSC. An early recovery coordination technical working group, "Groupe de Travail Technique Gouvernance et Relance Economique" (GTTGRE), has been established with focal points in each of the humanitarian coordinating clusters ("Groupes sectoriels"). This technical coordination group is intended to ensure that early recovery approaches take into account humanitarian programmes/activities wherever and whenever feasible" and address key gap areas in (early) recovery that fall outside of existing "Groupes sectoriels. New expertise within the UNDP CO will play a key role in helping national structures in coordinating ER activities along with already existing staff at central level as well as locally.

93. The GTTGRE specific objectives are (a) to liaise with the national structures leading or working in early recovery programmes; (b) to develop a coordinated approach to early recovery and lay the groundwork for long-term recovery; (c) to guide and facilitate partners work on economic recovery and governance; (d) to analyze national post-conflict strategic frameworks and help in shaping NGOs and UN system's appropriate interventions; (e) to assist the Ministry of Economy and Planning and the Emergency and Post-conflict Programmes Department in coordinating all major ongoing and planned activities and (e) to facilitate national advocacy efforts for good governance and help mobilize resources.
94. As described above (pt 75), this may be done through: information management system, placing of technical staff support to work with the UN and national partners, including UNOCI's Civil Affairs Section. Strategic planning efforts for early recovery will be done, coherently with the PRSP, UNDAF and CPD findings and plans. Moreover, it will assure the participation of appropriate national technical staff when (and where) appropriate, in close collaboration with international partners such as UN agencies, EU Commission, World Bank, African Development Bank and other IFIs.

IX. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

95. The Ministry for Planning and Development (MEMPD) will continue to play a major oversight role in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programme as the UNDP focal point responsible for the coordination of external aid. With a view to building national capacities and ensuring the sustainability of results, most of projects funded through the two basket fund are implemented through a NEX modality. If necessary, implementation of some of these activities may be assigned to UN agencies, including UNDP. Joint programmes may be carried out if required. The results will be assessed through close monitoring of the efficient use of resources, the ensuing impacts and the effects on the standard of living of the beneficiary populations, in particular through missions and field visits. Reference data will be collected by carrying out a study of the baseline situation in partnership with the Government and other stakeholders, especially those of the United Nations system (UNDAF). In the context of programme evaluation, annual reviews will be continued. A mid-term review (2011), a final evaluation (2013) and thematic evaluations of the programme's impact will be conducted. Annual audits of projects and programmes will remain systematic and mandatory, as will the monitoring of implementation of their recommendations.
96. The Country office will be responsible for monitoring the activities of the technical personnel requested and for tracking progress on a regular basis. Monitoring activities will include data collection and regular reports in addition to field visits by the office at the central and field levels, and joint missions with NGOs and participating UN agencies, where applicable. Field visit reports will be prepared and used as inputs for Project Progress Reports to be reviewed during national Annual Review/Planning meetings. Community databases and profiles with simple and measurable monitoring indicators on process, inputs, output and outcomes will be established and information will be collected, analyzed, and documented on a regular basis.
97. To support the CO's strategic shift toward results, monitoring and evaluation must provide a strong and coherent system of learning and performance measurement. Operating units are expected to monitor systematically progress toward achievement of results, report on those results annually in the ROAR and integrate lessons learned into management decisions and future programming initiatives. The senior CO Managers will be expected to provide active leadership to the change management process towards better monitoring, learning and evaluation for results.

- 98 The M&E officer will help key groups (senior office management, programme managers and project management) to assess performance at all levels of programming (the UNDAF; CCF/SRF and Project/Programme level), with regard to: (a) the progress towards outcomes; (b) the contribution of UNDP to the outcomes through outputs (generated by projects, policy advice, advocacy and other activities); and (c) the partnership strategy. The ROAR will remain the centerpiece of performance monitoring and reporting, based on the SRF and generated through the RBMS.

X. LEGAL CONTEXT

- 99 The above project specifications constitute the instrument referred to under Article 1 of the basic aid agreement signed between the Government of Cote d'Ivoire and the United Nations Development Programme on 3 December 1993
- 100 The following changes may be brought into this Project Document, if not objected to by the parties, even if they bear only the signature of the Country Director: (i) additional annexes to the Project Document; (ii) adjustments in the contributions already agreed upon or increase in costs due to inflation or any other cause beyond the office's control that do not result in major changes to the immediate objectives, the products or activities of the project; and (iii) changes made after mandatory annual reviews aimed at readjusting the planned contributions, to reflect an increase in costs of services of experts or other costs due to inflation or to take into account the preferential treatment granted for refund of expenses of the implementing agencies.
- 101 According to the provisions of the basic agreement, the Ivorian Government will facilitate the customs clearance, transit, storage and distribution of goods and equipment acquired in the framework of the implementation of the programme. In accordance with this agreement, the goods and services shall be tax free.

XI. RISKS

102. **Political, security and financial risks.** The progress toward ending the crisis should not obscure the fragility of the situation that the country is facing. In such a context and beyond the organization of the presidential elections scheduled for November 30, 2008, many problems still remain: identification, land tenure, disarmament and demobilization, post-election risks...) and could constitute a major hindrance to the implementation of the programme. In addition, insufficient resources and other forms of risks (financial, massive displacement of human resources, difficulty in adopting national execution procedures, etc.) could also hamper the implementation of the programme.
- 103 A number of additional challenges need to be considered and addressed upfront:
- The comprehensive approach increases the risk of putting in place a programme too complex to succeed. Clarity of design and implementation mechanisms, as well as learning from mistakes ("worst practices") committed elsewhere, is essential.
 - An area-based development approach is a long term commitment, and community based development will not be amenable to rushing. This has implications for time-framed delivery expectations and involves great risk in the case of re-eruption of fighting in the concerned areas.
 - Such a programme is capital intensive and will need to include resource mobilization efforts – obtaining preliminary donor commitment – as part of the formulation process. This will entail reaching consensus among donors on the execution modalities.
Joint or even coordinated programming is complex and there are few examples of effortless inter-agency collaboration. Any disincentives to joint programming need to be overcome.
 - The unstable situation with respect to human security in Cote d'Ivoire needs to be managed.
104. **Risk Management Plan.** To mitigate those risk factors, the CO has been working on a Risk Management Plan (RMP) based on effective guiding principles. A first draft has been circulated for comments, and will serve as the basis for a planned support mission before the end of the year to help the CO finalize the RMP document as an integral part of the Country Program Document (CPD). Moreover, the finalization of the actualized Contingency Plan for the whole UN system is also in progress under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator.

ANNEX 1. STRATEGIC RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK

Intended Outcomes:

1. The government substantive contribution to the recovery needs and program priorities is provided through a well coordinated (Early) Recovery Planning
2. Strengthened National Capacities to Manage Post-Conflict Recovery Processes at all levels
3. Strengthened women capacities and participation, to prevent, reduce, mitigate and cope with the impact of conflicts
4. Post-crisis socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated; crisis-affected-groups returned and reintegrated, including ex-combatants
5. Community Security and Social Cohesion at Local Level Restored

Outcomes indicators :

1. A coordinated approach to early recovery is developed and the groundwork for long-term recovery is laid
2. National expertise and financial resources are secured by the Government for (at least) the next three years
3. An operational presence of national structures in crisis-affected regions that is responsive to local demand for expertise and to community post-conflict recovery needs
4. A successful skills transfer to local experts is ensured and an adequate level of programme funds mobilized;
5. Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflicts
6. Decentralization and local governance and citizen participation improved
7. Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced.
8. Government's expertise in (early) recovery is fully established and tapped into by national and international partners.
9. Level of planning and operational capacity of national and local authorities to manage early recovery programmes and processes;
10. Level of capacity of women, local communities and CSOs to contribute effectively in election and (early) recovery processes;
11. Level of mainstreaming of a gender and human rights perspective into processes related to elections, governance and (early) recovery at all levels;
12. Number and level of access to public services, employment and income-generating activities by local communities, vulnerable groups, ex-combatants, ex-militias, young people, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women;
13. Effectiveness of solutions generated in conflict prevention and community security problems.

Services Lines: (1) Poverty Reduction ; (2) Governance; (3) Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES FOR EARLY RECOVERY AND POST-CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Expected Outputs	Indicative Activities	Indicators	BUDGET	
			2009	2010
<p>1.1 A coordinated approach to early recovery is developed and the groundwork for long-term recovery is laid</p> <p>1.2. Government's expertise in (early) recovery is fully established and tapped into by national and international partners.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity development provided for : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GoCI-UN Joint rapid assessments - Analysis of ER opportunities that should ideally lead to the development of an ER Strategic Framework and Action Plan - Coordination and setting up of an appropriate ER coordination mechanism - Regular liaison with the national and international stakeholders - Information sharing among GoCI and UN agencies and other partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of allocation of resources for early recovery activities - Percentage of post-conflict recovery budget to supporting local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution - Percentage of national early recovery plan elements successfully completed - Levels of affected community participation in decision making (numbers of meetings held, percentage attendance by marginalized groups, percentage of women and men attending, numbers of action plans from meetings) - Percentage of recommendations in monitoring and evaluation reports successfully followed up - Percentage of grievance cases successfully resolved - Extent to which national and local institutions are managing early recovery:- degree of control over budgets;- degree of control over planning processes;- level of support required from external agencies;- regularity of payment of staff;- regularity of staff performance assessment;- regularity of audit, monitoring and evaluation - Extent of community participation in decision-making - Percentage of results/objectives in joint programmes achieved - Level of satisfaction of partners with partnerships - System (agreement) in place that establishes roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders - Level of national authority coordination capacity (e.g. ability to call meetings, to develop policy and plans, to coordinate implementation of programmes) - Percentage of programme objectives met - Level of satisfaction of beneficiaries and partners with (early) recovery programming and management 	1 038 728	293 760

Outcome 2: Strengthened National Capacities to Manage Post-Conflict Recovery Processes at all levels

Expected Outputs	Indicative Activities	Indicators	BUDGET	
			2009	2010
<p>2.1. National expertise and financial resources are secured by the Government for (at least) the next three years</p> <p>2.2. An operational presence of national structures in crisis-affected regions that is responsive to local demand for expertise and to community post-conflict recovery needs</p> <p>2.3. A successful skills transfer to local experts is ensured;</p> <p>2.4. An adequate level of programme funds mobilized;</p>	<p>Assistance in:</p> <p>Reformulation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Procurement and Contracting - Needs assessment and planning - Implementation and M&E - Field missions - Equipment and materials - Capacity building, transfer of skills and coaching - Advocacy - Resource mobilization through basket-fund mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An adequate pool of human resources adequately trained, equipped, funded and authorized to deliver/undertake UNDP (early) recovery products and services; - Clearly identified government authorities (agencies/division/unit) mandated to undertake policy and implementation of (early) recovery with demonstrated working link with UNDP - Completion of assessment of the national and local capacities available, including gender mainstreaming capacity, to meet (early) recovery needs - Formulation of an adequate capacity development plan for national and local counterparts - Level of operational capacity of national and local authorities to manage recovery process: Adequate finances, staffing levels with requisite experience and adequate hardware (computers, transport) - Level of operational capacity of national and local authorities to manage recovery: -Level of seniority of staff at senior level (ability to formulate national/local level plans); -Extent of gender-sensitivity of staff; -Level of experience of staff in community based work (ability to carry out participatory surveys and implement participatory programming; (ability to work with marginalized communities) - Number of training courses provided which include gender analysis of post-conflict recovery processes 	1 307 124	775 728
			<p>3.1. Post-conflict governance capacity strengthened, including measures to work towards prevention of resumption of conflicts.</p> <p>3.2. Decentralization and local governance improved,</p> <p>3.3. Citizen participation increased</p> <p>3.4. Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced.</p>	<p>Workshops, trainings, technical and financial assistance to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen capacities of local communities and CSOs - Mainstream of a gender and human rights perspective through planning and programming processes - Improve public social services delivery

		BUDGET		
Expected Outputs	Indicative Activities	Indicators (disaggregated by sex and age)		
		2009	2010	
<p>4.1. Local communities, vulnerable groups, ex-combatants, ex-militias, young people, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women have better access to public services, employment and income-generating activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restoration of (socio-economic) infrastructures - Strengthening of technical and financial capacities of vulnerable groups for reviving their economic activities through appropriate policies, grants, revolving funds and microcredit schemes - Promotion of social cohesion mechanisms and initiatives - Support to job creation mechanisms and initiatives 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Level of access to markets, pastures, water sources, and commons, by sex and socio-economic grouping, and extent of movement of livestock 2. Level of access to public services (clinics, schools, vocational institutes, credit facilities, transportation networks) 3. % of individuals and groups successfully reintegrated, by sex, age, and geographic region 4. % of individuals and groups who returned to their home community 5. Perceptions of host communities of young people, ex-combatants and IDPs 6. % of IDPs, ex-combatants and women/young people associated with armed forces and groups integrated into local or community-based development projects 7. % of ex-combatants and women/young people associated with armed forces and groups incorporated into the national army or police, by sex 8. % of individuals and groups who gained the ownership of land and/or other property, by sex 9. Average mortality/morbidity rate of host communities; average firearm homicide, blade and burn rates (per 1,000) of host communities; average firearm injury, blade and burn rates (per 1,000) of host communities 10. Average armed assault, intimidation, harassment, rape, and theft rates (per 1,000) of host communities 11. % of female deaths, injuries, abductions, rapes and domestic violence cases reported among female ex-combatants and women/children associated with armed forces and groups 12. Income levels of returnee, young people and ex-combatant households (male and female headed) 13. Employment rate among ex-combatants, young people and women associated with armed forces and groups (in formal and informal sectors), by sex and age 14. % of ex-combatants and women/children associated with armed forces and groups who have access to health services, by sex and age 15. Extent of the HIV and other sexually transmitted disease infection rate among ex-combatants and women/children associated with armed forces and groups, by sex and age 16. IDPs, young people, ex-combatant and women/young people associated with armed forces and groups participation in community activities (politics, cultural, public/community meetings, support networks), by sex and age 	<p>2 332 856</p>	<p>857 124</p>

Expected Outputs	Indicative Activities	Indicators	BUDGET	
			2009	2010
<p>5.1. Solutions generated for conflict prevention through common analysis and inclusive dialogue among government, relevant civil society actors and other partners</p> <p>5.2. The security environment, dialogue and national cohesion are improved</p> <p>5.3. Gender equality and women's empowerment enhanced</p>	<p>Workshops, trainings, technical and financial assistance to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen capacities of structures and mechanisms for national reconciliation - Build women's skills, competences and confidence. - Support women's representation in the social, political, and economic spheres - Develop women's networks and institutions for conflict prevention, peace building, and post-conflict reconstruction - Support initiatives that improve community security and restore social cohesion at local level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National strategy and policy frameworks for conflict prevention and peace building - Level of input of women's organizations into policy making (number of meetings with government attended; number of recommendations by women's organizations taken up in national strategy and policy frameworks). - Level of gender sensitivity of emergency response planning (e.g. numbers of women/men who have taken conflict prevention training; plans for prevention of gender-based violence). - Number of links established between women's organizations and networks and other national stakeholders and institutions. - % of conflict prevention budget disbursed to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse. - Level of gender-based violence, including rape and domestic violence. - Number of homicides, by sex and age of perpetrator and victim. - Level of satisfaction of beneficiaries with community security and conflict prevention programming, by sex and age. 	<p>613 364</p>	<p>527 325</p>

Outcome: Community Security and Social Cohesion at Local Level Restored

Expected Outputs	Indicative Activities	Indicators	BUDGET	
			2009	2010
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of unifying and self-managed community projects and activities promoted - Decrease in number and intensity of conflicts between local communities (-50%) - % of women/men in governmental peace-related decision-making committees and bodies - % of post-conflict recovery budget to supporting local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution. - Number of training courses provided which include gender analysis of post-conflict recovery processes. - Number of capacity development programmes supporting the participation of women in post-conflict recovery, including for ensuring gender responsive interim government frameworks, negotiation and leadership. - % of post-conflict recovery budget allocated to support awareness raising, civic education and access to information about peace processes among women's organizations and networks. 		
TOTAL BUDGET (for 2 years)			5 849 196	4 541 796

Funding available for projects activities : approximately US\$ 40 millions, see breakdown and other details in annexes 4,5, 6, (pages 34, 37 & 40)

ANNEX 2: SUMMARY PROFILES FOR THE FORESEEN HUMAN RESOURCES

f) Sr. Governance Specialist (L5)

The GS acts as the manager and advisor to country office on all aspects of CO Governance programme. The main role is to facilitate implementation of the Governance Programme, ensure implementation of resource mobilization strategies, strengthen strategic partnership and donor intelligence, undertake knowledge building and sharing as well as monitoring and evaluation of Governance programme interventions. The GS also ensures that Governance interventions respond creatively to emerging challenges and opportunities. In addition to undertaking strategic planning and repositioning of Governance interventions, the GS ensures that CO's Governance interventions are consistent with UNDAF/CPD priorities.

To successfully implement CO Governance programme of support to the GoC, the GS provides sound leadership to the Governance Team and works in close collaboration with other programme unit teams, the operations unit teams and UNDP HQs staff that work on governance issues. In addition, the GS also collaborates with the UN system, government officials, and donors, and civil society organizations.

Will have specific experience and expertise pertaining to:

- Strengthening local governance systems and institution building in post-conflict situations and experience from the design or management of programmes aimed at strengthening local governance;
- The role of local democratic processes in peace building and reconciliation;
- Formulation and design of UN-wide joint programmes, knowledge of UN reform, appreciation of the various UN agency missions, and a good understanding of the issues involved in "UN coordination" and "joint programming" and the differences between them;
- Training in service the country office staff in understanding and managing governance projects.

g) Sr. Economic Recovery Specialist (L5)

The Sr. ERS: 1) serve to facilitate GoC counterparts in economic recovery and development of Cote d'Ivoire and, 2) advise UNDP senior management on economic policies and trends and provide analysis for formulation of post-conflict strategies in coordination with the Governance Specialist, 3) support the achievement of the UNCT's identified outcomes, 4) Support and coordinate with the national programme advisers, Early Recovery Advisors, Principal Post-Conflict Specialist and the CO as a whole.

The primary purpose of this position is to guide the development and direct the operation of UNDP CO's economic initiatives for Cote d'Ivoire, identifying options and enhancing the impact of its projects and programmes.

Will have specific experience and expertise pertaining to:

- Community-driven development, community empowerment, and local democratic/participatory processes, sustainable livelihoods and local poverty reduction initiatives, specifically with experience from area-based development schemes.
- Experience from the design or management of programmes aimed at strengthening local governance for development;
- Design and set-up of local development funds strengthening local governance of development, specifically local development funds incl. the UNCDF model;
- The relationship between local economic development and peace building and reconciliation;
- Formulation and design of UN-wide joint programmes, knowledge of UN reform, appreciation of the various UN agency missions, and a good understanding of the issues involved in "UN coordination" and "joint programming" and the differences between them;

The Gender Adviser facilitates coordinates and advocates for the implementation of sector-by-sector gender equality programming in a (early) recovery setting in accordance with the *Early Recovery Guidance Note* (gender equality programming in ER is multi-sectoral, requiring the gender adviser to work with multiple organisations and actors from the displaced and host communities, NGO and government implementing partners, UN agencies and national and international organisations).

6) Gender Advisor (L4)

- The bridging of humanitarian relief to recovery with a longer term view to development; extensive experience in relief situations and conflict countries;
- Experience from the design or management of programmes targeting IDPs, young people, women, etc.;
- Capacities in management;
- The Core d'Ivoire conflict/post conflict environment, understanding of the land-based conflict scenario, strong understanding of the drivers and dynamics of the conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire;

Three ERA are needed to fill in three positions: Bouaké, Bondoukou and Korhogo sub-offices. The ERA will have specific experience and expertise pertaining to:

5) Early Recovery Specialists (4 posts-L3)

The M&E specialist will work 70% of his/her time in close cooperation with the programme advisors on developing knowledge and strategies for capacity building in the field of M&E and 20% of his/her time on supporting UNDP sub-offices in building their M&E capacities and establishing and implementing their M&E plans in line with the newly established UNDP M&E policy. To the extent possible, the Specialist will also focus (10%) on building capacities of national counterparts (including the building a roster of qualified national evaluators in support of M&E functions in the CO).

The main objective of the M&E Specialist assignment is to carry out the technical and operational functions of project monitoring and evaluation with adherence to UNDP practices and procedures. The M&E Specialist will bring expertise and knowledge in the area of monitoring and evaluation and Results Based Management to CO. The provision of evaluation advisory services, as well as support for capacity development in M&E, are key priorities. The position involves extensive travel into the field offices, as well as interacting closely with national government and international development agencies. S/he will work closely with teams of Elections and Post-Conflict as well as Poverty Reduction and Governance Unit.

4) Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist (L3)

Under the guidance and direct supervision of the DRK (Operations), the PCS is a team leader of the CO Procurement Unit, responsible for effective delivery of procurement services in order to obtain the best value for money. He/she promotes a collaborative, client-focused, quality and results-oriented approach. The PCS works in close collaboration with the Operations, Programme and project teams in the CO, UNDP HQs staff and Government officials to successfully deliver procurement services.

The support on procurement aims at ensuring cost-effective and efficient procurement in UNDP. With substantial growth in procurement and need to mitigate risk, the procurement is going through a considerable change process. One of the key focuses through the Operations Unit is to assist CO in professionalizing the procurement function and improving the procurement capacity. Because of physical remoteness and isolation of some UNDP sub-offices, electronic and communications equipment, vehicles as well as goods required for field operations are often in very short supply and extremely expensive. The Operations Unit is often compounded by administrative difficulties that complicate the purchase or importation of goods. Moreover, UNDP has been asked to manage two Trust Funds within the framework of Elections and the "Programmes de Sortie de Crise" in Cote d'Ivoire. Thus, there is high expectation from UNDP to procure goods and services to accelerate programme delivery.

3) Procurement and Contracting Specialist (PCS) - (L3)

The Gender Adviser will use both the *Early Recovery Guidance Note* and the companion materials for orientation and training guides, planning worksheets, etc.) to facilitate planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the mainstreaming of gender equality programming into each UNDP's sector of (early) recovery response.

The aim of the gender adviser is to establish sustainable mechanisms and build capacity to continue and replicate her/his work after the assignment has ended. All activities should be undertaken in a manner that supports this aim.

The required qualifications of all required human resources are: (i) Advanced university degree in a field relevant to development; (ii) Minimum 07 years relevant working experience incl. in the field; (iii) Excellent facilitative, interpersonal, and French writing skills; (iv) Extensive experience in development programmatic analysis (formulation, evaluation, etc.) and/or management (e.g. CTA role) – ideally both and (v) Good understanding of UNDP's mission.

THE POST-CONFLICT UNIT & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OFFICES STRUCTURES

Background

As explained above, infrastructure in the country is very limited. SO were established at Bouake, Guiglo, Katiago and Bondoukou. In general, with the exception of Bouake, other areas are difficult to access. Therefore, projects required additional operational support. The local governance and service delivery systems are very weak as the country is still *de facto* divided in two with ex-rebel forces controlling the centre-north and west and the government forces the south and centre-south of the country. This arrangement requires higher levels of interaction between UNDP and counterparts at the local level. The main reasons why the Sub offices were established are as follow:

- To improve interaction with local communities
- To play a lead role in early recovery
- To improve interaction with local counterparts
- To improve operations support to projects, and centralize the support function
- To ensure permanent presence in areas with limited access

UNDP sub-offices are called *Operational Support Offices*, to emphasize the fact that UNDP is present on ground. The following services and functions provided:

- Operational project support (finance, procurement, HR)
- Project / programme assurance (planning, coordination, M&E)
- Partnership building on behalf of UNDP, including government, donors, and NGOs
- Facilitation of UN (UNDP) coordination
- UN agencies representation, including FAO, UNICEF, UNOPS and IOM
- Implementation support services for national and international partners
- Data/information gathering and analysis

Scope of delegation / Atlas roles

Apart from activities such as project identification and screening, petty cash management and UNDP representation in protocol meetings (with local authorities, UN agencies and other partners), field staff doesn't have a written delegation of authority or any level of delegation /Atlas approval level. This will be done soon.

Cost-Sharing System

The Shared Costs System (SCS) is a major component of the UN's strategy for improved humanitarian and (early) recovery programs delivery and cost savings. The mandate provided a two-year timeframe in which to achieve several objectives related to a more effective and economical use of resources with respect to financial, materiel management, human resources (especially between UNDP and OCHA) and other security-related costs among UN partners (UNICEF, FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNOPS, UNOCI). The estimate costs showed below concern only the part that goes to UNDP on the basis of cost-sharing system with other UN partners.

Sub office	Item:	Yearly costs (*):
Bondoukou	Staffing:	115,000 USD
	Equipment:	15,000 USD
Katiago	Staffing:	375,000 USD
	Equipment:	15,000 USD
Bouake	Staffing:	14,000 USD
	Equipment:	14,000 USD
Katiago	Staffing:	175,000 USD
	Equipment:	40,000 USD

The exit strategy was developed during the initial planning phase. Since the SOs were specifically set up to ensure implementation of the (early) recovery and livelihood programmes 2007 - 2009, their closure was initially planned after 2 years (for Sept. 2009), but funding for the second year, which is supposed to be provided through PARC programme, is not yet secured. All contracts were determined and limited accordingly (one year renewable).

Exit strategy and closure

Programming tools and management should have been holding workshops to harmonize approaches and tools for planning, M&E and management of sub-offices, UNDP procedures, etc. It is only four months since staffs are deployed, but difficulties are still operational: purchase of fuel, vehicles/offices maintenance, payment of salaries, communication, water and electricity supply, etc.


In the SO planning phase took 4 months; recruitment process took 2 months for international and 4 months for local staff; 3 months were required to secure cars and 1 month to secure V-SAT and generators; 3 months required for local equipment (office furniture, computers). It took about 4 months to remove offices. The total time from planning / design to fully operational office took 7 months.

In terms of lessons learned, it is too early to draw lessons on sub-offices as staffs have been deployed in April/May 2008.

Lessons learned

*** estimation
 (**) HDK Operations Cell

Running:	36,000 USD
Staffing:	435,000 USD
Equipment:	23,000 USD
Running:	24,000 USD
Staffing:	400,000 USD
Equipment:	15,000 USD
Running:	20,000 USD




UN HC/RC
UNDP Resident Representative




UNDP Country Director
Côte d'Ivoire



SUB-OFFICES




United Nations Joint Sub-Offices



UNDP Country Office
Côte d'Ivoire

Post-Crisis
CHART



ANNEX 4: COUNTRY OFFICE FINANCIAL UPDATE - SEPTEMBER 2008

DONATEURS	PROJETS FINANCES	Montant disponible 2007 USD	Dépenses 2007 USD	Montant effectif disponible 2008	Budget 2008 révisé ATLAS	Dépenses 2008	Solde subbudget	Cash disponible 2008	
								USD	FCFA
France	Election 00057717	-	-	3 181 431,20	3 181 431,20	-	3 144 651,82	3 144 651,82	1 311 914 148,13
	Communication DDR - 00013156	167 948,59	77 272,59	90 676,00	90 676,00	4 939,71	85 736,29	85 736,29	35 768 237,09
	Appui au DDR Zone Est - 00040519	1 326 259,00	-	1 326 259,00	1 326 259,00	-	1 326 259,00	1 326 259,00	553 300 665,95
	TOTAL	1 494 207,59	77 272,59	4 598 366,20	4 598 366,20	4 939,71	4 593 426,49	4 556 647,11	1 900 983 051,17
UNION EUROPEENNE	Election	-	-	7 366 073,17	8 184 525,74	-	8 184 525,74	7 366 073,17	3 246 987 151,56
	Appui à la promotion nationale des OMD - 00051863	362 257,00	362 257,00	1 374 769,00	1 374 769,00	1 263 668,13	1 111 100,87	1 111 100,72	46 349 998,28
	Restauration de l'Ecole - 00053670	441 249,00	324 671,64	423 541,00	379 809,00	204 629,41	175 179,59	218 911,59	91 327 507,32
	TOTAL	803 506,00		9 164 383,17	9 939 103,74	1 468 297,54	8 470 806,20	7 696 085,48	3 394 664 657,15
CANADA	Appui au SRSB - 00013161	72 257,00	2 315,88	74 572,88	46 000,00	23 795,56	22 204,44	50 777,32	21 183 739,35
	TOTAL	72 257,00	2 315,88	74 572,88	46 000,00	23 795,56	22 204,44	50 777,32	21 183 739,35
Allemagne	Election - 00057717	-	-	1 114 778,94	1 114 778,94	-	1 114 778,94	1 114 778,94	465 073 511,20
	TOTAL			1 114 778,94	1 114 778,94		1 114 778,94	1 114 778,94	465 073 511,20
Belgique	PASU, Appui à la sécurité urbaine - 00013145	1 065 156,00	751 408,00	597 526,00	673 986,00	193 532,78	480 453,22	403 993,22	168 541 527,46
	Appui au processus de Paix - 00036888	2 112 579,00	55 945,86	2 056 633,14	-	-	480 453,22	2 056 633,14	858 004 723,04
	TOTAL	3 177 735,00	807 353,86	2 654 159,14	673 986,00	193 532,78	480 453,22	2 460 626,36	1 026 546 250,50
DANEMARK	Appui DDR et Armes Légères - 00045956	484 751,00	180 204,00	844 320,00	734 000,00	174 692,00	559 308,00	669 628,00	279 361 435,69

TOTAL	484 751,00	1 802 204,00	844 320,00	734 000,00	174 692,00	559 308,00	669 628,00	279 361 435,69
JAPON								
Election	-	-	9 073 310,54	9 073 310,54	-	9 073 310,54	9 073 310,54	3 785 285 350,87
Appui au Processus DDR - 00035554	234 469,00	181 191,00	53 278,00	53 278,00	2 988,00	50 310,00	50 310,00	20 988 778,59
Perennisation des cantines scolaires - 00036501	1 873 037,00	1 221 387,00	1 619 691,00	1 883 556,00	525 855,00	1 357 701,00	1 093 836,00	456 336 347,00
TOTAL	2 107 506,00	1 402 578,00	10 746 279,54	11 010 144,54	528 823,00	10 481 321,54	10 217 450,54	4 262 610 476,47
NORVEGE								
ABRIS - 00013147	1 192 187,00	837 229,00	354 958,00	363 709,00	210 712,00	152 997,00	144 246,00	60 177 844,49
Appui au Processus de Paix - 00048340	413 889,00	23 508,00	390 381,00	395 252,00	363 709,00	31 543,00	26 672,00	11 127 265,01
Femmes dans la consolidation de la Paix - 0005731	547 492,00	73 880,00	473 612,00	24 713,00	24 251,22	461,78	449 560,78	187 468 374,45
Combattre la VCF et rapporter	320 000,00	82 149,00	227 557,08	235 225,00	61 943,00	193 282,00	165 614,08	69 092 372,42
Programme Jeunes - Côte d'Ivoire - 00057499	769 230,00	-	769 203,77	529 000,00	11 676,86	517 323,14	757 526,91	316 031 894,06
Renforcement égalité des sexes - 00055402	341 571,00	128 506,00	233 938,00	481 791,00	172 690,38	309 100,52	61 247,62	25 551 833,34
Appui à l'intégration du Genre - 00062309	-	-	715 000,00	715 000,00	-	715 000,00	-	-
TOTAL	3 594 369,00	1 145 272,00	3 164 649,85	2 704 690,00	944 982,46	1 919 707,54	1 604 667,39	669 449 583,77
SUEDE								
Contribution de la Suède au DDR - 00046877	1 137 138,52	411 975,42	725 163,10	150 000,00	38 830,00	111 170,00	686 333,10	286 330 619,66
Redéploiement de l'Administration - 00054107	870 445,00	842 460,02	27 984,98	68 480,00	39 342,00	29 138,00	357,02	4 738 023,82
Programme de Retour des IDPs - 00054108	580 475,00	225 885,27	354 589,73	350 504,00	306 977,00	43 527,00	397 690,00	165 911 893,41
TOTAL	2 588 058,52	1 480 320,71	1 407 737,81	558 984,00	385 149,00	183 835,00	1 072 666,99	447 504 459,29
SUISSE								
ABRIS - 00013147	-	-	1 285 012,42	1,00	-	1,00	512,00	213 600,77
Projet Humanitaire FISDES -00053757	377 597,00	333 180,00	342 774,48	148 319,00	95 363,94	52 955,06	247 410,54	103 216 955,77
Projet d'Appui Nutritionnel - 00056421	759 775,00	545 336,47	463 470,00	484 430,00	429 376,02	55 053,98	34 093,98	14 223 633,42
Reconstitution des ressources génétiques - 00056948	429 690,00	129 574,00	600 258,31	392 478,00	16 951,82	375 526,18	583 306,49	243 349 051,26
Projet de transformation de noix de Cajou - 00059582	-	-	133 591,50	133 591,50	33 206,46	100 385,04	145 121,65	60 543 156,04
Redéploiement de l'Administration -	-	-	5 513 088,79	5 513 088,79	-	5 513 088,79	5 513 088,79	2 299 999 999,21

Retour des personnes déplacées															
	Reconciliation Nationale			1 076 647,81	1 076 647,81			1 076 647,81	1 076 647,81			450 000 001,24			
	Projet d'Appui Alimentation Eau potable			599 248,78	599 248,78			599 248,78	599 248,78			245 999 999,25			
	Fonds Fiduciaire (Cips environnement PDI...)			4 793 990,25	4 793 990,25			4 793 990,25	4 793 990,25			1 999 999 998,41			
	TOTAL			1 567 862,00	1 567 862,00			1 567 862,00	1 567 862,00			1 000 000 001,29			
CEDEAO															
	Election			500 000,00	500 000,00			500 000,00	500 000,00			220 401 500,00			
	TOTAL			500 000,00	500 000,00			500 000,00	500 000,00			220 401 500,00			
GVT Côte d'Ivoire															
	MEF, Renforcement des Capacités et Mod-00031903			57 000,00	54 263,87			121 261,06	123 865,00			78 674,56	44 990,44	42 386,50	17 683 181,55
	Appui à la Cellule Opérationnelle UNU-INRA - 00053336			39 089,00	5 224,80			33 864,73	33 865,00			17 620,07	16 244,93	16 244,66	6 777 093,46
	TOTAL			96 089,00	59 488,67			155 125,79	157 730,00			96 294,63	61 235,37	58 631,16	24 460 275,01
	GRAND TOTAL			1 597 541,11	6 158 264,42			51 331 450,79	47 648 573,68			4 295 604,92	43 352 968,76	45 394 379,80	19 123 785 366,22

ANNEX 5: BASKET FUNDS FOR ELECTIONS AND CPR - PROGRAMMES

PANIERES DE FONDS PNUD DES PROGRAMMES DE SORTIE DE CRISE

(Montant en milliards de FCA) – Situation août 2008

AXES	BAILLEURS	STRUCTURES/AGENCES D'EXECUTION	CONTRIBUTIONS BAILLEURS	
			II. ELECTIONS	
Identification du corps électoral et organisation des scrutins	Allemagne	PNUD		0,465
	UE	PNUD		3,607
	Japon	PNUD		3,785
	France	PNUD		1,312
	USA	IFES/CEI		0,168
	PNUD	PNUD		0,168
	CEDEAO	CEI/PNUD		0,210
	SOUS TOTAL : ELECTIONS			9,716
III. RESTRUCTURATION ET REFONDATION DES FORCES DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE				
Désarmement, démantèlement des milices et démobilisation des ex combattants	Danemark	PNUD		0,572
	SOUS TOTAL: RESTRUCTURATION ET REFONDATION DES FORCES DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE			0,572
IV. RESTAURATION DE L'AUTORITE DE L'ETAT ET REDEPLOIEMENT DE L'ADMINISTRATION				
Redéploiement de l'administration	Suède	PNUD/CNPPRA		0,025
	FISDES	PNUD/CNPPRA		2,300
SOUS TOTAL: RESTAURATION DE L'AUTORITE DE L'ETAT ET REDEPLOIEMENT DE L'ADMINISTRATION				2,325

PANIERES DE FONDS PNUD DES PROGRAMMES DE SORTIE DE CRISE

(Montant en milliards de FCF) – Situation août 2008

AXES	BAILLEURS	STRUCTURES/AGENCES D'EXECUTION	CONTRIBUTIONS BAILLEURS
V. CONSOLIDATION DE LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE, DE LA PAIX, DE LA SECURITE ET DE LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES PERSONNES ET DES BIENS			
Réinsertion/Réhabilitation Communautaire	PNUD	PNUD	0,126
	France	PNUD	0,656
	Belgique	PNUD	0,873
	Danemark	PNUD	0,440
	Norvège	PNUD	0,480
	Suède	PNUD	0,311
	Suisse	ONUCl/PNUD	0,220
	Corée du Sud	ONUCl/PNUD	0,220
	Suède	PNUD/MSVG	0,162
	FISDES	PNUD/MSVG	0,450
FISDES	PNUD/MINRRI	0,250	
Réconciliation nationale			4,189
SOUS TOTAL: CONSOLIDATION DE LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE, DE LA PAIX, DE LA SECURITE ET DE LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES PERSONNES ET DES BIENS			
VII. COORDINATION, SUIVI-EVALUATION DU PROCESSUS			
Coordination, suivi-évaluation	PNUD	PNUD	0,368
SOUS TOTAL: COORDINATION, SUIVI-EVALUATION DU PROCESSUS			0,368
VIII. URGENCES HUMANITAIRES			
Intrants agricoles	Japon	PNUD	0,168
SOUS TOTAL: URGENCES HUMANITAIRES			0,168

PANIER DE FONDS PNUD DES PROGRAMMES DE SORTIE DE CRISE

(Montant en milliards de FCFA) – Situation août 2008

AXES	BAILLEURS	STRUCTURES/AGENCES D'EXECUTION	CONTRIBUTIONS BAILLEURS
IX. SECURITE (DES POPULATIONS)			
Réduction des armes légères	Danemark	PNUD	0,131
	PNUD	PNUD	0,063
	CEDEAO	PNUD/ECOSAP	0,026
	Japon	PNUD/ECOSAP	0,413
SOUS TOTAL: SECURITE (DES POPULATIONS)			0,633
XI. INFRASTRUCTURES SOCIO ECONOMIQUES DE BASE			
Infrastructures hydrauliques	FISDES	PNUD/DHH	2,000
SOUS TOTAL: INFRASTRUCTURES SOCIO ECONOMIQUES DE BASE			2,000
XIII. DROITS DE L'HOMME			
Résolution des conflits sociaux	Norvège	PNUD	0,048
	PNUD	PNUD	0,046
Participation des femmes	PNUD	PNUD	0,126
Protection des groupes vulnérables	Danemark	PNUD	0,221
	Norvège	PNUD	0,076
SOUS TOTAL: DROITS DE L'HOMME			0,518
SOUS-TOTAL PSC-PSU SANS ELECTIONS			10,772
TOTAL BUDGET: CPR PROGRAMME AND ELECTIONS			46 135 519 US \$

ANNEX 6: Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) Budget Portfolio – Sept. 2008

Project ID	Activites	Donors	Budget en dollars US	
			Total	Reliquat au 23 sept. 2008
00036388	- Appui au processus de paix par la réinsertion des Ex-combattants et ex-miliciens	Belgique	2 441 575,00	1 980 476,54
00040519	- Appui au processus de paix par la réinsertion des jeunes à risques	France	1 326 260,00	1 326 260,00
00045956	- Identification des ex-combattants / Support au regroupement / Support aux groupes vulnérables / Réinsertion des ex-miliciens / Appui au programme sur les ALPC / Appui au retour des PDI	Danemark	4 411 125,72	4 115 620,00
00046877	- Soutien aux groupes vulnérables / Réinsertion des ex-miliciens	Suède	1 349 250,00	794 519,07
00048340	- Réinsertion des ex-combattants, ex-miliciens, enfants soldats / Appui à la réhabilitation communautaire / Soutien aux femmes	Norvège	596 739,06	146 100,00
00054107	- Appui au redéploiement de l'administration	Suède	870 445,00	29 138,00
00054108	- Appui au retour des PDI	FISDES	4 600 000,00	4 600 000,00
		Suède	580 475,00	43 527,00
00057499	- Appui à la réinsertion des jeunes	FISDES	900 000,00	900 000,00
		Norvège	1 043 250,00	1 000 446,91
En cours de démarrage	- Appui à la réconciliation nationale et à la cohésion sociale	FISDES	500 000,00	500 000,00
		BCPR	3 047 360,00	488 762,96
00058085	- PARC			

Project ID	Activites	Donors	Budget en dollars US	
			Total	Reliquat au 23 sept. 2008
En cours de lancement	- Programme d'appui à la lutte contre les ALPC	ECOSAP	60 000,00	60 000,00
En cours	1000 Microprojets	Peace Building Fund	4 000 000,00	4 000 000,00
	- QIPS	Corée du Sud et Suisse	1 000 000,00	627 951,72
		TOTAL	26 726 479,78	20 612 802,20