United Nations Development Programme Iraq

Support to Security Sector Reform – Phase I

FINAL NARRATIVE PROJECT REPORT

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UNDAF Outcome(s)	UNDAF Priority 1: Improved governance, including protection of human rights
CP Outcome(s):	CP Outcome 3: Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Output(s):	1) National Security Strategy is developed through a participatory approach 2) Parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector strengthened concurrently and in direct support of the production of the NSS 3) Research capacities of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS) strengthened
Implementing Partner:	UNDP Iraq
Responsible Partner:	Direct Implementation Modality
Project Location(s):	Baghdad, IRAQ

Acronyms

AD Team	Analysis and Drafting Team
ANCSS	Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies
CoR	Council of Representatives
CP	Country Programme
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSO	Civil society organization
CVS	Crime Victimisation Survey
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DS Committee	Defence and Security Committee
FCO	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GOI	Government of Iraq
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRSO	Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NSR	National Security Review
NSS	National Security Strategy
ONSA	Office of the National Security Strategy
Q	Quarter
RE Team	Review and Evaluation Team
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToT or TOT or ToTs	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USA	United States of America

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Executive Summary

Towards the end of 2012, the Government of Iraq (GoI) identified the need for a new National Security Strategy (NSS) to replace the outdated version that had been developed by the US during the occupation. UNDP was approached by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to support such an initiative. The Support to the SSR project was subsequently launched in February 2013 with the financial support of the UK Government through funds drawn from the Conflict Pool, a multiple agency funding mechanism sponsored by DFID, MoD and the FCO. The initial project timeframe was 24 months, however, given the challenges of 2014, a no cost extension was granted to enable an additional 3 months of activities, resulting in the end date of the project being 31 March 2015.

The project, as articulated in the project document, had one output, which was to ensure that 'the reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards'. The project had three 'key activities' which were, to facilitate the development of the new GoI NSS; to strengthen the oversight capacity of the Defence and Security Committee (DS Committee) of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and finally; to develop the capacity of the nascent GoI policy institute, the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS).

Despite the challenges that were posed to the implementation of the project by the security crisis of June 2014 and the political crisis that ensued, UNDP was nonetheless able to provide key strategic and technical guidance and mentorship to its main GoI interlocuter, the ONSA, resulting in the development of a robust draft of the NSS. The success of the project and the strong relationships that have subsequently been developed have resulted in a Phase II being launched thereby placing UNDP as the lead actor and partner of choice for the GoI when it comes to SSR in Iraq.

The key strengths of the NSS can be seen to derive from two factors: firstly, from the substance and structure of the document, which seeks to identify and to mitigate against the root causes of insecurity and instability in Iraq. This has resulted in the document being a far-reaching and broad document that necessitates a whole of government approach to its implementation. Secondly, the new NSS is a product of significant efforts by the GoI, and particularly of the ONSA who was given the mandate to develop it, to ensure wide-ranging consultations amongst the whole of government at the central and provincial levels and also with civil society. It was hoped that such consultations would ensure the overall legitimacy of the document and also to avoid the end product being seen as 'owned' by any particular administration.

It is fair to say that the first key activity of the project – the development of the NSS – was by far and away the area where the project was able to gain the most traction and to deliver most tangibly. This was partly due to the high levels of political will from the GoI side that were involved in the development of the NSS, but also due to the close partnership between UNDP and the ONSA which provided an enabling environment for this first objective.

Efforts with the Defence and Security Committee were more challenging and the project delivered results that fell shy of what had initially been foreseen in the activities of the project document. This was mainly due to a number of challenges, firstly, the former Iraqi administration had created an environment where parliamentary capacity and oversight was severely restricted. There was thus little interest from the DS Committee to engage in efforts to strengthen oversight mechanisms. Secondly, the elections, which took place in April 2014, drew much of the focus for the first half of 2014 and the security and political crises that ensued meant that the Head of the Committee was not appointed until November 2014, rendering it impossible to conduct activities before this. Consequently, activities were only able to commence in the first quarter of 2015.

Activities with the Al Nahrain Centre fared little better. The major obstacle for progress during the lifecycle of the project was the lack of a Director General for the Centre. Whilst a suitable candidate, Dr Taleb al Hamdani, was finally appointed in January 2014, his tenure was characterised by long-term sick leave, which he took out of country, returning only at the end of 2014. It was therefore not possible to initiate any capacity building efforts in the absence of a strategic decision maker. In early 2015, he was replaced by Hamza Shareef, the main interlocutor in the ONSA. UNDP was however able to conduct a needs assessment of the Centre and the Roadmap of Activities that was subsequently developed will comprise a major component of the Second Phase of the Support to SSR Project.

I. Context

When the United States occupied Iraq one of their first actions was to dismantle the Iraqi Security forces and to implement a de-Ba'athification policy, which excluded members of the Ba'ath party from top military and security positions. This inevitably led to a security vacuum across the country, which would take several years to partially fill. When re-building the Iraqi Police and Military, the US government spent billions of US Dollars training and re-equipping the forces. However, the new architecture and the new missions, roles and responsibilities of the security forces remain a work in progress and several important gaps remain that need urgent attention. Fighting internal terrorism was at the heart of the overall US approach, while critical activities such as configuring the ISF to defend Iraq against external threats, community based policing and arms control received scant attention.

With the withdrawal of the US Military in December 2011, Iraq regained its sovereignty and the GoI was able to claim full control of its own security institutions. Iraq, under US occupation, produced a National Security Strategy that expired in 2010. Consequently, the newly established National Security Council had the opportunity and responsibility to develop and write a new post-American Security Strategy based on Iraqi perceptions, Iraqi priorities and realities. The strategy posed a challenging endeavour due to a) the departure of the US forces and a short-term reduction in resources, in particular intelligence, b) on-going political competition with top ministerial positions in the security ministries unfilled, c) lack of skills and expertise in security sector formulation, d) ongoing terror attacks proved draining on the security forces preventing them from much needed reform, e) a lack of clarity in the missions, roles and responsibilities of the existing security sector, f) no agreed logic to the existing command and control architecture of the existing security forces, g) no clear direction in the transition to police primacy for the provision of internal security and h) a culture of suspicion with political interference in the security and intelligence services.

The ONSA, established through CPA order 68, was responsible for providing analysis and advice to the PM on matters relating to security. Whilst the capacity of the ONSA to collect and collate information was identified as being satisfactory, the ability to analyse and translate that information into policy was seen as requiring further improvement. A commitment to enhance this capacity with the aim of developing a new NSS was articulated by the GoI who formally requested that UNDP support this initiative. Financial support was provided through the UK Government's Conflict Pool (FCO, MOD, DFID).

Oversight of the security sector also remained challenging. This was partly due to a lack of resources and expertise in the Parliament whereby the Research Directorate had limited resources but also due to limited information being provided by relevant security ministries to Parliament. Parliament, i.e. the Standing Committee for Security and Defence, has been bestowed with the right to call upon any Minister or Government official to provide information to the Parliament. However, in 2012 when the project was being developed, this right was not being exercised. Parliamentary inquiries remained limited and public hearings were in their infant stages. There was thus a lack of checks and balances over the security sector, in particular in relation to expenditure.

The GoI approached UNDP in 2012 to request that it support the development of a project which would tackle three issues: the development of a new NSS; support to the development of oversight capacity of the Defence and Security Committee and support to the research and analysis capacity of the ONSA, through its new policy centre, the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies. These efforts constituted the Support to Security Sector Reform, Phase I.

II. Performance review

Implementation strategy review

1. Quality of partnerships

The primary partnership within this project has been with the Office of the National Security Adviser in Baghdad. The ONSA was mandated under CPA Order No. 68 and is the executive arm of the National Security Adviser, who heads the National Security Council. This partnership has been of high quality as this project provided a series of international staff and consultants, including the Senior Adviser on SSR, retired British General, Sir Robert Gordon, who worked very closely with ONSA staff to support and mentor and also to provide technical strategic guidance to the Analysis and Development Team, who were responsible for the development of the NSS. A strong mentorship dynamic was developed and Robert Gordon was able to come out to Baghdad regularly (roughly every 6-8 weeks) often for a period of 10 working days at a time. His work is expected to continue into Phase II.

Partnership was developed with the Defence and Security Committee, although relationships with the Committee were distant during the Maliki administration. This was mainly due to a number of challenges, firstly, that this particular administration had created an environment where parliamentary capacity and oversight was severely restricted. There was thus little interest from the DS Committee to engage in efforts to strengthen oversight mechanisms and the Head of the Committee Mr. Hassan Al Saneed, who was closely allied to Maliki was particularly reticent to develop any meaningful partnerships with UNDP which may have served to strengthen oversight capacity. Secondly, the elections, which took place in April 2014, drew much of the focus for the first half of 2014 and the security and political crises that ensued meant that the new Head of the Committee was not appointed until November 2014, rendering it impossible to conduct activities before this.

During this time, UNDP however, did strive to bring on board suitable partners to support the DS Committee. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was approached and the formation of a tri-partite partnership between UNDP, the Committee and DCAF was initiated. In 2013, this culminated in the implementation of a workshop for DS Committee members in Istanbul. The purpose was to undertake a self-assessment of capacity and to identify where efforts were needed[1]. While the genesis of this partnership looked promising, unfortunately, DCAF was not able to commit to further activities, although reasons for this were never clearly articulated. It was presumed by UNDP that this was for two reasons. Firstly, that DCAF consistently alerted UNDP to the fact that it would not be able to conduct activities in Baghdad for security reasons, which would have been highly problematic. Secondly, it was thought that perhaps they did not feel that the partnership was gaining the necessary amounts of traction and/or political buy in from the Committee. Again, it should be stressed that these are suppositions from UNDP that were never clearly expressed by DCAF officially.

The newly appointed Head Mr. Hakim al Zamili from the Sadrist bloc has been far more amenable and a number of good meetings have taken place between him and the UNDP Country Director and also on the working level during the concluding parts of the project. This more constructive approach to UNDP relations meant that the first of a series of training programmes, as identified in the 2013 Action Plan was able to take place in the first quarter of 2015. However, for this project, these developments occurred too late in the lifecycle to enable any real and tangible progress. A strong

[1] Self Assessment and Action Plan, as developed by UNDP, DCAF and the DS Committee

mentoring partnership with the DS Committee therefore never really materialised. However, given the existence of the Action Plan and the keenness with which the first training on financial oversight was received, there is scope to build and strengthen these relations in the future and Phase II should seek to do this.

Relations with the Al Nahrain Centre were always very positive if not particularly fruitful. The major obstacle for progress during the lifecycle of the project was the lack of a Director General for the Centre. Whilst a suitable candidate, Dr Taleb al Hamdani, was finally appointed in January 2014, his tenure was characterised by long-term sick leave, which he took out of country, returning only at the end of 2014. It was therefore not possible to initiate any capacity building efforts in the absence of a strategic decision maker. In early 2015, he was replaced by Hamza Shareef, the main interlocutor in the ONSA. UNDP was however able to conduct a needs assessment of the Centre and the Roadmap of Activities that was subsequently developed will comprise a major component of the Second Phase of the Support to SSR Project.

Throughout the lifecycle of the project, various attempts were made by UNDP to initiate effective strategic partnerships for the Centre. Examples included efforts to partner the Centre with Chatham House, with the Royal United Services Institute and with the French Institut National des Hautes Etudes de la Securite et de la Justice. However, these attempts were not successful mostly as a result of the fact that the ANCSS did not have the capacity, research or otherwise, to be able to offer a viable framework for either academic/research exchange or joint research pieces. Sustained delivery of institutional capacity building to create an enabling institutional architecture for the Centre's research unit was a pre-requisite for this to happen, however, without strategic leadership or the presence of a Director, efforts to initiate this would have been futile.

During the final quarter of the project, when the DG had returned from his bout of ill health, UNDP was able to move forward with the recruitment of an expert who would conduct a needs assessment and capacity building roadmap for the ANCSS. Dr Ann Livingstone had been the Director of the Pearson Centre for Peacekeeping Studies in Ottawa and was able to offer a huge wealth of experience in developing both the institutional and research capacities of research centres and policy institutes in both developed and developing countries. Her relationship with the Centre's staff, as well as with the Deputy Security Adviser, was extremely good from the outset and she was able to develop a sound assessment, which was approved by the ONSA, and an action plan for future activities in the short, medium and long-term.[2] The Centre has consistently articulated its strong desire in continuing the partnership with Dr Livingstone in order that she may implement the capacity building activities listed in the Roadmap.

In summary, whilst the partnerships for two out of the three were perhaps not able to deliver to the full extent that had been hoped for, it was able to lay down the foundations and early phases of some promising mentorship programmes. Phase II should seek to capitalise on this.

2. Sustainability

UNDP's main thrust of activities during Phase I centred on the provision of capacity building to representatives of Government and the Iraqi civil service. With regards to the development of the National Security Strategy, the Senior Adviser on SSR, Robert Gordon, was asked by the GoI to target the mentorship programme at two specific groups over the course of the strategy development phase, namely the Review and Evaluation Team, whose job it was to conduct a full review and critique of the outdated US-developed NSS, and the Analysis and Drafting Team, who were provided with the findings of the R&E Team and were then expected to proceed with drafting the new NSS. In

[2] Needs Assessment and Capacity Building Action Plan for the ANCSS

reality, these two groups contained many of the same individuals, however the deliverables of the groups were different.

Capacity building focused on a number of key points, which included instruction on the conduct of root cause analyses, structured risk assessments, threat assessments and consultation processes. The mentorship programme was designed based on a learn through doing modality centred on intensive 5-10 day working sessions with the Senior Adviser and then periods whereby the groups had to work independently to produce assessments, analyses or drafts during the Adviser's absence from Baghdad. The next working session would then serve both as a way to review the product and further develop it etc. The sustainability factor stemmed from the assertion that the Teams would continue to be convened after the development of the NSS draft and during the subsequent routine reviews. In this way, the guidance, mentorship and capacity would be sustained. This has happened and more importantly, the change over within the team has been minimal meaning that the capacity developed continues to be applied.

UNDP did at various points attempt to ensure sustainability by encouraging members of the R&E and A&D Teams, who for the mostpart consisted of senior ranking officials, mostly Director General or equivalent, to bring with them more junior counterparts who could benefit from the training. Despite the ONSA advocating for this, it did not gain traction.

Sustainability in terms of the proposed training for parliamentarians was identified quite early on as being potentially problematic, given the frequent change-over of MPs. UNDP thus sought to encourage the participation of the permanent staff of the DS Committee to ensure continuity. Ultimately, as a result of only being able to conduct one training activity during the project given the constraining strategic environment, this did not present such a major issue.

Management effectiveness review

1. Timely delivery of outputs

The project had one output: to ensure that 'the reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards', which was supposed to be delivered by the end of December 2014. Given that this 'output' is not easy to measure, it is perhaps expedient to use the key activities as more quantifiable and measurable benchmarks against which one can assess the timeliness of delivery, in line with the targets outlined in the project document.

1) Development of the NSS through a participatory approach

Target: A national security strategy is developed through a participatory process: - ***By 31/12/2013 the National Security Strategy is drafted***

The target date was in hindsight unrealistic. This was not only due to the amount of capacity building work that needed to be undertaken to enable the development of a first draft, but also due to the time needed to conduct a national security review, to ensure sufficient consultations both governmental and non-governmental, and to allow for the necessary reviews and redrafts that were inherent within the process. In addition, the elections, which temporarily diminished the momentum, followed by the security crisis added extra delays and revisions. However, despite this a first draft was developed in early 2014 but this was just the beginning of the iterative process needed to fine-tune.

A three-month no-cost extension was granted to allow for additional consultations. The project end date was thus 31 March 2015. At the time of project close, a good solid draft had been developed. The President had seen it and approved, the NSC at Deputies had approved and the PM was reviewing it. It had not however been officially endorsed.

2) The strengthening of parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector in direct support of the production of the NSS

Target: Number of consultations held between the ONSA and the D&S committee members during the national security strategy development process and number of public hearings held by the D&S committee - *By 01/07/2013, a minimum of 3 consultations have been held and by 31/12/2013 at least three additional public hearings have been held on security related issues*

Two consultations between the ONSA and the DS Committee on the development of the NSS were held over 2013 and 2014. Additionally, one written submission was provided by the DS Committee to the ONSA which provided comments and recommendations on the draft NSS. In fairness to the ONSA, they attempted a number of additional consultations with the DS Committee, however, during the previous administration, the political will on the other side for closer coordination and cooperation seemed to be lacking. One public hearing was held in September 2014 by the newly formed committee on security (security commanders) to take stock of reasons that led to the situation in Saqlawlah and Alsger in Anbar province and the reasons for the delay in providing necessary support . Three public hearings took place in January, February and March to discuss with Nineveh Provincial Council members regarding local security situation and measures to liberate areas under ISIS control; to discuss the law of INIS and hosted by the Director Generals of both the legal and Administrative Directorates of Iraqi National Intelligence Services (INIS); to discuss pensions of millitary personnel hosted by the National Retirement Directorate respectively,

3) The enhancement of the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development

Target: Number of researches and studies conducted - *By 30/09/2014, a minimum of 10 research papers/studies have been produced by the ONSA*

The ANCSS over the course of the project has produced a number of studies, mostly through publication, both online and in hardcopy, of the ANCSS journals. These include: Two journals on *Rumors and the Psychological Warfare*; and *Terrorism, Daesh as an example;* 34 studies were conducted covering topics several topics including ISIS and Terrorism, Regional Countries affairs, Budget Deficit, Political affairs in Turkey, US-SAUDI Relations, Iraqi-Turkish relations, Iraqi-Kuwaiti Relations, Iranian-Turkish Relations, Security Food, Transparency, Human Rights in Iraq, Military Spending in the world for year 2014, The People's Protection Units of the Kurds in Syria, and others; and Nine Books addressing number of topics including Good Citizenship, The Perversion of Youth, Art of Criticism, Elements of Awareness and Foresight, Environment Protection, The Spirit of Tolerance, Violence and Peace and The Art of Dealing with Society, Moderation is the way.

2. Cost-effective use of inputs

This project made every effort to address a balance for cost effectiveness. This balance included the building of ownership in relation to inputs, deliverables and sustainability. Staff costs were shared with other projects in the portfolio, which was cost effective and broadened skill sets.

III. Project results summary

The project, as stated in the 2012 project document[3] had one output, which was to ensure that 'the reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards'. This was to be achieved through the accomplishment of three 'key activities' as outlined in the agreed project document, namely: the development of the NSS through a participatory

[3] Project Document, Support to SSR

approach; the strengthening of parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector in direct support of the production of the NSS; and the enhancement of the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development.

1 Development of the NSS through a participatory approach
   - 1.1 Framework for technical assistance and joint work plan developed and agreed between UNDP and the GoI/ONSA
   - 1.2 National Security Sector Review Process developed and agreed
   - 1.3 National Threat Assessment developed to inform a new NSS
   - 1.4 Victimisation survey conducted and launched
   - 1.5 NSS produced that adheres to best practices and human rights principles

2 The strengthening of parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector in direct support of the production of the NSS
   - 2.1 Support to CoR Security and Defence Committee to build their capacity to conduct effective over-sight and ensure democratic accountability of the security services in a manner that enhances national security and democratic support for the security services

3 The enhancement of the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development
   - 3.1 Think tank established under the ONSA with capacity to support the formation of the new NSS
   - 3.2 Communication and knowledge transfer networks established with non-governmental security policy institutes and university research centres
   - 3.3 Enhanced capacity in non-government security policy institutes and research centres at universities to support government security research requirements

Development of the NSS Through a Participatory Approach

- 1.1 Framework for technical assistance and joint work plan developed and agreed between UNDP and the GoI/INSA
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- 1.4 Victimisation survey conducted and launched
- 1.5 NSS produced that adheres to best practices and human rights principles

UNDP has a global mandate to support governments in the area of good governance and SSR and has the widest experience of any UN agency in producing policy advice and support to governments on security and defence matters. This expertise is predicated on experience in many countries facing post conflict situations, as is the case in Iraq. Specific advice and support provided by UNDP to the GoI has involved such areas as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), 'mine-action', disaster relief planning, gender awareness, the alleviation of domestic violence, reconciliation and more recently, a wide ranging program of support to capacity building in the Council of Representatives (Parliament).

In the course of these programs, UNDP was able to develop an excellent working relationship with the ONSA and consequently was asked in 2012 by the National Security Advisor's team to consider the provision of capacity building support to his office and the provision of advice in the formulation of a new Iraqi National Security Strategy to replace the expired US version.

In furtherance of that goal, UNDP implemented between June and December 2012 a Project Initiation Plan, aimed primarily at kick starting the development of the NSS and at providing high-

level technical advice and strategic guidance to the ONSA. This was successfully achieved through the following:

- UNDP and the ONSA organized a ***workshop in Istanbul on National Security Strategies*** between 4 and 7 July 2012. The workshop came as a follow up from an earlier workshop conducted in London and Bath in March 2012, done in collaboration with the Foreign Commonwealth Office. The objective of the Istanbul workshop was to provide staff members of the ONSA and a representative from the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence and Security some insights into different models of national security strategies. This workshop also provided an opportunity for members of the Iraqi delegation to examine the various security challenges faced in Iraq and offered room for discussions with experts from other countries on how potentially Iraq can tackle these challenges in a comprehensive and inclusive new national security strategy that promotes an effective oversight role for Parliament and civil society.
- ***Deployment of a Senior Security Sector Reform Adviser to the ONSA*** (July – December 2012). This consultant worked closely within the ONSA to support the production of a series of notes and guidance and to assist in the preparation and conduct of a series of workshop to lay the foundations for the development of the NSS.
- ***Study tour in France for a number of Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives***.

  During the period 25-30 November 2012, a delegation composed of 5 Iraqi MPs as well as two senior staff from the COR participated to a study tour in France organized jointly between UNDP and the French National Assembly. This visit enabled the Iraqi delegation to learn about the tools and mechanisms in place in the French political system to enable parliamentary oversight of the security sector by the French Parliament.

These activities, which culminated in a national workshop held in Baghdad on 4 and 5 December 2012, proved to be very successful in developing further the trust and relationship between UNDP and the ONSA and also in evidencing the commitment of the GoI towards the development of a national security strategy.

1.1 Framework for technical assistance and joint work plan developed and agreed between UNDP and the GoI/ONSA

UNDP, through the first senior security sector advisor, Phil Wilkinson, and the project team engaged extensively with the ONSA to develop a framework for technical assistance and joint work. This was developed on time during Q2 of 2013. It was presented at a series of conferences and consultations, including at Chatham House, by Hamza Shareef from the ONSA. [4]

1.2 National Security Sector Review Process developed and agreed

In order to develop a coherent and operational NSS, a prior process was foreseen as being necessary. The new National Security Strategy would establish the Government's vision for Iraq's future and provide the framework for the individual strategies of the security and justice ministries, in line with Article 110 of the Constitution:

> *The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following matters; second, formulating and executing national security policy, including establishing and managing armed forces to secure the protection and guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq*.

[4] Annex 4 – the breifing provided by ONSA which highlights the timeframe and technical processes involved in the development of the NSS

With the support of UNDP's first senior adviser, Phil Wilkinson, who worked closely with the ONSA until his departure from UNDP in May 2013, a National Security Sector Review Process was developed and preliminarily agreed with ONSA.[5] The process called for a comprehensive national assessment of existing ministerial policies and a projection of the future security environment and challenges. The purpose of the national security review was therefore to assess existing policies in order to identify deficiencies and where necessary to provide a new overarching policy framework that will direct and inform new more cost effective ministerial policies and security strategies for the future.

This process was tasked to the Review and Evaluation (RE) Team, established in June 2013, who represented a cross section of roughly 15 ministries and agencies, including MFA, ONSA, MoI, MoD, Counter Terrorism Service, Ministry of Electricity, Ministry for Oil, Prime Minister's Advisory Council, General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers (COMSEC), Ministry for Women's Affairs, Ministry for Water Resources, ANCSS, Ministry of Planning, Iraqi National Intelligence Services, General Authority for the Kurdish Regional Government. By this time, Phil Wilkinson had left and so it was left to the incumbent SSR Adviser, Robert Gordon, to steer and mentor them through the process.

In addition to shaping ministerial security related policies, another more direct purpose of the review was articulated as to identify existing missions and roles across the security sector and analyse force structures, equipment, weapon systems and resources in the performance of those roles against those threats identified in a national threat assessment. This element of the NSR was never undertaken as there was not enough political will under the Maliki regime to undergo such a potentially sensitive review process. Indeed, it is unlikely that even with the new administration in place that such an initiative to 'bear all' would be fully embraced for fear of political capture.

The Al Nahrain Centre staff minuted the meetings of the R&E Team to review the existing strategies and to analyse accordingly. The project had impact both in developing the capacity of the group in terms of analyzing and synthesizing information and data from existing strategies and policies. The ONSA was also able to demonstrate its effectiveness as a convening power in the regular weekly meetings that it called for the Team. R&E Team efforts culminated in a draft report in early August 2013, which was finalised in early September, in keeping with the foreseen deadlines, and which was then submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) at Deputies level. It was endorsed in late September 2013.

1.3 National Threat Assessment developed to inform a new NSS

Whilst it was the R&E Team who were responsible for mapping and analyzing the existing and relevant policy frameworks and documents that had been prior developed by the GoI, it was the Joint Intelligence and Analysis Centre (JIAC) of the ONSA who was ultimately responsible for developing the national threat assessment.

The process led by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) included consultations with a wide range of stakeholders in different ministries. This assessment was put before the NSC at Deputies level who gave their approval of the assessment in October 2013. It thus went to form a fundamental component of the NSS and the external and internal strategic environment chapters therein.

1.4 Victimisation survey conducted and launched

In 2012, UNDP in collaboration with UN Office for Drugs and Crime and UNAMI's Joint Analysis Unit, formed a partnership with the GoI's Central Statistics Office and also with the Kurdish Regional Statistics Office (KRSO). The aim of the partnership was to realise a nation-wide Crime Victimisation

[5] Annex 5– the National Security Review Process

Survey that would help to fill the information gaps on crime and criminal justice in Iraq that could be used as a starting point for assessing the population's perception of security in Iraq. It was therefore envisaged as supplying an important set of baselines for the development of the NSS as well as providing an invaluable tool to inform the process and engage further government counterparts.

During the course of the project, UNDP, alongside UNODC and JAU were able to provide technical support on the design of the questionnaire and of the sample, training and capacity building, quality assurance on fieldwork and data etc. This was done through a series of workshops, focus groups, technical meetings and training sessions with CSO and KRSO officials.[6] Despite successfully piloting the questionnaire[7] in Qadisiyah, Baghdad and KRG in 2014, the roll-out of the full survey was halted due to the untenable security situations that ensued following the fall of Mosul in June 2014. It was therefore decided to suspend the CVS initiative until such a time as the survey could be implemented in the nation-wide manner in which it had been initially intended. The groundwork has thus been laid for a future roll-out. The data-bases are developed and in place, however, it is possible that additional capacity building and training for those conducting interviews and collecting data will need to be repeated.

1.5 NSS produced that adheres to best practices and human rights principles

The final draft during the project lifecycle was produced on 23 January 2015. Whilst it has been unofficially sanctioned by the President's Office and officially approved by the National Security Council at Deputies level, it has not yet been ultimately endorsed by the National Security Council at Ministers' level. Minor reviews, included structural adjustments and editorial amendments are ongoing.

Series of Consultations and Meetings with Various Stakeholders:

The NSS draft is the product of extensive consultations across government and with civil society and non-governmental components of Iraqi governance structures. Attempts were also made to engage with local government entities although this was marred by the timing, which coincided with the fall of Mosul, after which it was hard to regain momentum in the governmental upheaval that followed.

The AD Team, at the behest of the ONSA and in accordance with the ToRs that UNDP helped to develop, was itself a cross governmental team of people, mainly at DG level. In addition to analyzing the work of the R&E Team, the AD Team's other key mandate was to conduct broad-based consultations with all necessary stakeholders and based on the output of such consultations, to draft the new NSS.

Political will within the ONSA to host a good consultation process was high. They therefore requested that UNDP recruit a public consultations expert, who joined the team in Q4 of 2013.

ONSA counterparts expressed enthusiasm for public consultations, repeatedly stating the desirability of ensuring that the Iraqi public recognised that the NSS is written by Iraqis for Iraqis. As such, ONSA was keen to undertake an even more extensive process than UNDP would otherwise have suggested.

At the heart of the public consultations process lay the idea of the public release of the draft NSS and the allowance of certain period for members of the public to review the document and provide feedback. The process would be supported by a number of other efforts aimed at increasing awareness of the NSS. These efforts would include:

[6] See final progress report for the CVS at Annex 6

[7] Final questionnaire at Annex 7

- Consultations with non-governmental organisations and civil society undertaken by ONSA;
- Public discussion of the draft NSS on TV through news programmes and interviews;
- Dissemination of the draft NSS through a website and through social media;
- Holding of workshops with public experts regarding certain themes within the NSS

Unfortunately, during the first half of 2014 the drafting process was faced with several delays and the public consultations were set back several times to allow for the first draft to be completed. Subsequently, ONSA felt that public consultations would not be appropriate in the period just prior to and just after the national elections.

In early June, the intention was to hold the public consultations as soon as possible after the formation of the new Government. Also planned for June, was a small grant scheme in which local CSOs would be required to conduct small focus groups across the country to raise awareness on the NSS and to get public views on the document. A call for proposals was circulated in April 2014 in this context.

With the fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014 and the quick advances made by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the security environment in Iraq underwent a sudden and significant shift. Over the following months, as the AD team undertook an extensive effort to redraft the NSS in response, public consultations were necessarily delayed.

During a review of the new draft of the NSS in Amman in late September, ONSA staff expressed a desire to undertake a public consultations process, albeit with a reduced scope compared with previous intentions.

Staff within ONSA demonstrated recognition of the value that public consultations can add to the drafting process and to the overall success of the NSS. Over the course of 2014, they also showed a willingness to undertake the process that exceeded the expectations of UNDP. Nevertheless, consultations dropped in terms of priority since June 2014, with the focus being on simply getting the document out.

Unfortunately, it remained the case that ONSA did not necessarily have the internal practical capacity to undertake a public consultations process. Certain individuals within the office appeared very capable in terms of media management within the Iraqi context and appeared very capable of learning on the job. Nevertheless, there was not much experience regarding the use of public consultations as a mechanism for informing policy formulation. This resulted in a tendency to see public consultations as a public relations exercise rather than a genuine effort to build public ownership in, and enhance the relevance of, the NSS. Other relevant agencies that were expected to bring a more strategic perspective, such as the An-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS), also lacked individuals with the understanding of public consultations.

The ONSA did make good efforts in engaging civil society and non-governmental organisations. In April 2014, a series five 'expert' workshops were held, each focusing on a separate substantive theme within the NSS. The ONSA ensured that representatives from the media, women's rights groups, youth groups, private sector, financial sector and academia were present. In January of 2015, there was also a dedicated event for non-governmental organisations on the NSS. While these served as useful first steps, further concerted efforts would have been of lasting benefit.

Due to public consultations not having been considered as part of the NSS drafting process from the beginning, as well as budget restraints (exacerbated by the inability of the GoI to pass the budget through much of 2014), ONSA also lacked the financial and personnel resources to support a fully-fledged public consultations process. This was clearly demonstrated in the failure to launch the intended social media campaign, which if going to be successful, required a dedicated team of people

to collect inputs, analyse and consolidate for consideration for the NSS. When asked, the ONSA were unable to dedicate staff towards a process, which rendered it unviable. In the end closest that they came was to provide the NSS to the public on the Government websites but with no facility which enabled the public to provide feedback or comment.

Ultimately, without a fully fledged, and funded, capacity-building process having been included from the beginning of the drafting process, the only way to address such capacity issues is to encourage ONSA to go through a public consultations process and ensure they take as much responsibility over the process as possible.

Support to the realization of studies and public surveys to inform the strategy development process:
One of the key targets in line with this activity was the development and launch of the Crime Victimisation Survey, the results of which the previous section describes and accounts for. Additionally, the public consultation strategy, as explained above, had intended to incorporate a series of surveys and questionnaires to the public to elicit some of the basic security perceptions held by the population. Although planned for Q2 of 2014, the GoI decided that the proximity to the elections would run the risk of having the NSS open to political capture and so postponed until June 2014 after they had run their course. However, Mosul prevented this from taking place then. Despite the lack of execution of these initiatives, the experts and consultants were able to work with the GoI in the KRSO, the CSO and the ONSA outreach section to plan and prepare for the implementation. Capacity in these contexts was therefore developed and when the time comes to launch new campaigns during the review of the NSS, the GoI should be well placed to do so.

Provision of high level expertise on specific issues through the recruitment of dedicated expertise:
While, the R&E Team and JIAC were responsible for providing an overview of the existing national security framework and a threat assessment respectively, they were superseded by the Analysis and Development Team in September 2013, whose role it was to analyse the work of the R&E Team, to prioritise the threats as outlined in the threat assessment, to conduct broad-based consultations with all necessary stakeholders and based on the output of such consultations, to draft the new NSS. UNDP support, through the Senior Adviser on SSR, was able to mentor the AD Team in the conduct of a root cause analysis exercise. Consequently, the AD Team worked independently to produce an analysis, which identified and prioritised the current problems facing Iraq, their root causes and plausible interventions that could be used to mitigate and resolve them. This formed the basis of the NSS.

Special out of country sessions with the AD Team occurred on three occasions – one with the whole AD Team in Beirut, which was designed to come up with the implementation matrix NSS – and two small drafting sessions with the Adviser and principle drafters of the AD Team, who number three or four. These out of country sessions proved extremely effective at producing deliverables of good quality and were very useful when extended periods of uninterrupted group efforts were required. They also enabled dedicated mentorship to some of the higher-level members by the Adviser.

Additional expert inputs were provided by the public consultations consultant who worked closely with the ONSA in the development of the outreach process. The activities and planning exercises conducted with them have enabled the ONSA to consider how they will strengthen and implement such processes during future reviews of the NSS. They have since expressed their intention to enact many of the outreach activities during these future NSS reviews.

In an attempt to incorporate a wider review of the NSS, UNDP organised a series of consultations with international experts on the draft NSS in May 2014. Experts included Professor Toby Dodge, LSE Sheelagh Stewart, Director of Governance, RoL and Security, UNDP, Gareth Stansfield, Professor of Middle East Politics and the Al-Qasimi Chair of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, Phil

Wilkinson, former Adviser to ONSA on NSS, Lt.Gen (ret) Jasbir Lida, former UN Force Commander, Sudan.

Additional expert inputs and guidance were provided through two study tours to Chatham House in London, one to the Royal United Services Institute and one to the Institut National des Hautes Etudes de la Securite et de la Justice.

Finally, the UN Inter-agency Task Force on Security Sector Reform travelled to Baghdad in June 2014 for a series of high-level government seminars and engagements on the NSS and SSR more broadly.

The impact of this array of expert engagement was twofold: it enabled the ONSA to cross check the validity and credibility of the draft NSS, which was seen to be sound and also ensured that it was in line with best practices; and it also enabled the genesis of a series of partnerships and working relations between the experts and their Iraqi counterparts with organisations like RUSI stating its interest in developing strategic partnerships and mentorship programmes with the ANCSS.

Provision of technical support and strategic guidance on the conduct of the strategy through the deployment of a senior SSR consultant:

During the initial and planning phases of the SSR Project, UNDP contracted Phil Wilkinson to work as the Senior Adviser on SSR. He was able to develop very good working relationships with the ONSA and the GoI more broadly and was responsible for setting the project up, developing both the overall plan for the NSS development and the National Security Review. He departed UNDP in May 2013 and was succeeded by Maj Gen (Ret) Robert Gordon who took on the role in October 2013.

Robert Gordon too was able to develop excellent relations with his counterparts in the ONSA and began his work mentoring the R&E Team, as described above, before going on to work with the AD Team in the development of the draft NSS.

The way in which the Adviser set up the mentoring process worked well with the AD Team. This comprised of intensive 'working sessions', which were held in and administratively facilitated by the ANCSS. Sessions lasted between 5 and 7 days and key instruction, guidance and technical inputs were provided as to how to conduct various analytical processes. At the end of each session, the AD Team and Adviser would mutually agree a programme of work and the Team would work independently to achieve the outcomes laid out therein. This learn through doing modality was successful and enabled the AD Team to draft documents over which they had total ownership. Fine-tuning would then occur during the next session.

The impact of the Senior Adviser's work was immediately recognized through the fact that the AD Team were able to produce the draft, in addition to undertaking all the analytical processes, threat and structured risk assessments that were required. They also demonstrated, further to several sets of working sessions, that they had a better understanding of how to prioritise the risks in order to identify those which posed the most immediate risk to Iraqi stability and security.

Strengthening of Parliament and Civilian Oversight of Security Sector in Support of NSS

2.1 Support to CoR Security and Defence Committee to build their capacity to conduct effective over-sight and ensure democratic accountability of the security services in a manner that enhances national security and democratic support for the security services

Efforts with the Defence and Security Committee were challenging and the project delivered results that fell shy of what had initially been foreseen in the activities of the project document. This was mainly due to a number of challenges, firstly, the former Iraqi administration had created an environment where parliamentary capacity and oversight was severely restricted. There was thus little interest from the DS Committee to engage in efforts to strengthen oversight mechanisms. Secondly, the elections, which took place in April 2014, drew much of the focus for the first half of 2014 and the security and political crises that ensued meant that the Head of the Committee was not appointed until November 2014, rendering it impossible to conduct activities before this. Consequently, activities were only able to commence in the first quarter of 2015.

Provision of high-level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the D&S Committee of the CoR (institutional contract with international NGO)

Early on in the project, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was identified by UNDP as being a sound potential partner for the DS Committee with whom a long-lasting mentorship programme could be developed through a tri-partite agreement. DCAF's strong global legacy in supporting parliaments in security sector reform has provided critical information on best practices and lessons learned and made it an obvious choice for such a partnership. After initial discussions, in December 2013, UNDP organised a workshop in Istanbul with both DCAF and the DS Committee.

The objective of this workshop was to exchange views on how to best advance the cooperation between the Council of Representatives, UNDP and DCAF, and to discuss avenues for assessing practical needs and expectations and exploring the potential for the tripartite cooperation on strengthening the role of parliament in Iraq's security sector governance. As a result of the Workshop, a basic needs assessment was conducted and an Action Plan developed, reviewed and agreed by the Committee. This was due to form the basis for future activities. As already mentioned, however, elections and the security crisis played major roles in severely hampering the Committee's ability or willingness to engage seriously with this.

Furthermore, and as has already been discussed in previous sections, DCAF was unable to commit to a longer-term partnership with UNDP and/or the Committee. Meaningful engagement with DCAF therefore ceased.

Further potential partners for mentorship were never identified by UNDP as the election period merged into one of extreme security crisis, it was seen as being an unfeasible time to initiate such a relationship.

Exchange of experience with relevant National Parliaments:

During the inception phase, a delegation of 5 Iraqi MPs as well as two senior staff from the Council of Representatives travelled to Paris in jointly organised trip by UNDP and the French National Assembly. The purpose of the trip was to enable the Iraqi delegation to learn about the tools and mechanisms in place in the French political system to enable parliamentary oversight of the security sector by the French Parliament.

However, given that the Parliament in France has relatively limited oversight capacities (compared to other parliament elsewhere in the world) and also that the legislative function is still very much controlled by the executive (as evidence by the number of laws adopted originating from the Government as opposed to those originating from the parliament or by the fact that the executive mostly controls the "order du jour" of the parliament), France did not perhaps constitute the best partner for the DS Committee representatives. The partnership was thus not pursued further.

In December 2014, the UK under its own initiative, set up meetings between the DS Committee and the House of Commons Defence Committee, who visited Baghdad as part of its Iraq Inquiry.

On site trainings/capacity development sessions for members of the DS Committee:
Again, after the Action Plan development in December 2013, the election cycle and the security situation meant delays to the implementation of the training sessions. After consultation between UNDP and the DS Committee, it was made clear that the priority for the Committee was capacity building aimed at improving financial oversight of the security sector. Consequently, UNDP set up a workshop in Amman in March 2015 that brought together representatives from the DS Committee, the Finance Committee, the Integrity Committee and parliamentary Financial Experts to improve their understanding of the roles, responsibilities and processes involved in financial oversight of the security sector. There was an extremely keen interest in this initiative and UNDP had to expand the number of participants due to over subscription and a request from the CoR counterparts.

During the workshop, it was clear that there was much enthusiasm although little existing subject matter knowledge from the parliamentarians. Whilst they were aware of the processes in general, understanding on how to execute such processes, such as financial reporting and review for example, were lacking. The Workshop provided a sound introduction, but it was clear that further workshops with expanded participation would be of great benefit in the future.

Unfortunately, in light of the fact that this only took place so late in the project, no follow up could take place and it was impossible to either monitor the impact that such a workshop had or to build on the expertise shared to ensure that it could be practically applied.

Results in relation to target (By 01/07/2013, a minimum of 3 consultations (between ONSA and Committee on the NSS) have been held and by 31/12/2013 at least three additional public hearings have been held on security related issues):
Clearly the target deadlines were far exceeded. There was also underperformance on achieving the targets identified. Firstly, while there were two consultations conducted between the ONSA and the DS Committee and whilst the Committee was able to provide written comments and recommendations, which were incorporated into the NSS, more never materialized. This was despite the best efforts of the ONSA who attempted on numerous occasions to invite the DS Committee to meet with them, however, during the Maliki regime, there was little interest on the part of the Committee. After the inauguration of the new Committee Head, there were causes for cautious optimism and the first semi public hearing on national security was held in September 2014. One public hearing was held in September 2014 to learn the facts and reasons behind the security breach that led to situation in Saqlawiyah and Alsger in Anbar and was hosted by the security commanders. This was followed by a special parliamentary committee established and chaired by the head of Security and Defense Parliamentary Committee to investigate the fall of Mosul and the parliamentary question session for the army commanders in December 2014.

The Enhancement of the Research and Analytical Capacities of the ANCSS

3.1 Think tank established under the ONSA with capacity to support the formation of the new NSS
3.2 Communication and knowledge transfer networks established with non-governmental security policy institutes and university research centres
3.3 Enhanced capacity in non-government security policy institutes and research centres at universities to support government security research requirements

Relations with the ANCSS were always highly positive, if not particularly fruitful. The major obstacle for progress during the lifecycle of the project was the lack of a Director General for the Centre. Whilst a suitable candidate, Dr Taleb al Hamdani, was finally appointed in January 2014, his tenure was characterised by long-term sick leave, which he took out of country, returning only at the end of 2014. It was therefore not possible to initiate any capacity building efforts in the absence of a strategic decision maker. In early 2015, he was replaced by Hamza Shareef, the main interlocutor in the ONSA. UNDP was however able to conduct a needs assessment of the Centre and the Roadmap of Activities that was subsequently developed will comprise a major component of the Second Phase of the Support to SSR Project.

3.1 Think Tank established under the ONSA with capacity to support the formation of the new NSS

The Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies was officially established on 18 June 2012 prior to the start date of this project, however efforts and activities within the Centre did not commence until 2013. From the outset, it has been structured as an independent government institution and is managed by the Chancellery of the National Security Adviser. The ANCSS, as per its mission statement and vision, is focused on acting as a platform for discussions and analysis relevant to government policies and strategies, especially with regard to the national security and avail to decision makers. Through convening workshops, seminars, conferences and studies in collaboration with a range of like-minded institutions (universities, regional and international centres), as well as developing relationships with subject matter experts, the ANCSS is designed to provide impartial policy analysis and evidence-based research in support of the decision makers in the GoI. As the ANCSS had been established before the project commenced, UNDP focused its efforts on ensuring that the capacity was there to enable it to establish its activities and support the NSS.

The Al Nahrain was able to play a vital role in providing the operational support necessary to develop the NSS. All meetings, conferences and workshops pertaining to the NSS process were held in the Centre and the staff were able to provide the administrative support inherent within these activities. It was also important to involve the ANCSS researchers in the drafting process to not only build their capacity but also to attempt to ensure that the ANCSS become the repository of institutional memory for future such processes. Some ANCSS staff did play a key role in driving the substantive aspects of the NSS agenda with one senior researcher being made responsible for one of the thematic clusters.

For reasons already explained, the desired degree and extent of dedicated capacity building provided by UNDP was never fully realized and activities in this context did not commence until late in the project. A weakness in both the institutional and research capacity of the ANCSS had been identified early on in the engagement. Despite having identified a suitable expert in mid 2014 who was willing and able to engage in a mentorship and capacity building programme with the Centre, it was not until early 2015, with the official appointment of the new Director General of the Centre, that this individual could be brought on board. Dr Ann Livingstone was able to travel to Baghdad twice during the final quarter of the programme and spent a total of 3 and a half weeks in country working closely with the administrative and research teams of the Centre, as well as consulting with the Deputy National Security Adviser to get a clear picture of the ONSA's vision for the Centre. The result was a detailed needs assessment and a roadmap of activities.

3.2 Communication and knowledge transfer networks established with non-governmental security policy institutes and university research centres

Over the course of the project, a number of attempts were made to develop strategic partnerships between the ANCSS and other non-government policy institutes, including Chatham House, RUSI, Al Ahram Center for Strategic Studies in Egypt, Exeter University etc. While there was mutual interest, ultimately, the lack of strategic direction and an official leader within the Centre in addition to issues such as the Centre's lack of a website or sound institutional architecture meant that negotiations never got past the initial phases.

In order to bolster the ANCSS visibility within Iraq and to enable the development of links with local partners, UNDP worked with the ANCSS to initiate a series of twice monthly 'brown bag lunch' policy networking events. The overarching objective was to bring together relevant academics, policy makers and subject matter experts on a regular basis to discuss key topics of interest and to develop policy recommendations or guidance, where appropriate. The initiative was warmly received by the ANCSS and a number of such events were organised that focused on the problem of IDPs and ISIS, the fourth generation of al- Qaida.

3.3 Enhanced capacity in non-government security policy institutes and research centres at universities to support government security research requirements

The brown bag lunch initiative, as outlined in the above section, was designed to enhance the capacity not just of the ANCSS, but of the other participating representatives from universities, policy institutes and think tanks within Baghdad who worked on topics relevant to national security. In addition to this, UNDP and the ONSA reached out to academics and other policy research institutes during the development of the NSS. Consequently, there were two representatives, one from the University of Suleymaniya and another from Baghdad University in the AD Team. Academic institutes and policy centres who worked on security-related issues were also invited to consult on the NSS and in this way were able to feed into the process.

Target:
By 30/09/2014, a minimum of 10 research papers/studies have been produced by the ONSA
While the deadline for this target was missed, by the end of the project in March 2015, 34 studies had been produced by the ONSA. These were made public both on the ANCSS website and in hardcopy with the ANCSS Journal.

IV. Project implementation challenges

Project Risks and Actions

The following key project risks have been observed over the project implementation lifecycle. A brief description is presented on the response and actions taken by UNDP Iraq to manage the risks.

1) Risk that elections in early 2014 will slow the progress and that a new government may not be supportive of the NSS development process or any outputs:
In order to maximise the likelihood of endorsement of the NSS by possible new administrations, UNDP continued to emphasise the importance of broad based consultations and an inclusive, participatory dynamic as being fundamental to the development of such a strategy. This approach would serve to minimise the likelihood of the current administration being seen as the sole owner of the output, thereby increasing its legitimacy in the eyes of future administrations.

2) Inability of implementing partners to engage in a timely way, thereby causing unnecessary delays to the achievement of project targets and objectives:
Attempts to mitigate concerns over DCAF's ability and willingness to operate in Baghdad were made through engaging at the senior levels, with UNDP Country Director meeting with the DCAF Regional Director in Geneva. Attempts to identify other potential partners by UNDP were initiated but were ultimately unsuccessful

3) Sustained UN absence from Baghdad in the wake of June 2014 will continue to pose challenges to the management of the project and to recruitment and engagement of consultants and high-level experts and thereby delivery of Objectives 2 & 3 :

UNDP was able to take the necessary actions to initiate remote management mechanisms to enable the continuation of the project. A series of out of country activities were convened with the GoI to sustain capacity building efforts. Increased reliance on UNDP national project officer also ensured that the day-to-day meetings with the GoI were undertaken.

V. Lessons learnt

During the lifecycle of this project multiple lessons were learned many of which have resulted in recommendations that could be taken into account during Phase II of the Support to Security Sector Reform project.

- Over-reliance on one interlocutor within GoI

Whilst the partnership between UNDP and the ONSA was excellent, it became clear that the very small team responsible for SSR efforts were being utilised by the GoI for a large number of other key national initiatives. The amount of time that they had to dedicate to SSR was therefore variable. Moreover, with such a small team being responsible for driving so many critical initiatives within Government, there is the danger of creating a 'single point of failure' environment where everything rides on one or two individuals. To mitigate against this in the future, UNDP should strongly advocate to the GoI for a more even delegation of tasks, spread across more individuals within each ministry. Furthermore, UNDP could do more to focus on creating equally positive relations with other ministries responsible for national security instead of relying on those in the ONSA alone.

- UN national staff to play a larger role in the delivery of training and capacity building

The crisis of June 2014 and the subsequent evacuation/relocation of international UN staff from Baghdad made it clear that in addition to invoking remote management mechanisms, greater focus needs to be paid to enabling UNDP national project staff to deliver capacity building activities to government partners. This is particularly important in a volatile security environment where deteriorations can occur quickly and dramatically. Better efforts could therefore be taken to ensure that UNDP national staff are provided with training and expertise development that could enable them to play a greater role in this context.

- Appreciation of the need for capacity building at the tactical level for GoI counterparts

There is often the expectation that projects should seek to deliver training and capacity building at a strategic level on the assumption that basic, more tactical capacity is existing. In many instances over the lifespan of this project, this assumption was proved to be incorrect. A couple of examples are as follows: the researchers in the ANCSS, most of whom have masters and/or doctorates, were presumed to have a basic analytical and research capacity, however, when requested to undertake a small and simple written exercise, it became immediately clear that this was lacking. Capacity building will therefore have to take this into account and will need to focus on the most basic of trainings, for example, what is a research paper versus a policy document etc,. Another example was when consulting on the NSS, it was presumed that there would be an understanding of the concept of a strategy, what a strategy is supposed to do and the sort of content to be found therein. This was not the case and a considerable amount of time over the course of the whole project was spent talking to GoI counterparts on exactly this. The same was absolutely true during the public and NGO consultations where this topic was the focus for a large chunk of each discussion. During Phase II, it would therefore be sage to take this into account when identifying outputs to ensure that they are realistic and consistent with the situation on the ground and to ensure that the consultants and experts engaged are able to deliver their training accordingly and with this in mind.

- Diversification of partnerships for GoI

In hindsight, it is clear that the project could have benefited from a more geographically and regionally diverse array of partners for GoI counterparts, in the development of the NSS, for the DS Committee and for the ANCSS. Many, if not all of the partners identified were Western European. Whilst there is no denying that these countries have a wealth of expertise, this over reliance on Western models is perhaps not best placed to support a country like Iraq in developing its own mechanisms and SSR processes. Possible examples for future efforts could include Indonesia, East Timor, South Africa, the Balkans, particularly BiH.

- Greater number of more regular steering committees

Over the project only two steering committee meetings were held. More regular and frequent committee meetings would have been of great benefit. A number of fairly seismic shifts have occurred in the Iraq context since the project document was developed in mid 2012. The project would therefore have benefitted from updating the project document to reflect the new realities on the ground. The project could then have been more responsive to these new situations, as appropriate. During Phase II, this should be a key commitment from all partners.

VI. Financial statement

The certified financial closure report of UNDP will be forthcoming in line with UNDP financial rules and regulations and the closure of the financial year 2015. A draft will be submitted in due course.

VII. Recommendations

In addition to the recommendations in Section V, the overarching recommendation for this project is that Phase II should seek to continue in the efforts that were started in Phase I.

VII Annexes

ANNEX 1:
Self Assessment and Action Plan, as developed by UNDP, DCAF and the DS Committee, developed in Istanbul Workshop, December 2013

ANNEX 2:
Needs Assessment and Capacity Building Action Plan for the ANCSS

ANNEX 3:
2012 Project Document

ANNEX 4:
ONSA Briefing

Annex 5:
National Security Review Process

Annex 6:
Crime Victimization Survey Final Progress Update

Annex 7:
Crime Victimization Survey Final Questionnaire

ANNEX 1 – DS Committee Action Plan, December 2013

Root Causes	**Domain of Committee Activity**	**Proposed Area of Possible Support by UNDP and DCAF**
1. Executive interference in oversight functions 2. Internal political discord (incl. politicization of COR staff) 3. Limited access to information 4. Limited technical skills 5. Legacies of previous authoritarian regime 6. Pervasive insecurity 7. The staffers appointed are on basis of political quotas	1. Summons & Hearings	1.1 Training on preparation, conduct, and follow- up on hearings and summons including analysis of SOPs 1.2 Training the administrative staff on information management and reporting skills 1.3 Training the administrative staff on report writing (both qualitative and quantitative aspects), legal and procedural foundations
	2. Investigations	2.1 Training the legal staff on preparation and conduct of investigation, including analysis of SOPs and field visit proceedings 2.2 Training the legal and administrative staff on preparation the quarterly and annual reports (both qualitative and quantitative aspects) 2.3 Recommending best practices for specialized committee staff to liaise with relevant authorities and ministries
	3. Financial Oversight	3.1 Training the advisors on budget planning, review, and oversight
1. Internal political discord (incl. politicization of COR staff) 2. Limited access to information 3. Limited technical skills 4. Legacies of previous authoritarian regime 5. Pervasive insecurity 6.	4. Participation in policy making processes	4.1 Promoting and supporting the participation of the D&S Committee in National Security Strategy (development especially defining national security threats, and the role, size and purpose of the security forces)
	5. Access to Information Law	5.1 Providing best international practice in balancing national security interests and the right to access information 5.2 Promote and support the ratification of the pending Access to Information Law
	6. Research and Analysis	6.1 Providing expert consultant to technically assist the review and drafting of security legislation 6.2 Enhancing access to and awareness of security sector related legislation 6.3 Supporting partnership with relevant institutions (both locally and internationally) including universities, CSOs, and think tanks
	7. Review of national legislation and peace agreements	7.1 Training for legal staff on legislative drafting 7.2 Providing technical consultants for developing pending legislation
Same as above	8. Complaint Filing	8.1 Providing consultant expert to analyze existing complaint system 8.2 Clarifying of SOPs (criteria, referral, reporting, monitoring) 8.3 Support for public communication strategy

ANNEX 2 – Needs Assessment for ANCSS, March 2015

Needs Assessment for the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies

Report to UNDP and ANCSS

23 March 2015

Ann Livingstone, Ph.D., UNDP Consultant

Introduction

A needs assessment is defined as '…a well-thought-out and impartial systematic effort to collect objective data or information that brings to light or enhances understanding of the need for services or programs'.[8] In the case of the Al –Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS), the needs assessment focused on the following:

- Output 1: Development of a comprehensive Needs Assessment of the ANCSS: 'will include details of the current research, institutional, financial and human resources capacity that is existing within the Centre'.
- Output 2: Production of a plan of action for the ANCSS, to be developed in close coordination with the ANCSS Director and the ONSA: 'will include prioritised activities, trainings and/or other initiatives that can be undertaken in the short, medium and long-term to support the capacity development of the ANCSS. Ideally, such a plan would also include indicative timelines for implementation'.[9]

This assessment was identified as a requirement by the ONSA and UNDP during the course of the First Phase of the Support to Security Sector Reform project. In order to conduct such an exercise, UNDP provided a senior expert to work closely with the ANCSS and ONSA to design a needs assessment based on a participatory process that began with initial discussions and the formulation of an implementation plan. The findings of the assessment and recommendations are laid out in this document.

The ultimate objective of the needs assessment is to provide a foundational understanding of issues that will affect the ability of the ANCSS to meet its strategic and operational objectives and to make recommendations regarding the institution's next steps.

Methodology

The needs assessment was designed using a qualitative assessment method based on interviews, review of documents such as the National Security Strategy, the founding Mission and Vision document of the ANCSS and the United Nations Development Program Phase Two of the Support to Security Sector Reform Project document.

During the conducting of the needs assessment in Baghdad, the UNDP consultant was in regular contact with the Director-General of the ANCSS and also met with the Deputy Director of the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) to provide updates on the progress as a means of ensuring transparency and accountability. The UNDP Project Manager was briefed on a daily basis.

Individual interviews were conducted with thirteen (13) personnel, ranging from entry level researchers to the heads of sections and senior management (see Annex 1 for the questionnaire). Interviewees were informed that the interviews were confidential, and that neither their names, positions, nor other identifying characteristics would be shared with anyone. Equally, their comments were to be frank and honest, with the commitment that their responses and shared

[8] Soriano, Fernando. 2013. *Conducting Needs Assessments: a multidisciplinary approach*, 2nd edition (London: Sage Publications), p. 5.

[9] Based on the Terms of Reference from UNDP

opinions would be considered confidential. Consolidation of common themes, comments, and ideas were used to create the analysis; those comments that were uniquely solitary were also acknowledged.

All notes taken during the interviews by the UNDP Consultant and/or the interpreters are retained by the UNDP Consultant.

Interpreters were vitally important in the interviewing process, and the UNDP consultant benefitted from having their excellent service for the interviews, as well as for translating documents. The interpreters also assisted in ensuring that good practices relative to cultural sensitivity and awareness were maintained during the interview process.

An additional joint meeting with the research staff and the research section heads provided an opportunity to observe the interactions between staff and their immediate supervisors. The questions posed to the staff were focused on specific research approaches, terminology, activities, and outputs such as reports, seminar documents, conference reports, etc. and will provide data on knowledge and skills specific to research methodologies. The response(s) will also provide a baseline for how the ANCSS staff defines terms and processes used in conducting their daily work. Further, it was an opportunity to observe gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivities between and amongst the researchers and their unit heads.

In addition to interviews, the review of documents provided background information regarding the creation of the ANCSS, its mission and vision, as well as initial strategic objectives.

Background

In 2004, under Coalition Provisional Order 68, the National Security Council (NSC) was created. Its principal role was to serve as the body that could facilitate and coordinate national security policy among and between ministries and agencies of the Government of Iraq (GoI). The chair of the NSC is the Prime Minister; the National Security Advisor is the primary advisor to the Ministerial Committee on National Security, and is charged with national security policy development and leading the coordination of key stakeholders.

The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a strong working relationship beginning in 2012. Together, they have been engaged in the development of a new National Security Strategy (NSS); the leadership of the ONSA in the development of the NSS is a clear indication of its convening authority, as well as its ability to build participatory processes that are inclusive, transparent and accountable. As a result, the ONSA is viewed as a critical partner in the NSS development process; an additional indicator of its importance is the fact that the leadership of H.E. Faleh al Fayaddh was maintained during the recent change of government.

During 2012, the emphasis on the Rule of Law was highlighted by the agreement with the GoI that UNDP, in close partnership with the ONSA, would support building the '…capacity of relevant institutions for research and analysis related to national security' (UNDP Report). From 2013-2014, one of the three project objectives focused on developing '…the capacity of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS) to deliver high-quality and independent research on issues of strategic importance to the GoI, to inform security policy and to guide decision makers on questions related to security in this and future administrations'.[10]

On 17 June 2012, the ANCSS was established by the NSC. It is structured as an independent government institution and is managed by the Chancellery of the National Security Adviser. The ANCSS is focused on acting as a "platform for discussions and analysis relevant to government policies and strategies, especially with regard to the national security and avail to decision makers[11] (see Annex 2). Through convening workshops, seminars, conferences and studies in collaboration with a range of like-minded institutions (universities, regional and international centres), as well as developing relationships with subject matter experts, the ANCSS is designed to

[10] UNDP Security Sector Reform Project, 2013-2017, pg. 7

[11] See About the Centre (Vision and Mission) document; see Annex 2

provide impartial policy analysis and evidence-based research in support of the decision makers in the GoI. The ANCSS organogram/structure is located in Annex 3.

There is little debate among the international community that think tanks and policy institutes are of critical importance to countries emerging from conflict. These institutions have the ability to serve as a platform for political dialogue and debate within and between government bodies, as well as to provide a mechanism by which civil society can also engage in the creation of a new social contract between the government and the governed. Given the priority requirement to conduct impartial evidence-based research and policy analysis, there is the expectation that the transparency and accountability in the work of the think tank/institution will enhance public trust and the confidence necessary for institutions of government to be credible and sustainable.

Think tanks and policy institutes tend to conduct evidenced-based research that is objective, and aims to provide decision-makers with data that supports empirical, transparent and accountable policy conclusions. The intention is that policies, therefore, are more likely to address the needs across the spectrum from local and community citizenry to national institutions of government. The longer term impact is a robust social contract that reflects a responsive and sustainable State in whom the citizens have confidence, and that functions in a secure and stable environment that empowers citizens as they conduct their daily business and lives.

In the case of the ANCSS, it was identified as the premier institution that could provide guidance and recommendations to ONSA, based on a variety of activities designed to address the issues most critical to national security in Iraq.[12]

Findings

The findings reported in this section take into consideration the current realities and risks:

- The ANCSS does not enjoy the status of an institution/think tank created by legislative processes but is instead the result of a NSC Directive, as noted in the background section. It is understood that currently, this Directive has not been incorporated into legislation; therefore, the ANCSS serves at the pleasure of the ONSA.
- The budget for the ANCSS is added to the overall budget of the ONSA as part of their activities. Under this current structure, the question remains as to whether the ANCSS is identified as a specific budget line within the ONSA overall budget. If the funds allocated to the ANCSS as part of the overall ONSA budget, one potential impact is that budgetary processes are fluid and are controlled through a hierarchical structure linking the Director-General ANCSS to the ONSA to the NSC and to the Ministry of Finance;
- As a result, , the ability to plan activities in the short and longer term, as well as to anticipate follow-up activities with a reasonable expectation of financial security is lacking. This results in ad hoc planning processes that make it difficult to monitor and evaluate activities, capture lessons learned and good practices and make necessary changes to processes;
- The primary client for the ANCSS is the ONSA and the NSC; clarity on their priorities and objectives, as well as the ability to respond quickly and effectively to this client is of paramount importance for the future growth and development of the ANCSS;
- There have been challenges in the leadership of the ANCSS as evidenced by the fact that the position was not seen as requiring a dedicated person, meaning the first incumbent held another position in another Government department and was only able to allocate a limited amount of time to his duties in the Centre. This was compounded by an extended period due to ill-health; as a result, many of the objectives identified in the first 12 months were not achieved; more recently, the leadership has changed and a new Director-General has been named;

[12] For more detailed background information, please see the National Security Strategy, the UNDP SSR Project 2014-17, Final Report on Advice to the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies, June 19, 2013; Steven R. Charbonneau, Senior Advisor, Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies, Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services Company, Office of Security Cooperation Iraq.

- There is significant effort being made to ensure that equal opportunities for women and men are provided at the ANCSS. During the interviews, the possibility of having seminars and /or workshops raising awareness of global efforts around Women, Peace and Security, gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment would be beneficial not only to the staff, but also to the wider community served by the ANCSS.
- One risk specific to the ANCSS is how a change in the leadership of the NSC/ONSA or within the GoI would affect the ANCSS;

The **Findings Section** is divided into the following categories and observations per the TOR:[13]

- Institutional Infrastructure
- Current Research
- Financial Structure
- Human Resource Capacity

Institutional Infrastructure

This section is divided into strategic and operational infrastructure.

Strategic Infrastructure Observations

a. Organogram

Purpose of an organogram: to illustrate the decision-making infrastructure of an organisation and communicate it to stakeholders (donors, funders, like-minded institutions, and the public). Typically, the organogram would be posted on the institutional website, be published in outreach documents, brochures, and communicated to staff and key stakeholders.

One of the first requests was to see the institutional organogram in order to understand how the ANCSS was organised, its chain of command and reporting lines, as well as how unit structures were incorporated into the overall framework and to determine any dotted lines of inter and intra-unit cooperation.

Thus far, two organograms have been presented; the differences between the two are substantive. The organogram presented by the former DG had not been validated. The new DG will be creating a new organagram that focuses on the change to the ANCSS, and that will be approved and validated by the NSC.

During the interviews, no staff member indicated any knowledge of the organogram, nor had any seen an organogram. It was a point of concern raised in each interview as the staff were therefore unclear as to the overall structure of the ANCSS, how their unit and ultimately, how they as individuals fit into the overall structure, and strategic and operational plan of the ANCSS.

It is difficult to clearly understand how the ANCSS is structured, and therefore, how decisions are taken, how inputs are gathered, and how decision-making processes and outcomes are communicated to the staff. For example, it is unclear as to why the head of administration would be the decision maker regarding the librarian position in light of the fact that the library functions primarily as a resource tool for the research unit. Furthermore, there is no indication that this decision was taken in any collaborative or consultative process that agreed on the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to serve in that capacity; indication was that the person was simply told to take the position.

To date, there do not appear to be any monitoring and evaluation mechanisms incorporated into the decision-making processes, or in any other aspect of administration.

b. Vision and Mission

Purpose of Vision and Mission Statements: a Vision Statement is an aspirational statement of what an institution would like to achieve in the long term; a Mission Statement is a statement of the core purpose of an institution and communicates the intended direction of the organisation.

[13] See TOR, pg. 3, Expected Outputs

c. The ANCSS has a new Vision and Mission Statement that is linked to the ANCSS objectives. The organogram, as well as all other documents will need to refer to the foundational principles noted in the Vision and Mission Statements in order to build a cohesive and coherent structure. Strategic Plan (with directives from ONSA/NSC)

Purpose of a Strategic Plan: an overarching plan at a strategic level that identifies the institution's long term objectives, and conceptualizes how the institution will achieve the objectives and fulfil the Mission Statement. They generally are based on a SWOT analysis, and focused on a 3-5 year long term view.

Presently, the ANCSS does not have a Strategic Plan. One consequence is the absence of an overarching guide for designing, developing, implementing and evaluating a comprehensive activity plan for the Centre. As a result, it is difficult to link the unit work plans to the Mission and Vision of the ANCSS. It is equally challenging for staff to understand how their daily work impacts or affects the progress of the ANCSS.

A further observation is the absence of clear linkages to the client's priorities and objectives in the daily work of the ANCSS. For example, despite efforts being made to consult numerous universities, government ministries, agencies and other policy-related bodies in Iraq to recommend priority subject areas, there was no indication how the subjects/topics assigned to the researchers by unit heads were linked to the objectives of the NSS and ONSA. Based on the interviews, personal research interests tend to be suggested as valid, rather than topics/subjects based on client priorities.

d. Policies, Standard Operating Procedures, Protocols (job descriptions, recruiting, vetting, selecting, on-boarding, M&, termination, promotion)

Purpose of policies, SOPS, Protocols: these documents form the basic infrastructure of any organisation and define how the institution will function on a day to day basis in terms of defining the personnel qualifications, characteristics, defining lessons learned and good practices for the business of the institution; outlines how the finances will be managed, as well as defining roles and responsibilities of staff, units, senior management and their interaction in a comprehensive manner. The purpose of Standard Operating Procedures is the creation of practices that are institution wide focused on reducing duplication of effort and are used to create efficiencies, and cost effective business practices.

Currently, there is no comprehensive set of infrastructure document to organise the internal structures of the ANCSS. In order to develop in an ordered fashion and in accordance with Iraqi Labour Law, there is an urgent need for their development so that the ANCSS can be on a solid human resource and legal footing.

There are well defined templates for job descriptions, standard operating procedures, policies, human resource guidelines, hiring protocols, promotion guidelines and other basic institutional frameworks in open sources that could be accessed and modified to accommodate the cultural and programming realties of the ANCSS.

It would take a comprehensive effort from the management and staff, but would be well worth considering as a high priority in order for the ANCSS to function at a common standard with other think tanks, whether they are international or regional.

Operational Infrastructure Observations

a. Unit Workplans:

One observation is the dis-connect among and within the unit work plans in terms of how the activities are linked to a comprehensive and prioritised annual plan. Given the absence of a Strategic Plan, this is understandable and not unusual in nascent centres/think tanks.

However, in order to maximize the human resources (researchers, experts), it would be helpful to have a prioritised and harmonised plan on the subjects to be researched, outputs identified, and linked to outcomes.

b. Lessons Learned Documentation and Archiving

When discussing how the ANCSS staff record Lessons Learned Documentation and Archiving, there was comment across the research staff that there are reports and conference outputs. However, in the follow up questions, it was evident that this did not translate into a systematic and comprehensive capturing of lessons learned in terms of what worked, what was not successful, what should be changed or budgetary analysis on cost per event against the money provided or identified activity objectives. There was also no record of follow-up with activity participants, conference speakers, or clients.

As a result, there is no standard method for designing a conference, a workshop, a seminar, or other functions. There is no checklist to determine task assignments, no performance data to ensure that mistakes are not repeated, and no templates for certificates of attendance, reports, briefings, brochures, or background papers that bear the ANCSS unique brand.

Archiving appears to be *ad hoc*, and if there is a systematic way of collecting data for future use, and analysis, it was not obvious or evident in the interviews.

c. Knowledge Management

Knowledge management in think tanks and centres is a critical component of ensuring that the information generated, shared, reported on and collected is current, useful and managed well. Researchers rely on having access to data that is catalogued, categorised, and readily accessible in order to perform their duties to a level of excellence.

In the interviews across the staff and management, it was clear that the knowledge management processes and systems within the ANCSS are weak. Instruments of knowledge management, such as the ANCSS website, archives and resources, such as MOUs and Curriculum Vitae's of subject matter experts were noted as under-developed and largely inaccessible under the control of individuals, rather than being easily accessible.

While some documents need to be classified (salaries, personnel matters, reprimands, etc.), CVs, MOUs, and archives of activities/events are generally thought to be non-classified documents that should be readily accessible to members of the staff.

For example, if a staff member needs to find an expert in support of a project, having access to the MOUs, as well as to the CVs makes it easier to scan the files, determine which resources fit the need, and then move forward per the ANCSS processes to contact the specific resource and ascertain availability, costs, timing, and interest. To have these sorts of resources available only through a hierarchical request process is not an effective or efficient use of time, talent and energy.

From the media aspect of knowledge management, the website is of particular importance as it is the 'window of the world to the ANCSS' and creates a perception about the professionalism of the Centre. The use of media such as the website, reports in the national media, interviews, published conference reports, research monographs, background papers, and policy briefs that highlight the activities of the Centre was consistently brought up in the interviews as being absent and/or weak. There was also a sense that from a senior management standpoint, this was not viewed as particularly important or urgent. As evidence of this, the upcoming absence of the media head for 6 months, with no assigned second in command (2iC) speaks for itself.

The general consensus was that having a robust media unit to work across the institution would be very helpful in creating a positive image, both in terms of the outputs of the Centre, as well as to highlight its importance to the ONSUA and NSC. The influential impact should not be underestimated.

However, it appears that when proposals are made to develop the website and other knowledge management instruments (magazines, publications, and brochures), the interest at the bureaucratic level is weak, and proposals are never fully discussed or acted upon. The general reason given is cost; however, in the interviews, the examples that were provided did indicate research on costs and value for money that was not out of line with the accrued value to the ANCSS. The impact of putting forward proposals only to have them dismissed without discussion or cause results in discouragement among the staff, a weak website that does not adequately

portray the work of the Centre and no marketing materials to publicise the ANCSS and its function.

Publications are another aspect of operational infrastructure that supports the marketing of the Centre. Again, publications should be institution-wide, and be used to give evidence of the important role of the Centre to the ONSA and NSC, and ultimately to the GoI. In many Centres, publications (both hard and soft copy) are used to market the brand to donors, funders, interested parties, key stakeholders and future donors, as well as to disseminate the research outputs. Publications can also be useful in providing data on institutional performance, value for money and serve as a strong outreach tool.

However, in the interview process, there was considerable frustration that when publications are planned or suggested, and designed in a cost effective way, there is generally a decision taken at finance and administrative level to stop the process. No reason is given for the decision, and there is currently no work plan in publications.

d. Communications Strategy (Media)

As far as can be discerned, there is not a systematic, or institution wide communications strategy that would advertise the work of the ANCSS, nor its presence beyond a nascent website.

Based on the interviews, it was consistently noted that any time there is an attempt to produce booklets, or interviews, or conference findings that could be used to highlight and follow-up the activity with the participants of ANCSS activities, or to the client, the response to producing these media tools is negative, asserting cost factors. There appears to be little understanding of the value of follow-up tools that a communications/media unit can create for the institution.

The role of public opinion surveys, or public perception analysis would be quite useful in ascertaining how the general Iraqi public views the NSS, the ANCSS, or in identifying what is of critical important to the general public vis-à-vis their daily security issues. However, in the absence of a strategic plan this sort of benefit will not be accrued to the Centre, and thereby, to the primary client.

Additionally, there is no Workplan for publications, or the website, and as a result, there is little work for the respective teams during their working day. This represents a waste of time, talent and energy, and creates frustration and a lack of commitment to the objectives of the ANCSS.

The link between the research unit and the Communications unit should be strong, given the need for products to publicise, but there appears to be a lack of cooperation or even understanding how the research unit and the communication group should interact. There is little evidence that each unit sees the mutual benefit and ultimate benefit to the ANCSS, and ONSA.

Current Research

The heart of think tanks and policy analysis institutions is the research and analysis unit. Without a strong and well-developed research and analysis structure, the outputs such as policy analysis, evidence-based research, and future trend projections will lack the integrity critical to the credibility of the institution. An additional expectation for think tanks/policy analysis institutions is freedom from political pressure so that their work can 'speak truth to power' without retribution. The importance of the ANCSS to Iraqi decision makers in terms of policy development cannot be overstated, given its proximity to the ONSA and the overall NSS.

Currently, the ANCSS has a unit titled Scientific Researches and Studies Affairs which includes Political and International Relations, Economic and Social, Military and Security, and Technology and Communication. [14] At the present time, there is no overall director of this unit, and the most active components appear to be the Military and Security and Political and International Relations sections. Both these components have Heads who guide the work of their respective teams. The absence of a director for the Scientific Researches and Studies Affairs results in a leadership gap, that lends itself to a resulting lack of transparent and accountable chain of command, clarity of roles and responsibilities for the staff, as well as clarity on the overall direction of the unit's research plan. This also results in a difficult horizontal management relationship in terms of the

[14] This information comes from the organogram provided, developed under former DG Dr. Talib al-Hamdani.

executive management team, which would normally include the Directors of Scientific Researchers and Studies Affairs, the General Services and Development Affairs and Administrative Affairs cooperating and managing daily operational tasks and reporting up to the Director General, Mr. Hamza.
Members of the Scientific Researches and Studies Affairs unit were interviewed independently (and with the interpreters) and in one collective meeting.
In the interest of maintaining the confidentiality of the interview process, the views and expressed opinions are consolidated to protect the process.
Several common themes were noted:

- Percentage of time spent doing administrative tasks outweighs research and analysis time; the consensus was between 60%-70% of researchers' time was spent doing administrative tasks, such as committee work, that are not related to their primary functions; as a result, there is little time to focus on their research function;
- The lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities was articulated in 90% of the interviewees; this leads to confusion about reporting lines, task identification, performance measures; linking Workplans and planning for future topics;
- The lack of publications, media interviews, opportunities to present at international/regional conferences results in a sense of working for an organisation that is not seen as credible, resulting in frustration;
- The absence of a research library hinders research and policy analysis; at the same time, there was general acknowledgement that the reality of weak English skills is also a handicap to conducting research, given the fact that a preponderance of evidence-based/applied research is written in English; however, little to no effort had been made in a systematic fashion to reach out to regional/international like-minded organisations to solicit Arabic publications;
- There is acknowledgment that the research staff are young professionals and do not have substantive experience in conducting research, developing surveys, writing policy analysis documents;
- There is a perceived sentiment that Senior Management do not understand what researchers need in order to do their work, and that furthermore, Senior Management are not responsive to requests for feedback, or when presented with an idea for media, publications, website, etc.
- The need for 'experts' to work with the ANCSS staff was articulated consistently; however, when asked what constitutes an 'expert', there was no consistent definition, particularly when related to the expertise held by evidence based researchers, or policy analysts;
- The lack of 'permanent staff' was viewed as a major problem by the researchers, and others in the interviewing process; the absence of a permanent staff leads to a high turnover rate, which does not support building a team that has institutional memory and a view towards collaboration on research, media, publications, and production of products that can be identified as work from the ANCSS;
- The lack of a strategic plan for the institution, as well as for the research unit results in an approval process that is step-heavy, lacks feedback, duplication of effort, and generally being overridden by the committee structure;
- The lack of a strategic plan also has affects the decisions regarding thematic subjects for analysis and research, and leads to a scattered list of subjects, which may or may not be related to the needs of ONSA;
- There is frustration with the lack of a professional development programme or capacity building workshops and training; ; the interviewees across the ANCSS commented on the need for such a opportunities, particularly with regard to English language skills, research skills, writing strategies, conducting open-source research using on-line methodologies;
- There is little understanding of gender mainstreaming as concept and practice;

- The absence of opportunities to communicate with international think tanks to learn how they function, as well as to share research topics, study tours, join offered workshops, etc.
- There was a consistent thread that the ANCSS does not guide the research topics based on a coherent plan, which refers to the absence of an overall strategic plan linked to the identified needs of the ONSA, or the priorities of the NSS; as a result, research topics tend to be those of personal interest or perceived benefit to the ANCSS, but are not linked either horizontally across the units, nor vertically within the units;
- There is a challenge with research staff preferring to work on a project as a team rather than as individual researchers; this becomes very difficult if a team member is absent, as then team then does no work during that time; at the same time, it is noted throughout the discussions that individual research capacity needs to be developed;
- The lack of methodological rigor among the researchers was evident, both in terms of outlining how a research project is designed and developed, as well as what the international standards are for research and policy analysis;
- One of the more critical issues is the lack of understanding the broad Security Sector Reform agenda, and how it links to the ANCSS; the focus is primarily on external military/security issues, with no linkage to police, law enforcement, and the internal security issues that link to the UNDP SSR project. The absence of the MOI is duly noted, but even in the discussions about what constitutes security, the overwhelming response focused on military issues.

When the joint meeting was convened, it was done for two purposes: (1) to observe the team dynamics; and (2) to solicit opinions on definitions of terms. It was hoped that individual responses would be forthcoming in order to assess the levels of research knowledge, experiences, skills and abilities. However, what was presented was a single narrative that unfortunately, did reveal a significant lack of understanding on basic research methodologies, definitions, and products that think tanks/policy analysis should be able to create. A concern is that the senior member of the team did not solicit responses, but rather took charge and drafted the response. It was enlightening.

The production of Background Briefs/Policy Papers for Workshops, Seminars and Conferences appears to be weak, and as there have been no publications for a significant period of time, it is difficult to assess how this part of the ANCSS functions. There is little understanding or agreement on what constitutes a report, a conference paper, a policy brief, or other such documents.

The UNDP consultant reviewed the Al Nahrain (A quarterly magazine issued by the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies) that was published in February 2014 as Issue 0. The topic was “The Psychological Warfare” and contained 5 articles. The quality of the research was extremely poor and the production of the magazine was equally disturbing. The credibility of any think tank/policy analysis institution is directly related to the quality of its research products, and the subsequent ability to exchange ideas with like-minded institutions; at the present time, with this quality product, ANCSS would not be able to engage in such exchanges with any credibility.

During the conference attended by the UNDP Consultant, the observation was the rapporteuring, note taking and moderating sessions could be improved with workshops, and training opportunities. These skill sets are critical in capturing data from an event, which are then used to create publications, media reports, and providing background information for policy analysis. These reports are also critical to linking with external and internal audiences, particularly through the website, which remains in a nascent stage.

In the interview process, it became evident that there is a lack of clarity on the NSS, and how ANCSS research and analysis thematic products should be linked to the NSS and ONSA as the primary client(s).The client relationship with ONSA/NSS is little understood in practical reality, although the overall expression indicated a superficial awareness.

Library

The issue of a library and its importance was a constant theme among not only the researchers, but across the interviewees. It was viewed as an immediate need in order for ANCSS to develop as

a 'proper think tank/policy analysis' organisation. That being said, it was noted that the Senior Management does not necessarily share that view, and had made little effort to date in moving the library forward using current holdings.
The assignment of being the librarian to a currently employed researcher who has no experience in building a library or even in how to organise data was seen as an indication of lack of understanding, and to some extent, even respect for what the ANCSS will need to develop its research capacity. With the current holdings, and some limited spending on-line sources in Arabic, it would be possible to set up a small research library, but the Workplan for its future would need to have committed finances, a librarian who can build the collection, and the full support of the Senior Management team.

Financial Infrastructure

One of the most significant findings centres on the financial infrastructure which is affected by the political reality of the ANCSS. As it does not currently enjoy legal standing as a result of its creation, there is no dedicated budget line in the Government of Iraq (GoI) budget, nor is there a dedicated amount of money that can be administered by the Director-General of ANCSS, independent of the GoI Ministry of Finance.
While appreciating current political realities, this is a major problem for ANCSS to overcome if it is to become the premier think tank/policy analysis institution for the ONSA in support of the NSS.
Financial independence allows an institution such as ANCSS to work in the privileged space of impartial research and policy analysis. Without that freedom, the work tends to be less challenging to dominant themes of government for fear that the financial support will be withdrawn, or limited.
This expectation for financial independence is a commonly held protocol in international think tanks/policy analysis institutions and there are models that could be useful to the ANCSS in creating at the outset, a blended model of financial independence as the GoI continues to strengthen under the new government.
In addition, the financial independence provides a backdrop for the ANCSS, as it gains strength, to compete for project funding from other resources, such as other like-minded institutions across the region, or amongst their international counterparts. In order to diversify the funding base for ANCSS, it will have to develop a record of successful use of funds against project objectives. Without this, the ability to compete for financial support from a source other than the GoI will be limited.
During the interview process, it was difficult to get information on how cost effective planning for conferences and other ANCSS activities was managed. There does not appear to be a template for planning events, and when other heads were asked how they funded their activities, the general response was that 'finance is not my responsibility'. It leads to a conclusion that the decision-making is rather ad hoc/random and not institutionalised across all units within the ANCSS.
When seeking insight into how catering, flights, accommodations, honoraria, discounts, costs of publications, brochures, stationary, background papers, etc. which are common factors in planning for activities was developed at the ANCSS, there was little indication of a consistent format for creating budgets that would be useful in seeing how and where money is spent. As a result, there does not appear to be a focus on audits, or of being able to report to government or donors where or how the allocated funds are dispersed. In a results based environment where donors expect 'value for taxpayer's money', this will not be acceptable practice and could have negative impact for the ANCSS.
There also does not appear to be a cost-recovery plan in place against the ANCSS being used by external agencies for meetings. When a suggestion was made that ANCSS could start a cost-recovery plan of renting space, charging a per person fee for catering, stationary, etc and well as adding an overhead charge to offset the time, talent and energy expended by staff in non-task related activities, this was a new idea. Again, in most think tanks, this sort of cost recovery is necessary and expected as part of budgetary processes and planning.

As a result, there is little collection of 'lessons learned and good practices' for the financial expenditures, and no urgency to use past experiences for the benefit of current and future activities. Again, this does not create a sense of confidence from donors, and quite possibly from the primary client.

If the ANCSS could create a rationale for a budget line in the GoI overall budget, or at the very least, make a case for a dedicated sum of money at the beginning of the Fiscal Year, with specific outputs, outcomes against a budget, and planned for the 12 months, it could provide a sense of stability and institutional freedom that would benefit the ANCSS. This initial 12 month budget would also provide an opportunity to share with the staff how their respective lines of effort are linked to spending and could create professional development opportunities for those interested in financial and institutional management.

Human Resource Capacity

In think tank/policy analysis institutions, the Human Resource (HR) function is a critical support unit for institutional success. Generally, this unit manages and oversees all the activities related to personnel and their management. If this unit is not optimally functional, then there will be difficulties in the recruiting, vetting, selecting, hiring, and terminating staff, as well as in contracting experts, managing secondments from a variety of sources. The HR unit will need to be heavily engaged with the Senior Management, as well as with unit heads.

This unit must have a complete understanding of Iraqi Labour Law, as well as principles of human rights, gender mainstreaming, and overall human resource management principles. Its leadership should be qualified as an HR expert, with experience in managing personnel in small institutions that are linked to governments. The HR unit also will need to be engaged in the process of contracting

Currently, there do not appear to be any job descriptions, policy guidance on dispute resolution, common standards of leave (vacation, sick, compassionate), and no policies on promotion, termination, or reprimand. To my knowledge, there are no benefits for the ANCSS staff, other than salary.

There is no salary ranking matrix, nor any indication of how decisions are made vis-à-vis pay scales. If there are differentiations in pay scales between older unit heads, younger staff, administration, research, then these differences must be accounted for in order to avoid morale problems amongst the staff.

Currently, none of this exists at the ANCSS, and is a high priority in terms of action items.

What is observed is, however, not unusual in a nascent organisation; many think tanks/policy analysis institutions face many similar challenges in the first 2-5 years of their existence. However, the unique reality for ANCSS is that it is being developed in a fragile post-conflict environment, with a new government, competing interests, and a regional landscape that continues to be in conflict. The result is that often, priorities are not focused on the investment of time and money to build a comprehensive HR capacity where the benefits are not evident for several months. Furthermore, there is a cultural underlay in Iraq which does affect how normative HR practices will be structured and implemented. Attention to these cultural practices will be a critical component of building an HR unit that is responsive both to the local cultural realities, and at the same time, responsive to the external funding agency whose cultural expectations will be very different.

In terms of current HR capacities, one observation is the fairly common one of older unit heads, with younger staff whose voice is not always heard clearly. The reality is that the older unit heads are not necessarily any more qualified in terms of policy analysis or research methodologies than the young professionals. Despite the numbers of certificates attested to, or the experience leading their respective disciplines, the responses to the research questions did support the observation that overall, the staff suffers from not having the expertise in leadership it needs. Given this, the HR unit will be critical in setting standards, and policies/processes for hiring the right people, at the right time, with the right HR support.

As part of the HR capacity building, all units will need to be involved in discussions regarding their unique needs, explaining characteristics of what they prioritise with regard to staffing in order to

meet objectives; for example, what expertise, and experience would be necessary to build a team. These inputs will then need to be linked to the institutional infrastructure in terms of policies and procedures in order to create a smoothly running institution.

Conclusions

The conclusions from the Needs Analysis are presented in the following Strength, Weakness, Opportunities/Challenges and Threats/Risk (SWOT) model.

Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Close to Government 2. Strong support from ONSA 3. Strong championship from Dr. Safaa 4. New DG with close ties to ONSA 5. In principle, aligned with NSS 6. Good logistics 7. Well-designed building for ANCSS 8. Less sectarianism among staff 9. Willingness to learn and adapt 10. Accessibility to local/regional experts, researchers, media outlets, academics and think-tanks	1. Lack of a Strategic Plan to guide ANCSS for 3-5 years 2. Lack of institutional infrastructure processes, policies, protocols and standard operating procedures that will drive institutional governance, functions, objectives, tasks, and research/police themes and subjects 3. No designated budget line for GoI, or dedicated budget for the DG to manage 4. Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities for staff and for Senior Management 5. Weak staffing in research unit, with little professional experience, and with limited research skills in terms of evidence-based research and/or policy analysis methodologies 6. Vacancies in leadership positions (unit heads, etc.) 7. Poor communication among ANCSS staff 8. Nascent website 9. Lack of an institution-wide communications strategy with internal and external focus 10. Limited emphasis/experience on Lessons Learned and Good Practices 11. Weak relationships with regional and/or international like-minded institutions 12. Research resources are limited 13. No substantive outputs (publications, etc.) 14. Weak understanding of research methodologies, policy analysis briefings 15. Language limitations
Challenges/Opportunities	**Risks/Threats**
1. Build infrastructure in a methodical step-by-step process that incrementally reinforces the ANCSS capacity to function as a think tank/policy analysis institution 2. Consistent leadership for the next 3-5 years, especially at the DG level 3. Filling current vacancies with experienced personnel, and creating a percentage of staff as permanent in order to reduce turn-over and build consistency in products 4. Finding and securing evidence-based research oriented experts who can mentor staff and build analytical policy capacity/capability 5. Diversity funding base to include regional sources of financial support 6. Seek legal standing for ANCSS in order to create budget stability 7. Incorporate Results Based Management and Budget processes incrementally to build ANCSS capacity for achieving donor expectations and building a strong reputation as a think tank/policy analysis institution 8. Provide English language instruction to staff in order to build their capacity to function in both	1. Inconsistent funding schedules from primary donor due to UN funding processes; 2. Non-existent monitoring and evaluation methodology to indicate achieving objectives with defined outputs, outcomes and impact statements that indicate to the funder how progress against objectives has been progressing 3. Sudden change in ANCSS leadership/senior management that would unexpectedly affect priorities for ANCSS, ONSA and NSS 4. Change in GoI/ONSA priorities that would affect ANCSS planned activities and programming 5. Regional conflict unexpectedly affects priorities, as well as budget allocations 6. Internal resistance to changes recommended for institutional growth and advancement 7. Limited revenue generation outputs from external sources 8. Inconsistent revenue available from GoI given economic realities and stresses on government 9. Lack of clarity on priorities for research and policy analysis and non-alignment with client (ONSA) objectives

Arabic and English	10. Continued hierarchical decision-making that results in failure to respond quickly to changing client priorities and fails to support emerging trend analysis in the research unit

Recommendations for a Plan of Action

Despite what must appear to be a list of weaknesses and risks, there is no reason why the ANCSS cannot emerge as a premier think tank and policy analysis institution that supports the National Security Strategy and the ONSA. It is in its early development phase, and similarly to other nascent institutions, is experiencing the difficulties that come with all beginnings. The fundamentals for building ANCSS's capacity are in place, from the building to the relationship with the ONSA; all that needs to be done now is the challenging, but rewarding work of infrastructure building.

The Action Plan/Way Forward is focused on the Fiscal Year 2015-2016, and puts most attention on the next 12 months. The highest priority is to write the Strategic Plan which will guide the ANCSS for the next 3-5 years. Without the plan, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to have the systematic development required for think tanks/policy analysis institutions to be successful. The Strategic Plan will also provide guidance on streamlining the research topics to be in more alignment with the ONSA and NSS and will better reflect the priorities of the principle clients.

There are several quick wins that can be accomplished to show the staff that the leadership is serious about their input, and their needs.

Quick Win #1: Create the library using whatever holdings are currently available at the ANCSS. With the starting of the library and a plan for its continued growth over the next 12 months, the research staff will be more able to do their tasks.

Quick Win #2: Create workshops/seminars/learning moments for the staff in English language, research methodologies, policy writing in order to start mentoring and building their capacities to perform their tasks closer to international standards and best practices.

Quick Win #3: Reduce the amount of time research staff spend on administrative duties (committee work, etc.) in order to have higher performance standards and outputs from their daily tasks. This would require placing responsibilities for such duties on the Administrative Unit.

As the ANCSS determines its way forward, the UNDP consultant recommends that as much as possible, the expertise for building the capacity of the ANCSS should be Iraqi, with international expertise providing support as needed.

It is anticipated that as the ANCSS meets and exceeds its client's objectives, the next steps could be to seek and secure authorisation to compete for international, regional and domestic grants that would add financial support to the activities of the ANCSS and its research staff. With the additional funds, it would be easier to promote study tours, exchanges with regional and international institutions (like-minded think tanks, universities, strategic studies centres) for the ANCSS staff and to build long term relationships based on the financial security.

The following chart outlines the suggested Action Plan or Way Forward based on the Needs Assessment Findings.

Action Item	Priority	Time Frame for Completion	Responsible Unit and Resources Needed	Staff Roles/Responsibilities
Write the **ANCSS Strategic Plan 2015-2018** to serve as the guide for the ANCSS; Refine Vision and Mission Statements Align organogram with Strategic Plan and institutional framework	**High Priority**	3-5 months	DG, ONSA, Senior Advisor to NSS and UNDP Consultant Seek and obtain support from ONSA Obtain sign-off from key stakeholders on the Strategic Plan	Create mixed staff focus groups to obtain input and buy-in Administrative Unit to provide support, documentation, data for the Strategic Plan such as money spent in the past on activities, any hiring history, etc. to have background information for Strategic Plan

Disseminate to staff, key stakeholders, public website				
Create necessary infrastructure such as job descriptions, Human Resource Management processes; institutional governance mechanisms; create roles and responsibilities for staff based on tasks and unit objectives linked to hiring practices Establish the Library with current holdings and equipment; actively plan for the FY additions	**High Priority**, but will need to be staged in incremental steps; priority to be determined by internal consultations, and with ONSA	3-6 months 1-2 months	DG, Administrative Unit, UNDP Consultant Iraqi Human Resource consultant to ensure compliance with Iraqi Labour Laws DG, UNDP Consultant, Research Unit Heads, Administration Unit	Use mixed staff focus groups to obtain input and buy-in Research staff, UNDP Consultant, External Librarian consultant (Iraqi)
Seek legal standing for ANCSS in order to facilitate budget line in GoI budget; If the latter is not political feasible, an alternative is obtaining specific funding for FY 2015-2016 for DG to manage to support ONSA priorities through ANCSS research and policy analysis priorities	**High Priority**	1-3 months	DG, ONSA, Ministerial Committee of National Security Ministry of Finance	Administrative Unit to provide any background data as required
Set research priorities for ANCSS aligned with ONSA needs and priorities Refine research topics/themes to align with skills and experience of research staff; Secure external SMEs, researchers to produce high quality monographs, papers, etc. that meet ONSA needs Mentor research staff	**High Priority** **Must be linked with the Strategic Plan, and Administrative Infrastructure development**	4-5 months	DG, ONSA, Unit Heads, UNDP Consultant Advice from Senior Advisor, NSS Consultations with local and regional think tanks/policy analysis institutions	Mixed Focus Groups for input; Research staff and unit heads
Conduct internal capacity building workshops, seminars for research staff on specific topics to enhance knowledge, skills and capacities in support of their work	**Medium Priority**	On-going through the FY	UNDP Consultant, Senior Advisor, NSS Research Unit Heads External experts from local and regional like-minded institutions	Research staff Admin staff

Organise one study tour to a regional think tank/policy analysis institution at end of FY				
Develop an internal and external Communication Plan to market the ANCSS; Communication Plan to be representative of ONSA objectives and priorities Communication Plan to include updating Website and keeping it current	**Medium Priority, linked to Strategic Plan**	3-8 months with priority on website	UNDP Consultant, DG, Communications/Publications Units; External Iraqi graphic designer, or staff with graphic design experience	Mixed focus groups from staff to bring unit perspectives to the discussion Administration Unit to provide data on past costs and experts who helped create the current website, publications, etc.
Publication of two papers, monographs, articles on the website to attract attention to ANCSS;	**Lower Priority** but needs to be excellent quality	4th Quarter of FY	DG, UNDP Consultant, Administration Unit, Communications/Publications Research Units	Research Unit to have lead

ANNEX 3: 2012 Project Document

United Nations Development Programme
Country: IRAQ
Project Document

Project Title: Support to Security Sector Reform in Iraq

UNDAF Outcome(s):
Priority 1: Improved governance, including the protection of human rights;
Outcome 1.3: Iraq has an improved legal and operational Rule of Law framework for administration and access to justice

Expected CP Outcome:
Outcome 2: Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards

Expected Outputs:
The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.

Implementing Partner: UNDP

Responsible Parties: UNDP, UNODC

Brief Description

The main objectives of this project are to support the Government of Iraq with the development of a new National Security Strategy in a post US occupation period; enable the capacity of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) in order to conduct security strategies and studies; to support the establishment of a new Security and Defence Think Tank; and to build capacity in the Parliament to enhance oversight of the Security and Defence sector in Iraq.

Iraq conducted its first Security Strategy for the period 2007-2010. Since then there have been dramatic changes in Iraq, mainly with the departure of the United States Military. The nature of national security threats is changing and hence the Government is preparing to embark upon a new Security Strategy.

UNDP will support the ONSA in designing appropriate assessments, conducting consultations with academics and civil society as well as designing a strategy that adheres to best practises and human rights principles.

The programme will be implemented over a 2 year period and will be funded by contributions from the Government of Iraq; the UK Government and UNDP Core Resources.

Programme Period:	2013-2014
Key Result Area (Strategic Plan):	Strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions
Atlas Award ID:	00067618
Start date:	01/02/2013
End Date	31/12/2014
LPAC Meeting Date	21/01/2013

Total allocated resources: 1.388.832

- FCO USD 1.088.832
- UNDP USD 300.000
- GOI TBC (for budget in 2014)

Agreed by the GOI:

Agreed by UNDP:

I. SITUATION ANALYSIS

Background

When the United States occupied Iraq one of their first actions was to dismantle the Iraqi Security forces and to implement a de-Ba'athification policy which excluded members of the Ba'ath party from top military and security positions. This inevitably entailed a brain drain in the security forces and led to a security vacuum across the country which will take several years to partially fill. When re-building the Iraqi Police and Military, the US government spent billions of US Dollars training and re-equipping the forces. However, the new architecture and the new missions, roles and responsibilities of the security forces remain a work in progress and several important gaps remain that need urgent attention. Fighting internal terrorism was at the heart of the overall US approach, while critical activities such as configuring the ISF to defend Iraq against external threats, community based policing and arms control received scant attention.

With the withdrawal of the US Military in December 2011, Iraq regained its sovereignty and the GoI is now claiming that it is fully in charge of its own security institutions. Iraq, under US occupation, produced a National Security Strategy which expired in 2010. Consequently, the newly established National Security Council now has the opportunity and responsibility to develop and write a new post-American Security Strategy based on Iraqi perceptions, Iraqi priorities and realities. The strategy will be a challenging endeavour due to a) the departure of the US forces and a short-term reduction in resources, in particular intelligence, b) on-going political competition with top ministerial positions in the security ministries unfilled, c) lack of skills and expertise in security sector formulation, d) ongoing terror attacks which are draining on the security forces preventing them from much needed reform, e) a lack of clarity in the missions, roles and responsibilities of the existing security sector, f) no agreed logic to the existing command and control architecture of the existing security forces, g) no clear direction in the transition to police primacy for the provision of internal security and h) a culture of suspicion with political interference in the security and intelligence services.

The Iraqi Government is currently forced to simultaneously address multiple challenges that range from ***insurgency, terrorism, corruption, organised crime, foreign influences in domestic affairs, extremisms*** as well as ***environmental challenges*** in the longer term. The range of these challenges makes it imperative that the Government conducts a comprehensive threat and risk assessment and maintains a continuous process of analysis and review of the threats and risks. A primary task of Government is continuously to review the strategic environment in order to identify, pre-empt and mitigate current and future threats to national interests.

In the security sector the military has, up until now, had the security lead in all major urban centres manning checkpoints to provide security in search of insurgents and terrorists. In the last two years major progress has been made with the number of security incidents dropping significantly and with the month of March in 2012 seeing the lowest number of incidents since the occupation in 2003. In spite of this progress, the situation remains politically fragile and the Government has indicated that it wishes to embark on a process of demilitarization and a transition to police primacy. Consequently, the Police Forces are slowly taking over security duties in the cities while the Military is returning to its more conventional role of national security and guarding the borders. This transition is being gradually implemented with military forces slowly being phased out as the security situation improves.

In an environment where the response to insecurity and violence is primarily of a repressive nature (as opposed to also preventive) a gap between the security forces and citizens often becomes inevitable. This lack of community policing will inevitably have a negative impact on the confidence of the ordinary people in the Police and the rule of law. Women, and other vulnerable groups are particularly affected by this situation. Unfortunately when rule of law does not prevail and the police have yet to be fully reformed and professionalised, an ethos of corruption and impunity flourishes which can compound the lack of security and the trust of the people in the Iraqi Criminal Justice System.

The security forces are currently saturated, which has prevented the Government from absorbing more militia members into the formal military units. The number of former military personnel that were formed into militias and paid to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the US Administration and latterly the Government is significant and well over 100,000. These militias belonged in most cases to forces such as the Sons of Iraq or men associated with different local tribes to enforce security in their areas. The Government has now indicated that these militias are to be dismantled and that payments to non-statutory forces will cease.

A security vacuum inevitably gives room to organised crime. Since most of the security forces in Iraq have been deployed to fight terrorism the capacity to fight crime is low and intelligence gathering is limited, which is dangerous in a world where crime is highly organised and technologically advanced. The Government will need to realign its strategy and approach to security to fight organised crime more effectively and to prevent criminal gangs from seizing influence that can have seriously negative influences on security in Iraq.

Foreign influences in domestic affairs in Iraq have posed significant political challenges to Iraqi sovereignty, be it from the US or from neighbouring countries. The Iraqi Government is trying to reassert its sovereignty by limiting foreign influences that can pose a threat to national security whether of a political or economic nature. Foreign influences are currently considered to be destabilising and potentially skewing the political life in Iraq. To tackle external influences the Government needs to clearly identify the challenges and dangers and have appropriate strategies in place that reinforce Iraqi sovereignty without resorting to protectionism.

Environmental challenges in Iraq are something the country will have to grapple with in the coming decades. This will require the development of a national Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategy. The most serious challenge is water. On one hand there is the dependence on neighbours allowing water to flow into Iraq but on the other is the lack of effective water management and irrigation. Collapse in irrigation has led to erosion which causes frequent sandstorms that in turn ruin crops. Effective water management and managing the environment will most likely be the biggest challenges for Iraq in the long term.

Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA)

The ONSA, established through CPA order 68, has 35 staff under its domain and is divided into 3 divisions namely the Strategic Planning Unit, the Strategic Analysis Intelligence Unit and the Clearance office which does vetting of security personnel. The National Security Advisor (NSA) heads the NSC under the overall leadership of the PM. The role of the NSA includes security policy development and the coordination of key actors from all the security entities. The deputy security advisor heads the 3 divisions. In addition to the 3 divisions there are 5 key security advisors who provide specialist support directly to the NSA and the divisions on key strategic issues. The ONSA analyses and advises the Prime Minister on matters relating to security, which usually translates into Policy. ONSA has been responsible for a large number of studies and reports, and issues regular situational updates countrywide. Considering that the ONSA has only been operating for 6 years their overall capacity to produce reports is positive. The capacity of ONSA to collect, collate information is high however its ability to analyse and translate that information into policy requires further improvement. This deficiency largely relates to a lack of internal systems and policies and the absence of standard operational procedures to ensure proper implementation. The development of the appropriate systems, policies and procedures will greatly facilitate the conduct of a national security review and the development of a new national security strategy. There is however now a new commitment to build the necessary internal capacity and start preparations for a new security review. In furtherance of this goal, the Government has formally requested that UNDP in collaboration with the United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO)to provide the support necessary to build the required capacity and to advise in the conduct of the national security review. This assistance and advice will be based upon best practices developed by UNDP elsewhere and information and lessons learned in relation to security sector reform and security strategies in other countries coming out of conflict.

External Support to Enhancing Iraqi Research and Analytical Capacity

There are a number of levels at which the capacity that the Government requires to be built in the ONSA can be delivered. At the highest level, the provision of advice and the assistance to build the internal capacity of the ONSA to conduct strategic research and analysis and to develop the necessary systems, policies and procedures can largely be delivered by a single senior advisor. A single advisor and point of contact can facilitate continuity and build relationships. In addition, however that advisor should have the resources available to call back for specialist advice and support to other UNDP agencies and appropriate policy institutes when necessary.

At a secondary level, building the capacity in the ONSA and the provision of support to the ONSA in the conduct of major research projects can be reinforced by building relationships with non-government Iraqi policy institutes, academic institutes and universities. Such relationships and the sharing of knowledge could prove mutually beneficial in terms of capacity building and academic support to both the ONSA and those institutes. A secondary purpose of this program could therefore support this mutually beneficial capacity building relationship by facilitating and supporting relationships between Iraqi security policy institutes (think-tanks) and universities and international partners of a similar nature. Both the University of Bath and Chatham House (Royal Institute for International Affairs) in the UK have existing relationships with the ONSA and have expressed a wish to develop these relationships further.

At a tertiary level, establishing and facilitating strategic international partnerships between Iraqi Universities and international partners (University of Bath and others) could improve university based policy research and the delivery of in-depth applied research papers. This capacity could be reinforced in the longer-term by the establishment of joint Iraqi and international post-graduate degree courses in conflict, development and security studies. External funding would be required for such a project but funding such a project could prove attractive to international sponsors from the industrial sector.

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Security and Defence

Oversight of the Security Sector remains challenging. This is partly due to a lack of resources and expertise in the Parliament whereby the Research Directorate has limited resources but also due to limited information being provided by relevant security ministries to Parliament. Parliament, i.e. the Standing Committee for Security and Defence, has the right to call upon any Minister or Government official to provide information to the Parliament. This is currently not being exercised. Parliamentary inquiries remain limited and public hearings are in their infant stages. Therefore there is a lack of checks and balances over the security sector, in particular in relation to expenditure.

II. UNDP's past and current support to the Iraqi Security Sector

UNDP has a global mandate to support governments in the area of good governance and Security Sector Reform (SSR), and has the widest experience of any UN agency in producing policy advice and support to governments on security and defence matters. This expertise is predicated on experience in many countries facing post conflict situations, as is the case in Iraq. Specific advice and support provided by UNDP to the Government of Iraq (GOI) has involved such areas as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), 'mine-action', disaster relief planning, gender awareness, the alleviation of domestic violence, reconciliation, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of militias, and more recently, a wide ranging program of support to capacity building in the Council of Representatives (Parliament).

In the course of these programs, the UNDP has developed an excellent working relationship with the Office of the National Security Advisor and consequently has been asked by the National Security Advisor's team to consider the provision of capacity building support to his office in the conduct of a comprehensive National Security Review (NSR) and the provision of advice in the formulation of a new Iraqi National Security Strategy which is likely to be shaped by new visions.

In furtherance of that goal, UNDP Implemented between June and December 2012 a Project Initiation Plan, aimed primarily at kick starting the development of the national security strategy and at providing high level technical advice and strategic guidance to the ONSA. This was successfully achieved through the following:

- UNDP and the ONSA organized a ***workshop in Istanbul on National Security Strategies*** between 4 and 7 July 2012. The workshop came as a follow up from an earlier workshop conducted in London and Bath in March 2012, done in collaboration with the Foreign Commonwealth Office. The objective of the Istanbul workshop was to provide staff members of the ONSA and a representative from the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence and Security some insights into different models of national security strategies. This workshop also provided an opportunity for members of the Iraqi delegation to examine the various security challenges faced in Iraq and offered room for discussions with experts from other countries on how potentially Iraq can tackle these challenges in a comprehensive and inclusive new national security strategy that promotes an effective oversight role for Parliament and civil society.
- ***Deployment of a Senior Security Sector Reform Adviser to the ONSA*** (July - December). This consultant worked closely within the ONSA to support the production of a series of notes and guidance and to assist in the preparation and conduct of a series of workshop to lay the foundations for the development of the national security strategy .
- ***Study tour in France for a number of Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives***.

  During the period 25-30 November 2012, a delegation composed of 5 Iraqi MPs as well as two senior staff from the COR participated to a study tour in France organized jointly between UNDP and the French National Assembly. This visit enabled the Iraqi delegation to learn about the tools and mechanisms in place in the French political system to enable parliamentary oversight of the security sector by the French Parliament.

These activities, which culminated in a national workshop held in Baghdad on 4 and 5 December, proved to be very successful in developing further the trust and relationship between UNDP and the ONSA and also in evidencing the commitment of the GoI towards the development of a national security strategy.

GOI has the intention to conduct a broad security review in preparations for the new security strategy that would set security firmly within a development context with a focus on good governance, parliamentary oversight, a determination of missions and roles across the entire security sector including the rule of law and justice sectors. The conduct of the review would be predicated upon the logic of a comprehensive national threat and risk analysis that would be based against development goals, human rights and consequently would weigh response options within the national fiscal round, ensuring that the security sector should be 'right-sized' to the requirement.

III. Programme Strategy

The main objectives of this project are to support the Government of Iraq with the development of a new National Security Strategy in a post US occupation period, including through the conduct of studies and surveys; to build the capacity of the ONSA to conduct security studies; to support the establishment of a new security and defence 'think tank'; and to build capacity in the Parliament to enhance oversight of security and defence. By focusing on both the executive and the legislative the project ensures that capacity building takes place on both sides to encourage a more inclusive security sector reform with effective oversight, not least financial, by Parliament.

The project has one main output under which, UNDP Iraq will, with support from UNDP HQ, more specifically the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the UK FCO, identify top experts to conduct training and workshops that will progressively build the capacity of the ONSA for conducting assessments and reviews in preparation for the formulation of security policies. The project will be implemented with the framework of UNDP's strategy to enhance the Rule of Law in Iraq. As such, the project will be implemented in close coordination with other relevant projects undertaken by UNDP with relevance for the security sector. These projects include: Support to Small Arms and Light Weapons and Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion, Family Security and Justice Support.

The project has one output and 3 identified activities but allows for flexibility as the priorities in the ONSA are yet to be identified and hence UNDP/UK FCO/GoI will have to adapt to the Iraqi needs in terms of what type of expertise will be required.

The key output of the project is: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.*** To achieve that output, three key activities have been identified under this project which will span over a 2 year period:

Key activity 1: National security strategy developed through a participatory approach

To achieve this activity, the following results will be expected:

1. National Security Sector Review Process Developed

While extensive consultation has already taken place with both members and staff of the ONSA further work is needed at the inception phase to agree on the scope and nature of UNDP/international technical support for to the ONSA and a security sector review process. UNDP will deploy an advisor who will support the ONSA throughout the formulation of the new strategy. This advisor will guide the Iraqi team throughout the entire process but commence by identifying which assessments and consultations are necessary to feed into the a new Security Policy.

Several workshops will be conducted with the ONSA working group to identify which assessments and reviews are necessary and how to go about designing these and how to best implement them. The workshops will call upon international advisors and specifically address national awareness, outreach and communications strategy reviews.

It is also important to conduct reviews of the national security legislation and which obligations Iraq has signed and how to link these with the national security policy development. For this, it is essential to conduct consultations with both Government entities, the legislative and finally with civil society and academia, including women's groups.

The objective is to end up with agreement and endorsement of a series of assessments and review, design them and plan their implementation. These multiple assessments and reviews will lay the foundations for the future strategy. It is anticipated that this will take up to one year.

As part of this, a nationwide victimization survey will be conducted jointly between the Iraqi Central Statistic Office (CSO), the ONSA and UN Agencies. The purpose of the survey will be to better understand the perceptions of Iraqi people on issues related to violence, crime and access to criminal justice. At all stages of the design and conduct of the survey, specific attention will be given to the situation of women as victims of crimes and violence and their ability to have their rights duly enforced. As such, all data will be gender disaggregated and specific analysis will be made for women and other vulnerable groups.

This survey will be a very important tool to inform the development of the national strategy and to ensure that this latter is based on people perception of violence and insecurity. UNDP will take the lead in the conduct of this survey, in close coordination with the UN Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) and UNODC.

While the project under consideration will not support the implementation of the strategy, UNDP to ensure that relevant tools and methodologies are developed and in place for the GoI to effectively monitor the strategy. These may consist in a result oriented action plan and/or M&E framework.

2. Comprehensive National Threat Assessment Process developed and conducted to inform a new National Security Policy

Conducting a Threat and Risk Assessment is critical and is usually large in scope. The Joint Planning Centre has identified important national security threats, some of which are based on the old strategy but a threat and risk assessment will inform the strategy on the magnitude of these perceived threats. It is essential before embarking on such an assessment to agree on the breadth of the actual assessment and to ensure that the process is inclusive. UNDP will support the ONSA in identifying a process to calculate and prioritise threats and risks at the national level. For this purpose several consultations and workshops will have to be conducted to build capacity and help design the assessment.

The workshops and the training sessions will thus support the ONSA in designing a consultative program. UNDP will also provide support in analysing the outcomes of the national threat assessment to feed into the National Security Strategy as well as support the development of a national risk register and the continuous review of threats and risks.

3. Finalisation of National Security Strategy

Once the proper assessments and reviews have been conducted it is empirical to conduct a series of consultations to translate the findings into policy. This is where also any necessary amendments to national security legislation should be identified.

In anticipation for the writing up of the strategy however there will be an introduction to the ONSA working group on best practises of security policies. The project plans for 2 study tour and a series of workshops (to be identified with the ONSA and the FCO).

UNDP will support and provide regular mentoring to the ONSA and the newly established research centre to write the new security policy. A series of trainers and experts will be deployed to Baghdad for each identified area. The areas will be identified at the inception phase and after some preliminary quick assessments.

UNDP will support with the drafting and the finalisation of security strategy paper in addition to conducting a review of the paper after its adoption. Since the adoption of a new strategy rests on political stability UNDP will have to ensure that its approach is flexible to suit the needs of the ONSA. The responsibility for the implementation and oversight of the national strategy will rest with the ONSA.

Key activity2: Parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector strengthened concurrently and in direct support of the production of the National Security Review

UNDP is already active in the Iraqi Parliament providing support to both the Administration and the different committees. It is therefore natural to engage with the Standing Committee on Security and Defence to build the capacity of the committee to conduct effective over-sight and ensure democratic accountability of the security services in a manner that enhances national security and democratic support for the security services.

It is therefore important to involve the committee in some of the consultations in the anticipation of the new strategy and one might argue that it would also be beneficial to conduct consultations in the parliament with parliamentary blocks and minority representatives that can feed into the new strategy. During the consultation phase before Iraq's first National Security Strategy (2007-2010) the Iraqi Parliament was consulted but it remains unsure as to how extensive theses consultations were. It is important to build unity around a new strategy which will have positive effects on reconciliation.

It is anticipated that support to Parliament will be threefold: 1)i.e. a series of workshops and trainings on Security Sector Reform, 2)capacity development of both staff in the Research and Legal Directorates and MPs and 3) support to public outreach in the context of security sector reform and the development of a new security strategy. Various entities have a strong legacy of supporting

parliaments when it comes to the security sector such as the institute for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) who are also used to working with committees responsible for security and defence. The UK FCO and other entities will also be in a prime position to support UNDP in bringing in experts to interact with the Committee and Parliament as a whole.

Key activity3: Research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development are enhanced and the Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS) fully established as the GoI 'think tank'

The Al Narhain Center for Strategic Studies (NCSS) has been recently established under the auspices of the office of the National Security Advisor. This center is responsible for conducting research and engages in advocacy in areas relating to security and defence. More specifically, this research body will provide advice on public policy relating to security and defence and its members will include public officials, academics and civil society representation. This type of entity is new within the Iraqi Government and the project thus anticipates that experts from foreign Think Tanks and research centres will lend support and give guidance to this new entity so that it can become a functional institute that serves the Government and the ONSA in formulating National Security Policies.

It is anticipated that a combination of circa 8-10 workshops and regular consultations will take place over a period of 2 years. These workshops will be aimed at building the research and analysis capacity of members and to encourage it to engage and include non-government actors and universities in regular consultations. While the support provided will focus very much on developing the capacities of the NCSS in the context of the security strategy, UNDP will also look at ways and means to support the institutional development of the center through the exchanges which will be conducted and the partnership which will be established. UNDP in collaboration with the UK FCO will also ensure that the new research centre is linked up with similar entities that can provide additional support such as Academic Experts and foreign and regional Think Tanks (such as Chatham House). It is also anticipated that members of the centre/institute will undergo at least 2 study tours to familiarize themselves with the workings of similar research centres in other countries involved in security policy work. These tours are yet to be decided with ONSA and further defined to match the real needs.

Partnership

The project will be implemented in close partnership with a relevant institutions and partners working in the area of security / security sector reform. These include, relevant bilateral partners (inc. the UK, US and French embassies), the United Nations Agencies and programmes (incl. the International Organization for Migration which as recently initiated a community policing programme), as well as local partners such as universities, think tanks, etc.

Gender analysis and strategy

Experience demonstrates that there are many different ways to integrate a gender perspective into SSR processes. These include:

- Developing gender responsive security laws and policies:

It is crucial, to address diverse security and justice needs, that laws and policies relating to security and justice are gender responsive and include the relevant international instruments in that matter. This demonstrates also a commitment and a political will to gender equality at the top-level of decisions-making. These policies and laws relating to security and justice should ensure both men and women equal access and participation in the different stages of a SSR process, such as developing, implementing and evaluating policy and/or law. They must also guarantee that their benefits, advantages and gains are equally accessible to both men and women.

- Supporting equality in recruitment, retention and advancement:

Security system institutions, from the policy making level to personnel working on the ground, have to be representative of the population they seek to serve, in order to enhance their legitimacy and efficiency in the eyes of the public.

- Promoting respect for human rights / combating Gender Based Violence and sexual misconducts

Addressing to gender based and human rights violations is crucial in order to ensure the operational effectiveness of security sector personnel and its legitimacy in the eye of the public.

In fact, sexual misconducts within the security personnel – especially where the overwhelming majority of the personnel is male –, undermines an institution trough a loss of productivity, lowered morale, absence from work, increased staff turnover and prevent women from integrating security agencies.

Also, security personnel in the police, penitentiary and army sectors, if not trained and aware on human rights respect and violations in general, are consequently not able to respond adequately and efficiently to such violations. It creates thus a lack of trust, legitimacy and efficiency of those institutions for the populations they seek to serve.

- Strengthening collaboration with women's organizations:

Women's civil society organizations (CSOs) can serve as a crucial bridge between local communities and security policymakers, strengthening local ownership through communicating security and justice needs to policymakers and raising awareness of SSR in local communities.

Based on this analysis, the project manager will ensure that the three outputs of the projects are implemented in a gender sensitive manner. This will be achieved by 1) ensuring that all the activities undertaken in the context of this project takes into consideration the specific needs of women and other vulnerable groups and 2) by ensuring that the project promotes women participation in all its activities.

1. Specific needs of women and other vulnerable groups

It is critical that the national security strategy which will be developed recognizes that women and other vulnerable groups are affected differently by issues of violence and insecurity, as recalled explicitly by UN SC resolution 1325. In order to ensure that gender issues are reflected in the national strategy, the following will be done:

- All studies which will be conducted to inform the development of the strategy will need to consider the specific needs of women and other vulnerable groups. Also, any survey which will be undertaken will have gender disaggregated data in order to understand the specific needs of women and other groups and to respond accordingly.

- During the consultation phase, women groups will be consulted and their views and opinions will be reflected in the various reports which will be produced. This is reflected in the indicators of the project.

- The national strategy will include a specific chapter on gender, in addition to mainstreaming gender into all the various chapters, where applicable.

The consultant who will be deployed will be specifically tasked to follow up on this issue and one of his contract deliverable will be specifically dedicated to gender issues. The project manager, alongside with the office gender specialists will monitor the whole process.

2. Women participation and empowerment

As men are highly over-represented within SSR processes and security institutions, and as it is often perceived to be the domain of 'experts' in the security arena and is sufficiently technical to discourage non military individuals and groups from entering the debate, concrete actions will be taken during the project implementation to enhance the participation and advancement of women, and to ensure the participation of CSOs, including women's organizations. In order to achieve that, Iraqi authorities will be for instance requested to nominate women in the various activities which will be conducted (incl. Study tours, workshops, etc.). Beyond participation of women, the project manager will ensure that the voice of the female participants is heard and that their comments / views / opinions are reflected in the various documents which will be produced.

The note on gender sensitivity in a SSR process which has been developed in the framework of this project will provide guidance for the implementation of the project throughout its various stages. In particular,

adherence to the principles and mechanisms contained in the following matrix will be monitored on a continuous basis

Gender responsive Mechanisms	
Objectives	Do the objectives include: - The improved delivery of security and justice services to men, women, girls and boys? - More representative and participative security sector institutions? - Increased accountability and reduced human rights violations?
Activities	- Are initiatives designed to address the particular security needs of women and girls, as well as marginalized men and boys? - Are there activities to increase the participation of women and other under-represented groups in security sector institutions? - What activities address human rights violations by security sector personnel? Are those activities pointing at all the different levels, from prevention and awareness raising with trainings, to formal procedures to resolve complaints and sanctions?
Outputs	- Are specific outputs directed towards women, men, girls and boys? - Are there outputs that focus on preventing, responding and prosecuting GBV and increasing the recruitment, retention and advancement of women within security and justice institutions?
Indicators	- Are there specific indicators to monitor gender-related objectives and the impact of gender activities? - Is data collection sex-disaggregated?
Budget	- Are specific funds earmarked for gender objectives, activities and outputs? - Are personnel and officials stakeholders involved in budget process aware and trained on technical methods to plan and implement a gender sensitive SSR budget?
Partners / beneficiaries	- Are women, girls, handicapped, minorities, elderly, youth and marginalized people clearly identified as beneficiaries? - Are women's and men's organizations working on gender issues, included as potential partners? - Do identified partners have the commitment and capacity to work in a gender-responsive manner? Are responsibilities and expectations regarding gender clearly spelled out in programme documents, agreements and contracts?

The project will also look at building linkages and synergies between the ONSA / Al Narhain Center with relevant institutions / organizations having dedicated expertise and / or particular interest on the issue of gender and security. These may include for instance the Iraqi Center of Excellence on Gender that UNDP is supporting and Iraqi NGOs which are part of the 1325 CSOs network.

IV. Results and Resources Framework

Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework: Outcome 2: Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards				
Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Review of security sector conducted and presented to the GOI (2010: no; 2014: yes)				
Applicable Key Result Area: Democratic Governance				
Partnership Strategy				
Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID):00067618				
INTENDED OUTPUTS	**OUTPUT TARGETS FOR 2013-2014**	**INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES**	**RESPONSIBLE PARTIES**	**INPUTS**
Output 1: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.*** *Indicators:* **1. A National Security Strategy is developed through a participatory approach** *Baseline:* Outdated national security strategy (2007-2010) *Target:* By 31/12/2013 the National Security Strategy is drafted **2. Number of consultations held between the ONSA and the D&S committee members during the national security strategy development process and number of public**	1. Framework for technical assistance and joint work-plan developed and agreed between UNDP and the GOI/ONSA (2013) 2. National Security Sector Review Process developed and Agreed (2013) 3. National Threat Assessment developed to inform a new National Security Policy (2013) 4. Victimization survey conducted and launched (2013) 5. National Security Strategy produced that adheres to best practices and HR principles.(2013)	**Key activity 1:** **Development of a National security strategy through a participatory approach.** Series of consultations / meetings with various stakeholders in Iraq Support to the realization of studies and public surveys to inform the strategy development process Provision of high level expertise on specific issues through the recruitment of dedicated expertise Provision of technical support and strategic guidance on the conduct of the strategy through the deployment of a senior SSR consultant	UNDP UNODC	Technical expertise Realization of studies / surveys Meetings/workshops TOTAL: $410.000 (UK: 210.000 UNDP: 200.000)

hearings held by the D&S committee *Baseline:* The CoR is rarely consulted on issues related to SSR. *Target:* By 01/07/2013, a minimum of 3 consultations have been held and by 31/12/2013 at least three additional public hearings have been held on security related issues **3. Number of researches and studies conducted** *Baseline:* To be defined *Target:* By 30/09/2014, a minimum of 10 research papers/studies have been produced by the ONSA	6. Support to CoR Security and Defence Committee to build their capacity to conduct effective over-sight and ensure democratic accountability of the security services in a manner that enhances national security and democratic support for the security services. (2014)	**Key activity 2: Strengthen Parliamentary and civilian oversight in direct support of the production of the National Security Review** Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the D&S Committee of the CoR (institutional contract with international NGO) Exchange of experience with relevant National Parliaments On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the D&S committee	UNDP	Technical Expertise Travel Meetings/ workshops TOTAL: $268.000 (UK: 168.000 UNDP: 100.000)
	7. Think Tank Established under the ONSA with capacity to support the formation of the new Security Policy (2013) 8. Communication and knowledge transfer networks established with non-government security policy institutes and university research centres (2014) 9. Enhanced capacity in non-government security policy institutes and research centres at universities to support government security research requirements (2014)	**Key activity 3: Enhance the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development and support the Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS) to become the GoI 'think tank' on security issues.** Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the ONSA through the exchange of experience with relevant Think Tank and policy research centers. On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the Office of the NSA Provision of technical support and strategic guidance through the deployment of a senior SSR consultant	UNDP	Technical expertise Travel TOTAL: $335.000 (UK: 335.000 UNDP: 0)

V.ANNUAL WORKPLAN YEAR 1-2

Year: 2013

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, associated indicators and annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	Timeframe				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	**Amount**
Output 1: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.*** *Indicators:* ***Indicators:*** **1. A National Security Strategy is developed through a participatory approach** ***Baseline*:** **Outdated national security strategy (2007-2010)** ***Target*:** **By 31/12/2013 the National Security Strategy is drafted**									
	Key activity 1: **Development of a National security strategy through a participatory approach.**								
	Series of consultations / meetings with various stakeholders in Iraq	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	Workshop & Travel (71600)	20,000
	Support to the realization of studies and public surveys to inform the strategy development process	X	X	X	X	UNDP / UNODC / IAU	UK	Consultancy(71200 - international)	40,000
							UNDP		183,019
	Provision of high level expertise on specific issues (four consultants - 20 working days each)	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	Consultancy(71200 - international)	50,000
	Recruitment of a Senior SSR Advisor	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	Consultancy(71200 - international)	100,000
Indicators: **1. Number of consultations held between the ONSA and the D&S committee members during the national security strategy development process and number of public hearings held by the D&S committee** *Baseline:* The CoR is rarely consulted on issues related to SSR. *Target:* By 01/07/2013, a minimum of 3 consultations have been held andby 31/12/2013 at least three additional public hearings have been held on security related issues									
	Key Activity 2: **Key activity 2: Strengthen Parliamentary and civilian oversight in direct support of the production of the National Security Review**								
	Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the D&S Committee of the CoR	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	NGO - Contract	50,000
							UNDP		50,000

	Exchange of experience with relevant National Parliaments		X	X		UNDP	UK	Workshop & travel (71600)	45,000
	On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the D&S committee					UNDP	UK/UNDP	NGO contract - See activity 1 above	
Indicators **1. Number of researches and studies conducted** *Baseline:* To be defined *Target:* By 30/09/2014, a minimum of 10 research papers/studies have been produced by the ONSA									
	Key Activity 3: **Enhance the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development and support the Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS) to become the GoI 'think tank' on security issues**								
	Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the ONSA through the exchange of experience with relevant Think Tank and policy research centers	X	X	X	X	ONSA / UNDP	UK	Workshop & Travel (71600)	50,000
	On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the Office of the NSA	X	X	X	X	ONSA / UNDP	UK	NGO Service contract - See activity 1 above	
	Recruitment of a Senior SSR Advisor	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	Consultancy (71200 - international)	100,000
TOTAL ACTIVITY 1 - 3									**688,019**
	Key Activity 4: **Management**								

	Project Associate		X	X	X			Service Contract (71400)	39,000
	National Officer		X	X	X				45,000
	travel	X	X	X	X		UK	73100	20,000
	Rental and maintenance of premises	X	X	X	X				15,000
TOTAL MANAGEMENT									**119,000**
TOTAL MANAGEMENT + ACTIVITY 1- 3									**807,019**
	Communication (1%) M&E (3%) Security (2%) GMS (7%)								8,070 24,518 16,140 42,374
TOTAL YEAR 1									**898,031**

Year: 2014

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, associated indicators and annual targets*	**PLANNED ACTIVITIES** *List activity results and associated actions*	**Timeframe**				**RESPONSIBLE PARTY**	**PLANNED BUDGET**		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	**Amount**
Output 1: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.*** *Indicators:*									

1. Number of consultations held between the ONSA and the D&S committee members during the national security strategy development process and number of public hearings held by the D&S committee *Baseline:* *The CoR is rarely consulted on issues related to SSR.* *Target:* *By 01/07/2013, a minimum of 3 consultations have been held and by 31/12/2013 at least three additional public hearings have been held on security related issues* ***2. Number of researches and studies conducted*** *Baseline:* To be defined *Target:* By 30/09/2014, a minimum of 10 research papers/studies have been produced by the ONSA	**Key Activity 2:** **Key activity 2: Strengthen Parliamentary and civilian oversight in direct support of the production of the National Security Review**								
	Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the D&S Committee of the CoR	X	X			UNDP	UK		55,000
	Exchange of experience with relevant National Parliaments	X				CoR / UNDP	UK	Workshop & travel (71600)	32,000
							UNDP		50,000
	On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the D&S committee					CoR / UNDP	UK	See activity 1	
	Key Activity 3: **Enhance the research and analytical capacities of the ONSA to inform policy development and support the Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS) to become the GoI 'think tank' on security issues**								

	Provision of high level technical expertise and establishment of a mentoring programme to support the ONSA through the exchange of experience with relevant Think Tank and policy research centers	X	X	X	X	ONSA / UNDP	UK	Workshop & Travel (71600)	75,000
	On site trainings / capacity development sessions for members of the Office of the NSA	X	X	X	X	ONSA / UNDP	UK	See activity 1 above	
	Recruitment of a Senior SSR Advisor	X	X	X	X	UNDP	UK	Consultancy (71200 - international)	110,000
TOTAL ACTIVITY 1 - 3									**3222,000**
	Key Activity 4: <u>Management</u>								
	Project Associate National Officer Rental and maintenance of premises	X X X	X X X	X X X	 X X		 UK	Service Contract (71400) Service Contract (71400) 73100	39,000 60,000 15,000
TOTAL MANAGEMENT									**114,000**
TOTAL MANAGEMENT + ACTIVITY 1-3									**436,000**
	Communication (1%) M&E (3%) Security (2%) GMS (7%)								4,360 12,870 8,720 28,851
TOTAL YEAR 2									**490,801**

UNDP will report against its contribution as a part of this project to give a better overview on its overall engagement on SSR. More importantly UNDP will discuss with the ONSA and the GoI their overall commitment to cost sharing. It is hoped that these negotiations will lead to cost sharing on any future travelling for Iraqi Delegations, freeing up costs for more expertise to be allocated to Iraq in the form of consultancies and policy support.

VI.Management structure



The project will be executed by UNDP using a Direct Implementation modality under the overall coordination of the Project Board which will consist of representatives from the ONSA, UK FCO and UNDP. The management and implementation structure for the programme will consist of the (a) Project Board (b) a Programme Management Unit under the Project Manager in addition to external and internal experts, including the CPR and Gender Advisors.

The role and the responsibilities of each entity in the organization structure are as follows:

1. Project Board

The PB will include senior representatives from UNDP and of the relevant Governorate authorities. It will be chaired by UNDP Country Director, who also functions as the Senior Executive of the PB, and will meet regularly and have a decision-making role. The Project Board will specifically be responsible for the following

- Review and appraise detailed Project Plan and AWP, including Atlas reports covering activity definition, quality criteria, issue log, risk log and the monitoring and communication plan
- Provide overall guidance and direction to the project, ensuring it remains within any specified constraints
- Address project issues as raised by the Project Manager
- Provide guidance and agree on possible countermeasures/management actions to address specific risks
- Agree on Project Manager's tolerances in the Annual Work Plan and quarterly plans when required
- Conduct regular meetings to review the Project Quarterly Progress Report and provide direction and recommendations to ensure that the agreed deliverables are produced satisfactorily according to plans
- Review Combined Delivery Reports (CDR) prior to certification by the Implementing Partner
- Review each completed project stage and approve progress to the next
- Appraise the Project Annual Progress Report, make recommendations for the next AWP, and inform the Outcome Board about the results of the review

- Provide ad-hoc direction and advice for exception situations when tolerances are exceeded
- Assess and decide on project changes through revisions

At the end of the project

- Assure that all Project deliverables have been produced satisfactorily
- Review and approve the Final project report , including lessons learnt
- Make recommendations for follow on actions to be submitted to the Outcome Board
- Commission project evaluation, if recommended by the PB
- Notify operational completion of the project to the Outcome Board
- Ensure full implementation of the project
- Provide strategic orientations and recommendations to the project manager and implementers.

❖ **The Executive**

The role of Executive will be hold by UNDP Country Director. The Executive is ultimately responsible for the project, supported by the Senior Beneficiary and Senior Supplier. The Executive's role is to ensure that the project is focused throughout its life cycle on achieving its objectives and delivering outputs that will contribute to higher level outcomes. The Executive has to ensure that the project gives value for money, ensuring a cost-conscious approach to the project, balancing the demands of beneficiary and supplier

❖ **The Senior Beneficiary**

A member of the NSC will hold the role of Senior Beneficiary. The Senior Beneficiary is responsible for validating the needs and for monitoring that the solution will meet those needs within the constraints of the project. The role represents the interests of all those who will benefit from the project, or those for whom the deliverables resulting from activities will achieve specific output targets. The Senior Beneficiary role monitors progress against targets and quality criteria.

❖ **Senior Supplier**

Head of Governance Pillar, UNDP will hold the role of Senior Supplier. The Senior Supplier represents the interests of the parties which provide funding and/or technical expertise to the project (designing, developing, facilitating, procuring, implementing). The Senior Supplier's primary function within the Board is to provide guidance regarding the technical feasibility of the project. The Senior Supplier role must have the authority to commit or acquire supplier resources required.

2. Project Team

❖ **Project Manager**

The PM will be responsible for the day to day implementation of the project. The PM also resides over any consultants or advisors that are hired to do capacity support. The Gender Advisor and the CPR Advisor will provide support in facilitating for the implementation of the programme and identify entry points. The PM is responsible for: Preparing the annual work plan

- Ensuring the implementation of the activities of the project
- Ensuring the financial follow up
- Identifying potential donors
- Producing narrative and financial reports

The PM is thus in charge of the day-to-day management of the project, including the work plan, budget planning and oversight, drafting terms of reference for the acquisition of services and goods,

elaborating and implementing a procurement plan, and the oversight of operations in the field. The Unit will also be responsible for producing financial and progress reports as required.

- **National Officer**

The National Officer will be responsible for supporting the implementation of the project in close coordination with the project manager and the consultants recruited in the framework of the project. He/she will be responsible for inter alia, liaising and coordinating between UNDP and national relevant counterpart for the effective implementation of the project, monitoring and reporting on its implementation, or conducting research to assist in the development of concept notes, project documents and policy frameworks as directed by the supervisor.

- **Project Associate**

The project associate will support the implementation of the project from an administrative and financial point of view. He/she will be responsible fororganizing meetings, missions and all other programme related events by securing the venue, arranging tickets, accommodations, entitlements, required security clearance requests and any other necessary support for the participants and team members; assisting in preparing mission planning; following up the requires approval process as well as preparation of necessary documents after the return from the mission for UNDP Rule of Law team (staff and consultants) and other participants as requested and preparing financial reports, update on available funds, monitoring and evaluation of results.

VII. Monitoring Framework And Evaluation

As mentioned above the management committee of the Project is in charge of the monitoring through narrative and financial progress reports in accordance with UNDP procedures and requirements. The steering committee will provide additional oversight to the monitoring and evaluation process by reviewing and leading the annual project report.

Ongoing monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken through the life of the project.

Monitoring and Review Milestones

Project Board meetings: These meetings will review progress reports half way through the implementation of the project so as to take necessary actions to ensure the project results are achieved and where necessary, recommend a change in implementation strategy.

Annual project review: Based on the Annual Review Report an annual project review will be conducted during the fourth quarter of the year or soon after, to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the following year should the project be extended or enter a phase II. This review will be driven by the Project Board and may involve other stakeholders as required. It will focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes.

Quality at entry assessment. This will be conducted in the framework of the outcome evaluation which is planned for 2013.

Financial Reporting

Financial reporting will be done in accordance with standard UNDP practises and UNDP financial rules and regulations. UNDP will be responsible for preparation of the project's Final Financial Statement. The project will be subject to a standard annual audit as per UNDP's rules, regulations and procedures. Any NGOs used during this project will be audited after implementation.

Quarterly Progress Reports

In accordance with UNDP procedures, quarterly progress reports will be produced by the Project Manager and submitted to the Project Board. These will include lessons-learned, risk log, issues log and a monitoring schedule plan to provide an assessment of progress against outputs, stipulated indicators and their

contribution towards the outcome as stated in the results framework, and as measured by the corresponding indicators.

Final Report:

A finial report will be prepared by Project Manager and shared with the Project Board. This report will include a summary of results achieved against the pre-defined annual targets at the output level and presented to the Steering Committee review.

Quality Management for Project Activity Results

Output 1: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.***		
Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)	*Key Activity 1: National Security Strategy*	*Start Date: 01/01/2013* *End Date: 31/12/2013*
Purpose	*To develop a national security strategy which will be endorsed by the GoI*	
Description	*In order to develop the strategy a number of activities will be conducted. These includes:* *1. Establishment of a working group* *2. Development of a number of studies and surveys* *3. Series of technical workshops*	
Quality Criteria *how/with what indicators the quality of the activity result will be measured?*	***Quality Method*** *Means of verification. What method will be used to determine if quality criteria has been met?*	***Date of Assessment*** *When will the assessment of quality be performed?*
See above indicators, as identified in the RRF. These includes, number of surveys / studies conducted, number of workshops / meetings held, etc.	*On-sight monitoring* *Consultant reports* *Reports by ONSA*	*The quality assessment will be performed on a continuous basis by the project manager and under the guidance of the project board*

Output 1: ***The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.***		
Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)	*Key activity 2: Parliamentary support*	*Start Date: 1/01/2013* *End Date: 3/06/2014*
Purpose	*To strengthen the role of the CoR to oversee the security sector*	
Description	*The output will be realized through the provision of technical support and strategic guidance to the Defense and Security Committee of the CoR. This will be done through the implementation of a monitoring programme with the support of an international NGOs / research policy center.*	
Quality Criteria *how/with what indicators the quality of the activity result will be measured?*	***Quality Method*** *Means of verification. What method will be used to determine if quality criteria has been met?*	***Date of Assessment*** *When will the assessment of quality be performed?*
See above indicators, as identified in the RRF. These includes, number of public hearings on security issues held by the CoR, number of questions to the government, etc.	*On-sight monitoring* *CoR gazette* *Contractor report*	*The quality assessment will be performed on a continuous basis by the project manager and under the guidance of the project board*

Output 1:

The reform of the Iraqi Security Sector is initiated, in line with relevant international and regional standards.		
Activity Result (Atlas Activity ID)	*Key Activity 3: Development of research and analytical capacities of the ONSA*	*Start Date: 01/01/2013* *End Date: 31/12/2014*
Purpose	*To support the ONSA to develop its research and analytical capacities*	
Description	*This output will be realized through the provision of technical support and strategic guidance to the ONSA and the Narhain Center. This will be achieved through the deployment of a consultant and the establishment of a twinning programme with a foreign research center*	
Quality Criteria *how/with what indicators the quality of the activity result will be measured?*	***Quality Method*** *Means of verification. What method will be used to determine if quality criteria has been met?*	***Date of Assessment*** *When will the assessment of quality be performed?*
See above indicators, as identified in the RRF. These includes,Number of exchange of experience with relevant Think Tank and policy research centers, number of research produced, etc.	*On-sight monitoring* *Consultant reports* *Reports by ONSA*	*The quality assessment will be performed on a continuous basis by the project manager and under the guidance of the project board*

VII Feasibility, risk management and sustainability

Though progress is currently discernible in respect of the security situation in Iraq, to some extent reflected in the outcomes of the January 2009 provincial elections and later the March 2010 General Elections, the security situation, while seeing some vast improvements remains unpredictable. This necessitates the formulation of a detailed *risk management strategy* that includes potential scenarios which identify risk factors and a flexible response strategy. This also necessitates the development of a sound communication approach in close coordination with the GoI. This approach will identify how the GoI wishes to communicate on its efforts to support the reform of the security sector and also describe how UNDP will communicate on a subject that is highly sensitive.

As indicated earlier, the holistic approach on which the UNDP Project is based requires a multi-pronged implementation process which serves to reinforce the inter-linkages between the three expected outputs This needs to be clearly reflected in all the identified risk scenarios, which also includes estimating the (additional) cost of contingency plans (see risk log for further details).

The security situation in Iraq remains a risk to the implementation of all projects although because many of the counterparts are situated in the IZ access for this particular initiative is good.

Another risk is political stability as well as political will. National ownership is thus essential so that the major stakeholders feel that they have a stake in the project which will be ensured through their participation in the Steering Committee and the Project Board and with regular liaison with the all the national counterparts in the National Security Council and other security entities. Although this is not expected during the year 2013, a change in Iraq leadership could have significant influence on the project implementation.

Lessons Learned

Past experiences in implementing projects in Iraq have taught us:

- This project will conduct most of its consultations and capacity building inside Iraq.
- National ownership is crucial for buy in and willingness to improve/change.
- Training or consultation/advice without substantive follow-up does not lead to sustainable capacity building. Training has got to be practical to increase technical expertise and in line with GoI needs. A follow up needs to be done where those trained get to implement what they have learned.
- Political appointments and or potential nepotism must be avoided at all costs.

- Changes in staff can lead to setbacks in projects. It's essential to have institutionally agreed frameworks that are flexible to anticipate any changes in counterparts.
- The project board will ensure the project remains on track and is delivered as planned.
- The ability to bring in external advisors and UN staff members depends on the security situation and availability of slots. Contingency plans have to be in place to ensure that the project is not compromised badly by security challenges or changes in UN staff ceilings.

VIII Legal Context

- ***The project has been subjected to LPAC for validity in the Country Office.***
- ***The country has signed the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA):***

This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the SBAA between the Government of Iraq and UNDP, signed on 12 January 1976

Consistent with the Article III of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement, the responsibility for the safety and security of the executing agency and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in the executing agency's custody, rests with the executing agency.

The executing agency shall:

a) put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;

b) Assume all risks and liabilities related to the executing agency's security, and the full implementation of the security plan[15].

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of this agreement.

The executing agency agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

[15]It is worth noting that due to the challenging security situation in Iraq the UN currently relies on its own security measures in addition to host nation support.

annex II Risk Log

Description	Risk Type	Potential Effect	Risk Impact	Risk Probability	Most Recent Management Response (i.e. action to be taken)	Risk Owner
Financial risks associated with non-core resources (late or non-payment)	Financial	Late or non-payment by donor represents significant risks to the CO, given scale of operations.	3	1	*Entered by unit* Apply new Risk Management Guideline tools to mitigate the risk.	Project Manager
Project management in complex environment, subject to compliance with cumbersome procedure	Environmental	Compromises the likelihood of achieving expected results.	3	2	*Entered by unit* Use fast track procedures and Crisis rules and regulations	Country Director
Capacity of government to plan and deliver.	Strategic	Slow and unsteady coordination with government institutions often results in changes of scope late in the project cycle, requiring additional negotiations, sourcing and procurement, all of which creates additional implementation delays.	2	3	*Entered by unit* Provision of additional support to GoI at different levels to assist in overcoming strategic shortcomings. Emphasis on scheduling and responsibilities helps focusing all stakeholders on responsible planning.	DRR - operation
Necessary reliance on remote management operational modalities.	Operational	Constraints on oversight and quality assurance to the site by UNDP. More expenses incur on consulting services for risk mitigation and quality assurance measure. Limited ability to monitor progress, financial arrangements, transparency of recruitment and procurement processes etc.	4	2	*Entered by unit* Apply the principles from the draft version of UNDP's Remote Management Programme Guidance Outsourcing services and quality to mitigate risk and ensure quality of work. Involve local counterparts in certification of progress of implementation at site.	DRR - Operation

Limitation and availability of vendors working in and for Iraq, in non-fluid market with lengthy delivery time to site.	Operational	Limits competition, complicates installation and compromises timely delivery.	1	2	*Entered by unit* Extensive procurement advertisement is in place Online vendor registration is established Expanding Vendor database including vendor short listing details LTA's established for recurring procurement	DRR Operations
Possible misappropriation of funds and sub-optimal achievements of program results due to limited in-country monitoring capacity	Operational	See risk on remote management.	3	2	*Entered by unit* See risk on remote management.	DRR Operations
The ability to attract on timely basis, and retain, high-calibre and appropriately profiled staff (modest incentive packages against unusual work load, with professional and personal risk associated with working in Iraq)	Operational	Success of the CO is directly linked to our ability to attract, as well as retain, high-calibre professionals.	4	3	*Entered by unit* Explore, in close collaboration with OHR Policy Division, innovative and creative ways of offering additional incentives for personnel.	DRR Operations
Constant changing government personnel at political and professional grades.	Political	Results in implementation delay and/or cancellation of project as renegotiation or reestablishment of functional relations is required; ultimately affecting delivery.	4	3	*Entered by unit* Avoidance of dependency on certain individuals in the current government structure through enhanced institutional development. The cancellation of one activity will not result in other activities folding.	Country Director
Changes in regulatory environment and introduction of new regulations and legislation	Regulatory	Delays project implementation due to cumbersome additional processes introduced by new policies, leading to low	3	3	*Entered by unit* Delivery targets reviewed and revised taking account of changing external	DRRs (Programme)

		delivery.			environment.	
Improved operating environment in some parts of the country	Operational	Improved UN presence in Iraq	4	4	*Entered by unit* Expansion and new presence established in, Ramadi and Najaf	DRR Program
deterioration of the security situation in Iraq	Political	field operation and field presence severely limited affecting program delivery	4	2	*Entered by unit* Reduction on staffing ceiling	DSS / DO

ANNEX 4 – ONSA Briefing, 2013

IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
REVIEW PROCESS

- ORGANIZATION
- TIMELINE
- TEAM INPUT/OUPUT FLOW CHART
- ROLES & RESPONSIBILITES
- TEAM SELECTION CRITERIA
- SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
- NATIONAL INTERESTS
- SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF ANALYSIS


Organizational Structure
PM
Na-onal Security Council
NSA
National Security Council
Deputies
National Security Policy Steering Committee
Dep NSA (Chair)
Management Committee
Project Manager
(Al-Nahrain Center)
Development & Monitoring Team
Analyzing & Draft Preparation Team
Review & Evaluation Team

NSS REVIEW TIMELINE



TEAM INPUT/OUTPUT FLOW CHART

Analyzing & Draft Preparation Team

- Evaluates strategic environment first, comprehensive evaluation criteria second
- National interests defined, categorized & priorities identified
- Develops information collection plan
- Develops and distributes assessment criteria for sector review
- Develops analytical criteria for interests & priorities & resources (weighted matrix)
- Collects sector assessments
- Prepares scenarios to evaluate the threats and the risks
- Writes "Comprehensive Study for the National Security (Security Environment & Threat Assessment)"

Review & Evaluation Team

- Provides Initial Security Environment & Core National Interests Guidance
- Approval of team leadership, membership, tasks, missions, roles & responsibilities
- Assessment Criteria defined and approved

National Security Policy Steering Committee
Deputy NSA (Chair)

National Security Council Deputies

TEAM INPUT/OUTPUT FLOW CHART



TEAM INPUT/OUTPUT FLOW CHART



ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Review & Evalua-on Team (Team Lead, Sector Associates, Secretary)

- Develops informaDon collecDon plan
- Develops assessment criteria for sector review
- Develops analyDcal criteria for interests & prioriDes & resources (weighted matrix)
- Prepares scenarios to evaluate the threats and risks
- Collects sector assessments
- Writes "Comprehensive Study of Security Environment & Threat Assessment"

Analysis & Dral Prepara-on Team (Analysis Team Lead and Associates, Dral Prepara-on Team Lead and Associates, Secretary)

- Analyzes "Comprehensive Study of Security Environment & Threat Assessment"
- Refines & reprioriDzes naDonal interests by integraDng sector strategies
- Align resources with strategies (ends, ways, means)
- Develops vision & NaDonal Security Strategy DraZ

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Development & Monitoring Team (Team Lead, Associates, Secretary)

- Review and develop the draZ
- Present the draZ to the NSC –DepuDes
- Develop the final draZ for approval
- Monitor the review and implementaDon of the strategy aZer its approving, and monitor the development of other sectors' strategy in order for them to support and be consistent with the NaDonal Security Strategy.
- Coordinates Revisions for Final Approval

Steering CommiLee

- Guide the work team
- Develop an evaluaDon guidelines, monitor the progress
- Present the outputs to the NSC---DepuDes and guide the Development and Monitoring Team in accordance with recommendaDons from the depuDes
- Guide other sectors in order for them to support the NSS
- Present the draZ to NSS and other federal authoriDes, regions, ParDes and poliDcal blocs, academics and civil society.

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Al Nahrain Center

- PreparaDon for the team meeDngs at the center
- Provide administraDve and logisDc support
- Provide studies and informaDon in accordance with the naDonal security council
- Contract experts to support the process in accordance with the team composiDon

TEAM SELCTION CRITERIA

Criteria for the selec-on of team members

- Must be graduates of prestigious and approved academies, holding at least a Masters Degree in their respective fields.
- Have a minimum of 22 years work experience in the executive services and progression in job position to the level of deputy director or higher in their respective fields.
- Have noteworthy and documented achievements and reputation in the field of strategic and operational planning and implementation, particularly after 2003.
- Have performed research, studies and workshops that have contributed to the development and building of state institutions and that have successfully helped strategic decisions.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NEAR FUTURE (1---4 YEARS)

- Oil will continue to be Iraq's primary economic driver
- Climate change will effect resources and agriculture
- Sectarian violence will continue to inhibit Iraqi unity
- Regional instability (Syria, Egypt,) will require military action to secure borders
- Key regional actors will impact Iraqi internal politics/security
- Advances in social issues will face challenges from cultural/religious customs

FUTURE (1---10 YEARS)

- Oil will continue to be Iraq's primary economic driver
- Resources sector decisions/actions in 2013-2016 will have long-range impacts
- Lack of education/training/employment of Iraqi youth can fuel instability

WHERE TO BEGIN?

SUGGESTED CORE NATIONAL INTERESTS?

Those interests that are enduring to Iraq and the Iraqi people, that is, they remain constant regardless of the political party in power and are essential to the well-being of Iraqis.

- ✓ ***Secure Iraqi Borders***
- ✓ ***Domestic Stability***
- ✓ ***Economic Prosperity for Iraq and Iraqis***
- ✓ ***Secure Production, Distribution and Exportation of Oil***
- ✓ ***Access, Distribution, and Use of Water Resources***
- ✓ ***Advance Human Rights and Dignity of Iraqi People***

WHAT ARE IRAQ'S KEY ISSUES?

- The cons-tu-on, the state structure and the prac-ce of sovereignty by the federal government (1)
- The cons-tu-onal rights and freedoms for individuals or groups (1)
- Independency, Sovereignty, the state security and the unity of the country (1)
- The state agencies: integrity and efficiency (1)
- Oil and gas , transferring lines and the exporta-on (4)
- Water, agriculture and environment (4)
- Electricity (4)
- Building economy, environment and sustained development (2)
- The infrastructure for ci-es and villages, and educa-on and community service (1)
- Internal threats, inconsistency to the local Peace (1)
- External threats (1)
- Campaigning against poverty and for social jus-ce (1)
- Police and judiciary (1)
- Armed forces , arming and Military Powers Balance (3)
- media, informa-on and communica-on (1)
- Security Performance and the reform needs (1)
- The security sector Budget: ceiling and priori-es (2)
- Strategies and current plans (1)
- Direct and indirect link to the expected na-onal Interests in 2014 (1)
- Evaluate the capacity of the ministry or the Bureau to provide support to the na-onal interests (1)

- A list of incurred losses in the resources during implemen-ng daily works (1)
- A vision on the immediate future plan (1)

CATEGORIES

(Interests & Al Nahrain Center Research)

1. Cons-tu-onal maLers, governance, interna-onal law;

2. Economics, economic infrastructure, budge-ng and delivery of government services;

3. Threat and risk analysis, security and defence planning,

4. Climate change, the security of natural resources, water and food;

5. Reconcilia-on, transi-onal jus-ce, social reform, the rule of law and access to jus-ce, and na-onal unity;

6. Informa-on technology and cyber security.

HOW DO YOU PRIORITIZE INTERESTS?

CATEGORIZE INTERESTS

Vital: *if unfulfilled, it will have immediate consequences for core na7onal interests.*

Important: *if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect core na7onal interests.*

Peripheral: *if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core na7onal interests.*

HOW DO SCIENTIFICALLY WEIGH THE INTERESTS

USE SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES

Suitability—will aiaining this priority support the core naDonal interests and subordinate interests?

Feasibility—can the priority be accomplished by the means available

Acceptability—are the consequences of cost jusDfied by the importance of the desired effect

EXAMPLE OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD



TOTAL		ACCEPTABILITY Do the benefits outweigh the costs?		FEASIBILITY How much does it cost?		SUITABILITY Does this support the strategy			
		Product	RaDng 1---5 Higher is beier	Product	RaDng 5 = Least cost	Product	RaDng 5 = most probable	Weight 3 = Vital 2 = Important 1 = Peripheral	Sector
45	*15*	15	5	15	5	15	5	3	Oil/Gas networks
33	*11*	12	4	9	3	12	4	3	Water & Ag
34.5	*9.5*	12	4	7.5	2.5	15	5	3	Electricity
16	*8*	4	2	6	3	6	3	2	Civil Infrastructure
24	*12*	10	5	8	4	6	3	2	Regional Threats
10	*5*	2	1	4	2	4	2	2	Education & Social Services
5	*5*	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	Police & Justice

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

1. The cons-tu-on, the state structure and the prac-ce of sovereignty by the federal government

   Objec-ve: A fully representa-ve government throughout Iraq

   a. How do Iraqis define good governance?
   b. What obstruc-ons to full representa-on exist within the current poli-cal environment?
   c. How can these obstruc-ons be overcome?

3. The cons-tu-onal rights and freedoms for individuals or groups

   Objec-ve: Protect and Promote Human Rights for all Iraqis

   a. What HR standards should the sectors include within their strategies?
   b. How will they ensure that these standards are incorporated into the strategies?
   c. How will they make the changes permanent?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

3. Independence, Sovereignty, the state security and the unity of the country

   Objec-ve: A secure, sovereign and unified Iraq

   a. What are the key internal threats to Iraq's sovereignty and unity?
   b. What are the key poli-cal and military external threats to a sovereign Iraq, both regionally and interna-onally?
   c. How can Iraq fully develop the ideals of ci-zens rights and rule of law?

4. The state agencies: integrity and efficiency

   Objec-ve: Integrated state agencies that are transparent and func-on in the interests of the Iraq people

   a. What are the key obstacles to integrity and efficiency in state agencies?
   b. Are there cultural causes of corrup-on in Iraqi agencies and how could they be alleviated?
   c. What mechanisms ensure state agencies are working in the interests of the Iraqi people and not their respec-ve agencies?
   d. What mechanisms can Iraq ins-tute to promote transparency in government, policy, and inter---agency transac-ons?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

5. Oil and gas , transferring lines and exporta-on

   Objec-ve: Secure fossil fuel infrastructure

   a. What are the cri-cal nodes within these systems?
   b. Who is responsible for system security?
   c. What resources are required to secure current infrastructure?
   d. What are your plans for growth to meet future demands?
   e. What resources will be necessary to meet those demands?

6. Water, agriculture and environment

   Objec-ve: Develop & maintain reliable, clean & efficient water infrastructure for collec-on, distribu-on and use

   a. Where are the cri-cal nodes within the water infrastructure?
   b. What are the main threats to Iraq's water access?
   c. What are the quality and volume standards to meets current and future Iraqi demands?
   d. What examples of alterna-ve sources of water are under considera-on or development and what are the costs associated with them?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

7. Electricity

Objec-ve: Maintain Iraq's ability to support its economic growth by securing & improving its electrical genera-on, transmission & distribu-on infrastructure

a. What are the cri-cal nodes within this sector?
b. What is required to sustain Iraq's current power needs?
c. List the key challenges to mee-ng current and future demands?
d. List any opportuni-es within this sector that can build on Iraq's capacity

8. Building economy, environment and sustained development

Objec-ve: Sustaining economic prosperity, growing economic opportunity, and improving the standard of living for all Iraqis

a. Which industrial sectors are significant to Iraq's economic growth?
b. What are the key obstacles to economic growth in Iraq?
c. How does Iraq aLract foreign direct investment?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

9. Infrastructure for ci-es and villages, and educa-on and community service

   Objec-ve: Develop and advance Iraqi infrastructure, community and educa-onal services

   a. What are the priori-es for rural and urban infrastructure development?
   b. How can Iraq leverage regional and interna-onal partnerships and resources to build internal capacity?
   c. Who will govern resource distribu-on (see transparency)?
   d. What educa-onal capacity needs to be developed to ensure Iraq's long---term security and economic prosperity?

10. Internal threats, inconsistency to the local Peace

    Objec-ve: Stability and the rule of law in Iraq

    a. What are the major obstacles to stability in Iraq?
    b. What state policies and prac-ces can be implemented to consistently apply the rule of law?
    c. How can state resources be u-lized to promote consistency?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

11. External threats

Objec-ve: Maintain physical and poli-cal security of borders and state

a. What are the major external threats to Iraq's stability
b. What physical and poli-cal challenges do those threats present?
c. What resources are required to address those threats?
d. How can Iraq leverage regional rela-onships to improve security?

12. Campaigning against poverty and for social jus-ce

Objec-ve: Advance Iraqi standard of living and universal human rights

a. How do you define the standard of living for the average Iraqi?
b. What are the major contribu-ons to poverty in Iraq?
c. What are the most successful programs to combat poverty in the region, and how can they be implemented in Iraq?
d. What impact does social injus-ce have on na-onal security?
e. How does Iraq ensure a 'level the playing field' with social jus-ce?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

13. Police and judicial system

Objec-ve: A fair and impar-al police and judiciary that maintains a safe and secure Iraq

a. What is the rela-onship between the judiciary and constabulary?
b. What are current and future required resources?
c. What are the barriers, if any, to effec-ve coopera-on?
d. How can both sectors cooperate to improve Iraqi jus-ce?

14. Armed forces, armament and military balance of power

Objec-ve: Strong Iraqi military capable of defending Iraq and its interests

a. What is the current status of Iraq's armed forces?
b. What capaci-es must be developed to meet current and emerging threats?
c. What resources are required to meet those capaci-es?

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

15. Media, informa-on and communica-on

    Objec-ve: To develop a robust and secure cyber environment

    a. What is the current state of Iraq's cyber environment?
    b. What are the cri-cal threats to maintaining Iraq's cyber security?
    c. Who is responsible for Iraq's cyber security?
    d. How do we manage cyber security na-onally?

16. Security Performance and the reform needs

Proposed Questions for NSR Teams

17. Security sector budget: ceiling and priori-es.

Objec-ve: Resources are properly alloLed to priori-zed sectors

IMPORTANT NOTE: It is vital that these ques-ons are asked aIer the threat assessment is complete and the security sectors are clearly defined

HOW DO YOU COLLECT THE DATA?

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

To facilitate the review and planning process, THE NaFonal Security Review Steering Commilee requests designated ministries and agencies to provide the following internal informaFon:

- **Mission statement**
- **Sector priorities**
- **Organizational structure**
- **Last year's budget request to meet mission and objectives**
- **List of challenges to meeting mission and sector priorities**
- **List of opportunities for capacity growth within the sector**
- **Key security or financial issues within the sector**

ANNEX 5: National Security Review Process, 2013

THE PROCESS FOR THE CONDUCT OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1. **Introduction**. Historically nation states have viewed security as an external threat to be addressed through foreign and defence policies. For those countries coming out of conflict and where a residual threat to the rule of law, reconciliation, social and economic development remains, security is a more comprehensive challenge that requires a broader, cross-ministerial response. In such circumstances security policy needs to embrace both national (internal and external dimensions) and human security concerns. In addition to national defence, the confidence of citizens in the rule of law, and the quality of governance, become fundamental to long-term national security and development. Addressing the concerns of the nations' citizens is a central function of national security policy.

2. **Aim**. The aim of this paper is to describe the Iraqi national security strategy process that has been developed over the last eight months and which is a product of lessons learned by key Iraqi officials from their last review process and informed by the more generic lessons that others have learned in other country national security reviews and strategies. The Iraqi national security strategy process described in this paper was endorsed by the National Security Advisor in February 2013.

3. **Background**. Iraq is emerging from thirty years of damaging sanctions, an abusive political regime, war and civil strife. Prime Minister Al-Malaki is fully aware of the challenges that his government faces and of the expectations of Iraqi citizens. In 2007, the Government, with some support from the Americans, produced its first National Security Strategy for the years 2007 – 2010 entitled "Iraq First". This was a well written document but lacked authority and now needs revision and updating. With the recent transition to sovereign ownership of all elements of governance, the development and presentation of a new national security policy by the Government of Iraq (GOI) would be a politically timely statement of full independence However, as the GOI is aware, if security policy is to have authority and relevance across government, and provide direction to the security forces, its development requires not only the engagement and endorsement of the security ministries but also the views of Parliament, civil society and Iraqi citizens. Iraqi policy institutes and think-tanks can be used to facilitate this broader engagement process. The experiences of other countries clearly indicate that time spent building cross government support and addressing regional concerns regarding national sovereignty and the concerns of citizens will result in a more realistic and sustainable policy response. This understanding has been used to inform the latest Iraqi national security strategy development process that has been endorsed by the NSA.

4. It is the GOI's intention to replace the National Security Strategy 2007 – 2010 entitled "Iraq First" with a new comprehensive national security policy/strategy[16]. This new National Security Strategy will establish the Government's vision for Iraq's future and provide the

[16] The terms policy and strategy are largely used inter-changeably in this paper. The term policy refers more to the political framework of the review, whereas strategy relates more to the specifics of the application of ways and means to achieve the policy goals defined in the political framework.

framework for the individual strategies of the security and justice ministries. Article 110 of the Constitution states:

> *The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following matters; second, formulating and executing national security policy, including establishing and managing armed forces to secure the protection and guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq*.

National security policy will provide the political framework and vision that will help shape the strategies of government ministries. The development of national security policy and the strategies of other ministries, especially the security ministries should be an iterative process. In order to ensure that the national security policy/strategy addresses both the security challenges of today and of tomorrow it will be based upon a comprehensive national assessment of existing ministerial policies and a projection of the future security environment and challenges. The purpose of the national security review is to assess existing policies in order to identify deficiencies and where necessary to provide a new overarching policy framework that will direct and inform new more cost effective ministerial policies and security strategies for the future.

5. **The Challenge**. The breadth of the internal and external security challenges to be confronted by the GOI is much broader than that faced by most other countries. It would be very easy to produce a policy statement that looks good on paper[17]. However, producing a national security policy statement that directs government ministries to achieve long-term security and development goals, as agreed by the executive, legislature and civil society is the greatest challenge of governance for any government. Building this sort of consensus in a country coming out of conflict takes time. The immediate challenge for the GOI has been to develop a comprehensive security review process that will build the required level of government and non-government consensus in order to develop a new national security strategy that will provide policy responses not only to regional security challenges but also to support human security, social and economic development, reconciliation and national unity. In relation to this review, one of the first major policy decisions was how wide to make the definition of national security and therefore which ministries and non-government agencies should be involved. The decision was taken to make the review as wide as practicable and to include issues such as food and water security.

6. **Generic National Security Review Process**. As discussed national security policy should set the framework to ensure that the strategies of individual ministries are coherent and therefore cost effective across government and the security sector. In a national context therefore, national security policy cannot be solely top-down driven but must address the resource realities of ministries and this negotiation takes time. The development and enactment of national security policy is the prime responsibility of the NSC. It is at the level of the PM and NSC that strategic decisions should be taken, directives issued to ministries and cross-government consensus built. A study of other national security reviews has been used by the principal staff of the NSA to enhance their previous efforts and these were first discussed at a workshop at Bath University in March 2012 and again in Istanbul in July 2012.

7. **Political Risk**. The political risk inherent in such a program as this will always be high. There are a number of risks that are inherent in the conduct of any national security review. The three most prevalent risks for countries coming out of conflict are a lack of capacity to address the full range of security challenges that exist, a lack of domestic political consensus to confront those challenges and potentially counter-productive donor support programs[18]. Donor support must first and foremost give priority to building indigenous capacity and ownership. Without indigenous ownership any policy development process will a nugatory exercise. Domestic political will must be sufficient to overcome the inevitable 'spoilers' that will exist and concurrently to manage the security challenges that can detract from maintaining the necessary

[17] This was the main criticism of the last security strategic "Iraq First".

[18] The effectiveness of donor development strategies is increasingly being challenged to enhance cost effectiveness. Monitoring and evaluation of development programs has become a growth industry in the last few years.

tempo to ensure a successful review process. A national security review will inevitably be seen by some as threatening their own personal interests and especially in a post conflict environment, sectarian interests and fears will need careful management. For a national security review to be successful, personal, partisan, narrow ethic or sectarian interests must be subordinated to the greater national good. Inevitably as a national security review matures from the conceptual to practical stages there will be an increasing number of stakeholders who will feel that their interests are being threatened. Irrespective of the political support that the programme has, there will always be those who will resist modernisation, rationalisation and reform. Experience has shown that change will be a generational and cultural challenge and should not be rushed if change is to be sustained over time.

8. **Comprehensive National Threat and Risk Analysis**. In order to help shape the conduct of the security review a series of guidelines were developed to guide ministries and agencies in the conduct of their own reviews. Those guidelines were based upon the premise that a comprehensive threat and risk analysis should provide much of the logic of a national security review and ultimately decide the level of resources allocated to response options and plans. It was agreed that a comprehensive threat and risk analysis should be a continuous process and the subject of regular debate in the NSC to ensure that response strategies and plans are comprehensive and up-to-date. What follows is an indicative list of the indirect and direct threats that Iraq faces, but is certainly not the full picture:

Indirect Threats:

- Inherited poor governance and corruption;
- Poverty;
- Need for reconciliation;
- Climate change.

Direct Threats:

- Competition for scarce resources, especially food and water;
- Conventional regional war and threats to national security;
- Internal conflict, insurgency and illegal militias;
- External interference in Iraqi political affairs;
- Terrorism;
- Trans-national, international and national crime;
- Break-down of law and order;
- Mines and unexploded ordnance;
- Man-made and natural disasters;
- Disease, pandemics.

It is good practice for every ministry to maintain a threat register, which they regularly update. There should also be a national threat register that draws upon the data and assessments of all relevant ministries and intelligence agencies. Who keeps the national threat register is a decision for the PM. Due to the sensitive nature of any threat register, its custody may be classified in the interests of national security. Many countries have developed risk registers to evaluate the likely success or otherwise of ministerial strategies. No strategy can ever be risk free.

9. **Stated Purpose of the Iraqi National Security Review**. The stated primary purpose of the Iraqi national security review is as follows:

> *The purpose of the national security review is to conduct a comprehensive review of Iraq's national interests across the broad spectrum of sectors and coordinate the effective and efficient application of its instruments of power in promoting Iraq's, and Iraqi's, national security*.

In addition to shaping ministerial security related policies, another more direct purpose of the review is to identify existing missions and roles across the security sector and analyse force structures, equipment, weapon systems and resources in the performance of those roles against those threats identified in a national threat assessment. A national security review is not a deliberate exercise in force cutting but should be designed to 'right-size' the security sector in order to deliver the roles and missions defined in national security policy in the most professional and cost effective manner.

10. **General Concept of the Review Process**. In broad terms, it was decided by senior staff at the A-NCSS that under the direction of the PM and NSC, the national security review process would consist of a series of coordinated concurrent activities as follows:

- PM and NSC direct and coordinate development of national security review and policy development using the NSA's senior staff supported by a new organisation to be called the Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies;
- NSA would appoint an Executive Steering Committee and would direct them to produce a series of directives for those ministries, government agencies and non-government agencies and civil society organisation involved in the review to assess and evaluate various governance and security activity related areas.
- Security Ministers direct and coordinate their own respective ministerial reviews and develop strategic options for discussion and decision within the Steering Committee and the NSC when required for final policy decision.
- A series of assessment, evaluation analysis and development teams based at the Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies coordinate this work and help synergise the product of the various external review teams into decision briefs for the Steering Committee.
- Based upon discussions between the Steering Committee and the NSC or its deputies, the Steering Committee would direct and develop the writing of the new national security strategy.

11 **Iraqi Facts.** Having defined the purpose of the review, some key facts were identified that were to guide the development of the review process. What follows is a direct translation of the facts from an Iraqi document:

- There are existing national strategies in place (National Development Plan 2010, the Future of the energy in Iraq 2012, and others) that will provide the framework for the national security review;
- Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies will be central to the national security review and will provide support to the whole process;
- We will use the authorities of the NSA to initiate the review process and assign Ministries and government agencies to the review;
- We will use the A-NCSS to engage civil society organizations, think-tanks and universities in the review;
- We will build the capacity of the A-NCSS in order to have the experts, authorities, knowledge, and credibility to make the required evaluations and the informed decisions in accordance with technical standards required of the review;
- The review process is flexible and can be amended at any time.

12. **Public Consultation**. It was also directed that public consultations with Parliament and civil society were to be included in the review process and in particular citizens were to be involved in the review and assessment process. The use of government networks, surveys, Iraqi

'think-tanks and universities and those networks belonging to Iraqi and international Non-Government Organisations (NGO), and the United Nations were also to be utilised to identify the concerns of citizens in the provinces. However, the main mechanism for the engagement of civil society and Iraqi citizens in the review was to be a re-invigorated Provincial Stability Assessment Group (PSAG). The PSAG was established with the full resources of the state to establish a nation-wide mechanism to reach out to Iraqi citizens. The PSAG is described below.

13. **Provincial Stability Assessment Group**. The original PSAG was established several years ago with U.S. assistance in order to gain a better understanding of what was happening in the governorates. The purpose of the PSAG is to improve the quality of the data that the Office of the NSA has available to input to their policy work and especially the conduct of the national security review. Using data principally produced by the security forces and local government agencies, the provincial teams of the PSAG produce weekly reports to the PSAG working group where they are collated into a national brief for the NSA /NSC and ministries. The working group meets weekly in the Office of the NSA. The PSAG produces weekly and monthly reports for the NSA and NSC. Districts and governorates are colour coded for stability; red poor, amber middling and green good. These reports can be used to hold ministries to account, and shape executive and policy decisions. Clearly the PSAG is an excellent mechanism to inform the security review process and their data and analysis will be fed into the assessment groups at the A-NCSS as appropriate. The reporting criteria used by the various levels of the PSAG are as follows:

- Security; numbers of incidents by IEDs, assassinations, deaths and wounded, and force readiness and effectiveness arrests etc;
- Effective governance, the delivery of public services and commitment to Human Rights;
- An assessment of the effectiveness and competence of the judiciary, and threats to the judiciary;
- Prison conditions judged against international standards;
- Economic conditions, jobs and comments on corruption;
- Public health, including threats from mines;
- Environmental concerns, dirty water and then to natural resources generally;
- The state of provincial education, the numbers of mud and brick schools and standard of teaching;

14. **Supporting Mechanisms and Processes.** Like all processes, a national security review requires a management structure and methodology that describes who will be responsible for what and when. Both were the subject of much discussion in the second half of 2012 and a series of three options were produced for the NSA's decision, which was received in January 2013. It was assumed that this decision also involved discussions in the NSC with the PM. In parallel, it was decided to start developing draft directives for ministries and government security forces to commence their own reviews and ministerial policies. These drafts were designed to inform the work of the Steering Committee, which ultimately would have responsibility for these directives. Once ministries receive this high level direction, they will then be responsible for developing their own processes for their engagement in the security review and the development of their own ministerial strategies. Consultation and coordination with the Steering Committee, with the Council of Representatives, Finance Ministry, Foreign Ministry, security ministries and the security forces should be continuous throughout the review process. And as far as national security will allow, consultation and coordination with civil society should be on a regular basis supported by a media campaign.

15. **Subordinate Ministerial Reviews** It was also decided to create a series of questions for engaged ministries to facilitate the immediate work of the Steering Committee. The answers to the following questions are designed to help the Steering Committee shape ministerial directives.

- Mission statement;
- Missions, tasks, roles and responsibilities;
- Existing strategies and plans;
- Existing capabilities under the following headings;
    - Command, control and communications,
    - Intelligence, reconnaissance and target acquisition,
    - Direct and indirect offensive means,
    - Direct and indirect defensive means,
    - Doctrine and training,
    - Administrative,
    - Logistics;
- Major equipment holdings by type and number;
- Immediate future plans.

This list is not prescriptive but designed to help ministries and agencies conduct their own internal reviews.

16. **Management Architecture**. After a series of option for the management of the national security review were presented to the NSA's principal staff, the following management architecture was agreed:



17. **Tasks.** The tasks of the various committees as defined by the senior staff of the NSA are below[19]:

The Review and Evaluation Team;

- Carry out evaluation on the strategic environment first, then make the compressive evaluation;
- Identify national interests and priorities, on the bases of adequate standards set for this purpose;
- Identify threats , their significant in accordance with adequate standards set for this purpose;

[19] These are a direct quote from the presentation given by Mr Hamza Hasan at Chatham House 18 March 2013.

- Conduct a comprehensive study on the National Security;
- Hand in what will be developed to the Draft Analysis and Development Team.

The Draft Analysis and Development Team;

- Analysis what will be introduced by the Review and Evaluation Team;
- Make suggestions on the budgets and other needs in order to implement the strategy and make the best use of it;
- Develop a national security strategy draft.

The Monitoring and Development Team;

- Review and develop the draft;
- Present the draft to the NSC –Deputies;
- Develop the final draft and approve it;
- Monitor the review and implementation of the strategy after its approving, and monitor the development of other sectors' strategy in order for them to support and be consistent with the National Security Strategy.

Steering Committee for the Development of the NSS

- Guide the work teams;
- Develop an evaluation guidelines, monitor the progress;
- Present the outputs to the NSC-Deputies and guide the Development and Monitoring Team in accordance with the recommendations made by the deputies;
- Guide other sectors in order for them to support the NSS;
- Present the draft to NSS and other federal authorities, regions, Parties and political blocs, academics and civil society;
- Facilitate the meetings of the teams at the A-NCSS;
- Provide administrative and logistics support;
- Provide studies and information in coordination with the NSA;
- Provide experts to support the process, if the team requested and in accordance with the regulations.

18. **Methodology**. A diagram showing the agreed process for the assessment, evaluation and development process is below:



19. **Time Table**. The predicted time table for the national security review is below. This time table will be subject to the vagaries of real time security challenges and the need to build the capacity necessary to conduct the review.



20. **Capacity Building - Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies**. Until as recent as last summer, the Office of the NSA consisted of a small group of senior advisors with limited research, analysis and secretarial capacity. Rather than build an enhanced and enlarged secretariat, the NSA took the decision to build the required additional capacity through the creation of a new stand-alone 'think-tank' to be called the Al-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (A-NCSS). The mission statement for the A-NCSS is as follows:

> "*Serves to enhance regional security by sustained, mutually-beneficial relationships and communities of interest among academic and security professionals. Fosters regional*

cooperation on critical security issues. Promotes effective communication and strategic capacity through critical discussion in an academic environment. Conducts strategic studies for the national security advisor to support national security requirements and to promote outreach and integration with other ministries and the broader national security community".

When the A-NCSS is operating to full capacity it will act as the NSA's central node for the conduct of the national security review. The A-NCSS will build an independent capacity to support and help coordinate the national security review and will host and assist the government committees and teams engaged in the review process. Once the review process becomes policy and it is put into practice, the A-NCSS will be tasked to monitor and evaluate the execution of that policy and to report back to the NSC accordingly. Once it has the capacity, the analysis of the data produced by the various working groups by the staff of the A-NCSS can be turned into briefs for the attention of the Steering Committee. As a part official and part independent policy institute, the A-NCSS will engage with other Iraqi 'think-tanks, universities and civil society organisations on a regular basis[20]. This engagement can be achieved through consultations; a media out-reach strategy and workshops. Thus far recruitment to the A-NCSS has been limited. However, the Director Development at the A-NCSS has developed the required institutional management policies and procedures for recruitment, vetting and training, and to ensure the effective operation of the Center.

21. **A Twin-Track Process – The Engagement of Civil Society and Citizens in the National Security Review**. Lessons learned in other countries clearly show that the more inclusive the review process the more relevant and sustainable the policy. In order to enhance inclusiveness the NSA has directed that a twin-track assessment process be developed as shown in the following diagram. Essentially every area of the review will be analysed independently by a government and a non-government body. They will send the product of their research and review to the teams at the A-NCSS where it will be synthesised into decision briefs for the Steering Committee. Decision briefs should high-light options, advantages and disadvantages of both and relative costs and risks. This twin-track process is already in action, whereby staff at the A-NCSS are conducting an independent financial review of security related policies.



[20] There has been much discussion in the A-NCSS and at Chatham House regarding the maintenance of the A-NCSS independent academic status. It is believed that this independent status is feasible but will require careful management and diverse income streams becoming available.

22. **Engagement of the Council of Representatives.** In addition to engaging with civil society and citizens, the NSA has directed that the Council of Representatives should be fully briefed and engaged in the conduct of the review process. Regular communications are to be established with the Security and Defence Over-sight Committee who are to be briefed and consulted on regular basis.

23. **Detailed Assessment Areas**. The national security review will address and assess the following areas of governance. This list is a translation of a list produced by the principal staff at the A-NCSS:

- The constitution, the state structure and the practice of sovereignty by the federal government ;
- Independency, Sovereignty, the state security and the unity of the country
- The state organs: integrity and efficiency;
- Iraq's place in the region, external relations, foreign interference in Iraq and Iraq's foreign policy;
- Oil and gas , transferring lines and the exportation;
- Water, agriculture and environment;
- Electricity;
- Building economy, environment and sustained development;
- Internal threats, Inconsistency to the local peace;
- Police and judiciary;
- Armed forces , arming and military powers balance;
- media, information and communication;
- Security Performance and the reform needs;
- The security sector Budget: ceiling and priorities;
- Strategies and current plans;
- Infrastructure , direct and indirect link to the expected national Interests in 2014;
- Evaluate the capacity of the ministry or the Bureau to provide support to the national interests;
- A list of incurred losses in the resources during implementing daily works;
- A vision on the immediate future plan.

24. **Management Risk Inherent in the Review Process**. Unlike most other smaller development challenges, donor support programs at the policy level will ebb and flow and can only be managed by an embedded policy advisor who has the trust and confidence of the host government. This trust and confidence takes many months to build and will inevitably be based upon previous experience and an acknowledgement by the recipient that the advice offered is based upon best international practice. To remain credible, advice must be objective and devoid of partisan interests. This requires that all advice, as far as possible, is offered in an open and transparent manner irrespective of external influences and agendas. If an advisor is forced to prioritise his advice, his prime loyalty must be to his client and not his employer. Without the trust and confidence of his client, the advisor is useless. Consequently, it is unfortunate but unavoidable that objective advice in support of endorsed objectives at the policy level will inevitably upset some stakeholders but that is the nature of the job. A policy advisor is not employed to tell stakeholders or the recipient of that advice only what they want to hear. In a policy level program based upon trust and influence, progress cannot be imposed from the outside by donors setting objectives or demanding extraneous deliverables. Progress depends upon local ownership and local political will, both of which should be encouraged and supported. Donors, who try to force the pace of a nationally owned security review by the early deployment of additional technocrats risk both derailing the review process and wasting scarce resources that

would be better deployed at a more appropriate time later in the program[21]. The risk should be carefully monitored by external over-sight bodies.

25. **The Way Forward**. Progress in this project has been sporadic, which is inevitable at the national policy level. Many of the necessary systems, policies and procedures are in place to both commence the national security review and build the capacity in the A-NCSS to support the review. It was reported that the first meeting of the national security review tool place 9 April at the A-NCSS. This is excellent news. Additional personnel have also been recruited to the staff of the A-NCSS and job descriptions, HR and office procedures have already been developed should help with their employment. The two international advisors currently in place in the A-NCSS are fully committed to enhancing the smooth running of the Center and are increasingly involved in the conduct of the national security review. From a broad Iraqi perspective having highly qualified senior managers available as technical advisors offers many benefits[22]. Originally the presence of international consultants was considered as a threat to the Iraqi ownership of the review. However, the Iraqi leadership are now one hundred per cent confident in their ownership of the security review process and they do not consider the presence of the international advisors or other donor personnel as a threat[23]. The Iraqis clearly are now confident that they have the ability, if not yet the full capacity to take the national security review forward. The recommended way forward for this program is therefore to maximise the presence of the existing international personnel, to acknowledge the Iraqi lead and accept that donor support will be mainly limited to the influence that derives from the presence of a well-placed and trusted policy advisors. The ability to exercise influence at high levels of government can be an extremely cost-effective investment.

26. **Conclusion**. It should be clear that the process of a national security review is a highly complex and protracted process. Consequently, if the resultant national security policy is to be effective and relevant over time it should not be rushed. The lessons of other countries would suggest that a successful national security review may take many months, even as long as 2 years. The time that is taken to build capacity and establish cross-ministerial coordination processes will bring additional benefits. This additional capacity will help to monitor the effectiveness of resultant national security policy/strategy and to ensure that the inevitable changes that will occur in the security environment can be managed within existing contingencies and resource constraints with the minimum of fuss. The enduring success of strategies and plans that are defined in national security policy is a clear indicator of competent governance; whereas a series of policy U-turns, as a consequence of a rushed national security review, is likely to be seen as incompetence. The Government of Iraq now has the processes and capacities in place to commence its own national security review. They are fully aware that these processes must remain flexible and that additional systems, policies and procedures will be identified that will need to be developed or amended as the process develops. Only time will tell whether there is sufficient political will to overcome the inevitable 'spoilers' that such a review will provoke but what is not in doubt however is that there is the intellectual capacity and political skill available within the existing senior staff of the NSA to make the on-going national review process a resounding success.

Philip Wilkinson OBE MPHIL
18 March 2013

[21] It is a common criticism of the development community that they suggest and offer support without thinking through the consequences. A potential recipient of donor support that is free will rarely if ever say no.

[22] Both Raytheon consultants are retired senior military officers who have augmented their military management training and experience with additional civilian qualifications. They have four post graduate degrees between them.

[23] The presence of the Raytheon advisors at the Chatham House event 18/19 March was discussed in detail with the DNSA and Mr Hamza Hasan who saw now problems whatsoever in their attendance.

UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

ANNEX 6: CVS Final Progress Report, Oct 2014

PROGRESS REPORT

Support to the Government of Iraq to conduct a national Crime Victimization and Access to Justice Survey

Project title	*Support to the Government of Iraq to conduct a national Crime Victimization and Access to Justice Survey*
Project starting date	14 March 2013
Location	Iraq
Contribution amount	119,200 USD
Contributing Agency	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Recipient agency	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – Statistics and Surveys Section (UNODC)
Date of report	31 October 2014
Reporting period	**15 September 2013 – 31 October 2014**

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3. Assessment of implementation of Action activities 114
4. Partners and other Co-operation ..... Error! Bookmark not defined.

1. Description

1.1. Name of beneficiary of contribution agreement: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

1.2. Name and title of the Contact person: Michael Jandl, Research Officer, Statistics and Surveys Section, UNODC

1.3. Name of UN partners in the Action:

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- Joint Analysis Unit Iraq(JAU)

1.4. Name of other partners in the Action:

- Central Statistical Office Iraq (CSO)
- Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO)

1.5. Title of the Action: *Support to the Government of Iraq to conduct a national Crime Victimization and Access to Justice Survey*

1.6. Target country:

- Iraq

2. Project synopsis

Project Title	Support to the Government of Iraq to conduct a national Crime Victimization and Access to Justice Survey
UNODC Project Number	GLOU 34/Iraq CVS

Nature of activities	Based on a joint (CSO, KRSO, UNDP, and UNODC) assessment of information gaps in Iraq, which concluded that data related to crime rates and criminal justice in Iraq are very limited, the project will support the Iraq Central Statistical Office (CSO) and the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO) in the implementation of a nationally representative Crime Victimization and Criminal Justice Survey. UNODC will provide technical support during survey implementation covering: Training and Capacity Building on crime victimization surveys, design of the final survey instrument, analysis of the data and the drafting of the analytical report.

Purpose	The survey will contribute to a better understanding of the scope, patterns and conditions surrounding crime in Iraq and support the development of evidence-based policies on crime and access to criminal justice in Iraq. Better data are required to strengthen the design and effectiveness of government crime prevention efforts as well as the effectiveness of the justice system. The survey will contribute to this by providing data on victimization rates related to personal and household crimes, reporting crime to police and the use and satisfaction from the justice system, the magnitude of the damage caused by crimes to individuals and communities, as well as the overall feeling of security or the lack thereof.

3. Assessment of implementation of Action activities

3.1. Activities and results

Synopsis of Project Activities		
Preparatory Activity 1	Needs assessment and discussions with stakeholders	Completed
Preparatory Activity 2	Stakeholders meeting to discuss and agree on main objectives and contents of the survey	Completed
Preparatory Activity 3	Training and Capacity Building: Introduction of survey scope, procedure and purpose to stakeholders	Completed
Preparatory Activity 4	Focus group meetings	Completed
Activity 1	Production of draft survey instrument	Completed
Activity 2	Production of Survey Guidelines for Interviewers	Completed
Activity 3	Finalization of pilot survey questionnaire	Completed
Activity 4	Review workshop	Completed
Activity 5	Finalization of survey questionnaire	Completed
Activity 6	Analysis of data quality	postponed
Activity 7	Preparation of final dataset and weight calculation	postponed
Activity 8	Data analysis and report writing	postponed -
Activity 9	Launch of report	TBD

Project Starting Date	Date of contract Signature: 14 March 2013 Start of Project Activities: 14 March 2013 End of Project Extention: 31 December 2014

Preparatory Activity 1. **Needs assessment and discussions with stakeholders**

During a mission to Iraq in January/February 2012, UNODC discussed the availability and uses of administrative and survey data on crime and criminal justice with various law enforcement and criminal justice actors of Iraq. It was concluded that data related to crime rates and criminal justice in Iraq are very limited and that Iraq would welcome technical assistance in a number of areas related to improving crime and criminal justice data. In the following months needs and requirements for technical assistance were discussed with stakeholders, resulting in a concept note for a technical assistance project. The conclusions of this assessment were taken forward by UNODC, UNDP and JAU to result in the current project. Further discussions with Iraqi implementing partners and stakeholders were held by JAU and UNDP resulting in a final project outline in December 2012.

Preparatory Activity 2. National stakeholder meeting

A roundtable stakeholders meeting with representatives of national ministries/agencies and UN agencies to discuss and agree on main objectives and contents of the victimization survey and crime statistics was held by UNODC and JAU in February 2013 in Baghdad.

The meeting took place at the Ministry of Planning in Baghdad on 11 February with representatives of national ministries/agencies and UN agencies (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Planning (MoP), Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, National Security Council (NSC), High Judicial Council, UNDP, JAU, UNODC, UNAMI). The meeting was chaired by the Chairman of CSO, Dr. Mehdi Al Alaak, who stressed the importance of this collaboration and the need for crime statistics and analysis. UNODC and JAU made a presentation on Crime Victimization Surveys and the survey concept note, and facilitated a discussion on the survey themes. In the discussion, relevant observations of crime types and trends in Iraq were identified.

Preparatory Activity 3. Technical meetings, training and capacity building

Technical Meetings of UNODC with CSO and JAU were held in February 2013 in Baghdad to identify main survey indicators and relevant administrative data gaps, and to discuss a first draft questionnaire, the survey methodology, the overall work-plan, focal-points and deliverables.

The meetings were held in the premises of the MoP with participants from CSO, UNODC and JAU. A first draft of the survey questionnaire was presented by UNODC and discussed in detail, resulting in a refined questionnaire version. The chairman of CSO joined the discussion and agreed to have a Memorandum of Understanding clarifying the collaboration on the survey. In technical discussions with the chairman it was also determined that the sample size of the survey will be determined on the basis of the survey precision needed at the governorate level, after the conduct of the pilot survey. The draft questionnaire will be translated to Arabic and Kurdish for discussion and review of stakeholders. It was decided that an Advisory Steering Committee (ASC) including (CSO, KRSO, NSC, UNDP, UNODC, and JAU) was to be established.

Administrative crime data: participants mentioned a limited availability of administrative crime data in Iraq but questioned the possibility of sharing such sensitive data. The NSC stated that they have the authority to request data from the relevant government entity and that the NSC is in a position to clear data sharing with

UNODC. It was agreed that JAU will follow up with national authorities to establish the availability of administrative data on homicide and other crimes.

Preparatory Activity 4. Focus Group Meetings

Two focus groups on the themes of the survey were held in February 2013, one with a group of local employees from various departments of the Ministry of Planning (security, police, engineering, social statistics departments, etc.) and one with UN Country Team colleagues working on violence/crime related areas (UNICEF, UNAMI, UNDP). The discussions gave direction to the main modules on crime, access to justice and access to firearms of the survey.

Activity 1. Production of draft survey instrument

Based on the experience of UNODC in the area of crime victimization surveys, the inputs collected in the stakeholder meetings and further discussions with UNDP and JAU, a draft survey questionnaire was produced and shared with UNDP and JAU. After further reviews and consultations the instrument was further refined and sent for translation to Arabic and Kurdish to be shared with project partners for comments and inputs.

Activity 2. Production of Survey Guidelines for Interviewers

Based on recent experience with field work in the area of victimization and corruption surveys, draft guidelines for interviewers were drafted and shared with UNDP and JAU. After further reviews and valuable inputs from UNDP and JAU the guidelines were revised and restructured. For testing in the pilot survey the guidelines were translated to Arabic and Kurdish.

Activity 3. Finalization of pilot survey questionnaire

The questionnaire was discussed with project partners and stakeholders in Iraq. Relevant feedback (translated to English) was received from project counterparts in August and September. A backtranslation of key questions of the questionnaire was performed by JAU and resulted in further refinements of several questions. All comments and inputs were used to refine and finalize the survey instrument for the pilot survey.

Activity 4. Review workshop

The pilot surveys in Qadisiya and Baghdad, as well as in Kurdistan were originally scheduled to take place before Ramadan in July 2013. However, the pilot surveys were repeatedly postponed due to security developments on the ground and resulting limitations in travel and field work conditions. Consequently, the workshop for reviewing the results of the pilot survey in discussions with implementing partners, which was expected to take place in the third week of September 2013, was postponed until after the completion of the pilot survey and the analysis of the results.

After further delays due to the highly unstable security situation, pilot surveys could finally be implemented in five governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, Suleymaniya by KRSO and

Qadisiya and Basrah by CSO) in January and February 2014. Immediately after the pilot surveys, the review workshop was organized and took place in Erbil from 25-27 February 2014. The workshop was organized by UNDP Iraq and took place in Hotel Capitol in Erbil. It was attended by 22 participants (5 staff of the Central Statistical Office (CSO, 4 from the central office in Baghdad and one field staff from Qadisiya), 11 staff of the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO, 1 each from Erbil, Dohuk and Suleymaniya, 5 from the central office in Erbil, who were later also joined by 3 interviewers who participated in the pilot survey), one representative of the National Security Council of Iraq as well as 2 staff from UNDP, 1 from JAU and 2 from UNODC).

Pilot data from KRSO were received shortly before the review workshop (291 interviews) and could be analysed for review at the workshop. Pilot data from CSO (200 interviews in Qadisiya and Basrah) were not ready before the workshop due to problems with the data entry application in the Arabic version but feedback could be provided directly by the participant from CSO covering the pilot in Qadisiya. Both KRSO and CSO had collected detailed information on the experience with the pilot survey and provided a comprehensive qualitative account of issues encountered during the pilot that need to be addressed. The debriefing with the interviewers added further detail to the interview situation and problems encountered during the interviews.

The review workshop was able to highlight the areas where the questionnaire and guidelines need revision. In addition, a revised workplan and time schedule were agreed with KRSO and CSO (see attached workshop report in the annex).

Activity 5. Finalization of survey questionnaire

Shortly after the review workshop, the questionnaire was shortened and revised according to the changes in questions and formulations discussed during the workshop (all changes to the questionnaire which accounted for the major part of the discussions at the workshop are not repeated here are integrated into the revised version of the questionnaire). All changes were made in the English version in track changes by UNODC and sent for translation to CSO and KRSO. The revised translations were double-checked by JAU, CSO and KRSO for possible translation errors and ambivalent meanings of translated expressions, such as those encountered in the pilot and workshop.

Future activities

Activity 6. Analysis of data quality

All future activities, such as the analysis of the data quality and the drafting of the survey report, depend on conditions for the survey actually going to the field. According to the revised time plan, this was planned to take place in July-August 2014, with subsequent time periods reserved for data quality control, data analysis, report drafting, translations and so on. However, the worsening security situation have so far prevented the fielding of any survey activities in Iraq. It is hoped that conditions will improve in 2015 in a way that allows UNODC and JAU to assist CSO and KRSO to implement the survey, if not in all 18 governorates than at least in a signicant portion of Iraq.

4.1. Assessment of relationship between project partners

The relationship between project partners has been very effective and productive. The project can build on good working relations from previous projects. Synergies and complementarities between project partners were identified and will continue to bring the project forward.

4.2. Assessment of relationship to state authorities

In general terms the relationship has been effective and positive: Both CSO and KRSO have welcomed the assistance of the UN in the production of much-needed statistics on crime and criminal justice through the victimization survey. UNODC's technical expertise is recognized and appreciated by relevant state authorities. A potential risk to the project can be identified in the lengthy procedures required for internal deliberations of partners and other stakeholders which result in delays to the project and may require further flexibility on the part of all UN agencies. A further risk may be that the new management of CSO that has been nominated after the elections in 2014 will be less inclined toward the project than the previous leadership.

The major risk to the project is that the unfavourable security conditions on the ground will continue to prevent the conduct of the survey field work in much of Iraq.

Name of the contact person for the Action:

Mr. Michael Jandl, Research Officer, Statistics and Surveys Section, UNODC

Signature: ……

Location: Statistics and Surveys Section, UNODC, Vienna, Austria

Date: 31 October 2014

Annex I

Workshop Report

Review workshop for the Survey on Crime Victimization and Access to Justice in Iraq

BACKGROUND

Based on a 2012 UNODC assessment of information gaps on crime and criminal justice in Iraq, which concluded that both administrative and survey data related to crime victimization and criminal justice in Iraq are very limited, the project will implement a nationally representative Survey on Crime Victimization, Access to Justice and Access to Firearms. The survey will be carried out by the Iraq Central Statistical Office (CSO) and the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Joint Analysis and Policy Unit (JAPU) provide technical support during survey implementation covering: training and capacity building on crime victimization surveys, design of the final survey instrument, analysis of the data and the drafting of the analytical report. A Contribution Agreement has been signed with UNDP for covering technical assistance costs, while the costs of the survey field work are covered by the project partners in Iraq. In March 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding between the UN Country Team in Iraq and CSO/KRSO was approved and signed by the Committee for International Partnership of the Council of Ministers.

A first round of meetings with stakeholders and implementing partners was held by in February 2013 in Baghdad, clarifying the scope and goals of the survey, and collecting input for the survey instrument. Since then there have been several delays in the implementation of the pilot survey due to the highly unstable and deteriorating security situation in Iraq in 2013. The review workshop now followed the conduct of the pilot surveys in five governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, Suleymaniya, Qadisiya and Basrah) in January/February 2014.

OBJECTIVES OF THE WORKSHOP

1. Present, discuss and review pilot survey results and findings
2. Revise the survey questionnaire and methodology based on these findings
3. Agree on a revised workplan with a concrete timeline

WORKSHOP ACTIVITIES

The workshop was organized by UNDP Iraq and took place in Hotel Capitol in Erbil. It was attended by 22 participants (see participants list in the Annex):

- 5 staff of the Central Statistical Office (CSO); 4 from the central office in Baghdad and one field staff from Qadisiya
- 11 staff of the Kurdistan Region Statistical Office (KRSO); 1 each from Erbil, Dohuk and Suleymaniya, 5 from the central office in Erbil, 3 interviewers from the pilot survey
- one representative of the National Security Council of Iraq
- 2 staff from UNDP
- 1 staff from JAPU
- 2 staff from UNODC

Opening remarks on the envisaged role of survey results in the drafting of the National Security Strategy for Iraq were made by UNDP. The continuing information gap on crime data and quantitative security indicators was highlighted. A nationwide household survey on crime victimization, to be conducted as inclusive and participatory as possible, could close this information gap and the survey results could also feed into the development of the National Security Strategy. The leadership of the national implementing partners in technical knowledge on survey implementation and fieldwork was acknowledged and the capacity building effort of the project was highlighted.

The workshop started with presentations of findings from the pilot surveys by CSO and KRSO: the experience from fieldwork, problems faced during fieldwork and general observations about the survey instruments were discussed. As pilot data from KRSO were received shortly before the review workshop (291 interviews), they could be analysed for review at the workshop. Pilot data from CSO (200 interviews in Qadisiya and Basrah) were not ready for the workshop due to problems with the data entry application in the Arabic version. These data will be made available to UNODC after the workshop. Both KRSO and CSO had collected detailed information on the experience with the pilot survey and provided a comprehensive qualitative account of issues encountered during the pilot survey that need to be addressed.

TOPICS DISCUSSED

In a presentation on data quality and issues encountered during the pilot survey results for the key indicators of the survey were presented and discussed by UNODC:

- Prevalence rates
- Data quality indicators and interview duration
- Problems faced during fieldwork
- Use of survey instruments

Further inquiries were made in a debriefing session of fieldwork staff conducting interviews for the pilot survey, which added further detail to the interview situation and problems encountered during the interviews. The topics included:

- Training and preparation for fieldwork
- Interview settings and accessibility of sampled households
- Questionnaire in local languages
- Personal security
- Readiness, openness and cooperation of respondents to participate
- Confidence in answers to sensitive questions
- Time constraints in interview settings

Based on the findings from the pilot survey analysis and on the outcomes of the debriefing, the draft questionnaire used in the pilot survey was reviewed. A significant number of questions was changed, dropped or added. The changes to the questionnaire are not repeated here but will be integrated into the revised English version of the questionnaire. Due to the need to shorten the questionnaire it was decided to delete the modules on livestock theft, household protection and trust in institutions, while adding a module on vandalism. All changes are in track changes and shall be translated by CSO and KRSO. The revised translations of the questionnaire are to be double-checked by JAPU, CSO and KRSO

for possible translation errors and ambivalent meanings of translated expressions, such as those encountered in the pilot and workshop.

In a brief discussion on technical issues probable sample design and sample size for the final survey were discussed. Usually CSO and KRSO define their sample size by the level of analysis, which is either by 1 or 2 layers (total or urban/rural). Samples usually cover every governorate, in which cluster samples of enumeration blocks are drawn. Within those clusters households are selected randomly from a list of households. The survey respondent is selected randomly (The consensus at the workshop was to change the age group of eligible respondents to 16-64). Rather than using the next birthday method as envisaged in the victimization survey, Kish tables are used in other surveys conducted by CSO and KRSO to randomize the choice of respondents. Taking into account low prevalence rates for certain types of crimes observed in the pilot study, The preferred sample size based on the expected prevalence rates encountered in the pilot survey will be 2,000 interviews per governorate (domain); KRSO asked to add GPS coordinates to each questionnaire to deepen spatial analysis of data. This exercise can however not be implemented by CSO. Remaining issues regarding data entry were resolved in a separate session.

RISK FACTORS

In the discussion of the workplan for survey implementation four issues emerged as possible obstacles for the survey implementation and present risk factors for keeping the timeline as agreed to during the workshop:

i. Violence before/during/after the general election on 30 April
ii. Resources committed by KRSO and CSO for the conduct of other surveys (MICS-5 and service industry survey in April/May/June)
iii. The unresolved budget situation (the budget had not yet been adopted by the Council of Ministers at the time of the workshop and no salaries had been paid to staff of the KRSO in February)
iv. The unstable security situation marked by escalating violence in several governorates of Iraq.

WORKPLAN

A detailed workplan with a timeline was agreed at the workshop. The main milestones are as follows:

i. All technical preparations for the field work (questionnaire translations, guidelines, sample frame and sample selection should be made until 12 June
ii. Training of Trainers (ToT) will take place in the last week of June
iii. A decision on the governorates covered by the survey should be made until 15 July.
iv. Training of all interviewers should be completed by 31 July
v. Field work is scheduled from 10 August – 22 September, data entry will commence on 17 August and run in parallel to the fieldwork
vi. Final cleaned data set will be available to UNODC/JAPU/UNDP by 30 September
vii. The draft survey report will be available to CSO/KRSO for review 4 December

viii. Review, revisions, translation, printing and launch of report should be completed by 31 March 2015

COVERAGE

While in the 3 governorates covered by KRSO no significant security issues are expected, CSO is confronted with major security issues that affect the survey field work. Under current circumstances, the survey can be implemented in 8 or 9 out of the 15 governorates covered by CSO (Basrah, Al-Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Dhiqar, Karbala, Maysan, Wasit and possibly Babil).

ADMINISTRATIVE CRIME DATA

Planned discussions and review of administrative crime data could not be held in the workshop but were addressed in bilateral talks after the workshop sessions. Definitions of data received by UNODC through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq in Vienna were clarified and the feasibility of CSO and KRSO providing data for CTS was explored. Senior workshop participants were selected as focal points for the CTS and copies of the CTS questionnaire in English and Arabic were given to them.

ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

The following issues need to be addressed for the full survey:

1. Extensive comments on and changes to the questionnaire collected in the workshop will be taken into account in the final version of the questionnaire. UNODC will provide a final version for review, translation and back-translation for all project partners shortly after the workshop;
2. The manual for interviewers needs to be revised according to the changes in the questionnaire and complemented by additional instructions for interviewers, including guidelines that emphasize the importance of randomly selecting respondents within the household as well as the correct recording of personal crimes in a multi-party interview situation frequently encountered in Iraqi families;
3. Some reluctance to respond to the survey (hard refusals) was encountered especially in more traditional or tribal areas. In these areas, CSO and KRSO will make special efforts to be in contact with community leaders/mayors/tribal leaders to disseminate advance information about the survey activities to reduce fears of respondents (and reduce the possibility of abuse of persons posturing as official interviewers).

IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS

- Finalization of questionnaire according to the results and discussions of the workshop (UNODC).
- Finalization of manual/guidelines for interviewers (UNODC).
- Review, translation and back-translation of survey questionnaire (CSO/KRSO/JAPU).
- Finalization of data entry program (JAPU).

- Preparation of survey sample according to sample design (CSO/KRSO)
- Training of Trainers (JAPU).
- Training of Interviewers (CSO/KRSO).

ANNEX

A1) Workshop agenda
A2) List of participants
A3) Workplan

A1) *IRAQ VICTIMISATION SURVEY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP AGENDA*

TUESDAY, 25 FEBRUARY 2014 (FIELDWORK STAFF PRESENT)	
09:15-09:30	**Introduction and Opening Remarks**
09:30-10:15	**Presentation of findings from pilot survey** (KRSO): • Experience from field work • Problems faced during fieldwork • Results of pilot survey *Short discussion*
10:15-11:00	**Presentation of findings from pilot survey** (CSO): • Experience from field • Problems faced during fieldwork • Results of pilot survey *Short discussion*
11:00-12:00	**Debriefing of Fieldwork staff** (group session): • Training and preparation for fieldwork (manual and other material,…) • Interview settings and accessibility of sampled households
12:00-13:00	*Lunch*
13:00-15:00	**Debriefing of Fieldwork staff** (group session continued): • Questionnaire (instructions, skipping rules, special questions, …) • Cooperation of respondents • Time constraints in interview • Problems faced during fieldwork
15:00-15:15	*Coffee and Tea Break*
15:15-16:30	**Debriefing of Fieldwork staff** (KRSO individual session): • Personal security • Readiness and openness of respondents to participate • Confidence in answers to sensitive questions • Understanding of the questionnaire in Kurdish
16:45-18:00	**Debriefing of Fieldwork staff** (CSO individual session): • Personal security • Readiness and openness of respondents to participate • Confidence in answers to sensitive questions • Understanding of the questionnaire in Arabic

WEDNESDAY, 26 FEBRUARY 2014	
09:30-12:00	**Presentation of findings from pilot survey and from debriefing** (UNODC): • Prevalence rates • Data quality indicators and interview duration • Problems faced during fieldwork • Use of survey instruments *Short discussion*
12:00-13:00	*Lunch*
13:00-15:45	**Review** of selected parts **of the draft questionnaire** • Key indicators to be included • Questions to be changed and questions to be dropped

15:45-16:00	*Coffee and Tea Break*
16:00-18:00	**Review and discussion** of **administrative crime data** • Coverage and inclusion of received data • Definitions of offences used • Feasibility of providing data for CTS

THURSDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 2014	
10:00-12:00	Review of changes to draft questionnaire and **finalisation of questionnaire**
12:00-13:00	*Lunch*
13:00-15:00	**Discussion on technical issues**: • Sample design • Interview mode and method • Fieldwork material • Selection of respondents • Data entry
15:00-15:15	*Coffee and Tea Break*
15:15-18:00	**Discussion on work plan** for survey implementation • Presentation of draft workplan (UNODC) • Review of and changes to draft workplan • Agreement on final workplan

A2) List of participants

Event Name: Crime Victimization Survey Workshop
Date: Feb 25-27, 2014
Location: Erbil, Iraq

No.	Participant Name	Office Name	Telephone No.	E-mail Address
1	**Thanaa Abbas Salman**	CSO	07901928667	thanaa53@yahoo.com
2	**Suham Abdul Hameed**	CSO	09701744214	suham_mh@yahoo.com
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15	**Dr. Serwan Mohammed**	KRSO		
16	**Dr. Ashraf Abdelaal**	JAPU		abdelaal@japuirag.org
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19	**Marc-Antoine Morel**	UNDP		marc.antoine,morel@undp.org
20	**Juan Slewa**	UNDP		juan.slewa@undp.org

A3) Workplan

	Description	Output	Output deadline
1	Finalisation of questionnaire	Final questionnaire (English)	13-Mar-2014
2	Translation of final questionnaire into Arabic and Kurdish	Translate questionnaire (Arabic & Kurdish)	27-Mar-2014
3	Preparation and update the sample frame	Sample frame	27-Mar-2014
4	Revise guidelines for fieldwork and quality assurance	Final manual in English	27-Mar-2014
5	Preparation of quality assurance guidelines	Quality assurance guidelines	10-Apr-2014
6	Interviewers and supervisors select	Interviewers list + replacement list	10-Apr-2014
7	Translation of manual into Arabic and Kurdish	Translate manual (Arabic & Kurdish)	10-Apr-2014
8	Development of sampling design	Description of sample design (English)	10-Apr-2014
9	Preparation of datafile template	Database in SPSS format with codebook	10-Apr-2014
10	Backtranslation of questionnaire and manual	Backtranslated questionnaire and manual	24-Apr-2014
11	Prepare specifications of technical report	Specifications of technical report	12-Jun-2014
12	Printing of the questionnaire (desired sample + 10%)	Printed questionnaires (Arabic & Kurdish)	12-Jun-2014
13	Printing of the manual (number of interviewers + trainers +10%)	Printed manuals (Arabic & Kurdish)	12-Jun-2014
14	Revision of data entry software	High quality software with in- built checks	12-Jun-2014
15	Sampling according to sample design	Survey sample	12-Jun-2014
16	Training of trainers	Report on ToT	26-Jun-2014
17	Preparation of fieldwork and selection of governorates	Fieldwork and quality assurance plan & description of task	15-Jul-2014
18	Training of Interviewers and supervisors	Report on ToI	31-Jul-2014
19	Start data gathering in the field	Start of fieldwork	10-Aug-2014
20	Start quality assurance in the field	Quality control during fieldwork	10-Aug-2014
21	Finish data gathering in the field	All filled-in questionnaires received	22-Sep-2014
22	Data entry	All filled-in questionnaires received	22-Sep-2014
23	Data checking	Data correction	30-Sep-2014
24	Calculation of weights	Database in SPSS format (English)	30-Sep-2014
25	Preparation of technical report on data collection	Technical report on data collection	09-Oct-2014
26	Finish quality assurance in the field	Report on data quality	09-Oct-2014
27	Report drafting	First draft report	04-Dec-2014
28	Translation of first draft report to Arabic and Kurdish	Translated first draft report (Arabic & Kurdish)	25-Dec-2014
29	Internal review/peer review and national counterparts review	Comments on first draft report	15-Jan-2015
30	Review of comments	Revised draft report for internal approval	29-Jan-2015
31	Finalization of report	Final report (English)	23-Feb-2014
32	Translation of final report to Arabic and Kurdish	Translated final report (Arabic & Kurdish)	12-Mar-2015
33	Printing Arabic and Kurdish version reports	Printed final reports (English, Arabic & Kurdish)	26-Mar-2015
34	Preparation of electronic publication of all language versions	Report website	31-Mar-2015
35	Launch event	Launch of report	31-Mar-2015

ANNEX 7 – CVS Final Questionnaire

Survey on Crime and Criminal Justice in IRAQ 2013
FINAL DRAFT FOR TRANSLATION of 13.08.2013

INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS

Number: |__|__|__|__|			**Cluster**
1. Governorate:	|__|__|	8. Building Number	|__|__|__| |__|__|
2. District:	|__|__|	9. Number of the house in the block	|__|__|__|
3. Alnahiah (Locality):	|__|	10. Number of families in the house	|__|__|
4. Environment: Urban 1 Rural 2	|__|	11. Code of family in the cluster	|__|__|__|
5. Name of the district / province:	|__|__|__|		
6. Name of hometown / village:	|__|__|	12. Time when interview started (24:00)	|__|__|__|__|
7. Block Number	|__|__|		

1. TYPE OF DWELLING

(1) House
(2) Flat in a block of flats
(3) Clay house
(4) Tent
(5) Caravan
(6) Other (SPECIFY:_____)

2. HOW MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY?

(1) Less than 5,000 inhabitants
(2) 5,000 – 10,000
(3) 10,000 – 50,000
(4) 50,000 – 100,000
(5) 100,000 – 500,000
(6) 500,000 – 1,000,000
(7) More than 1,000,000 inhabitants
(8) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

3. Sex of the Interviewer << **INT. INDICATE YOUR OWN GENDER** >>

(1) Male
(2) Female

<< INTERVIEWER INTRODUCTION >>

I am an interviewer from the Central Statistical Office. We are conducting a survey in cooperation with the United Nations about the problems of crime.

May I ask you a few questions? This interview won't take much of your time. Your answers will, of course, be treated **CONFIDENTIALLY** and **ANONYMOUSLY**.

<< **INT.: Do not ask for personal I.D. card! Personal details for follow up (name and contact details) will be asked only at the end of questionnaire>>**

<< **INT.: IF RESPONDENT IS SUSPICIOUS OR DOUBTFUL** >>

If you want to check whether this survey is done for the Central Statistical Office and in cooperation with the United Nations or if you would like more information, I can give you the phone number of the project coordinator.

<< **INT.: IF RESPONDENT ASKS FOR THAT NUMBER** >>

His/her telephone is .....

4. In order to determine which person in your household I should interview, I would like to know how many people there are in your household.

<< **INT.: YOU MUST INCLUDE RESPONDENT AND ANY CHILDREN. NOTE THAT A HOUSEHOLD IS DEFINED AS PERSONS SHARING THE SAME ADDRESS AND EATING FROM THE SAME KITCHEN** >>

Number of male household members 16 years and older	
Number of male household members below 16 years	
Number of female household members 16 years and older	
Number of female household members below 16 years	

5. And how many of these household members (male and female) are aged 16 to 75?

Number of household members aged 16 to 75: _____

<< **INT: Determine respondent with next-birthday method, by asking: >>**

Could I now please interview the person in your household aged 16-64 whose birthday is next?

<< **INT.:SELECT RESPONDENT AND CONTINUE WITH INTERVIEW>>**

<< **INT. BEGINNING OF INTERVIEW >>**

INTERVIEWER:	**Unspecific answers to questions such as "don't know", "can't remember" and "refused to say" must NOT be read out to respondents. In other words, answers of this nature should not even be suggested to respondents from the beginning. Respondents should rather be allowed to "VOLUNTEER" these answers themselves.**

<< **INTERVIEWER** >>: **I am an interviewer from the Central Statistical Office. We are conducting a survey in cooperation with the United Nations about the problems of crime.**
May I ask you a few questions? This interview won't take much of your time. Your answers will, of course, be treated CONFIDENTIALLY and ANONYMOUSLY.

6. Indicate **GENDER of RESPONDENT(PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED)**
(1) male
(2) female

7. To start with, could you give me a little information about yourself and your household. This is to help us understand better the results of the survey. First of all, could you tell me the year in which you were born?

<< **INT.:RECORD YEAR** >> eg. 19 |6|0| Date_____

8. How long have you yourself lived in this area?

(1) less than one year
(2) one year - less 3 years
(3) 3 years - less 5 years
(4) 5 years - less 10 years
(5) 10 years or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

9. May I ask your marital status?

(1) single
(2) married
(3) living with someone as a couple
(4) divorced
(5) separated
(6) widow/widower

10. How would you define your educational attainment?

(1) no formal education and illiterate
(2) no formal education but can read and write
(3) less than primary
(4) primary
(5) intermediate
(6) secondary
(7) Diploma
(8) University degree

11. How would you describe your current occupational position. Are you working, keeping house, going to school or college? Or are your retired? Are you unemployed but looking for work?

(1) working (in dependent employment or self-employed)
(2) not working and looking for work (unemployed)
(3) keeping home (homemaker)
(4) retired, disabled
(5) studying/going to school/college
(6) other (SPECIFY) .....

12. Could you please tell me in which **MONTHLY** income category your whole household, **after** deductions for tax etc., falls? << **INT: THE TOTAL AMOUNT THAT** ALL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD **TOGETHER GET TO TAKE HOME PER MONTH** - INDICATE **THE AMOUNT - EVEN IF ONLY A ROUGH ESTIMATE - FOR EXAMPLE**>>

(1) Less than IQD 100,000
(2) more than 100,000 and up to 400,000

(2) more than 400,000 and up to 700,000
(3) more than 700,000 and up to 1,000,000
(4) more than 1,000,000 and up to 1,500,000
(5) more than 1,500,000 and up to 2,500,000
(6) more than 2,500,000
(7) don’t know/ refuse to say << **INT.: DON’T READ** >>

Perceptions of Security

Now I would like to ask some questions about your personal opinion.

13. What are the three most prevalent threats, in order of importance, that concern your country?

(1) Poverty/low standard of living
(2) Terrorist attacks
(3) Relations between the country's component communities
(4) Natural hazards (Drought, Dust storms etc.)
(5) Corruption
(6) Criminality
(7) Unemployment
(8) Hunger/malnutrition
(9) Access to public services (water, electricity etc.)
(10) Don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: enter numbers in order of importance:>>**

FIRST	
Second	
Third	

14. How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, neither safe nor unsafe, a bit unsafe, or very unsafe, or do you never walk alone after dark?

(1) very safe
(2) fairly safe
(3) neither safe nor unsafe
(4) bit unsafe
(5) very unsafe
(6) I never walk alone after dark

15. How safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, neither safe nor unsafe, a bit unsafe, or very unsafe?

(1) very safe
(2) fairly safe
(3) neither safe nor unsafe
(4) bit unsafe
(5) very unsafe
(6) I never stay alone at home

16. Now imagine the following situations you may experience during daytime: being in public spaces such as a crowded market place, waiting at vehicle checkpoints or queuing for goods or services. In such situations do you feel very safe, fairly safe, neither safe nor unsafe, a bit unsafe, or very unsafe?

(1) very safe
(2) fairly safe
(3) neither safe nor unsafe
(4) bit unsafe
(5) very unsafe
(6) it depends on the situation
(7) don't know/not applicable << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

17. During the last 12 months (since September 2012), how often were you PERSONALLY in contact with drug related problems in the area in which you live? For example seeing people dealing in drugs, taking or using drugs in public places, or by finding evidence left behind by drug addicts such as syringes?

(1) Daily or almost daily
(2) Few times per week
(3) Few times per month
(4) Few times per year
(5) Rarely/almost never
(6) Never
(7) Don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

18. In comparison to the previous 3 years (from September 2010 to September 2012), do you think that drug related problems in the area in which you live have increased, remained stable or decreased?

(1) Increased
(2) Remained stable
(3) Decreased
(4) Don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

19. Can I ask you then, who is the primary responsible entity in your area for ensuring security ?

(1) Police
(2) Iraqi security forces (army)
(3) Militias
(4) Other (SPECIFY:_____)
(5) Don't know ---> **GO TO Q21** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

20. Taking everything into account, how good do you think the primary responsible entity in your area are in ensuring security? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, neither good nor bad job, a fairly poor job or a very poor job?

(1) very good job
(2) fairly good job
(3) neither good nor bad job
(4) fairly poor job
(5) very poor job

21. I would now like to ask a question about the helpfulness of the police. How far would you agree that the police do everything they can to help people and to be of service? Would you fully agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to disagree or fully disagree?

(1) fully agree
(2) tend to agree
(3) neither agree nor disagree
(4) tend to disagree
(5) fully disagree

22. Private security companies are increasingly taking up certain functions in protecting public institutions, companies, households and private individuals. During the past 12 months did you or any member of your household use the services of a private security company to guarantee the safety of your household or your own personal safety?

(1) Yes, to guarantee the safety of my house
(2) Yes, to guarantee my personal safety
(3) Yes, both of these
(4) No
(5) don't know/refused to answer

23. I now want to turn to the subject of **CRIME, such as stealing, breaking into houses or personal attacks against individuals**. Has the topic of crime come up in any conversation you have had with your family, **friends or colleagues in the last two weeks?**

(1) yes
(2) no

24. How would you rate the overall level of criminality in your area?

(1) very high
(2) high
(3) medium
(4) low
(5) very low
(6) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

25. In comparison to one year ago (September 2012), do you think that the crime risk in the area you live in has strongly increased, increased, remained stable, decreased or strongly decreased?

(1) strongly increased
(2) increased
(3) remained stable

(4) decreased
(5) strongly decreased
(6) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

26. I now want to ask you about crimes **YOU** or **YOUR CURRENT HOUSEHOLD** may have experienced during the past **3 years, in other words since September 2010**.

Please note, I am only interested in offences which **you** and **people you live with now** have experienced.

It is sometimes difficult to remember such incidents so I will read the questions slowly and I would like you to think **CAREFULLY** about them. I shall start with some questions about crimes involving cars, and so I need to ask you about car ownership.

CAR OWNERSHIP (HOUSEHOLD)

27. During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, has anyone in your household had for private use any car, van or truck?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **IF NO, GO TO Q63**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q63**

28. IF YES. How many usually (most of the time?)

<< **INT.: COUNT TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES OWNED AT THE SAME TIME** >>

(1) one
(2) two
(3) three
(4) four
(5) five or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

THEFT OF VEHICLES (HOUSEHOLD)

29. During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, have you or other members of your household had any of their cars/vans/trucks stolen **when nobody was in the vehicle?** Please take your time to think about it.

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q42**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q42**

30. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT. READ OUT** >>

(1) during the last 12 months ---> **GO TO Q31**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q32**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q32** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

31. << **INT.: IF during the last 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the last 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

32. **THE LAST TIME**, did this happen at or near your own home, at the workplace, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?

<< **INT.: INCLUDE INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN GARAGES, DRIVEWAYS, ETC. AS CODE 1** >>

(1) **at** own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) at the workplace

(4) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(5) elsewhere in the country
(6) abroad
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

33. (The last time) was the vehicle ever recovered?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

34. (The last time) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q38**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q39** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST THE FOLLOWING QUESTION ACCORDINGLY** >>

35. << **INT.: IF YES** >> Why did you/they (adjust) report it to the authorities?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>
<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER**: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To recover the car/van/truck
(2) For insurance reasons
(3) Crimes should be reported
(4) Wanted offender to be caught
(5) To stop it happening again
(6) To get help
(7) To get compensation from the offender
(8) To prevent false accusations in case the car is misused for criminal purposes
(9) Other (SPECIFY_____)

36. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with your (their) report?

(1) yes, satisfied ---> **GO TO Q39**
(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q37**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q37**
(4) don't know ---> **GO TO Q39** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

37. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

For what reason were you (they) dissatisfied?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender/ didn't recover my car/van
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY_____)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

.....

GO TO Q39

38. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you or no-one else report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER**: Can you tell me a little more?

(01) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(02) my family solved it / solved it myself
(03) reported to other authority
(04) no insurance
(05) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(06) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(07) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(08) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(09) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

39. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q42**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q42**

40. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

41. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

HIJACKING/ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF CARS, VANS OR TRUCKS (HOUSEHOLD)

42. Now I would like to ask you about hijacking of cars, vans or trucks.

During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, has anybody attempted to steal or has anyone actually stolen a car, van or truck by force (e.g. firearm, knife, or other weapon, assault), **when you or other members of your present household were inside or just outside the vehicle?**

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q63**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q63** << INT.: DON'T READ >>

43. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the last 12 months ---> **GO TO Q44**
(2) before then ---> **GO TO Q45**
(3) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q45** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

44. << **INT.: IF during the last 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the last 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice

(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

45. **THE LAST TIME THAT THIS HAPPENED -** where did the hijacking or attempted hijacking occur? Did this happen at or near your own home, at the workplace, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?

<< **INT.: INCLUDE INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN GARAGES, DRIVEWAYS, ETC. AS CODE 1** >>

(1) **at** own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) at the workplace
(4) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(5) elsewhere in the country
(6) abroad
(7) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

46. (The last time) How many people were involved in committing this offence?

(1) one person
(2) two persons
(3) three or more persons
(4) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

47. (About the last incident) Did you know **at least one offender** by name or by sight?

(1) no, did not know offender(s)
(2) known by sight only
(3) known by name
(4) known by name and sight
(5) not known/don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

48. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a knife, a gun, another weapon or something used as a weapon?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q51**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q51** << INT.: DON'T READ >>

49. (If weapon) What was it? << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) knife
(2) handgun (revolver/pistol)
(3) long gun (shotgun, rifle, machine gun)
(4) other weapon, specify:_____
(5) something used as a weapon/(bottle/broken bottle piece)
(6) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

50. Was the weapon actually used?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

51. Was the car/van/truck actually stolen?

(1) yes ---> **GO TO Q52**
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q53**

52. (The last time) was the car/van ever recovered?

(1) yes
(2) no

53. Did you or anybody else suffer an injury as a result?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q55**

(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q55** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

54. (If injury) Did you or anybody else see a doctor, hospital or a medical clinic as a result?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

55. (The last time) did you or anyone else report that incident to the police or to the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q59**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q60** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST QUESTION ACCORDINGLY** >>

56. << **INT.: IF YES** >> Why did you/they (adjust) report it to the authorities?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>
<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER**: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To recover the car/van/truck
(2) For insurance reasons
(3) Crimes should be reported
(4) Wanted offender to be caught
(5) To stop it happening again
(6) To get help
(7) To get compensation from the offender
(8) To prevent false accusations in case the car is misused for criminal purposes
(9) Other (SPECIFY_____)

57. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied ---> **GO TO Q60**
(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q58**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q58**
(4) don't know ---> **GO TO Q60**<< **INT. DON'T READ** >>

58. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

For what reason were you (they) dissatisfied?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender/ didn't recover my car/van/truck
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY_____)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

.....

GO TO Q60

59. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you or no-one else report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER**: Can you tell me a little more?

(01) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(02) my family solved it / solved it myself
(03) reported to other authority
(04) no insurance
(05) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(06) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(07) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(08) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(09) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

60. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q63**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q63**

61. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

62. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP (HOUSEHOLD)

63. During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, has anyone in your household owned livestock?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q78**

THEFT OF LIVESTOCK (HOUSEHOLD)

64. During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, have you or other members of your household had any of their LIVESTOCK stolen?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q78**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q78** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

65. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q66**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q67**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q67** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

66. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times

(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

67. **THE LAST TIME THAT THIS HAPPENED**, did this theft happen at or near your own home or elsewhere?

(1) stable/chicken run, etc. at own home
(2) camp near own home
(3) grazing land (field)
(4) elsewhere (specify)

68. The last time, what LIVESTOCK was stolen?

(1) sheep
(2) goat
(3) horse
(4) cow/cattle
(5) camel
(6) chicken/poultry
(7) other (PLEASE SPECIFY:_____)

69. (The last time) did you or anybody else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) No -----> **GO TO Q73**
(5) Don't know -----> **GO TO Q74** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

70. << INT.: IF YES >> Why did you (they) report it?

(1) To recover property
(2) For insurance reasons
(3) Crimes should be reported
(4) Wanted offender to be caught
(5) To stop it happening again
(6) To get help
(7) To get compensation from the offender
(8) Other

71. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied ---> **GO TO Q74**
(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q72**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q72**
(4) don't know ---> **GO TO Q74** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

72. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

For what reason were you (they) dissatisfied?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender/ didn't recover the livestock
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY)

.....

GO TO Q74

73. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you or anyone else report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER**: Can you tell me a little more?

(01) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(02) my family solved it / solved it myself
(03) reported to other authority
(04) no insurance
(05) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(06) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(07) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(08) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(09) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

74. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q77**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q77**

75. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

76. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

77. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you or your household. Was it very serious, somewhat serious or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

BURGLARY (HOUSEHOLD)

78. During the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, did anyone actually get into your house or flat without permission and steal or try to steal something? I am **not including** here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups.

<< **INT.: INCLUDE CELLARS, DO NOT INCLUDE BURGLARIES IN SECOND HOUSES OR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS** >>

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q91**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q91** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

79. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q80**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q81**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q81** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

80. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

81. **THE LAST TIME THAT THIS HAPPENED**, was anything actually stolen?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

82. The **LAST TIME** this happened, was any member of your household at home?

(1) yes
(2) no —--> **GO TO Q85**

83. Was any member of your household aware of the presence of the burglars the last time this happened?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

84. Were any members of your household intimidated (threatened), assaulted, etc. In other words, would you describe the situation as a **HOUSE ROBBERY**, i.e. you or your household were robbed in your own home?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

85. (The last time) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q89**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q90** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST QUESTION ACCORDINGLY** >>

86. << **INT.: IF YES** >> Why did you/they(adjust) report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To recover property
(2) For insurance reasons
(3) Crimes should be reported
(4) Wanted offender to be caught
(5) To stop it happening again
(6) To get help
(7) To get compensation from the offender
(8) Other

87. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with your (their) report?

(1) yes, satisfied ---> **GO TO Q90**

(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q88**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q88**
(4) don't know ---> **GO TO Q90** << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

88. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

For what reason were you (they) dissatisfied? You can give more than one reason.

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender/ didn't recover my property
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

.....

GO TO Q90

89. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you or no-one else report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(01) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(02) my family solved it / solved it myself
(03) reported to other authority
(04) no insurance
(05) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(06) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with they authorities
(07) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(08) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(09) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

90. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you or your household? Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

ATTEMPTED BURGLARY (HOUSEHOLD)

91. Apart from this, during the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010, do you have any evidence that someone tried to get into your house or flat unsuccessfully? For example, damage to locks, doors or windows, or scratches around the lock?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q96**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q96** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

92. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q93**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q94**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q94** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

93. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

94. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED, did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

95. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you or your household? Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

KIDNAPPING (HOUSEHOLD)

96. During the past 3 years (since September 2010), have you or any member of your household been taken away and held against will for the purpose of obtaining money or any other benefit for liberation? (Kidnapping).

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q119**

97. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q98**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q99**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q99** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

98. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

99. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED, did this happen at or near your own home, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?

(1) **at** your own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(4) elsewhere in the country
(5) abroad
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

100. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED, how old was the person kidnapped?

(1) **below 18 years old**
(2) **18 years or older**
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

101. (About the last incident) What was the purpose of the kidnapping?

(1) to extort money
(2) to reach political or terrorist goals
(3) it was a personal/family dispute
(4) Other (SPECIFY:_____)
(5) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

102. (The last time) How many people were involved in committing this offence?

(1) one person
(2) two persons
(3) three or more persons
(4) don't know << **INT.:DON'T READ** >>

103. (About the last incident) Did you know **AT LEAST ONE** offender by name or by sight?

(1) did not know offender(s)
(2) known by sight only
(3) known by name
(4) known by name and sight
(5) did not see offender << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

104. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a knife, a gun, another weapon or something used as a weapon?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q106**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q106** << INT.: DON'T READ >>

105. (If weapon) What was it? << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) knife
(2) gun
(3) other weapon, specify:_____
(4) something used as a weapon (bottle/broken bottle piece)
(5) don't know << INT.:DON'T READ>>

106. Did the offender receive any payment, good or other benefit from you or your family?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q108**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q108** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

107. How much approximately was paid by you or your family?

(1) indicate the approximate amount in Iraqi Dinar: **FOR EXAMPLE, ID,5000=** >>

Amount_____(Dinars only)

(2) something else was given
(3) don't know

108. What was the outcome of the kidnapping?

(1) the person kidnapped was released
(2) the person kidnapped was killed
(3) the person is still held against his will
(3) other (SPECIFY:_____)

109. (The last time) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q113**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q114** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY** >>

110. Why did you (they) report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To get help
(2) Crimes should be reported
(3) Wanted offender to be caught
(4) To stop it happening again
(5) Other (PLEASE SPECIFY:_____)

111. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied ——> **GO TO Q114**
(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q112**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q112**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q114** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

112. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

For what reasons were you (they) dissatisfied? You can give more than one reason.

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offenders
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) the kidnapped person was not released
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY:_____)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

GO TO Q114

113. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) my family solved it / solved it myself
(2) reported to other authority
(3) fear of negative consequences for the kidnapped person/fear of reprisal
(4) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(5) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(6) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(7) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

114. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q117**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q117**

115. **<<INT. IF YES >>**

Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

116. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

117. In some countries, civil society organizations or other agencies have been set up to help victims of crime by giving information, or practical or emotional support. Did you get help from such an organization or specialised agency?

(1) yes
(2) no

118. Do you feel the services of a civil society organization or other specialised agency to help victims of crime have (would have) been useful for you?

(1) no, not useful
(2) yes, useful
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

HOMICIDE (HOUSEHOLD)

I would now like to ask you some questions on members of your household who are no longer with you. We realize that these questions may be difficult to answer for you and bring back strong memories of people close to you. Please consider that information on past events will help to design measures that can help prevent crime and violence in the future.

119. During the past 6 years (since 2007), has any member of your household died? (INT: do not include relatives who were living outside of the household)

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q136**

120. << **INT.: IF yes** >> How many ?

(1) number of persons

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

121. Among those members of your household who died during the past 6 years (since 2007), has anyone died through outside force or violence? (INT: do not include relatives who were living outside of the household)

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q136**

122. << **INT.: IF yes** >> In chronological order starting with the most recent event, please list the year of death and the age and sex of any victim who died through outside force or violence

<<INT: enter one record per victim>>

Victim number	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Year of death					
(2) Age of victim					
(3) Sex of victim					

(4) <<don't know/refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

123. How did this happen?

(1) <<INT: MARK only one per victim>>

Victim number	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Victim of a terrorist attack, political or inter-ethnic violence					
(2) Victim during operations of armed forces or police					
(3) Victim during a criminal attack (during a robbery, burglary, assault, etc.)					
(4) Victim of violence due to other reasons (personal conflict, family-related violence, etc.)					
(5) Victim of an accident (incl. car accident or suicide					
(6) Other (SPECIFY:_____)					
(7) Don't know/ refused to say << **INT. DON'T READ** >>					

124. What was the weapon used in the killing?

<<INT: MARK only one per victim. In case of Accident, note the Cause of death under 'other means'.>>

Victim number	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Explosive weapons (incl. suicide bombings)					
(2) Firearm					
(3) Knife					
(4) Other means					
(5) Don't know/ refused to say << **INT. DON'T READ** >>					

125. Was the household member killed one of the following?

<<INT: MARK only one per victim>>

Victim number	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Member of the armed forces/police					
(2) Other government official					
(3) Civilian					
(4) Other (SPECIFY:_____)					
(5) Don't know/ refused to say << **INT. DON'T READ** >>					

126. (The last time) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q130**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q131** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY** >>

127. Why did you (they) report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To get help
(2) Crimes should be reported
(3) Wanted offender to be caught
(4) To stop it happening again
(5) Other (PLEASE SPECIFY:_____)

128. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied —--> **GO TO Q131**
(2) somewhat, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q129**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q129**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q131** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

129. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

For what reasons were you (they) dissatisfied? You can give more than one reason.

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offenders
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY:_____)
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

GO TO Q131

130. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) my family solved it / solved it myself
(2) reported to other authority
(3) didn't dare/fear of reprisal
(4) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(5) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(6) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(7) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

131. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q134**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q134**

132. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

133. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

134. In some countries, civil society organizations or other agencies have been set up to help the family members of victims by giving information, or practical or emotional support. Did you get help from such an organization or specialised agency?

(1) yes

(2) no

135. Do you feel the services of a civil society organization or other specialised agency to help family members of victims have (would have) been useful for you?

(1) no, not useful
(2) yes, useful
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

NB: NEXT I WANT TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED TO YOU **PERSONALLY**. THINGS THAT YOU HAVE **MENTIONED ALREADY** OR WHICH HAPPENED TO **OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD** MUST **NOT** BE MENTIONED NOW.

ROBBERY (PERSONAL)

136. During the **past 3 years, in other words since September 2010** has anyone taken something from you, by using force, or threatening you **or** did anyone try to steal something from you by using force or threatening force?

<< **INT.: PICKPOCKETING MUST BE REPORTED UNDER PERSONAL THEFTS (Q158 - Q164)** >>

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q158**

137. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q138**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q139**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q139** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

138. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

139. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED, did this happen at or near your own home, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?

(1) **at** your own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(4) elsewhere in the country
(5) abroad
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

140. (The last time) How many people were involved in committing this offence?

(1) one person
(2) two persons
(3) three or more persons
(4) don't know << **INT.:DON'T READ** >>

141. (About the last incident) Did you know **AT LEAST ONE** offender by name or by sight?

(1) did not know offender(s)
(2) known by sight only
(3) known by name
(4) known by name and sight
(5) did not see offender << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

142. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a knife, a gun, another weapon or something used as a weapon?

(1) yes

(2) no ---> **GO TO Q146**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q146** << INT.: DON'T READ >>

143. (If weapon) What was it? << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) knife ---> **GO TO Q145**
(2) gun ---> **GO TO Q144**
(3) other weapon, specify:_____ ---> **GO TO Q145**
(4) something used as a weapon (bottle/broken bottle piece) ---> **GO TO Q145**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q146** << INT.: DON'T READ >>

144. **If** it was a **gun**, was it a handgun or a long gun?

<< **INT.: LONG GUNS INCLUDE SHOTGUNS, RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES** >>

(1) handgun (revolver/pistol)
(2) long gun (shotgun, rifle, machinegun)
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

145. Was the weapon actually used?
(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

146. Did the offender actually steal something from you?

(1) yes
(2) no

147. (The last time) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q151**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q152** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE AND ADJUST ACCORDINGLY** >>

148. Why did you (they) report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) To recover property
(2) For insurance reasons
(3) Crimes should be reported
(4) Wanted offender to be caught
(5) To stop it happening again
(6) To get help
(7) To get compensation from the offender
(8) Other

149. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied —--> **GO TO Q152**
(2) somehow, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q150**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q150**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q152** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

150. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED** >>

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

For what reasons were you (they) dissatisfied? You can give more than one reason.

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender/ didn't recover my property
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

GO TO Q152

151. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(2) my family solved it / solved it myself
(3) reported to other authority
(4) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(5) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(6) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(7) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(8) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

152. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q155**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q155**

153. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

154. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

155. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you?
Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

156. In some countries, civil society organizations or other agencies have been set up to help victims of crime by giving information, or practical or emotional support. Did you get help from such an organization or specialised agency?

(1) yes

(2) no

157. Do you feel the services of a civil society organization or other specialised agency to help victims of crime have (would have) been useful for you?

(1) no, not useful
(2) yes, useful
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

PERSONAL THEFTS (PERSONAL)

<< **INT.: READ SLOWLY** >>

158. Apart from theft involving force, there are many other types of theft of personal property, such as pickpocketing or the theft of a purse, wallet, clothing, jewellery, sports equipment, etc. at one's work, at school, on public transport, or in the street. During the past **3 years, in other words since September 2010**, have you **PERSONALLY** been the victim of any of these thefts?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q**165

159. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q160**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q161**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q161** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

160. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

161. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED, did this happen at or near your own home, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad.

(1) **at** own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) at the workplace
(4) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(5) elsewhere in the country
(6) abroad
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

162. (The last time) Were you holding or carrying what was stolen (that is to say, was it a case of pick-pocketing?)

(1) yes
(2) no

163. (The last time) did you or anyone else report that incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

164. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you.
Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious

(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

ASSAULTS/THREATS (PERSONAL)

165. Apart from the incidents just covered, have you during the **past 3 years, in other words since September 2010** been personally attacked or threatened by someone in a way that really frightened you either at home or elsewhere, such as in the street, at school, on public transport, or at your workplace?

<< **INT.: INCLUDE HERE DOMESTIC ASSAULTS IF MENTIONED BY RESPONDENT** >>

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q192**

166. Take your time to consider. An incident of this sort might also have involved your partner, family member or a close friend. So apart from incidents already covered, have you in the past 3 years, in other words since September 2010 been personally attacked or threatened by someone you know, in a way that really frightened you?

(1) Yes
(2) No ---> **GO TO Q192**

167. When did this last happen? Was this ... << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) during the past 12 months ---> **GO TO Q168**
(3) before then ---> **GO TO Q169**
(4) don't know/can't remember ---> **GO TO Q169** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

168. << **INT.: IF during the past 12 months** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

169. **THE LAST TIME** THAT THIS HAPPENED,did this happen in your home, near your own home, elsewhere in your city or governorate, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?

(1) **at** your own home
(2) **near** own home
(3) at the workplace
(4) elsewhere in the city or governorate
(5) elsewhere in the country
(6) abroad
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

170. (The last time) How many people were involved in committing the offence?

(1) one person
(2) two persons
(3) three or more persons
(4) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

171. (About the last incident) Did you know **at least one** offender by name or by sight?

(1) did not know offender(s) ---> **GO TO Q173**
(2) known by sight only ---> **GO TO Q173**
(3) known by name ---> **GO TO Q172**
(4) known by name and sight
(5) did not see offender ---> **GO TO Q173**

172. (**Only if known by name or by name and sight**) Were any of them your spouse, ex-spouse, partner, ex-partner, fiancé/ fiancée, close friend, a relative or somebody you work with?

<< **INT.: MEANS RELATIONSHIP AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENCE** >>

<< **IF UNCLEAR, PROBE WHETHER EX-SPOUSE, EX-PARTNER or close friend AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENCE** >>

(1) spouse, partner (at the time)
(2) ex-spouse, ex-partner (at the time)
(3) fiancé/ fiancée (at the time)
(4) close friend (at the time)
(5) relative
(6) somebody you work with
(7) none of these
(8) refuses to say << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

173. (**The last time**) can you tell me what actually happened, were you threatened, or was force used?

(1) just threatened
(2) force used
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

174. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a knife, a gun, another weapon or something used as a weapon?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q178**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q178** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

175. (**If weapon**) What was it? << **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) knife ---> **GO TO Q177**
(2) gun ---> **GO TO Q176**
(3) other weapon, specify:_____ ---> **GO TO Q177**
(4) something used as a weapon (bottle/broken bottle piece) ---> **GO TO Q177**
(5) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q177**

176. (**If gun**) Was it a handgun or a long gun?

<< **INT.: LONG GUNS INCLUDE SHOTGUNS, RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES** >>

(1) handgun
(2) long gun (shotgun, rifle, machinegun)
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

177. Was the weapon actually used?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

178. Did you suffer an injury as a result?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

179. (If injury) Did you see a doctor, hospital or medical clinic as a result?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

180. (The last time) did you or anyone else report that last incident to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes, to the police
(2) yes, to the judiciary (courts)
(3) yes, to both the police and the judiciary (courts)
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q184**
(5) don't know ---> **GO TO Q185** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF YES, NOTE WHETHER THE REPORT WAS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT OR SOMEBODY ELSE**

AND ADJUST QUESTION ACCORDINGLY >>

181. Why did you (they) report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) Crimes should be reported
(2) Wanted offender to be caught/punished
(3) To stop it happening again
(4) To get help
(5) To get compensation from the offender
(6) Other (specify please)

182. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way they dealt with the report?

(1) yes, satisfied ---> **GO TO Q185**
(2) somehow, but not completely satisfied ---> **GO TO Q183**
(3) no, not satisfied ---> **GO TO Q183**
(4) don't know ---> **GO TO Q185** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

183. << **INT.: IF DISSATISFIED**

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

For what reasons were you (they) dissatisfied? You can give more than one reason.

(1) they didn't do enough/were not interested
(2) they didn't find or apprehend the offender
(3) they didn't keep me properly informed
(4) they didn't treat me correctly/were impolite
(5) they were slow to arrive
(6) other reasons (PLEASE SPECIFY)
(7) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

GO TO QUESTION 185

184. << **INT.: IF NOT** >> Why didn't you report it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

<< **INT.: IF NO CLEAR ANSWER** >>: Can you tell me a little more?

(1) not worth reporting/not serious enough/no loss
(2) my family solved it / solved it myself
(3) reported to other authority
(4) they could or would do nothing/lack of proof
(5) fear/dislike of the authorities/no involvement wanted with the authorities
(6) didn't dare (for fear of reprisal)
(7) other reasons (SPECIFY_____)
(8) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

185. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q**188
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q**188

186. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

187. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

188. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you?
Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

189. Do you regard the incident as a crime?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

190. In some countries, civil society organizations or other agencies have been set up to help victims of crime by giving information, or practical or emotional support. Did you get help from such an organization or specialised agency?

(1) yes
(2) no

191. Do you feel the services of a civil society organization or other specialised agency to help victims of crime have (would have) been useful for you?

(1) no, not useful
(2) yes, useful
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

CONSUMER FRAUD (**PERSONAL**)

192. During the past 12 months (since September 2012), were you the victim of a consumer fraud?

In other words, has someone when selling something to you or delivering a service cheated you in terms of quantity or quality of the goods/service?

(1) yes
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q202**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q202** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

193. << **INT.: IF YES** >> How often did it happen during the past 12 months?

(1) once
(2) twice
(3) three times
(4) four times
(5) five times or more
(6) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

<< **INT.: IF MORE THAN ONCE, ASK ABOUT THE LAST TIME** >>

194. << **INT.: IF YES** >> (The last time this happened) how did this fraud take place? Was it to do with

...
<< **INT.: READ OUT** >>

(1) construction or repair work
(2) work done by a garage (vehicle repairs)
(3) a hotel or restaurant
(4) a grocery store
(5) another sort of shop
(6) an internet transaction/e-commerce
(7) some other things (PLEASE SPECIFY_____)
(8) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

195. What type of fraud was it?

(1) False scales or weights
(2) A stolen/forged credit card
(3) Counterfeit bank note/money
(4) A fraudulent scheme
(5) An impersonation scheme (somebody using a false identity)
(6) some other fraud (PLEASE SPECIFY_____)
(7) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

196. (The last time), did you or anyone else report this consumer fraud to the police or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

197. Can I just check then, (the last time) did you or anyone else report to some other Authority, such as a tribal leader or a religious leader?

(1) yes, a tribal leader
(2) yes, a religious leader
(3) yes, some other authority
(4) no ---> **GO TO Q200**
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >> ---> **GO TO Q200**

198. **<<INT. IF YES >>**
Did you see this (abovementioned) report as AN ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE POLICE or the judiciary (courts)?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

199. (The last time) Were you satisfied with the way they handled your case?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

200. Taking everything into account, how serious was the incident for you? Was it very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

(1) very serious
(2) somewhat serious
(3) not very serious
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>

201. Do you regard the incident as a crime?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

BRIBERY (PERSONAL)

202. During the last 12 months (since September 2012), did you have a direct contact or indirect contact with any personnel from the following institutions (for example when using the public service or to obtain information/help or to ask for any document or administration procedures)? << INT.: If the answer is "yes" go to Q203 for the same item If the answer is "no" go to the next item in the list>>			203. During the last 12 months, did you have to give a gift or pay extra money to personnel from this institution, either directly or indirectly (with the exclusion of the established official amount of fees)? << INT.: If the answer is "yes" go to Q204 for the same item If the answer is "no" go to the next item in Q202>>		204. How many times did you have to give a gift or pay extra money directly or indirectly in the last 12 months to any **"police"** [<< INT.: enter institution>>] personnel (with the exclusion of the established official amount of fees)? And so on for the rest of the institutions Continue with Q202 for the next item.
Official authorities/institutions	**Yes**	**No**	**Yes**	**No**	**Number of times**
1. Police	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
2.Judges	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
3.Public Prosecutors	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
4.Doctors in public facilities	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
5.Nurses in public facilities	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
6.Teachers in public facilities	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
7.Cadastre officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
8.Customs officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
9.Tax/revenue officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
10.Car registration/driving licenses officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
11.Public utilities officers (water, electricity, etc.)	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
12.Welfare agency/ministry officers (pensions, social benefits, etc.)	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
13. PDS officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
14.Foreign embassy/consulate officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
15. Municipal or provincial or governorates officers (public employees)	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
16. Members of municipal or provincial governments (elected representatives)	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
17.Members of national government	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
18.Members of parliament	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
19.Iraqi security forces	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
20.Officers of foreign private companies	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
21. International organizations officers (UN, WHO, UNICEF, etc.)	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|
22.Non-Government organization (NGO) officers	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	|__||__|

<< INT.: IF no gifts/payments were made under any of the categories in Q203 go to Q207, otherwise go to Q205>>

205. The last time you had to make such extra payment or gift, did you report it to any official authority/institution (e.g. police, court, official administration, etc.)?

(1) yes ---> **GO TO Q206**
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q207**
(3) don't know ---> **GO TO Q207** << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

206. (The last time) to which authority/institution did you report that you had to give such an extra payment? (mark all that apply)

(1) Police
(2) Court/public prosecutor
(3) Commission of Integrity
(4) Member of municipal/provincial government
(5) Inspector General
(6) Supervisor to the official (in the same organization of the officer requesting the payment)
(6) Other (SPECIFY_____) << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

ACCESS TO JUSTICE_(HOUSEHOLD)

People are sometimes involved in disputes and turn to a formal or informal authority to settle these disputes.

207. Please think carefully, since January 2007, have you personally or has any member of your household been involved in any dispute or legal problem among the following list?

<<**INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED**>>**PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY**>>

#	Type of Dispute	YES	NO
	Civil cases		
01	Land dispute		
02	Administrative dispute (problems obtaining official documents; ID, Passport, marriage/divorce papers etc.)		
03	Family dispute (contested divorce, child support/custody, contested inheritance (excluding land), domestic violence)		
04	Financial dispute (Enforcement of business agreement, repayment of loans)		
05	Occupational dispute (work-related problems)		
06	Distribution of PDS		
07	Unpaid compensation from government		
08	Other type of civil case		
	Criminal cases		
09	Theft/hijacking of vehicles		
10	Theft of livestock		
11	Burglary or attempted burlary		
12	Kidnapping		
13	Homicide		
14	Robbery		
15	Personal theft		
16	Assaults / Threats		
17	Bribery or other forms of corruption		
18	Other type of criminal case		

208. From the table above, Which was the most recent dispute you or any member of your family was involved in since January 2007?:

(1) **<<INT: Enter the corresponding number from the table, IF ANY>>**

☐☐

(2) NO DISPUTES since January 2007 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >> ---> **GO TO Q224**

209. (The last time) To whom did you turn in order to have your dispute handled?

(1) Formal Justice (courts) only ---> **GO TO Q211**
(2) To tribe leaders only ---> **GO TO Q219**
(3) Both formal justice and tribe leaders ---> **GO TO Q210**
(4) None of these, the dispute was handled through personal dialogue ---> **GO TO Q224**
(5) None of these, the dispute was never taken up by anyone ---> **GO TO Q224**
(6) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>> ---> **GO TO Q224**

210. (The last time) Why did you use both systems?

(1) I have equal confidence in both systems
(2) I have more confidence in formal justice but was under pressure to also use tribe leaders
(3) I have more confidence in tribe leaders, but only the formal justice system can effectively guarantee my rights
(4) Other reason (please specify: _____)
(5) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

211. (The last time) How satisfied were you with the way the court handled the case?

(1) Very satisfied ---> **GO TO Q213**
(2) Satisfied ---> **GO TO Q213**

(3) Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied ---> **GO TO Q213**
(4) Unsatisfied
(5) Very unsatisfied
(6) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>> ---> **GO TO Q213**

212. (The last time) Why were you not satisfied with the way the court handled the case?

<<**INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED**>>**PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY**>>

(1) Too expensive
(2) Long delays in the process
(3) Lack of clarity of the process
(4) Need to bribe
(5) Insufficient information on the status of the case was provided
(6) Did not have the chance to fully explain/present my case
(7) Other (Specify:_____)
(8) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

213. (The last time) How long did it take to reach a final settlement of the case in court (from the day the case went to court to the day of the final decision)?

(1) less than 3 months
(2) more than 3 but less than 12 months
(3) more than 12 months but less than 2 years
(4) more than 2 years
(5) no final settlement of the case yet ----→ GO TO Q215
(6) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

214. (The last time) What were the total costs of the legal proceedings for you or your family? (including any fees, costs for lawyers and any collateral costs)?

(1) no costs for me or my family
(2) between zero and 250,000 Iraqi Denars
(3) more than 250,000 Denars and up to 500,000 Denars
(4) more than 500,000 Denars and up to 1.000,000 Denars
(5) more than 1.000,000 Denars and up to 3.000,000 Denars
(6) more than 3.000,000 Denars
(7) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

215. (The last time) Did you receive economic assistance from the state or any other public entity to cover the costs of legal proceedings?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

216. (The last time) Did you receive any free legal assistance from any of the following?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) from a government office
(2) from a lawyer or a lawyers' association
(3) from another non-governmental organization (NGO)
(4) other (SPECIFY: _____)
(5) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

217. (The last time) How did you obtain information about your legal rights before the legal proceedings?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) from the police
(2) from a government office
(3) from a lawyer
(4) from an NGO
(5) from a friend/family member
(6) from a publication (newspaper/TV)
(7) from the internet
(8) other (SPECIFY:_____)
(9) no information obtained before the proceedings

(10)don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

218. In your opinion, do you think that if you are accused of some wrongdoing and are not able to pay for a lawyer yourself, you are entitled to get a lawyer free of charge to assist and defend you?

(1) yes ---> **GO TO Q220**
(2) no ---> **GO TO Q220**
(3) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>> ---> **GO TO Q220**

219. You mentioned that you have turned to tribe leaders to have your dispute handled. Why did you turn to tribe leaders rather than the formal justice system?

(1) The proceedings in court are too slow
(2) To avoid paying money for bribes in court
(3) Because of pressure from my family or tribe
(4) Courts are too expensive
(5) Courts are too distant from my house
(6) Lack of evidence in court
(7) To avoid damaging the relationship with other families or tribes
(8) Lack of knowledge on how the formal justice system works
(9) Other (SPECIFY:_____)
(10) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

220. (The last time you turned to tribal leaders to have a dispute handled) How satisfied were you with the way the tribe leaders handled the case?

(1) Very satisfied ---> **GO TO Q222**
(2) Satisfied ---> **GO TO Q222**
(3) Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied ---> **GO TO Q222**
(4) Unsatisfied
(5) Very unsatisfied
(6) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>> ---> **GO TO Q222**

221. (The last time) Why were you not satisfied?

<<**INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED**>>**PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY**>>

(1) The decision is not enforced
(2) The mechanism is not clear and lacks a standard set of norms and procedures
(3) The process is not impartial
(4) The process is too long
(5) The process is too expensive
(6) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

222. (The last time) How long did it take to reach a final settlement of the case (from the day the case went to the traditional system to the day of the final decision)?

(1) less than 3 months
(2) more than 3 but less than 12 months
(3) more than 12 months but less than 2 years
(4) more than 2 years
(5) no final settlement of the case yet ----→ GO TO Q224
(6) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

223. (The last time) What were the total costs for you or your family, if any, to reach a final settlement of the case (excluding any payments by third parties such as tribal funds)?

(1) no costs for me or my family
(2) between zero and 250,000 Iraqi Denars
(3) more than 250,000 Denars and up to 500,000 Denars
(4) more than 500,000 Denars and up to 1.000,000 Denars
(5) more than 1.000,000 Denars and up to 3.000,000 Denars
(6) more than 3.000,000 Denars
(7) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>

224. Please express to what extent you agree with the following statements (strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree).?

	1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Undecided	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree	9. DK/NA
(1) Most people understand how the formal justice system works	1	2	3	4	5	9
(2) For most people, courts are within reasonable distance from where they live	1	2	3	4	5	9
(3) The staff (judges, police, and clerks) treats people with respect	1	2	3	4	5	9
(4) The staff often ask for money (bribes)	1	2	3	4	5	9
(5) The formal justice system effectively protects the rights of every citizen	1	2	3	4	5	9
(6) Most people trust judges and court staff	1	2	3	4	5	9

225. If you wanted to resolve any of the following disputes, could you please tell me for the following types of disputes whether you would prefer to use the formal justice system (that is police and courts), an informal justice body (such as tribal, community or religious decision making bodies), both of these or none of these?:

#	Type of Dispute	Formal justice system	Informal justice body	Both formal and informal justice system	Neither of them	Don't know
01	Land dispute	1	2	3	4	5
02	Administrative dispute (problems obtaining official documents; ID, Passport, marriage/divorce papers etc.)	1	2	3	4	5
03	Family dispute (contested divorce, child support/custody, contested inheritance (excluding land), domestic violence)	1	2	3	4	5
04	Financial dispute (Enforcement of business agreement, repayment of loans)	1	2	3	4	5
05	Theft or hijacking of vehicles	1	2	3	4	5
06	Kidnapping	1	2	3	4	5
07	Homicide	1	2	3	4	5
08	Assaults / Threats	1	2	3	4	5
09	Bribery or other forms of corruption	1	2	3	4	5

HOME PROTECTION_**(HOUSEHOLD)**

In order to help understand why some homes are more at risk of crime than others, could I ask you some questions about the security of your house? Please remember that your answers will, of course, be treated **CONFIDENTIALLY** and **ANONYMOUSLY**.

226. Is your house protected by the following:

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(01) a burglar alarm

(02) a formal neighbourhood watch scheme

(03) special door locks

(04) special window/door grilles

(05) a dog that would detect a burglar

(06) a high fence

(07) a caretaker or security guard

(08) friendly arrangements with neighbours to watch each others houses

(09) not protected by any of these

(10) respondent refuses to answer << **INT.: DON'T READ** >>

AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO FIREARMS **(HOUSEHOLD)**

227. Could you tell me whether your birthday is on an odd (1,3,5,..) or an even (2,4,6,..) day of the month?

<<INT: For example, 20 April is on an even day while 19 May is on an odd day of the month. **WRITE DOWN THE day of the month indicated and mark only one of the following options**>>

Day of the month:

☐☐

(1) <<odd day>> => GO TO Q228 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(2) <<even day>> => GO TO Q230 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<don't know >> => GO TO Q230 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

228. Could I ask you to think about 5 neighbouring households that you know well. Please try to imagine these households now in front of you. (<< INTERVIEWER: Allow respondent some time to imagine 5 housholds in front of them >>) In your personal opinion, how many of these do you think have guns in their homes?

<<INT: only one answer allowed. If respondent is uncertain, ask to make a guess>>

(1) estimated number of neighbouring households, among the 5 households you know well, with guns in their homes:

☐☐

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

229. In how many of these estimated cases of households with guns are you confident that the household really has a gun? (for example because they personally told you or because you have seen the gun yourself)

<<INT: only one answer allowed. If respondent is uncertain, ask to make a guess>>

(1) number of households, among the estimated households with guns, where respondent is confident that the household really has a gun:

☐☐

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

=> GO TO Q232 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

230. Could I ask you to think, how many neighbours do you have that you know well?

<<INT: **WRITE DOWN THE number of neighbours indicated – if asked, specify that 'neighbours' means 'neighbouring households' where 'household is defined as persons sharing the same address and eating from the same kitchen**>>

(1) number of neighbouring households

☐☐

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

231. In your personal opinion, how many of these do you think have guns in their homes?

<<INT: only one answer allowed. If respondent is uncertain, ask to make a guess>>

(1) estimated number of neighbouring households with guns in their homes

☐☐

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

232. Of these neighbouring households that you think have guns, how confident are you that they really have guns in their homes?

very confident, moderately confident and not very confident that the household really owns a gun?, for example because they personally told you or because you have seen the gun yourself?

(1) Very confident (they told me personally or I saw the guns personally)
(2) Moderately confident (somebody else told me)
(3) Not very confident (only indirect indications such as seeing ammunition, hearing gunshots etc.)
(4) Not at all confident (no indications)
(5) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(6) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

233. During the last year, how often have you seen people with guns in your neighborhood, with the exclusion of police and armed forces?

(1) Daily or almost daily
(2) Few times per week
(3) Few times per month
(4) Few times per year
(5) Rarely/almost never
(6) Never
(6) Don't know << **INT. DON'T READ** >>

234. Do you think the following is acceptable?

	1. Acceptable	**2. Undecided**	**3. Not acceptable**	**4. don't know**
(1) Using a gun for celebratory purposes	1	2	3	4
(2) Owning a gun to protect your family	1	2	3	4
(3) A civilian carrying a gun in public	1	2	3	4
(4) Selling guns in open markets	1	2	3	4
(5) Selling guns to minors	1	2	3	4

235. Security is a major concern in Iraq today and some people have guns in their homes to protect themselves and their families from potential dangers or for other uses. In your opinion, does the availability of a gun in a normal household contribute to a feeling of increased security against crime?

(1) yes
(2) no
(3) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

236. Do you or someone else in your household own a handgun, hunting gun or any other firearm?

(1) yes
(2) no => GO TO Q240
(3) refused => GO TO Q240 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(4) <<don't know => GO TO Q240 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

237. << **INT.: IF yes** >> How many?

(1) number of guns in household:

☐☐

(2) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(3) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

238. Could you tell me which sort of gun or guns you or someone in your household own?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) handgun (Pistol or revolver)
(2) hunting gun
(3) non automatic rifle
(4) semi-automatic rifle
(5) automatic rifle
(6) another type of firearm
(7) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(8) <<refused to say>> << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

239. For what reason do you or anyone else in your household own the gun (guns)?

<<***INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED***>>***PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY***>>

(1) for hunting
(2) for target shooting
(3) as part of a collection
(4) for crime prevention/protection
(5) in the armed forces or the police
(6) because it has always been in the family/home
(7) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >>>>
(8) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >>>>

240. Do you know where it would be possible to get a gun?

(1) yes => GO TO Q241
(2) no => GO TO Q242
(3) <<don't know => GO TO Q242 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>
(4) <<Refused to answer>> => GO TO Q242 << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

241. Where would it be easier to get it?

<< **INT.: MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED** >> **PLEASE MARK ALL THAT APPLY** >>

(1) buy one in the market
(2) buy one through some people I know
(3) know of a hidden cache
(4) buy from a friend in the police
(5) buy from a friend in the armed forces
(6) borrow one/hire
(7) Other (specify:_____)
(8) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>
(9) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >>

242. Do you know approximately how much a gun would cost?

(1) yes => GO TO Q243
(2) no => GO TO Q244
(3) <<don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >> => GO TO Q244

243. How much do you think that it would cost to buy a handgun?

<<INT: ask to give an amount, even approximate. Check 'strange' value.

WRITE DOWN THE AMOUNT - EVEN IF ONLY A ROUGH ESTIMATE - FOR EXAMPLE, ID,500= 00500>>

Amount_____(Dinars only)

244. Do you think there are too many guns in Iraq?

(1) Yes
(2) No
(3) Don't know

245. Do you think the Government of Iraq should take action to reduce the presence of guns in Iraq?

(1) Yes

(2) No ----→ GO TO Q248
(3) Don't know ----→ GO TO Q248

246. If Yes, what do you think would be the MOST effective way of reducing the presence of guns?

<< **INT.: CHOOSE ONLY ONE** >>

(1) Buy guns from people
(2) Disarm people under threat of punishment
(3) Enforce stricter laws on the possession and sale of firearms
(4) Strengthen security
(5) Reduce weapons smuggling across borders
(6) Other (Specify _____)
(7) Don't know << INT.: DON'T READ >> >>

247. Regarding the holding of weapons by civilians, what kind of firearms do you think should be ***"freely authorized", "authorized but registered", "subject to special permits", or "banned for civilian use"***?

<< **INT.: CHOOSE ONLY ONE** >>

	Freely authorized	***Authorized but registered***	***Subject to special permits***	***Banned for civilian use***	**Don't know**
Handgun	1	2	3	4	5
Hunting gun	1	2	3	4	5
Non automatic rifle	1	2	3	4	5
Automatic weapon (AK 47 …)	1	2	3	4	5

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS **(PERSONAL)**

248. Do you feel that government security institutions in your area are representative of your own component community?

(1) Strongly representative
(2) Representative
(3) Undecided
(4) Not representative
(5) Not at all representative
(6) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>
(7) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >>

249. Do you feel that the security of your own component community is given the same attention as that of other component communities by government security institutions?

(1) Less attention
(2) Same attention
(3) More attention
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>
(5) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >>

250. Would you feel comfortable reporting a crime or security incident to a member of a government security institution from a different component community?

(1) Comfortable
(2) Not comfortable
(3) I would not pay attention to the affiliation of security institution officer
(4) don't know << INT.: DON'T READ>>
(5) refused to answer << INT.: DON'T READ >>

Thank you very much for you co-operation in this survey. We realize that we have been asking you some difficult questions. So if you like, I can give you again a telephone number of a person in my office if you want to check.

INTERVIEWER: FOR THE PURPOSES OF MAKING "SPOT CHECKS" AND TO CONFIRM THE CORRECT AND PROPER COMPLETION OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE, PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:

PHYSICAL ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:_____

NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF RESPONDENT_____

AREA CLASSIFICATION

592-593 ☐☐

SUMMARY INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENT SELECTION AND PARTICIPATION
<< INTERVIEWER: TO BE FILLED IN AFTER COMPLETION OF THE INTERVIEW.
IN CASE OF REFUSAL USE REFUSAL ATTACHMENT.

251. NUMBER OF VISITS (insert actual number; include the current visit) for example |_2_|

Number of visits: _____ ☐☐

252. DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERVIEW

(1) yes ---> **GO TO MOTIVATION Q253**
(2) no ---> **MAKE USE OF "INTERVIEW REFUSED" ATTACHMENT Q0**

253. Was it difficult to convince the respondent to take part in the interview?

(1) yes
(2) no

254. How do you rate the cooperation of the respondent throughout the interview?

(1) Good
(2) Not good nor bad
(3) Bad

255. LENGTH OF ACTUAL INTERVIEW

Total length of interview in minutes: _____ ☐☐ _____

256. TOTAL TIME SPENT WITH INTERVIEWEE

Total TIME SPENT with interviewee in minutes (including actual interview, introduction, greetings etc.): ☐☐

257. Please answer the following 3 questions for each of the 8 question numbers listed. If you can not remember the situation, please go back to the answer given in the questionnaire and try to refresh your memory. Make use of the notes you have taken during the interview.

Question number	a) Did the respondent need additional explanations?	b) Was the respondent reluctant to answer?	c) Do you think the respondent gave an honest answer?
117	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
119	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
201	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
207	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
226	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
227	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
228	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no
244	(1) yes (2) no	(1) yes (2) no	(1)yes (2)don't know (3)no

REFUSALS

SUMMARY INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENT SELECTION AND PARTICIPATION: TO BE FILLED IN UPON REFUSAL/IMPOSSIBILITY TO CARRY IT OUT (THREE OR MORE UNSUCCESSFUL VISITS TO A HOUSE OR UNIT)

INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS

Cluster Number: |__|__|__|__|			
8. Governorate:	|__|__|	8. Building Number	|__|__|__| |__|__|
9. District:	|__|__|	9. Number of the house in the block	|__|__|__|
10. Alnahiah (Locality):	|__|	10. Number of families in the house	|__|__|
11. Environment: Urban 1 Rural 2	|__|	11. Code of family in the cluster	|__|__|__|
12. Name of the district / province:	|__|__|__|		
13. Name of hometown / village:	|__|__|		
14. Block Number |__|__|			

258. TYPE OF DWELLING

(1) House
(2) Flat in a block of flats
(3) Clay house
(4) Tent
(5) Caravan
(6) Other (SPECIFY:_____)

259. HOW MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY?

(1) Less than 5,000 inhabitants
(2) 5,000 – 10,000
(3) 10,000 – 50,000
(4) 50,000 – 100,000
(5) 100,000 – 500,000
(6) 500,000 – 1,000,000
(7) More than 1,000,000 inhabitants
(8) Don’t know << INT.: DON’T READ >>

260. SEX OF INTERVIEWER

(1) Male
(2) Female

261. NUMBER OF VISITS (insert actual number; include the current visit) for example |_2_|

Number of visits: _____

262. REASONS WHY A SPECIFIC CASE IS TREATED AS A “REFUSAL” OR INTERVIEW THE PREMATURELY TERMINATED (BEFORE THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE QUESTIONNAIRE MUST BE REJECTED)

(1) the address does not exist
(2) no household address
(3) nobody at home
(4) household: refused because of lack of time
(5) household: refused because of previous bad experiences
(6) household: refused because he/she does not participate in interviews in general
(7) household: refused this interview because of the subject
(8) other reasons (SPECIFY).....