UNDP Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis Project.

Partial Final Review

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Caveat

According to the Terms of Reference for the Final Evaluation of the CRMA, 10 days were allowed for the field work in Sudan that included a visit to at least one State where the CRMA had been operating. They also required that the appropriate Federal and State ministries be consulted to verify both the activities and the impact of the stated outputs in the Project Log frame. In the event, despite an additional 5 days being allowed, neither the visit to the State, nor key meetings with Federal government Ministries proved possible. A meeting with the Project Steering Committee was delayed until the third week. The Government decreed that the evaluation should not proceed and that no travel to any State was possible, until such time as they had reviewed the project reports and evaluations, the ToRs for the Evaluation, the Consultant's CV and the proposed methodology. They wished to be part of the Evaluation but would only contribute following such a review. The Evaluation was thus deferred at this point until such time as the Steering Committee is able to provide its input and approval.

As no further meetings with Government officials or travel to verify CRMA activities in the State(s) were possible at that time, the Consultant ended his mission. What follows is an interim report of the evaluation findings dealing with the Information Management Working Group, the UNDP units and Departments, the NGO Forum and Donors, with limited interviews conducted with Government Authorities – WD State Minister of Finance, Central Bureau of Statistics and Remote Sensing Authority – prior to the Steering Committee meeting. An on-line survey, intended for all parties and individuals associated with the project was prepared but also put on hold pending the government approval.

Thus, this report should be read as a Partial Final Evaluation of the project, as no independent verification of the work of CRMA in the States took place and only a limited number of key Ministries in the Federal Government were interviewed.

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Government of Sudan, UNDP, the CRMA program or their donors.

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Acronyms

AWP	Annual Work Plan
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CD	Country Director (UNDP)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPRU	Crisis and Recovery Unit (UNDP)
CRM	Crisis and Recovery Mapping
CRMA	Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis Project
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCPSF	Peace and Stability Fund
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
ER	Early Recovery
EWS	Early Warning System
GIS	Geographical Information System
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GPS	Global Positioning System
IMWG	Information Management Working Group
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
IMPACT	Information Management for Planning and Coordination Team
IMU	Information Management Unit
(I)NGO	(International) Non-Government Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JCRP	Joint Crisis and Recovery Programme
KM	Knowledge Management
KMSP	Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MI	Military Intelligence
MIC	Ministry of International Cooperation
MIMU	Myanmar Information Management Unit
MoFNE	Ministry of Finance and National Economy
MoInt	Ministry of the Interior
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics – South Sudan
NEX	National Execution
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSD	Oversight and Support Division (UNDP)
PIP	Project Identification Paper ()
RCSO	Resident Coordinator's Support Office
RPCM	Reconciliation and Peaceful Co-existence Mechanism
RR	Resident Representative (UNDP)
RSA	Remote Sensing Authority
SA	(State) Situational Analysis
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIMU	Sudan Information Management Unit
SKS	South Kordofan State
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Mapping Unit in WFP
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

Executive Summary

The Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis Project was started in 2008 (to support the UNDP Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme). It aimed to collect data on conflict risk and occurrence and provide such data to the UN and subsequently the State Governments. It evolved into a major system for collecting and collating multi-level data (point level to State level) from myriad sources and presenting it in a standardised, rational manner that was much appreciated by all parties who understood the process. However, to meet its initial design, it deliberately focused on the States in its early development. As it expanded, it recognised the need to gather interconnecting data between States, as many factors (transhumance, markets, road infrastructure etc.) have inter-State influence. Also, having proved its value in assisting State Governments to adopt planning methodology to develop State Strategic plans, the national significance of the programme, for all users, whether it is the UN or Government became apparent. Two independent reviews in 2010 and 2011 emphasised the importance of federal Government ownership and Phase 2 of the Project was designed to address primarily the need to build the Government capacity in strategic planning, an area of universally acknowledged weakness. The words "Threat and Risk" in the Project title were changed, and the "Crisis and Recovery" Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) was adopted for the Phase 2; the idea being to broaden the scope of the technical appellation, but remain within the particular crisis and recovery focus of the Project's mandate.

In the event, this led to many problems through poor communication, misunderstandings, misconceptions and multi-party actions without common purpose or recognition of what the actual areas of contention were. The Project was terminated in mid-2013, as a result of all the negative impressions, which had very little to do with the actual technical products, but more to do with the organisational context in which they were embedded.

This Partial Final Review of the CRMA is the result of a desk study, reviewing available literature on the CRMA, as well as a short and limited field consultation with key personnel of the IMWG partners, Donors, NGO Forum and UNDP units involved. Due to security and time limitations only a telephone interview and literature study was possible with CRMA/UNDP South Sudan. Interviews with key Government Authorities were limited to the WD State Minister of Finance, the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Humanitarian Aid Commission and the Remote Sensing Authority, as further consultation with Federal and State Authorities was blocked by the Project Steering Committee, who also suspended further evaluation of the Project and prevented the consultant's travel outside of Khartoum, pending its review of the evaluation process. An on-line Technical Survey (Annex 3) was prepared for participants in the Project, but was only administered to the UN and other Non-government organisations and Donors, pending the Government's approval of wider dissemination.

Section 1 provides the background to the Project, following its evolution from a Threat and Risk assessment to a comprehensive strategic Planning tool; the timeline is provided in Annex 1. The section describes the formulation of the CRMA Tool box (the CRM Methodology; Digital Atlas; Information Management Working Group (IMWG) Information Management Tool and its four components – the 4Ws, the Incident and Event Mapper, the Basic Services Mapper and the Crisis and Recovery Mapper; the Website; and, the State Situation Analyses. It describes the evaluation methodology utilised and the selection of key persons to be interviewed and outlines the guiding questions for these interviews.

Section 2 provides a detailed analysis of the four Log frame Outputs using OECD Criteria:

- *Relevance:* Outputs 1, 3 and 4 are significantly relevant to: the strategic planning capability of the Federal, State and Locality governments; the Annual and long term planning of the UN Agencies, especially the many units within UNDP; and particularly, for the coordination and monitoring of activities including the assessment of impact and accountability. They are also relevant to Donor programming and their allocation of funds to ensure synergies and complementarity of operations. Output 2 had two targets, an early warning system for natural hazards and a conflict monitoring/mapping system. Though both are relevant to the situation in Sudan, the first has been poorly conceived and hardly implemented. The second is of major relevance to several units within UNDP and the State Governments.

- *Effectiveness:* The early closure of the Project has severely limited its effectiveness: simply providing the tool packages to the State authorities is no guarantee that they will be used. Though the Situation Analyses and State Strategic plans have been established they are all time sensitive and, with the Project closure, no follow-up is possible. With notable exceptions (CPRU/JCRP, WFP and Unicef), the CRMA has been ineffective in changing the mind set of how the UN Agencies, NGOs and donors, plan and use data. Most continue to use their own systems, even if the underlying data sets are the standardised shape files created by CRMA.

- *Impact:* The impact of all Outputs has been limited inevitably by the curtailment of the designed period. Many respondents have asserted that if only more time was available for training and understanding, not to mention support for establishing systems of data updating, then the potential of the tools and processes could be realised. Changing attitudes and perceptions takes time and carefully structured input and many felt the project closed right on the cusp of this realisation.
  Various senior government officers, UN Agency personnel and NGOs appreciated the Products and the various reports noted the evident changes in strategic thinking, approach and planning achieved with the direct support of the Project. The following impacts in particular were emphasised:
  - ➢ Standardised Information Management platforms and enabled and enhanced information sharing;
  - ➢ Raised awareness and demand for digital mapping for strategic planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of impact;
  - ➢ Reduced time, labour and expense of participating parties;
  - ➢ The Process has the potential for a major impact, but this requires a buy-in to the system and clear sense of ownership by all parties not only in the UNDP but in the UNCT, and ultimately, Government and NGOs. It requires strong leadership, with a clear sense of direction and an overview of what the final product of coordinated strategic planning could look like. It requires an understanding of the tools and what they can do and a clear, strong recognition of the need for constant information updating and the budgetary provision to make it all possible. There is a real sense at the technical level that this is possible and the impact could be immense – but the task ahead is to overcome the political baggage of past mistakes and organisational reputations if the worthy products of the CRMA are to have any legacy at all.

- *Sustainability:* It is highly doubtful that the use of the tools and the methodology, will or can be sustained at any level of Government and by most UN agencies, due to:
  - ➢ Lack of leadership and direction from the IMWG;
  - ➢ Inadequate training in tool use;
  - ➢ Lack of confidence in using the tools and processes;
  - ➢ Difficulty in updating the data: expensive; time consuming; and, no provision made in departmental budgets.
  - ➢ No requirements built into job descriptions to ensure individual posts are required to collect and update data.

  A major shortcoming is the massive turn-over of staff in the various agencies. The Project made inadequate provision for the UN system of staff turnover or Government department re-shuffles and retirements, and the implications of such for long term programmes.

  The role of the Information Management Unit that has been established in the UNDP Oversight and Support Division thus becomes critical in maintaining the database and tools and providing a continued source of training and support to the nascent UNDP adoption of the process.

Section 3 highlights the common elements of the detailed analysis in Section 2 and answers the overarching questions concerning the Project's accomplishments:

- ➢ *The Project Strategy for Capacity Development*: was to build a sustainable working capacity within the targeted users of the CRMA products and methodology that would enable standardisation of approach, improved strategic planning and reliable monitoring of activities in an interactive and complementary manner between the many disparate parties involved in Development. The production of the tools and their effectiveness is analysed, emphasising their time sensitivity and need of maintenance/updating and training in their use. Though the technical

package may well have been almost complete and functioning, the intended users were left ill-prepared. The constraints on the Capacity building component are discussed in light of the severely truncated project timeline and operational difficulties imposed by the Federal Government.

➢ *Enhancement of CRMA Partners' Capacity:* The extent to which CRMA has enhanced its partners' capacity in terms of improved conflict sensitive and evidence based analysis, strategic planning and programming and the degree to which this is sustainable is discussed and for the most part is found to be seriously limited:

➢ **State Governments:** Though three States produced Strategic plans it is yet to be ascertained whether they are capable of independently continuing the process. Five out of the eight target States have received the technical document package, but, reportedly, are not confident in using it due to stated insufficient training and lack of equipment. Training and support is also urgently needed to address the newly established States and staff and ongoing reorganisation of government institutions.

➢ **Federal Government:** The enhancement of planning capacity has not been realised; limited training has been received in a very limited number of departments, though many ministries have expressed interest in the planning potential of the CRMA process and products.

➢ **United Nations system**: Whereas UNDP, WFP and UNICEF are regularly using the Database, most other UN agencies, funds and programmes are not comfortable using the tools, due to the brevity of training and the constraints on follow-up. Most still concentrate on their existing systems, as there has been no concerted effort by the IMWG for the system to become the mapping tool of the UN. The IMWG has remained restricted to the UN Agencies and attempts to open it up to Government and NGOs have not been successful. Without the latters' input and participation in the whole process, genuine overall strategic planning and monitoring is not possible. There is little confidence in all agencies consulted that the tools and process will be maintained. There is serious concern that the agencies will revert to the pre-CRMA days of multi-platforms and data incompatibility.

➢ **UNDP programmes:** the CRMA processes and tools have not generally been adopted in the day to day management of programmes addressing governance and conflict related challenges, except for JCRP, which is fully engaged in their use. However, The CPRU is increasingly using the CRMA products in the design and monitoring of its programmes. The lack of direction and resolve at the senior level to bolster the tool use throughout the system is evident, as is the lack of provision for recognising the skill-set in job descriptions and time allocations. Lack of confidence in the use of the tools is expressed in all the UNDP programmes and Units, due to the stated lack of training, the reluctance to use the technical manuals and the turn-over of staff. The newly established IMU in the OSD is thus crucial for the ongoing maintenance and support of the products. As it is, without major intervention and a central decision to adopt and promote the process, sustainability must seriously be considered doubtful.

➢ **Donors and NGOs:** The CRMA products and process have had no lasting impact on Donor planning. None of the Donors has institutionalised the tools in their own planning or instructed that project formulation and NGO proposals should use the database and tools to provide evidence to support their identification of needs and location of priorities. Though many NGOs have expressed interest in the tools, they have received scant training and have been denied participation in the IMWG, missing the opportunity to standardise the approach and share their experience and creative suggestions on information needs and learning methodologies.

➢ *Impact of the Project's early closure: upon its objectives and overall sustainability:* As predicted in the March 2013 Options Paper, the early closure of the project has seen an overall failure of the Project to reach its objectives, other than to produce a technically sound and comprehensive tool kit for evidence-based strategic planning, monitoring and reporting. The reduction in time simply meant that despite the refinement of the tools and the comprehensive support package of manuals, guides and training material, actual familiarisation with the tools and process was not possible, so most potential users lack confidence in utilising the product.

Plus, there was insufficient time to promote the use of the product to all parties and have it adopted as the central Information Management asset. As it stands, the overall sustainability of the products is unlikely, though limited use in UNDP (CPRU and JCRP) is evident. Its continued use and possible expansion will depend a great deal on the work of the IMU and UNDP's willingness to fund the Unit to maintain the tools.

The decision to close the Project prematurely was therefore questionable; the UN, DfID and the EU should have made greater efforts and exercised greater patience to identify the real issues. Wider consultation among all the potential users as to exactly what was wanted and what needed to be done to get there, should have been conducted and all parties should have made every effort to understand exactly what the Project had achieved – both prior reviews had identified the Project's great potential and emphasised the expected difficulties in achieving it. The whole process required a mind-set change and this takes time and political will to achieve. This should have been recognised.

Section 4 analyses the Sustainability and Replication Strategies with specific emphasis on:

➢ The extent to which the Project outputs have delivered outcomes in terms of sustainable improvements and the probability of this being maintained or improved;

➢ The extent to which the CRMA's information management tools and products are considered relevant by Central Authorities (Government and UN) plus the individual users and the interest and likelihood of their continued use now that the Project has ended;

➢ The role of the IMU in sustaining the database and expanding tool use; and,

➢ the relevance/appropriateness of the CRMA model in terms of replication in other post crisis settings.

The current review considers that the system is not sustainable as it stands today, despite the products being enthusiastically accepted by a series of State governments and commented on favourably by federal ministries as answering the very serious planning questions that confront them. The system has not been adequately transferred and is not being widely used. Without the necessary training and continued technical support, all that has so far been achieved will attenuate and have no lasting effect. The newly functional IMU within the OSD of UNDP should maintain some effect within the UN Agencies and UNDP itself. Its main task will be managing the database and website and could enhance the use of the tools through continued training in their use.

As for the Replication strategy, the CRMA Phase 2 was intended to establish the process and tool use in Sudan as a precursor to establishment in similar circumstances elsewhere. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, this has not been successfully completed as a working system. However, the manuals and tools are detailed and comprehensive and could easily form the basis of a packaged transfer to other post crisis situations – provided that the central issue of embedding them in a central government institution responsible for statistics and planning, as an initial requirement, is recognised. This conclusion is supported by the evidence of the success of the process in South Sudan that duly followed this route and the report on the equally successful process' adaptation from Myanmar.

Section 5 examines a number of serious issues, which have impacted on CRMA's effectiveness and sustainability and what may be learned from them. Specifically, the following have major bearing on future Project design:

• *Federal Ownership:* Centralisation of operation in the Federal Authority is a prerequisite for the uptake and sustainable operation of such methodology. There are no short cuts and complex situations and multiple mandates such as exist in Sudan take more time to resolve. The difference between the Project adoption by the Central Government in South Sudan compared to the difficulties faced in Sudan is noted.

• *Exit strategy*: This should be acknowledged from the start with final ownership, maintenance of outputs and continued use identified.

• *Vision and leadership:* A project that involves multiple Agencies - Government, UN, Donors and NGOs - requires a clear vision of what the overall product should be and strong leadership to guide and rigorously coordinate the many different parties to achieve the necessary Information management mind-set.

- *Standardisation of Planning, monitoring and reporting:* It is logical that if strategic coordination of development activities and humanitarian response is to be truly effective then the Atlases/database need to be updated with all project inputs and planning priorities from whatever development source. Currently, there is no mechanism for capturing the activities of the non-traditional donors in the process of information gathering for strategic planning and this should be addressed.

- *Need for insistence on updating information and utilising tools:* Information Management should be seen for the valuable tool that it is in assuring strategic planning and standardised monitoring and reporting of activities, and enabling a genuine assessment of impact and accountability over time. It requires the skills to be present in every participating unit, agency or department and thus requires a clear job description and qualification requirement built into the individual Terms of Reference for such positions and appropriate departmental budgeting.

- *Accounting for staff turnover and loss of institutional memory, amongst all users:* Long term projects that require the development and retention of a specific skill base should build staff turnover mitigation activities into the initial plan to ensure sustainability and continued generation of the skill base

Section 6 concludes the review and makes a number of recommendations. Mistakes were definitely made in the implementation of this programme, but these have been identified and hopefully will not be repeated. The main recommendation is that the technical advances made by the CRMA and the information sharing platform that it created should not be simply shelved. Every effort should be made by UNDP to ensure that the tools are maintained and updated and that the UNCT recognises their importance in meeting the identified need for a standardised system of needs assessment, strategic planning and just as importantly, project monitoring, reporting and impact assessment.

What is common in the analysis of all the stated Project outputs is that the closure of the Project represents a major missed opportunity in addressing one of the most aggravating shortcomings in assuring a comprehensive and effective development programme in Sudan – the lack of accurate, timely data across a wide range of different subject areas and disciplines and the lack of a standardised and thus comparative means of presenting such data that enables dependable analysis of the genuine needs and priorities.

Those more familiar with the CRMA tools, recognised the real monitoring possibilities that would provide greater opportunities for coherent coordination and accountability with genuine potential for assessing the impact of interventions. The major problems were seen, not as technical but as political. In the event, the Project was terminated prematurely due mainly to concerns over the political ramifications of the uncertainty and misconceptions of the Project's purpose – while a more creative engagement between the UN, DfID and the EU, with wider consultation of the targeted users of the products, may have found a more productive way to proceed.

The Project demonstrated a major dichotomy – the technical staff responsible for data management clearly sees the potential of the CRMA products for coordination, planning, monitoring and reporting. The senior managers see the end results but also the political difficulties. The latter masks the importance of unifying the approach to data collection and the importance of the role the IMWG should have taken and in fact still must take in assuring that there is a single shared system.

According to the RC, ideally there should be one mapping system for the UN. The CRMA products offer such a system but the uptake of the tools and mapping process within the UNCT and wider development community will depend on:

- The reorganisation and re-tasking of the IMWG to advise and assist its members correctly;

- The leadership of the RCO in driving the standardisation of Information Management and the adoption of these tools as the central system to develop and monitor the AWP.

- Opening the doors to the INGOs, NGOs and all donors in Information Management sharing, priority identification and programme planning and coordination;

- The development of simplified training tools, such as on-line training videos; and,

- The continued dialogue with the Government parties to overcome the underlying suspicions about the purpose of the system and promote the technological support for the development of a mutually beneficial, evidence-based, strategic planning and monitoring tool. The importance of the latter to the imminent expansion of DRA activities in Darfur cannot be over-emphasised.

Thus, the RCO should immediately re-examine the role and function of the IMWG, strengthening the data updating methodology and compliance. It should make a clear decision as to what form the common data sharing, planning, monitoring and reporting tools should take and, through strong coordination and leadership, reach a common agreement with the UNCT to use this tool across the board as **"the"** planning, monitoring and reporting system. All UNDP units and other UN Agencies need to recognise it as such and not as something in addition to their own systems.

The RCO should re-examine the membership of the IMWG. It should: be co-chaired by a Federal Authority (e.g. the Central Bureau of Statistics) so that it may be seen to be Government led; include representation from the NGO Forum, to ensure further dissemination of information and materials to its members who constitute a major portion of the UN implementing partners and who should provide regular updates of performance against the AWP; and, include representation from the donors (both traditional and non-traditional) who need to maintain awareness of the status of the development environment and take the changing priorities into account in their long-term planning. It should continue dialogue with the Project Steering Committee to secure understanding and government ownership of the software and process.

In the short term, the UNDP should endeavour to maintain the valuable products that they have created over the last five years, through careful attention and support to the IMU, so that it may concentrate on re-training and refresher courses for all those staff of UN and government departments to ensure utilisation of the process; taking up the offer of the NGO Sudia to create training videos may well be a great place to start. An immediate issue to be addressed is the very real need for an effective planning and monitoring tool for the DRA in its major recovery and development programme in Darfur.

In the long-term, the future of any such system depends on its adoption and use by the Government of Sudan. Every effort should be made to initiate a new project anchored by a strong and convincing federal government agency. There is a need for strong, focused leadership and a willingness to discuss and support the development of the system within the Federal and State governments that will fulfil a real need for coherent, reliable, evidence-based, strategic planning, project monitoring and impact assessment for all parties involved in the development and welfare of Sudan.

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview of the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA)

The Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project (TRMA)[1] started in 2008 (to support the UNDP Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme. It aimed to collect data on conflict risk and occurrence and provide such data to the UN and subsequently the State Governments. In order to understand the incidence and risk of conflict, TRMA soon realised that there were many different and possible triggers and causes. Thus, in addition to conflict-specific data, it collected existing data on a broad range of topics from myriad sources. In fact, the only data it generated itself were the conflict perception and incidence analyses collected via participatory workshops with key stakeholders at the Locality level in the target State(s). From this early conflict risk mapping, the Crisis and Recovery Mapping (CRM) methodology was developed and this remains a focused tool for conflict prevention and conflict sensitive development. It continues to be used by the Joint Crisis and Recovery Programme (JCRP) and by the UN Justice and Rule of Law Unit for the development of Locality Plans in the Eastern States.

The Project evolved to provide a diversity of stakeholders with strategic planning and decision-making tools for crisis, recovery and development programming in the various conflict states.[2] According to the sequential quarterly reports, the project assisted in the compilation of geo-referenced state-by-state information on human security and socio-economic recovery risk data, providing state and non-state recovery and development actors with key inputs for their analysis and strategic planning processes. However, the project development concentrated on technical solutions and the necessary steps and inclusions were not systematic or planned, laying the ground for future expansion problems.

Prior to the advent of the TRMA, the disparate UN Agencies used a plethora of information platforms and exhibited reluctance to share information – either due to incompatibility or covetousness. According to the WFP VAM unit and OCHA, there was no system of standardised data verification or general agreement on what was wanted or indeed needed. Thus, an early, major aim of the Project was to produce an efficient information sharing platform between the various UN Agencies, (one that would assist in strategic planning of the humanitarian and development response). This evolved into a more ambitious programme/process aimed at providing a series of comprehensive tools, manuals and instructions, supporting a platform that should enhance the UN's, Federal and State governments' and non-state actors' capacity to utilise shared, verified and reliable information for evidence-based, conflict-sensitive, strategic planning. The correct name for the Phase 2 of the Project should be Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis "*Support*" – emphasising that CRMA does NOT produce information or do the analysis itself, but collects existing information from as many sources as possible and collates it on a common and standardised platform for the interested party to analyse. Every piece of information on the data base includes its source and the date acquired. The information and data thus gathered depends a great deal on the implementing agency's ability to both verify and update its specific data on a regular basis.

The CRMA Phase 1 review (External DfID BCPR Review, 2010), stated, *inter alia*, that:

> "….the CRMA has made remarkable process towards creating the capability for impact and has significant potential to do so. The CRMA project is well-run, cost-efficient and cost-effective, is worth investment, and holds the potential to improve how the UN system operates in the Sudan – as well as elsewhere. For that very reason it is worth emphasizing that for now focus must be on making the system work properly in the Sudan to ensure that there is, in fact, an established system to replicate."

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[1] The terminology "Threat and Risk", though technically correct, generated resistance from various actors, most notably within the GoSS, especially regarding the use of the word "threat". Thus, the label *Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA)* was introduced for the activities in Southern Sudan and adopted for the Phase 2 of the overall TRMA project; the idea being to broaden the scope of the technical appellation, but remain within the particular crisis and recovery focus of the Project's mandate. (CTA CRMA – *personal comment*).

[2] "The project evolved from threat and risk to a broader, evidence-based, strategic planning package," A factor also noted in the Nordic Consulting Group: CRMA Capacity Development: A way towards sustainable evidence based strategic planning – an independent review. August 2011, p. 10

The 2010 Review praised the robust nature of the programme and its overall efficiency and intent. However, it emphasised that the original concept appeared to be overambitious in achieving its outputs in the timeframe specified. The above statement talks of "potential" rather than establishment and the Review recommended that for true sustainability and the possibility of replication in other countries, three operational phases would be required. Most importantly, it recognised the need for centralisation of the process and far greater involvement of the federal government in adopting and utilising the tools and procedures.

To this end, a formulation study was conducted in 2011 to investigate the best way forward. The study again praised the work done but recommended that greater effort be made to draw in the Federal Government to ensure that the process and tools were used centrally and adopted as a uniform methodology. It recommended a major capacity building programme as the Phase 2 of the CRMA.

This gave rise to the Phase 2 document entitled: ***CRMA Implementation Guidelines for Enhancing Government Capacities in Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning (Phase 2)***

> "Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) project's overall objective is to enhance the capacities of state and non-state actors in knowledge management (KM) for evidence-based, conflict-sensitive strategic planning. CRMA works with both federal ministries/agencies and State governments to help establish common information sharing mechanisms, with common information management standards, tools and processes. CRMA also closely engages with the federal and state strategic planning agencies and units, in embedding KM tools and processes, with standard formats and procedures, as part of the State strategic planning cycle."

As an opening statement the above is very positive, but the reality was, apparently, different. For a start, it is evident that the emphasis had shifted dramatically from conflict mapping to comprehensive information gathering for strategic development planning. Both the annual report 2012 and the first quarterly report 2013 stated that though the Programme was viewed favourably in certain Ministries, there seemed to be major resistance to the programme as a whole from the federal authorities, which blocked access to and cooperation with State governments. Though the guidelines were intended to be a living document, meant to operationalise CRMA's capacity enhancement strategy and to set standards of application for all CRMA staff engaging with the Government, little such engagement proved possible. The timeline of the project development and the subsequent administrative issues it faced in its Phase 2 that led to the Project's early closure in June 2013 is given in Annex 1.

a) Planning:

The planning documents include a comprehensive log frame that had just been updated and approved when the notice of termination was served. The Log Frame had four outputs, a full analysis of which is provided in Section 2. The main aspect of all four outputs was capacity building for the targeted users of the CRMA Products and knowledge management processes, the Government at State and Federal Level, the UN Agencies, Donors and NGOs and many departments within UNDP itself to enable and enhance evidence based, strategic planning and project management, coordination and monitoring. After the termination notice, a final 3-month closure plan was produced that stated the actions to be taken to preserve the outputs of the CRMA Programme and make them accessible for future users.

b) Technical:

The Project produced a comprehensive set of tools, manuals and interactive atlases, as well as a Situation Analysis of each of the targeted States (see Table 1 and Section 3.2 for the analysis of the tools). The CRMA Phase 2 focused on institutionalising these tools, aiming to embed them within the client's analysis and strategic planning process. The tools were designed for effective knowledge management and, as such, their real usefulness and attractiveness depended on the quality of the data held in the underlying database – both the data's accuracy and its currency. The first required an agreed standard list of what information to gather and thorough verification of the input while the latter relied on the frequency of updating. To this end an Information Management Working Group (IMWG)[3] was formed early in the process from the UNCT, to manage and update the available information across the agencies. An analysis of the effectiveness of the IMWG is given Section 2 – Output 3.

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[3] Information Management Working Group: It is a technical working group established by UNCT Sudan in 2008, bringing together the UN's leading field-based agencies. The IMWG is mandated by the UNCT to produce, manage and share up-to-date baseline and cross-sectoral information for joint planning purposes.

Tool	Target	Status	Sustainability
CRMA Methodology	Initially for CSAC and JCRP Conflict analysis at State level. Also State Planners	Used for Conflict/risk mapping and the production of all State Situation analyses and Locality planning in Eastern States. Latest updating tool not disseminated nor training done. *Products:* • Crisis and Recovery Mapping – Methodology and Best Practice; • Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis – Manual	Limited to JCRP. Methodology expensive and time consuming and though much appreciated by State Governments, it was conducted by CRMA (with State Government participation), but insufficient capacity and no budget allocation to continue.
Digital Atlas	Federal Government Ministries, State and Regional Ministries and departments, UN Agencies, Donors and NGOs	Displays multi-layer, physical and operational data in a manner designed to enable analysis of correlations and associations *Products:* • IMWG Digital Atlas V. 9 May 2013 - CD • IMWG: Digital Atlas User manual • 7 State Atlases: An A3 printed paper Atlas, accurate to May 2013 Data sets giving up to 11 "maps" or visual data sets of various resources (administrative boundaries, transport infrastructure, soils and hydrology through access to Water, Health, Education Markets and Rule of Law). BNS, RSS, GS, KS, CDS, WDS, SDS. • Sudan Admin A3 Map Nov 2012 CRMA.	Maintenance of the data is now the responsibility of the IMU in the UNDP OSD. Submission of updated and verified data is still the responsibility of the IMWG membership. On past record this is doubtful unless very strong revision to the organisation is made and clear directions given and agreed. The paper Atlases are simply snapshots of information current at the time of printing

Cont'd

Tool *(Cont'd)*	Target	Status	Sustainability
IMWG Information Management Tool • 4Ws – Who What, Where & When ○ Ushahidi Web-based monitoring tool • Incident and Event Mapper (IEM) • Basic Services Mapper (BSM) • Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	IMWG members and UN Project Managers and Planners. Selected NGOs received introductory training in mid-2013. State planning officers received the manuals in the hand out package but were not trained	Only the 4Ws completed and in use by limited number UN Agencies and UNDP Units. 93 people received limited training in June/July 2013. Ushahidi tool developed in Sept. 2013, not disseminated and limited users. *Products:* • IMWG Database and Mapping Tool: 4Ws Application – Tutorial v.1 (also translated into Arabic) • Tutorials for the IEM, BSM & CRM were still in production at the closure of the project and have not been disseminated or utilised at this point. A specific IEM for UNHCR has been commissioned, paid for and is in preparation through IOM.	UNDP CPRU is using the tool effectively. Much depends on the role of the IMU in enhancing training and tech support and on the IMWG to insist on its adoption for monitoring the AWP. Major effort to enable the DRA to utilise the tool in the planning and monitoring of the DDS, both the DRDF and the UNMPTF (FaST Facility) will ensure its expanded use.
State Situation Analysis	State Governments and State Planning Officers	*Products:* • Kassala State – Situation Analysis, April 2009, • Red Sea State – Situation Analysis, April 2009, • Blue Nile State – Situation Analysis, March 2010, • Gedaref State Situation Analysis, May 2010, • West Darfur State Situation Analysis, 2011 (An Arabic translation is also available). Includes what is now Central Darfur State • Enhancement of Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Guidelines and Resource Materials • Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Training Course, Facilitator's Guide • Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Training Course, Participants' Manual	All the SA need updating as circumstances have radically changed in the Darfur States BNS and SKS. The Eastern States have received major funding through the Kuwait fund and much infrastructure and development has been undertaken that will reshape the SA. Major capacity building in these skills is still required if effective strategic planning is to take account of the changes and monitor progress.

Lastly, the CRMA has established a website - http://imwgweb.4wsimwg.net/index.html on which all the documents, tools and manuals are accessible. The maintenance of which will be the responsibility of the Information Management Unit, currently being established in the Oversight and Support Division (OSD) of UNDP (see Analysis of Output 3 in Section 2).

The package of products was delivered to the States and UN partners in July 2013. Full details are given in Annex 6.

1.2. Evaluation methodology

1.2.1. Interview selection

The Phase 2 Log Frame focuses on four outputs:

➢ OUTPUT 1: National Capacity Building; National knowledge management capacities enhanced to support conflict-sensitive and evidence-based analysis, strategic planning and programming.

➢ OUTPUT 2: Regional and/or State early warning mechanisms enhanced for effective early response.

➢ OUTPUT3: Knowledge management tools provided to and used by UN Agencies, mission(s), NGOs, and donors to improve coordination and planning.

➢ OUTPUT 4: UNDP capacities for conflict prevention, analysis and crisis sensitive recovery and development programming enhanced

Based on these, a long list was prepared of appropriate institutions that had been identified in the Phase 2 proposal, the 2013 AWP or the 2013 1st and 2nd Quarterly reports, as being involved in the recent activities of the CRMA. The former Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) of CRMA suggested the names of key individuals. A key component of Phase 2 was the involvement of the Federal government in the operation and ownership of the process, thus discussions with the key ministries, especially those detailed as members of the Technical Advisory Committee, later renamed the Steering Committee were deemed of paramount importance. An application for a meeting with the key Federal Ministries was submitted at the start of the field work. The response took 10 days and the meeting was only possible after a further 5 days, which had already necessitated an extension of the Field work. Thus, the only federal government meetings possible were those conducted with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Remote Sensing Authority (RSA) prior to the Steering Committee meeting, which subsequently deferred the field visits and any further interviews with Government stakeholders.

Out of the ten States in Sudan that have been involved in the Project only Kassala State, West Darfur and North Darfur states have had recent intervention in Phase 2. Though each of the Central, South and East Darfur governments expressed interest in the project and a willingness to engage in the process, activities were not able to start due to the operational difficulties CRMA faced over the last two years. Travel to the Darfur States, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan was deemed too difficult and time consuming for the Consultant. Given these movement restrictions, the Consultant was advised that assessing the interaction with Kassala State would be sufficient. Thus, a travel permit was requested for Kassala State at the start of the in-country work period. This permit was refused by the Government for two weeks and the reason only became apparent in the third week of the field work when, at the first meeting with the Steering Committee, it became apparent that no further work on the evaluation could be conducted until such time as the SC had reviewed and agreed the Evaluation ToRs, the choice of Consultant and the Methodology proposed. So, no direct verification of data at any State Government level was possible, though the WD State Minister of Finance was interviewed while he was in Khartoum. Requested meetings with key government institutions and Ministries also proved impossible until the SC is satisfied with the proposed evaluation process. The evaluation was thus brought to an abrupt halt, pending the approval of the Steering Committee to continue. Such approval will only occur after a careful appraisal of all the documentation on the evaluation requested by the Steering Committee and presented to them by UNDP following the meeting.

The CRMA project in southern Sudan was split from the original project at secession in 2011 and has since been run as a separate entity. Thus, as indicated in the 2012 Annual report, the Sudan CRMA has not had responsibility for, or reported on, activities in South Sudan. Due to the on-going conflict, it was not possible to visit South Sudan at this time, but the final report of the South Sudan CRMA Project (1st September 2011 – 28th February 2013) was made available during the assignment and a phone interview with the UNDP Focal Point was conducted (See Executive Summary in Annex 2).

Another major focus was ensuring the consistent sharing of uniform information among the UN agencies. Thus, interviews were conducted with all parties involved in the merging of the information platforms between OCHA and UNDP, the information management procedures and the establishment

of coherent and consistent processes within the UN Agencies, especially the role and ability of the RCO, the UNDP CPRU and the members of the IMWG.

Box 1: Stakeholders Identified for Consultation

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    i.   ***Federal Government authorities: ****
- ❖ Steering Committee of the CRMA: MoFNE, MoInt, MI, CBS, FAS, MoLab, National Council for Strategic Planning, National Department of Survey, Higher Council for Decentralised Government as a group *and individually.* *
- ❖ *State Minister of Finance (Department of International Cooperation) **
- ❖ *Ministry of Science, Technology and Communications **
- ❖ Remote Sensing Authority
- ❖ CBS
- ❖ Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) – Regional Planning Officer
- ❖ Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Aid Commission (**HAC**) **-** Projects and Programs Administration

    ii.   ***State Government: ****
- ❖ *Eastern States:*
    - ➢ *Director of Planning (Kassala)*
    - ➢ *Head of Strategic Planning Council (Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref)*
    - ➢ *Locality Planning offices (Kassala)*
- ❖ *West Darfur*
    - ➢ Minister of Finance (in Khartoum)
- ❖ South Kordofan: Ex-Head of RPCM: Gral. Osman Gadim (also Gidei Falagala, ex-RPCM technical staff,

    iii.   ***UN Agencies***
- ❖ IMWG (Ktm):   OCHA, UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, UNOPS, UNAIDS, UNHabitat, IOM)
- ❖ Humanitarian Sectors / Sector Leads: (RRR, Protection)
- ❖ UNDP
    - ➢ CPRU (JCRP, CRMA, DDR/CSAC, DCPSF)
    - ➢ Poverty Reduction Unit,
    - ➢ Governance and Rule of Law Unit
    - ➢ Peace and Development Advisor
    - ➢ RCSO
        - • Aid Effectiveness Unit, (also Ex-Director MIC, 2011-13)
        - • RR
    - ➢ OSD

    iv.   ***Donors***
- ❖ UKAid (DfID)
- ❖ Sweden (SIDA)
- ❖ EU
- ❖ Japan

    v.   ***INGOs and National NGOs***
- ❖ NGO Forum
- ❖ Sudia

*** N.B.: No interviews were possible with any representatives of the Institutions in Italics***

Likewise, in addition to the UN Annual Work Plan (AWP) and the annual allocations and periodic government investment in long term planning are the International Donor programmes that provide considerable and essential funding through widely varied planning processes, both in focus and in timing. As major funders of the Project, it was necessary to establish the importance the EU and DfID place on access to such information for strategic planning, as provided by the CRM process and if the tools and processes are appreciated and have or will be adopted and continued. Unfortunately, both CIDA (Canada) and SIDA (Sweden), who had significant input into the earlier phase of the programme, no longer have representation in the country. The available literature makes no mention of the non-traditional donors and their involvement or possible uptake of the process, despite their often significant contributions to recovery and development. However, UNDP and DfID advised that as such donors had

not been involved in the process to date, little would be gained by such consultation during the evaluation. This issue is further discussed in Section 5, Lessons Learned.

The Darfur Regional Authority is responsible for the implementation of the Darfur Recovery and Development Fund (DRDF) and the performance of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) created in 2013 as the result of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Strategic development planning is of great importance and the CRMA played a significant role in both the development of the Darfur Situation Analysis and the mapping information used in the presentation of the data in the Doha conference. The CRMA tools offer a clear advantageous means of coordinating and monitoring the very large number of development projects in preparation and soon to be launched in Darfur. The close-down work plan for the CRMA (April - June 2013) mentions the preparation of a proposed Impact project to assist the DRA utilise the monitoring and planning tools effectively. This is discussed in detail under the analysis of Output 1.

The intention of the Phase 2 was also to broaden the usage of the process by including NGOs so that they may improve both their strategic priority setting and their proposal submissions (Output 3). Thus representatives of the INGOs (the Chair of the NGO Forum) and national NGOs were interviewed.

Respondents were informed that their answers would be used in the formulation of the evaluation and specific quotes may be used. Only two respondents specifically asked not to be quoted, while three others requested that the Consultant make particular reference to their comments.

1.2.2. Guiding questions for interviews

The key questions revolved around the extent of usage of the CRMA products and the impact or changes that such usage had imparted on the planning processes of the users, the sustainability of the process and the possibility of transferring the developed tools and process to other countries or post-crisis settings.

To this end, a set of core questions were raised in each interview. These questions endeavoured to establish firstly, the knowledge level and perception of the CRM process, and secondly, to determine the physical evidence of CRM knowledge transfer, tool usage and data maintenance:

i)   What is known about the CRM process and their understanding of it?
   a. What impact has it had on the way plans are made?
   b. What impact has it had in the priority setting of available investment fund usage?
   c. What has been done to ensure updating and information sharing?
   d. What is their opinion of the Project's overall capacity development strategy and approach?
ii) What evidence is there of transfer of knowledge and skills in the CRM process at the planning level of each institution (Fed, State, UN, NGO Donor)?
   a. Number of active users
   b. Evidence in State plans, UN work Plan, individual UN agency and unit planning
   c. RCO requirements for data sharing and updating
   d. Evidence of Budget (State, Fed and agency) allowance for database management, in-service training (for new and transferred personnel), data gathering and processing
   e. Evidence of Donor priority identification and ToR requirements for CRM usage in their project/programme planning and implementation.
   f. Evidence of usage in NGO submissions
iii) What has been set in place at the RCO, to support the IMWG to:
   a. Maintain the database,
   b. Train additional and replacement personnel,
   c. Ensure consistent and standardised data upgrading and processing.

Based on these core questions, an online survey (see Annex 3) was prepared, intended to overcome the limited face-to-face contact possible. It was designed to ascertain the way in which the CRMA planning and monitoring tools for Information Management had been disseminated to the targeted users (UN Agencies, State Governments and various NGOs in Sudan) and the effect of the training undertaken. It aimed at estimating the continued usage of the tools after the project closure and the impact of that closure on the recipient users. The survey is in the process of being administered to the UN, Donors and NGOs, but was not administered to any government institution or individual until such time as authorisation is granted by the Steering Committee. The results will be included as a late Annex to this Review.

2. Answered questions/Findings

The start-up of CRMA Phase two was fraught with problems. The lack of Federal Government involvement had been emphasised in the Phase 1 review and Phase 2 was designed to address this. As respondents from MIC, CBS and HAC all reported, the first they really knew about the project was in late 2011, when the CRMA presented its processes and products to a meeting of Federal Ministries organised by MIC. It became immediately apparent that "the project (was) subjected to some criticisms and concerns from some Government Institutions, following the presentation of the data and information gathered by the project at earlier stage, that however, refer to lack of coordination & communication with the relevant Federal Institutions."[4] The major problem it would seem was that there was no "champion" of the project at the Federal level – no one single institution that could claim ownership of the project or explain the process to the other government ministries. As the CBS pointed out, there are very many producers and users of information, resulting in a complex mix of mandated Ministries and departments for information collection and mapping, especially multiple departments under the Ministry of Defence. The CRMA posed an apparent conflict with these mandates – CBS collected information, Department of Survey was responsible for mapping and the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology was responsible for strategic planning through its Council set up for this purpose. The minutes of the first meeting reveal the level of suspicion and confusion as to the purpose of the programme. National Security and Military Intelligence were concerned about who had access to the data and its accuracy. As a result, the activities of CRMA were suspended in the States until this could be sorted out.

It is interesting to note at this point that the very same processes in South Sudan had met with much greater success. According to the reports, the programme was centrally adopted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which, with a successful capacity building programme, created a National information management system and utilised the CRMA tools effectively, producing and updating the digital atlas and chairing the IMWG[5] (see Annex 2). As the CBS and MIC in Sudan pointed out, this was far simpler in South Sudan as they were starting from scratch and the NBS had a monopoly on information gathering, whereas in Sudan there was a more complicated system of institutions, all of whom had a part to play and whose roles had not been properly recognised by the project.

MIC organised follow-up meetings in which the issues were resolved, so much so that, with the formation of the Technical Advisory Committee (later renamed the Steering Committee), the Government attended, and signed the minutes of, the Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC) with UNDP in May 2012. A Project Executive Board (PEB) was immediately called, but postponed on request of one of the Donors, and the Revised Project Document was sent to MIC for signature. However, before the PEB could be reconvened and the Project Document signed, MIC was dissolved in a Government re-shuffle and was absorbed into the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in September 2012. The Project lost its newly acquired "champion".

According to both MIC and CBS, it is also apparent that the Department of Survey (DS) continued its opposition to the Project, allegedly over the Project's transgression of its mapping mandate. It appears that the DS wished to be the central beneficiary under a National Executed Programme (NEX) – a process that MIC deemed unacceptable, as Phase 2 required major capacity building with external input and also feared that the donors would not have agreed to the funding switch. What actually happened is complicated and subject to conjecture. There was, allegedly, considerable behind the scenes opposition and, despite agreement at the technical meetings for the project to proceed and the support of MIC, who emphasised the full consultation process undertaken, the suspension of activities was not lifted.

DfID had agreed to fund the Project Phase 2 on the basis of the signed LPAC in July 2012. With the suspension of activities in the States, the Project continued developing and refining the tools and

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[4] Letter (MIC Ref: MIC/S/1) from the Undersecretary of MIC to the CD UNDP, 29th February 2012
[5] "The national Information Management Working Group (IMWG) has been functioning as a formal information-sharing platform and coordination mechanism that provides all recovery and development actors with a common basic package of available and relevant information for their individual analysis and planning efforts. Regional IMWG have been established in Southern Sudan." Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in South Sudan, Final Report (September 2011 – February 2013)

training, concentrating on the IMWG members and UNDP departments. It provided a great deal of assistance to the DJAM 2012. However, with the continued suspension and the lack of progress in the Project outputs, the future direction of the Project was brought into question.

No exit strategy for the Project in Phase 1 is evident despite undergoing regular reporting on the major changes in Project development and direction. In fact, such a lack was first noted in the 2010 Project Evaluation by DfID and BCPR. This recommended that such a robust and useful project needed far more time if it was to realise its potential – it recommended that the Project should be extended to three phases – a three/four-year phase one, establishing the programme in the states, a three-year phase 2, embedding the strategic planning process and tools in the Federal Government and a two-year consolidation phase to hand over the whole process to the government authorities having assured its sustainability through adequate capacity building and budgetary provision. These recommendations were followed up by an independent Formulation Mission in which Phase II was consciously re-designed by all parties to become a broader information management for strategic planning programme. Phase 2 may thus be considered the CRMA exit Strategy – it was formulated to have sufficient time to concentrate on building operational capacity and capability at all levels of Government, UN and NGOs, to develop efficient Knowledge Management tools and promote widespread coordinated use of the process. The fact that the time available to achieve this was significantly truncated prevented a successful conclusion. If there is any chance of impact longevity and system and process usage then the provision had to be made at project closure for the long term maintenance and updating of the database and the continued training of personnel in all institutions and government levels. This is examined in the analysis of Output 3.

In March 2013, UNDP prepared an Options paper for DfID with five different scenarios of the way forward, *a)* wait for the suspension to be lifted and accelerate efforts to achieve the expected results, *b)* Concentrate on building the capacity of the DRA and its State partners in Information Management for its management of the DRDF and DDS; *c)* Concentrate on Output 1 & 2 at the State level; *d)* Concentrate on Outputs 3&4 with CBS as National Counterpart; or *e)* close down the project.

Option *e)* clearly predicted what the effect of early closure of the project would be:
- Phase I investments in knowledge management, crisis mapping and participatory analysis for strategic planning are *not* assured in sustainable manner;
- Promises made to state governments for substantive capacity development and transfer of tools, processes and skills *not* answered;
- Information sharing and knowledge management tools *not* embedded within the international development community; and,
- Processes for evidence-based and conflict-sensitive programming *not* standardised within UNDP. *(Author's emphasis)*

Despite these predictions and with apparently little discussion on the implications of closure, DfID notified UNDP/CRMA on 24th March that it was withdrawing its funding as of the end of June 2013. The project had 3 months to close down its activities and salvage what it could from its work. The Project prepared a close-down work plan based on the four log frame outputs. The subsequent degree of delivery on the Project document for the proposed Phase 2 log frame is analysed below:

Log Frame Outputs	Target 2014	Deliverables and Planned Activities to 30/6/2013	Status at 31/12/13
OUTPUT 1: **National Capacity Building; National knowledge management capacities enhanced to support conflict-sensitive and evidence-based analysis, strategic planning and programming.**	• 8 States and 4 Federal Ministries/ Agencies have implemented and institutionalized Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning strategies. • 8 States with common standards, processes and tools for crisis and recovery knowledge management across at least 3 Ministries/agencies, and linked to at least 4 Federal Ministries/agencies. • 8 states preparing State Strategic Plan Mid Term Review applying crisis and recovery/knowledge management tools and processes.	• Finalise and handover to state governments package of materials and brief on KM for SP and importance of common information base. • National staff to conduct requested follow-up missions to assure proper handover. • Workshop with all key State Government counterparts (with possible inclusion of some key federal agencies) in Khartoum - how best to utilise CRMA resources and materials for their internal KM strategies and engagement with other potential external partners. • Do quick perception survey of impact of CRMA and SSP in Kassala and utilise results in fund raising materials and conversations, and also evaluation report for DFID. ***Close down procedures:*** • Hand over package to DfID • Package public summaries and put on UNDP Sudan website. • Support development of UNDP project proposal for IMPACT, supporting the DRA for results-oriented management of the DDS. • Formal closure process, including technical closure	• Hand-over of materials completed to all States • Follow-up in West, Central, South and East Darfur, and Blue Nile States only, as MoFNE objections prevented visits to other States. • 5 States: Centralised Hand-over workshop completed with West, Central, South and East Darfur, and Blue Nile. Other states not permitted to attend by MoFNE. • Perception survey of all States completed by 12/2013 • Full package delivered to DFID & EU • Website completed and running on external server system: http://imwgweb.4wsimwg.net/ind ex.html • IMPACT PIP completed and submitted to DRA • Completed, except for final Report (Due March 2014) and final Evaluation

2.1.   OUTPUT 1

National Capacity Building; National knowledge management capacities enhanced to support conflict-sensitive and evidence-based analysis, strategic planning and programming.

Analysis:

Phase 1 of the CRMA was conducted at the State level, in the so-called "conflict" states and Transitional Areas. Initially targeting the mapping of conflict this soon extended to map the possible triggers of conflict - including infrastructure (absence or poor condition), physical (rainfall, environmental condition) and social (transhumance, ethnic and political differences). Extensive data sets on all factors that might trigger conflict were collected and compiled from myriad sources. However, this was State based; the appropriate Federal Government Ministries were not sufficiently involved.[6] Indeed, Most Ministries knew little about the programme until it was introduced to them at the start of Phase 2, almost as a *fait accompli,* and proposed to form the basis of a broader data set to underpin evidence-based planning by Sudan state and federal level, government departments. Though admittedly addressing a very serious issue, identified by many government departments as the lack of accurate, evidence-based information for strategic planning, it should have been developed with the federal Government from the start, meeting their concerns on information sharing, security sensitivity and specific information needs, rather than a working product developed by the UN without government input and with the UN central to the collection of National data. This created antagonism and suspicions about the project that, in the end, brought about its closure.

Relevance:

Despite the limited verification possible – no visit to State institutions or key meetings with Federal Ministries - there is little doubt as to the relevance of the work of CRMA in Sudan to the strategic planning capability of the Federal, State and Locality governments. The Director of the Department of UN Agencies in the Ministry of International Cooperation during the period when Phase 2 experienced its major start-up problems stated that, as a result of the meetings he organised and the demonstrations of the work of CRMA made at the Federal level, there was a very high level of acceptance with MoInt, CBS and National Security – they visited CRMA and saw what was available (4Ws tool for planning) and realised that they could follow NGO work in a professional, evidence-based manner, not one simply based on rumour. He further stated that MIC considered the CRMA a very valuable project not before seen, as it addressed government weaknesses in information, analysis and strategic planning. The MIC Undersecretary's letter to the CD UNDP also stated that: "the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis Project – CRMA consider one of the most strategic projects that greatly contributed to enhancing knowledge Management and support strategic development planning at both Federal and State level."[7] The CBS stated that the information is needed and needs to be displayed to assist strategic planning and 5yr planning. It should continue but needs cooperation first with all federal government. The main problem identified by the CBS was that the government cannot just accept the data presented as is, but needs to technically check it and verify it with the CBS data and all anomalies identified and corrected. The CBS Director, GIS Sector, also criticised the narrow focus of the Project on the conflict states, whereas a National Programme needed to apply the CRMA tools and methodologies to all states. Far from closing down the Project, the CBS proposed developing CRM methodology in localities in two non-conflict states to provide real training and build the same capacity in all administrations.

The CRMA Quarterly Reports on the work in the States record the importance of the CRMA processes and the major inputs into the development of strategic plans at the State and, in the East, at the Locality level. The WD State Minister of Finance described the CRMA information management process as being of major importance to the State in managing its services and infrastructure, returns and IDPs.

The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) was asked to assess the relevance of the Digital Atlas and 4Ws tool to HAC's requirements and their compatibility with its work process. HAC stated that the

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[6] There was some involvement of Federal Authorities, most importantly MIC and later the Higher Council of Decentralisation during Phase I

[7] *Op cit* (MIC Ref: MIC/S/1)

information and presentation were relevant and that they were using the CRMA shape files from the Digital Atlas in their own system. However, the tools needed to be modified with customised data collection forms and more training in analysis and reporting. First and foremost, the tools needed to be in Arabic; thus the CRMA produced a translated working model in December 2013, but was unable to disseminate it or train users due to the Project's closure. Thus, though recognised by the government as a possibly useful tool to monitor NGO activities, it has not realised its full potential.

Finally, the CRMA tools and process would appear to be tailor made for the function of the Darfur Regional Authority's planning, monitoring and reporting of their major reconstruction and recovery programme under the DDS and DRDF. Darfur has changed dramatically, especially in a social context and re-location and returns have changed many social mores – the need for information to ensure realistic strategic planning is paramount. As part of the close down procedure in May 2013, the CPRU of UNDP, drawing on the CRMA team and experience, developed a project called IMPACT[8]. First mooted as Option B in the March 2013 Options paper as a possible future direction of CRMA, a Project Identification Paper (PIP) was prepared in April for a 6-month project aimed to build capacities for evidence-based and conflict-sensitive planning, coordination and M&E within the Darfur Regional Authority and its State Government partners.[9] It was sent to the DRA but was not acted upon. The DRA have devised 1,071 projects under the DRDF of which 315 contracts in a first phase will be signed at the end of January 2014. CRMA had entered over 800 of these projects on the Data base before the Project closed in December. The DRA Officers consulted during the evaluation were unaware of the 4Ws tool. They recognised their weakness in monitoring the projects and wanted a digitised mapping system for the purpose – every project they had was tabulated on a separate piece of paper and they needed a more efficient system. One recommendation (see Section 6) of this Review is that every effort should be made to ensure that the 4Ws tool and its monitoring capability is made available to the DRA Technical Secretariat and fully supported by the UN and donors.

Effectiveness

Though "Relevant", the project cannot be judged to have been effective in the delivery of Output 1. Verification in the States was not possible, but it is clear that simply providing the tool packages to the State authorities is no guarantee of their effective use – the WD Minister of Finance stated that though they wanted to use the tools, all the material handed over in July 2013 had simply been put in storage, as insufficient training in their use had been given. He also mentioned that following the publication of the WD Situation Analysis, which had been developed with CRMA methodology and assistance in 2012, the State had been divided into WD and CD, and further training and assistance in amending the documents and developing a reliable method of updating the data was not forthcoming, as, by that time, the Project's work had been curtailed in the States by the Federal Authorities. According to the Minister, the problem facing all the States is that CRMA Phase one was for information collection and report analysis but Phase 2 was for training and institutionalisation of the process; as this was not done then the tools could not be used or the data updated.

The Governance and Rule of Law Unit of UNDP working in Kassala and Red Sea States in Eastern Sudan stated that the State Strategic plans have improved due to the work of CRMA. There is much broader consultation and the plans are being implemented, with an M&E system established. The Government, reportedly, has decreed that all development activities must be consistent with these strategic plans and not arbitrarily initiated. However, though CRMA ostensibly helped build government capacity in collection, collation and analysis of social and economic information in 20 localities, the Unit has real doubt on the extent of understanding and use of the tools. The Unit considers the major challenge to the effectiveness of the process being the insufficient institutional capacity and the ability of the Governments to continue to use the tools and process without continued external input.

According to two separate Federal Government respondents, there is an information system already in place and used by the various Ministries. Called the Sudan Aid Information Database 2006, it deals with tracking Aid grants from Donors and it provides answers to questions from the Presidency and

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[8] CRMA Options Paper, February 2013
[9] Information Management for Planning and Coordination Team (IMPACT). UNDP April 2013.

Ministers, so, allegedly, has proved very popular and well supported. It is simplistic compared to the CRMA products, being far more limited in its output. The same respondents keenly appreciated the value of the CRMA products as offering a lot more, but there is no sense of ownership and little understanding of how to access it. Again, this realisation and appreciation was evident just as the Project was closed so no actions could be taken to take advantage of the enthusiasm and develop capacity in the products' use.

Impact

The impact of this output has been limited, mainly due to the truncation of the activity. The potential impact was great, as evidenced by the very positive comments of the senior government officers interviewed and the information given in various reports on changes in strategic thinking, approach and planning. The WD Minister of Finance emphasised that the CRMA has changed the way strategic planning is conducted in the State: the workshops provided a system of getting very useful information at Locality level previously unobtainable for planning use. CRMA has thus helped to determine the real priorities that then fit into the 25-year overall plan and the 5-year strategic plan, which themselves are split into Annual Work Plans. The project quarterly reports and independent comments from the UNDP Governance and Rule of Law Unit state that there has been a mind change in using information for development planning – the 5th National Plan of Kassala State (KS) is based on information collated by the CRMA Project. The Governments of KS and Blue Nile State have reportedly formed information centres utilising CRM methodology and linked with aid effectiveness and M&E. A similar unit was formed in South Kordofan under the Reconciliation and Peaceful Co-existence Mechanism (RPCM) set up by the State Governor. The RPCM operated for four years and was reportedly deemed an effective conflict mitigation mechanism, mapping conflict, identifying flash points and settling tribal disputes. The RPCM was dissolved in 2013 after the separation of SKS and WKS. It was replaced by the Committee of Social Peace and Peaceful Co-existence but the CRM process had not been institutionalised and the training and experience has been lost. With the suspension of CRMA activities in the States and the ongoing conflict, remedial training has not been possible. It appears that under this Output, the Project was on the cusp of achieving meaningful and possibly lasting change, but was curtailed before the processes could be internalised.

Sustainability:

As it stands at the time of this review, it is highly doubtful that the use of the tools and the methodology, developed by the CRMA Project, will or can be sustained in Government departments at any level: Federal, State or Locality. The UNDP Aid effectiveness Unit held the view that if there was no political will to continue with the process, then without updates and training the data will not be used. All the Government officers interviewed expressed the same concerns:

- inadequate training resulting in lack of confidence in using the processes;
- difficulty in updating the data, as it is expensive and time consuming, and no provisions made in departmental budgets for doing so; and,
- no requirements built into job descriptions to ensure individual posts are required to collect and update data.

HAC was typical of many interviewed in stating this last as the main problem in any institution - the turn-over of staff in the different units is high and the subsequent loss of trained personnel, with no provision for replacement training, degrades institutional memory. Lastly, the CRMA tools were being developed and improved to the very end of the project, adopting and incorporating the latest advances in technology. The equipment available to the government units expected to operate these tools is reported to not keep pace – the computers have too low specifications to operate efficiently and the units have no budgets to upgrade, meaning that the units cannot use the tools to their full potential. This discourages or makes impossible their effective use. The upgrading of the capacity of these units was supposed to be a function of Phase 2, but the early closure prevented this.

One of the shortcomings of simply providing the tools to the various departments without ensuring their proper installation and providing adequate follow-up in their use is evident from the situation in the Federal Government's Remote Sensing Authority (RSA), where 10 copies of the latest Digital Atlas CD were provided in July 2013; the Director could not find a single copy when interviewed in January

2014. However, the RSA had been able to use the CRMA technical expertise to activate the International Disasters Charter in response to the major floods in 2013, and retained the knowledge of the process to re-activate it in the face of future natural disasters.

The Project reports all extol the enthusiasm for the Project within certain state governments; but as the 2011 review noted "given the free nature of the CRMA support thus far, commitment on behalf of the states has not required direct financial contributions and hence, their degree of commitment will not be proven until states are willing to substantiate their desire (…) with some financial contribution of their own" (p. 15). In the limited review just completed this question was raised to government departments – data updating and collation is expensive in man-power and equipment and requires both budgetary support and technical provision in the human resource job descriptions. The simple response was that neither has yet been addressed in departmental budgets.

Effect of Project Closure:

It was generally recognised within the Government agencies consulted that there is a genuine need to change the information management culture within the Government. It requires a mind change if they are to get people to check and use data in strategic planning, but such a mind change takes time and reiteration of input. The early closure of the Project deprived the Government agencies of the time necessary to develop the skills and internalise the advantages of the process and tools. The CBS would like to see all the issues resolved as really needed the information. It has proposed four new projects all involving digitised information and all, ironically, covered by the four components of the almost completed Information Management tool developed for the IMWG. HAC was adamant that the work needed to be kept going and stated that all government departments should feed the system – they need maps of the new States and Localities and need to know what are the priorities and who is doing what, where. They insisted that the IMWG should NOT only be made up of UN Agencies but should include relevant Government line ministries and the 4Ws tool should be given to, and used by, a wide range of institutions, *inter alia*: NGOs and UN Agencies (projects and programs), line ministries, State commissions and coordination units, and Food Security and Agriculture Departments. The WD State Minister regretted the Project closure as it was needed to back-up strategic planning. He was hopeful that UNDP would develop a new project so that the work could continue. The Steering Committee wanted to see a full evaluation of the future of the Project's work that determined where the software is, who uses it, who owns it and who improves it.

Conclusion:

This has been a definite lost opportunity – everyone spoken to in Government saw the technical value of the programme and its potential for enhancing national, knowledge management capacity in conflict sensitive and evidence-based analysis. This will help rationalise strategic planning based on genuine, consultative identification of needs and priorities. Those more familiar with the tools, recognised the real monitoring possibilities that would provide greater opportunities for coherent coordination and accountability with genuine potential for assessing impact of interventions. The major problems were seen, not as technical but as political – Federal ownership is essential and greater care should have been taken in the identification of Federal Ministries with responsibilities in these areas and a correct information package and approach devised to avoid misunderstandings due to supposition and rumour. A great deal of time, effort and financial resources have gone into the development of a product that is almost universally seen as not only needed but wanted by national stakeholders to strengthen their planning capacities. Every effort should be made to ensure that the products are maintained and even further developed. The bare necessities of this are being retained within a small Information Management Unit within the UNDP OSD (see Output 3) but it is evident that the IMU needs to concentrate on re-training and refresher courses for the concerned staff of government departments so that they may continue to utilise the process and develop sustainable national capacities. What is needed is a new project anchored by a strong and convincing Federal Government champion.

Log Frame Outputs	Target 2014	Deliverables and Planned Activities to 30/6/2013	Status at 31/12/13
OUTPUT 2: **Regional and/or State early warning mechanisms enhanced for effective early response.**	• 2 early warning mechanisms designed and established for effective early response. • Existing government led conflict management and resolution mechanisms supported with KM tools and training. JCRP has the capacity to develop KM in new mechanisms.	• Hand-over EW concept note to Kassala State Government. • Hand over EW Concept Note to agreed UNDP unit – CPRU – DDR, JCRP, DRM. • Support design of UNDP corporate EWEA system (joint initiative with BCPR) as committed.	• Hand-over of EW concept note to Kassala State Government completed. • Hand over EW Concept Note to agreed UNDP unit – CPRU – DDR, JCRP, DRM completed and links to DRR ProDoc established • Design of UNDP corporate EWEA system (joint initiative with BCPR) supported via mission to HQ and proposal developed.

2.2.   OUTPUT 2:

Regional and/or State early warning mechanisms enhanced for effective early response.

Analysis:

There is very little to analyse with this output. The first target: 2 Early Warning Mechanisms/Systems (EWSs) designed and operational - fell well short of expectations; the only thing that was accomplished was the production of a Concept Note that was handed to one State Government and to the UN Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit. No follow-up or further development was evident from discussions with the Units involved.

What these discussions did reveal was some basic misconceptions as to what is actually proposed for the EWS. DfID and the EU thought it was related to conflict and that the EWS Project was about conflict mapping.

The Steering Committee also exhibited confusion as to the EWS' purpose, when it asked the question, "What is the EWS for – drought or conflict?"

The Concept note is entitled: "CRMA - Integrated Early Warning System for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience". It proposes "a way forward for setting up pilot Early Warning/Early Response (EW/ER) mechanisms at state-level in Sudan." Its Objective is: "To improve state capacity in disaster risk information management (IM) and enhance resilience of high risk states and local communities against most common *natural hazards* (author's emphasis) by establishing EW/ER mechanisms." It does NOT concentrate on conflict.

A discussion on the proposal is not necessary here, other than to say, in the opinion of the current reviewer and the 2011 evaluation of the project,[10] that one is very much required if the proposal were to receive any serious consideration, as it raises many contentious issues in formulation, management and sustainability.

That being said the second Target: "Existing government led conflict management and resolution mechanisms supported with KM (Knowledge Management) tools and training. JCRP has the capacity to develop KM in new mechanisms" is entirely to do with peace building and conflict mapping.

According to the quarterly reports and to JCRP, CRMA/JCRP worked with the Reconciliation and Peaceful Co-existence Mechanism (RPCM) in South Kordofan. The RPCM was formed during the CPA period and worked as a bi-partisan structure, which included both the SPLM and NCP, more or less as an effective conflict mitigation mechanism in South Kordofan State (SKS). Unfortunately, despite early successes, the change in government in 2011, resulted in a change in the composition of the RPCM. Although on paper it included all political parties (except SPLM N, which had been made illegal), once the war with the SPLM N broke out, it became more controlled by the Government. In July 2013, SKS and West Kordofan State (WKS) were separated and the RPCM was dissolved in August 2013. It was replaced by a new mechanism, the Committee of Social Peace and Peaceful Co-existence, so the work had to start again. However, the outbreak of civil war in the State seriously disrupted the programme, so little has been achieved. The new Governor of WKS is the ex-deputy governor of SKS, so is familiar with CRM – according to JCRP, he is just initiating a peace building body and JCRP will work with it, but has little to report as yet.

From discussions with different parties, various points emerged concerning the *effectiveness* and *sustainability* of such conflict mitigation programme. The CRM workshop methodology asks wider questions and collects data for more than just the specific parameters being investigated. This may constitute a problem, as these questions are neither exhaustive nor systematic, giving varied results and reliability. Similarly, is how the data is subsequently updated - UNDP in SKS provided data gleaned from UN Agencies and NGOs into the IMWG database for use in the 4Ws and this was updated as long as the RCO existed in Kadugli. But the system was NOT institutionalised and though people may have

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[10] "The CRMA project has not been designed to be an early warning system, nor does the project have the experience to establish a data collection mechanism to populate an early warning system". Nordic Consulting Group August 2011. *Op cit.*, p.18-9.

software, limited training with no follow-up means that they are not using it and so there is no subsequent updating. The DG Strategic Planning in Kadugli was very enthusiastic about the programme – he wanted to institutionalise the process. Unfortunately, he died and his replacement knows little about the programme and there is no one now to educate him on it. This highlights the very real problem with the personal approach with both training and support, which needs to be recognised and addressed in the Project design, not just left to an *ad hoc* response (see Section 6).

Following the CPA in 2005, most Agencies and donors supported conflict prevention and peace building. But the apparent "policy of conflict" in Sudan results in very unreliable access to the areas of most concern and data collection is either allowed or not and is often viewed with suspicion and misunderstanding as to purpose. The resumption of conflict in SKS and Blue Nile State (BNS) in 2011 and the ongoing conflict in Darfur meant that pertinent conflict data could not be collected. Thus, the CRMA Project was perceived to lose its dynamism and usefulness.

There is overall agreement that the data gathered by CRMA on Conflict mapping was good and the collation and tool products useful but the base line data (other than physical) was not good. The problem lies with the way data is inputted and what is wanted. Such input requires clear leadership and strong coordination to better improve the data sharing mind-set of the different agencies. BUT, different agencies and donors have external interests wanting certain actions and specific information and do things differently with different budgeting schedules and delivery times. Unless this is recognised and planned for it tends to undermine coordination efforts.

In this context, it was easy to slide from strict conflict mapping into a broader perspective on the causes of conflict, as indeed the Project did at a very early stage. Some partners to the project raised concerns that the Project should have been officially redesigned and agreed with all parties. This is of course precisely what should have happened but it did not; Phase 1 of the Project was allowed to evolve *ad hoc* in response to perceived needs. This begs the question of Donor and Implementing Agency oversight through project monitoring – quarterly reports, annual reports, mid-term reviews. These should have revealed: aberrations and tangential actions; the initial lack of an exit strategy (see Section 2, page 9); the concentration on technical detail at the expense of a project over-view and regard for the political aspects. These should all have been brought to the attention of the Project Executive Board and the Project Steering Committee and addressed at the earliest opportunity.

Conclusion:

A very poorly executed output, with many questions concerning Project oversight and intervention. The one positive aspect is that CPR Unit staff and projects, in particular JCRP, is one of the few UNDP Units that is confident in the use of the CRMA tools, in particular the IMWG software, and continues to use GIS information in producing conflict and contextual analysis to guide its conflict prevention and mitigation response. JCRP has employed a long-term expert from CRMA and is continuing to use the software efficiently for conflict analysis and project activity tracking. It assists the CPRU in the production of visual information products. It is planning to continue its work with the new governments in WKS and SKS, as and when access and security allows. It reports that the States are enthusiastic for the Project's continuation and development, as they have seen the benefits.

Log Frame Outputs	Target 2014	Deliverables and Planned Activities to 30/6/2013	Status at 31/12/13
OUTPUT3: **Knowledge management tools provided to and used by UN Agencies, mission(s), NGOs, donors to improve coordination and planning.**	• Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools managed by CSO and available for all UN agencies and missions, and all INGOs, NNGOs and donors. • Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools utilized by CSO and all key UN agencies and missions, and key INGOs, NNGOs and donors in a sustainable and consistent manner for their programming and coordination. • UNCT members, key INGOs / NNGOs become IMWG members. Full handover of support functions to CSO and national counterparts.	• Complete current IMWG Tool development phase by 30 June. • Share current tool including code with anyone interested in taking on further development, including discussions with UNICEF re DevInfo and OCHA/CSO (See SIMU proposal). • Support UNDP/CSO/OCHA development of SIMU project proposal and present for approval to UNCT/HCT. • GIER Sector IMWG 4Ws Tool roll out and training. • IMWG Digital Atlas v.9 completed and distributed by mid-May. • Finalise DA training for IMWG members and interested donors. • Hold IMWG meeting to discuss closure of CRMA and interim management mechanisms until proposed SIMU or alternative OCHA/CSO capacities are in place. • Finalise roll-out of 4Ws to RC/HC and DFID. • Arabic translation of IMWG Atlas. Arabic translation /programming of IMWG Tool.	• Version 1 of IMWG Tool development phase ready for roll-out by 31/7. Test version running for UNDP CPRU, DCPSF and GIER sector groups. • Version 1.0 of the 4Ws was completed in end September and rolled out to 3 groups, UNDP (52 users), GIER (13 users), DCPSF (28 users) for a total of 93 users. • UNHCR requested a tailored version of the Incident and Event Mapper for its' Protection work, and has funded the development of this, which should be ready in February 2014. • A web-based 4Ws tool was developed, using the Ushaidi mapping software, and fully integrated into the computer-based 4Ws system. Its' test version was completed in December, and it is currently undergoing stress tests and adjustments before roll-out. • SIMU proposal developed for CSO/OCHA/RCO converted to IMU under UNDP/OSD[11] • GIER Sector IMWG 4Ws Tool roll out and training completed. • IMWG Digital Atlas v.9 completed and distributed by mid-May. DA training for IMWG members and interested donors completed • Finalise roll-out of 4Ws to RC/HC and DfID. • Arabic translation /programming of IMWG Atlas completed 12/13 and User Manual in Arabic drafted. Not published for lack of time/resources

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[11] This was completed at the end of February 2014, with the IMU fully functional in UNDP: 3 technical staff in-place with all the appropriate equipment.

2.3.   OUTPUT3:

Knowledge management tools provided to and used by UN Agencies, mission(s), NGOs, donors to improve coordination and planning.

Analysis:

There were three major targets for the end of 2014:

a) An Information Management Unit set up within the CSO to maintain the tools and make them available to all UN Agencies, Donors and NGOs;

b) Having all key UN Agencies, NGOs and Donors utilising the tools in "a sustainable and consistent manner for their programming and coordination";

c) Broaden the IMWG to include Government and NGOs under the joint chair of the National Counterpart (CBS) and the UN CSO.

Target (c) was not achieved. The CBS was invited to the IMWG meetings but did not participate; though it is a member of the Steering Committee (the Technical Advisory Group set up in 2012). As mentioned in the analysis of Output 1, the CBS is proposing four projects, all of which are covered or could easily be assisted by the input of the IMWG, so this is a missed opportunity. The IMWG voted to include NGOs but this was vetoed by the UNCT, as it would require a change in the IMWG ToRs and "two-string reporting". This weakens the IMWG, as the input of the implementing Agencies is vital to maintaining the data base and the overview of the AWP; it needs the different donor funding bases to provide true strategic planning and honest monitoring of performance. The chair of the IMWG is currently shared between OCHA and the RCO (See comments on the IMWG below).

a) Target 1: An Information Management Unit set up within the CSO to maintain the tools and make them available to all UN Agencies, Donors and NGOs.

Early discussions with the RCSO on building its capacity for IM and the coordination of the IMWG were conducted by the CPRU and the Project in 2011 and 2012. With the imminent closure of the Project in mid-2013, a proposal for a Sudan Information Management Unit (SIMU) was finalised as part of the close-down process. In order to provide the RC with a major coordination tool and ensure coherent monitoring of activities and progress of UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes, the SIMU was intended to be lodged within the Resident Coordinator's Office, who is also the co-chair of the IMWG. But, given the reaction by certain elements of the Government to the mapping components of the CRMA and the suspicions this raised in the national security and Military Intelligence sectors, the UN deemed it inadvisable for the RCO to host the SIMU. However, the RCO clearly recognised that the tools and database needed to be maintained to support the capacity to produce maps for strategic planning at all levels. The UN requires real-time accurate data to predict movements and coordinate efforts with concrete acceptance and involvement of high level Government parties and the approval of State Security. After examining various options, it was decided to establish a small Information Management Unit within the Oversight and Support Division (OSD) of UNDP. The Unit, consisting of three technical staff and the equipment needed for mapping support and maintaining the digital atlas for the IMWG and supporting UNDP project tracking, monitoring and evaluation was initiated in December 2013, finally becoming fully operational in February 2014. The IMU also maintains the consolidated Resource Centre website: http://imwgweb.4wsimwg.net/index.html, established in December 2013.

As the IMU is only just operational no analysis of its effectiveness or sustainability is possible. However, if it is to have any impact then it must address 3 issues:

i)   *maintaining the digital atlas:* this requires strong leadership from the RCO, as co-chair of the IMWG, to ensure that all agencies consistently update their data in the Database – too many respondents, from UN Agencies, donors and within UNDP itself, complained that the data was out of date or unreliable and they had to collect and use their own data – clearly missing the point of the IMWG and the requirement to share this data and improve the data base layers that covered their activities. The IMWG Chairs need to use the meetings to insist on data updates

and data quality verification – agree standardised systems and check on knowledge and experience levels of attendees and arrange appropriate training.

ii) ***Follow-up training:*** Just maintaining the database is insufficient to ensure its use. Again, due to the rapid closure of the project, a great number of the staff trained in Government and UN Agencies, NGOs and Donors are not confident in the use of the tools and as a consequence are not using them despite having the software uploaded on their computers. This situation is exacerbated by the turn-over of staff in all agencies and the subsequent loss of institutional memory and technical skills – a system of refresher and re-training courses needs to be established – The IMU should look at the suggestion and offer by Sudia (NNGO) to produce training videos for each of the tools – these can be placed on You-Tube and the individual can learn as and when is convenient to them in their own locations, saving the expense and time of organised training sessions, Sudia has developed such a system for its own processes and it is reportedly working very well.[12]

iii) ***Government Liaison:*** Interestingly, this Log Frame Output makes no mention in the creation of the IMU of who has responsibility of maintaining links with the Government Ministries; it is as if Log Frame Output One and Three are considered completely stand-alone issues. Yet it is this lack of communication at the Federal level that has led to so many misunderstandings and misconceptions of the project and its purpose in the first place. Thus, it is vital that such liaison is created as early as possible and preferably at the Project planning Stage. The UN should be seen to be supporting the Government's long term strategic planning, not leading it (see Section 6)

b) *Target 2: Having all key UN Agencies, NGOs and Donors utilising the tools in "a sustainable and consistent manner for their programming and coordination";*

This is a key factor of the evaluation – what effect has the CRMA project had on the strategic planning and operation of the UN Agencies, Donors and NGOs and whether the tools developed are in fact being used and will continue to be used and the data sets updated in the process?

Relevance:

This Target is highly relevant to the successful realisation of UN strategic planning in Sudan and to the coherent coordination of the plans' implementation. As the RR/RC told the Consultant, "Ideally, there should be one mapping system to be produced for the whole UN system."

Seven UN Agencies, all members of the IMWG were interviewed: OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UN Aids, UN Habitat and UNOPS. The general consensus was that the project was immensely beneficial to all users as it saved considerable time and expense spent in collecting various forms of data of different qualities from myriad sources. It allowed the information to be displayed in a standardised, visual format with cross-referencing with other agency data made accessible to aid in planning and reporting. All of them recognised the relevance of the CRMA products to their work, even those that had made little or no use of it as yet – however, many of the personnel are recently employed and have had limited training or exposure to the products and most agencies continue to use their existing systems.

OCHA is the Co-Chair of the IMWG and has for years maintained its own database and mapping capacity for coordination purposes. This capacity was never intended for individual agency use, thus the tools developed by the CRMA provided significant and necessary agency support in visualising their planning and enabling accountable monitoring.

Four Donors were consulted: EU, DfID, Sweden and Japan. Two representatives were unaware of the project (though one had seen some of the maps in project Proposals but had not paid them much attention; when they needed information they simply asked UNDP, but were unaware of where the detail came from). One did not use the CRMA products (despite investing heavily in the project), though it recognized that the information had been used in some project proposals and formulations –

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[12] "In this age of the internet, people no longer learn from manuals, but turn to You Tube to see how it is done" (Sudia Exec Dir. Personal Comment).

but not in any institutionalised manner. There was concern over the accuracy and verification of the data and that the project had expanded beyond its remit of conflict mapping into general data collection.

The NGO Forum stated that they came late to know about the project. The Atlas and tools were presented to the directors of 21 INGOs in the last quarter of 2013. These have proved to be very useful in showing where individual sector programmes are situated and aiding coordination and proposal preparation. The Forum has a partnership working group that builds capacity of National NGOs and is working with HAC, which likes the Atlas as it is systematic and stated that it is important that this work continues, as it is a real asset for planning and coordination. The NGO Forum chair was most insistent that the following message be sent to the decision makers of the Project: "We need it, we want it, talk to us." Once again the lack of communication is revealed as one of the Project's major failings.

Effectiveness:

For the most part, the CRMA has been ineffective in changing the mind set of how the UN Agencies NGOs and donors, plan and use data. Most are continuing with their own systems, even if the underlying data sets are the standardised shape files created by CRMA. Whereas, many have seen CRMA as the "go-to" organisation to get the maps and information required, many have also complained about the quality and reliability of the data ("It is not up-to-date!") without understanding that it is their responsibility to up-date it. A major weakness of the project is this lack of rigour in insisting on consistent data collection, frequency of update and M&E. All this data is being collected as part of individual agency activities but is still not being shared, nor do most have the capacity to produce the Maps of the data themselves.

For Information Management to be effective, it requires a technical understanding that works across agencies with a clear mandate and leadership – but the mandate needs to be properly set. It needs institutionalising over a wide base – NGOs and Agencies – with a common understanding of responsibilities and adherence to commitments. IM is a long term, on-going programme and needs to have its funding assured for the long term otherwise the concentration of the users is simply on contract renewal. The data from the different agencies needs also to be shared with the government but as OCHA stated Information Management is very political. It is important to maintain a good informal relationship with the Government, especially at technical level, but it is very difficult to formalise the process as it is too easily blocked, so there is an overall reluctance to do so.

WFP speaks very highly of the CRMA project. The Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) unit stated that its GIS is entirely based on the CRMA work.[13] According to VAM, the beauty of the Atlas is that it can be used by anyone without having to know how the software works – it is widely used for planning, as it is easy to use and is self-explanatory – no real training needed, mostly done "on-the-job" after basic introductory training by CRMA. VAM does not use the 4Ws tool as its properties are not required in their work.

Other Agencies, such as HABITAT and UNAIDS have used the atlas and data base in Regional Spatial planning – the shape files and range of information available has saved a great deal of time and effort as more than 50% of what was needed was already captured by CRMA. This has been especially important in small organisations with limited human and economic resources. UNAIDS had to use available data from WHO for their map production, as their own data was not ready, and have now realised how important is their responsibility to update data.

One big concern of so many people has been the quality of the Data in the data base. WFP states that the original data has been re-checked and verified over the past few years and is now estimated to be 99% accurate, but this has not been relayed to many earlier users, who dismissed the data as being unreliable; a major disconnect in the project between technical people and Project managers and policy makers that should have been better addressed in the IMWG. The Donors also made this comment,

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[13] A VAM Officer & member of the IMWG stated that "CRMA has made us lazy – they have done all the hard, base-level work – all the base layers have now been converted to standard shape files and all new layers use the same format and are used by all parties, including government – a lasting legacy." (VAM Officer, personal comment).

which shows the persistence of early perceptions that requires constant updating and iteration to overcome; again the supposed role of the IMWG, which singularly failed in this responsibility.

A common complaint once again is that despite the number of people trained in the tool use, the training was done too quickly, not followed-up and the turn-over in staff has deprived many agencies of the trained personnel and there is no one to train replacements. Who is trained within an organisation is also an issue – it would be better to have an express policy of training long-term national staff to ensure longevity of institutional capacity, rather than international staff on short-term contracts (e.g. UNOPS). The NGO Forum recommended the establishment of a proper training programme for both INGOs and NGOs – they are all very keen but not confident with the training received – they felt that the programme was closed too early for the benefit to be secured. Also, the training targeted the Country Directors not their technical people – so it was considered more a PR exercise. The production of training videos would make the training far more effective.

New personnel – e.g. UNHCR – have had no briefing on the project – at the recent IMWG meeting, the first the new officer had attended, he asked about a suitable commercial mapping system for UNHCR's data – there was apparently no understanding of what was already available. What was most disconcerting, apart from the fact that only 6 of the 15 UN Agency members attended, was that there had been no welcome at the IMWG to newcomers or an explanation of what it was all about; the leadership and understanding of the IMWG function was absent. In fact, UNHCR had paid CRMA in December 2013 for a customised version of the Incident and Events Mapper that would give them precisely what they were now asking for. The funds for the development of the tool had been passed over to IOM at the closure of the Project and the tool should be ready in February. The current UNHCR staff expressed no knowledge of this, nor did the IMWG chair apprise them of the fact.

The donor community did not appear to use the Project tools regularly or effectively. Occasionally they have been used extensively in donor project proposals, such as in the IOM pastoralism project in the border areas, but generally, the information was not considered sufficiently dynamic or up-to-date. Interestingly, one donor found that much more usable information comes from local NGOs who cover all the areas, therefore there is no need for a central data base – which anyway is "too clunky and out of date" – though it was acknowledged that it is difficult for NGOs to share and compare information as they are isolated with poor communications. This perception, however, exhibits a major disconnect or at least a serious misunderstanding of the role of the system. Whereas, local NGOs may be most informative of local conflicts and have an EW role, they are unlikely to have the capacity to provide comprehensive information for strategic planning. The claim to use local NGOs as the major information source makes no explanation as to how the information supplied is collected, verified or collated, nor how frequently it is updated and by whom.

This demonstrates not only the poor perception of the power and organisation of the CRMA methodology, but also its dependency on all parties accepting their data responsibilities. Neither the EU nor DfID had institutionalised the use of the CRMA tools – there was no requirement for their use in establishing priorities in their planning, or using them to determine programmatic investment. There was no requirement for consultants to use the tools in project formulation or for NGOs to use them in their project proposals as justification of their identified needs or priority locations. The tools were certainly not employed in the monitoring of the project portfolio. Thus, there was little evidence of any use of the products by the very agencies that had funded their development.

The same methodology has worked far more efficiently in South Sudan, according to the reports. In Sudan, there were too many missed opportunities for improving the system and leading the agencies to adopt the standardised sharing of information for the betterment of all. [14]

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[14] The Swedish representative commented that "all that said, I remember when there was no information available at all. CRMA produced something to demonstrate from the beginning, and though there was some type of conflict over quality of the information, during the CPA the data gathered proved very useful to many players."

Impact

The impact of Output 3 has been limited inevitably by the curtailment of the designed period. Many respondents have asserted that if only more time was available for training and understanding, not to mention support for establishing systems of data updating, then the potential of the tools and processes could be realised. Changing attitudes and perceptions takes time and carefully structured input and many felt the project closed right on the cusp of this realisation, a sentiment with which this reviewer agrees.

Actual impact is difficult to measure; it is still too early after the Project's closure to assess real changes attributed to the project's methodology and tool development. The restricted nature of the evaluation extent is also limiting, though the Online survey should address the latter to some extent. But looking at the work of a couple of institutions that have used the CRMA products extensively, some lasting impact can be observed. The WFP VAM Unit (Data assessment and collation) is the technical backstop for all WFP's partners in Government. Before the CRMA there existed the Sudan Interagency Mapping Taskforce. But all the Agencies used different platforms and shape files for their data, which made it very difficult to share information or use it in a coherent manner. According to WFP, CRMA has been extremely useful in Data management in Sudan, it has standardised the shape files and enabled sharing. The Atlas is for all of Sudan and is an extremely useful tool and forms the basis of the VAM's work. When government ministries (Education, Health) ask WFP for information assistance, they receive the standardised shape files and can share information, as all are compatible – thus they are using CRMA products.

Sustainability

As spelt out in the March 2013 Options paper, the early closure of the project would bring its sustainability into severe doubt. This is evident from the discussions with the participating agencies. One glaring shortcoming that quickly became obvious was the massive turn-over of staff in the various agencies (short-term contracts). The project made inadequate provision for the UN system of staff turnover and its implications for long term programmes. Very few of the people interviewed had witnessed the evolution of the project and had varied perceptions as to its purpose or products. Many reported that there was no formal hand-over of instructions or training on their arrival and the IMWG did not adequately explain what was needed or what the responsibilities of the Agency focal persons were, so uncertainty was common. Managers may use the maps but not necessarily know of CRMA's role and importance in the whole process, or their own responsibilities within the IMWG to regularly update their agency's information in the Database.

Likewise, many NGOs and UN Agencies and departments alike reported that the level of training received had been inadequate to give them confidence in using the tools correctly. Certainly they did not feel confident in teaching a replacement or new staff.

The project training programme and the IMWG meetings singularly failed in this aspect to recognise this fact of life in the development sphere and allow for it in their operation. This is a factor that must be addressed in all long term programmes requiring consistent, quality assured input from multiple agencies. The UNCT needed to recognise at an early stage the importance of such a system and take on ownership of the process to ensure genuine coordination and monitoring of the AWP (see Section 6).

An underlying factor is that most agencies and NGOs had their own systems of data storage and analysis and required a very good reason as to why they should utilise two systems – missing the point of the advantages of one standardised system. A commonly expressed problem was that most users not only do not know how to update the database but they are reluctant to spend the time doing it, especially if it requires a computer and being tech savvy – the system needs a simple methodology to get people to bother. A simplified updating system using mobile phones and an Ushahidi web-based input had been developed in the last 6-months of the Project but was not disseminated nor in use at Project closure. Very few of the Agencies were even aware of its existence.

The 2010 DfID/BCPR review, noted that the CRMA Project did not have a developed exit strategy to safeguard its developments and ensure the continued use of the tools and methodologies developed. The review suggested that three phases would be ideal to ensure a sustainable outcome. As discussed in

Section 2, Phase 2 in its entirety could be viewed as the CRMA exit strategy, in which adequate training, tool development and strategic thinking were to be promoted and the processes become institutionalised at all levels and in all parties. The decision to close the Project early, guaranteed that such an outcome could not be achieved and whatever could possibly be done in the close-down period was bound to be inadequate.

Effect of Project closure

There are many new platforms for digital information management being developed and already available, though CRMA was seen as being at the forefront of this development with its main focus on process, but enthusiasm for these programmes is spreading and with CRMA no longer developing its products they will soon be overtaken –WFP pointed out that with the potential unifying process of CRMA removed, the situation may well slip back into its previous mode of multiple incompatible systems and restricted information sharing. Other Agencies referred to it as a missed opportunity and regretted the lost resource and the advantages the standardisation and central hub for information offered.

The NGO Forum could NOT understand why it closed when so much had been done – so many good things put together. The Forum stated that at least 6-months more was needed to ensure adequate training and disbursement of materials and suggested that maybe the leading INGOs could support its continuation if the UN could not, though it acknowledged the risk to INGOs if the situation with certain parties in the Federal Government that had expressed their opposition to the project was not resolved. Sudia, a National NGO, stated that before the decision to close had been taken unilaterally, discussions on what this implied should have been held with the users. The NGO network could have brought NGOs who are using digital mapping together to form a small core group to continue ideas, as just training on the system was inadequate; they had the forum to put them all together to see how to move forward and would have used videos and online support to enable the use of the 4Ws. It is important to note that the use of the Guide books and manuals is now considered cumbersome and unattractive, not to mention archaic in this time of digital development.

The Donors, on the other hand, appear to have a mixed assessment of the knowledge management tools produced by the Project and extended to partners under Output 3: on the one hand, the tools were developed, publicised and found to be useful, as they responded to the identified needs of Information Management, but on the other, with the Project's truncation, sustainable capacities were not built and continued use and development of the products is unlikely, thus, not a positive result!

Conclusion:

The result of Output 3 demonstrates a major dichotomy – the technical staff responsible for data management are appreciative of the CRMA products and clearly see the potential for coordination, planning, monitoring and reporting. The senior managers see the end results but also the political difficulties. They seem not to have grasped the importance of unifying the approach to data collection and the importance of the role the IMWG should have taken and in fact still must take in assuring that there is a single shared system. There is a need for strong focused leadership and a willingness to discuss and support the development of the system within the Federal and State governments – maybe not the CRMA itself as this now carries a lot of undesirable baggage and misconceptions but the process that will fulfil a real need for coherent and reliable, evidence based, strategic planning, project monitoring and impact assessment for all parties involved in the development and welfare of Sudan.

Log Frame Outputs	Target 2014	Deliverables and Planned Activities to 30/6/2013	Status at 31/12/13
OUTPUT 4: **UNDP capacities for conflict prevention, analysis and crisis sensitive recovery and development programming enhanced**	• Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools utilised in UNDP programmes for planning and programming purposes. System in place for tools to be used in development of all new programming.	• Roll-out of planned CRM trainings for Darfur livelihoods project. • Train JCRP in CRM, IMWG Digital Atlas and tool and hand over EW concept note. • Support to Myanmar Information Management Unit to review IM set up, develop GIS-based products in support of joint analysis and planning, and review/discuss/adapt CRM and analysis methodology. • Present CRMA experience and tools at UNDP global Community of Practice event on Technology for better governance and conflict prevention. • Technical support to BCPR Early Warning team in the development of concept and strategy for corporate EWEA system. • Technical Support to ICCM 2013 as committed. • Purchase of CRMA domain with multi-year running costs of webhosting (website) on which all resources, tool code can be placed and publicly shared by UNDP-DFID	• CRM training for Darfur livelihoods project completed. • Completed training of JCRP in CRM, IMWG Digital Atlas and tool and hand over EW concept note. • GIS-based products developed with Myanmar Information Management Unit and CRM and analysis methodology reviewed/discussed/adapted. • CRMA experience and tools presented at UNDP global Community of Practice event on Technology for better governance and conflict prevention. • Technical support to BCPR Early Warning team in the development of concept and strategy for corporate EWEA system. • Technical Support to ICCM 2013 completed in November in Nairobi. • CRMA domain established with multi-year running costs of webhosting (website) on which all resources, tool code have been placed and publicly shared by UNDP-DFID.

2.4.   OUTPUT 4:

UNDP capacities for conflict prevention, analysis and crisis sensitive recovery and development programming enhanced

Analysis:

The key questions in this output are: to what extent has the CRMA project enhanced UNDP programme capacity in terms of improved conflict sensitive and evidence based analysis, strategic planning and programming; the extent to which the CRMA processes and tools have been adopted; and, the degree to which their use is sustainable?

As with the previous Outputs, the project was terminated before its processes and products could have a real effect at the central level of UNDP programme planning. The main programmes targeted by the CRMA during Phase 2 were mainly part of the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit. Though all had some staff who had received training in the CRMA tools and processes, none of the programmes, with the exception of JCRP, felt fully confident in their use, resulting in a very wide range of utilisation. Thus, though the CPRU projects have been instructed to use the 4W tool to input and update project activities and there is evidence of the products being used by the Units in their planning and reports, the information displays have been mainly generated by the Project itself at the individual Unit's request, rather than been institutionalised and generated through their own capacity.

Relevance:

What is apparent is that many of the units had used the CRMA products to demonstrate their Project data visually to Government Ministries at both the Federal and State levels and to communities and Local Authorities, often to great positive effect. Every unit referred to the very poor planning system that exists in their work with Government at whatever level due to the lack of reliable information. The Poverty Reduction Unit had used CRMA staff to present and explain the tools to 3 different federal ministers including the Minister of Social Welfare, who, they reported, recognised the value of the colourful displays of information and were keen to use the process, but required training. In December 2013 the Aid Management and Coordination Unit held a workshop with HAC and MoFNE who were, reportedly, very impressed with the products and wanted the capacity to be their own, so that they could get into dialogue with communities and localities, a significant element that is absent in current planning practice. However, the Units related that they always sensed that the Ministers were reactive on this subject rather than proactive – they seemed to be waiting for the UNDP to take the initiative in further development of the process, emphasising the institutional problem with planning.

CRMA was appreciated by most of the interviewed Units. It is seen as relevant to their programmes, but the product use was very much dependent on having the Project there to produce the visual data displays – none of the Units, apart from JCRP, felt they had the capacity to do so themselves.

JCRP is different in that it has been working with the CRMA from its start and is specifically involved with conflict reconciliation and mapping, working with State Governments and Localities. It has employed ex-CRMA staff and is fully conversant with the tools and processes. It continues to use them on a daily basis and produces its visual data displays (what most users refer to as "maps") whenever needed. It is utilising the 4Ws tool for spatial representation of its initiatives and to monitor progress – it is in fact using the tools as designed and represents what is possible and where all the units should have been by the end of the Project cycle, if the proper training and advocacy of the tool use could have been completed.

As mentioned in the analysis of Output 1, the Governance and Rule of Law unit has been involved in assisting the eastern State Governments in the development of state strategic plans and Locality plans and have used the CRM methodology extensively. The Locality Plans are the first in Sudan, though they have only been accomplished with the major participation of CRMA staff. DDR and CSAC both have national counterparts at the federal level – Min of Presidential Affairs, the DDR Commission and Min Interior - and also work at the State level with relevant ministries running 17 CSAC Committees. All have used CRMA to collect pertinent data for both physical mapping and perception mapping from Localities and locations identified as priorities by the Local authorities. Using CRM methodology, consultation with multi-stakeholders at community level resulted in the identification of hard and soft

interventions, which were accepted by the authorities. Thus, the work and usefulness of the CRMA process and products are valued by these Government Ministries. Unfortunately, over the last 2.5 years this capacity has been lost, as CRMA has not able to move in the States. Thus there have been no updates and DDR has had to rely mainly on secondary data. Now they realise that they should have built the capacity to use the tools and input the data and undertake the analysis themselves – a little late to realise what the original intention had been.

DCPSF joined the technical secretariat in 2012. Supported by the CRMA GIS mapping capacity, they completed a conflict analysis of Darfur and identified hotspots and priority areas that have been used in the last two call for proposals. They can now map all their project locations and overlay the priority areas, enabling better monitoring of *effectiveness* of the coverage and *impact* of the Programme. However, the DCPSF was dependent on the Project for the output, as according to the Head of Section, most of the DCPSF staff and partners did not know how to use the tools.

Effectiveness:

The CRMA claims that its major accomplishments in the truncated period of the project were in fact the capacity building and tool development for the IMWG (Output 3) and for UNDP specifically (Output 4). As previously shown, there is no argument with the tool development – apart from the fact that 3 components of the IMWG Information Tool still need to be completed and the information to keep the Atlas useful still needs to be updated on a regular basis, but the tools are sophisticated and have proven to be of immense use to those who know how to use them. The CPRU, as a Unit, used the 4Ws to keep track of project activities in 2013 and will continue to use it in 2014. The potential for creating a single information mapping system for UNDP, and maybe the UNCT as a whole, is very great. But the capacity building in the tool use and the subsequent adoption as the common platform for evidence-based, strategic planning, programming and monitoring fell short of what is required.

The effectiveness of JCRP's work was severely disrupted by the upheavals in South Kordofan. They are the most accomplished user of the CRMA tools and process, but they face having to rebuild the capacity in the State and only when the access issue is resolved. However, they did report an interesting follow-up, 6-months ago, by the Minister of Animal Resources in SKS, who asked for the tools' software for his Ministry's use. According to JCRP, he stated that there was no other document or system like it in Sudan. Whether this was followed-up and he is using it, has not been verified.

The Governance and Rule of Law point out that UNDP has benefited greatly from the project all over Sudan, as all UN Agencies are acting on visual data displays (maps) and have distributed to Government and NGOs, who have expressed much better understanding of needs and priorities as a result. Certainly, the output of the DJAM 2012 – the Darfur Development Strategy document made heavy use of the CRMA data display outputs to illustrate clearly the Darfur Situation Analysis to improve the international Donors' understanding and appreciation of Darfur's development priorities.

When it comes to the *effectiveness* of the training, the shortcomings were highlighted by both the DDR and DCPSF Section heads. The trained capacity within the section is low in numbers and not targeted on the correct people. Very few projects have individual IT support persons and the training concentrated on International staff (who have short term contracts) and Project Managers, rather than a broader range of project staff, such as M&E people, field coordinators, etc. who actually collect and collate the data. None of those trained are reportedly confident in the use of the tools, certainly not to train replacements or even additional users. Thus, the tools have not been used much and certainly the data generated in the section has not been updated in the Database – a key component of the purpose and usefulness of the whole system. Whenever maps have been needed they have always returned to CRMA, as neither Unit has the physical capacity to produce them. Now, if they are to continue using the data they will have to rely on the new IMU, whose activities and capacity is still to be tested. In 2013, the DCPSF decided to use the 4ws tool as a monitoring tool and required its 29 partners to enter updated data before making reports on their activities. All the partners had sent one staff to the short single training in July, but when checked in September/October, the usage was virtually nil and no data entry had been done.

Impact

It is, unfortunately too soon to see what lasting impact the Project might have on UNDP's future planning and programming. In discussions with the different sections, it is clear that the Project has not permeated thinking and planning across the UNDP programme as well as it should have done, given the length of operation and the sophisticated tool development on offer. But, encouragingly, the CPRU at least, has used the CRMA products to guide, track and visualise its whole programme for the past 2 years. They have used the 4Ws tool to track the NGO projects under the RRR Sector that they co-lead and very recently, were able to demonstrate an updated status of last year's CHF allocation to RRR sector partners using a map from the 4Ws system, the latter being produced by ex-CRMA staff in JCRP for the Unit. All Sections and Units agree that the potential for such impact is great, IF it could all be got to work. The latter depends a great deal on strong leadership, with a clear sense of direction and an overview of what the final product of coordinated strategic planning within UNDP could look like. It requires an understanding of the tools and what they can do and a clear, strong recognition of the need for constant information updating and the budgetary provision to make it all possible. Many UNDP Section heads reported ambivalence over the use of the products, sensing the lack of clear directives in their use.

Sustainability

The biggest problem is institutionalising the CRMA products within UNDP. Though administered by UNDP, the CRMA Project was sub-contracted to IOM where, as the UNDP Aid Effectiveness advisor pointed out, the vision of the Project grew to include multi partners/clients and moved away from a UNDP focus. The Project started by setting up partnerships at State level with State Government and Line ministries, but with little involvement of the Federal government other than MIC, which was kept apprised of the Project's progress and assisted with coordination of activities. But IOM had faced severe operational difficulties in its Darfur Programme and the government's negative perception of this seemed to have been carried through to the separate CRMA This perception and the very limited Federal engagement lie at the base of the government imposed operational delays. These, and the voiced suspicions over security and Project purpose, caused serious concern in the UNDP senior management over the Project's viability. This has endangered the recognition of the value of the products. To use an old cliché – it may well be a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. This needs to be avoided at all costs – if the products are to be maintained, developed and used in the manner envisioned and really provide the basis for genuine strategic planning, then a very careful appraisal of the way forward needs to be undertaken. Otherwise, as it stands now and despite the minor capacity of the IMU there is a real danger that the products will lie idle and the effort wasted.

Part of this institutionalisation must be the recognition of the responsibility for the data management work is included in staff job descriptions and some sort of financial allowance or reward for the work. It is difficult to impose discipline on the quality or timing of data input when there is no agreed responsibility. Without it the product will always be variable and discouraging to use.

Effect of Project closure:

The data and products will not be used without updates and training. If there is no political will to continue maintaining and developing the tools, then UNDP will lose a serious analytical asset. For instance, the DDR said that without the technical assistance the Unit cannot produce its presentation maps, which are important to convince stakeholders and focus discussions and identify correlations (e.g. areas of conflict contained large numbers of ex-combatants). All UNDP stakeholders agreed that the Project closed too early for its real potential to be realised, just when the corporate mind-set was starting to understand its real value.

Conclusion:

The CRMA products present a major opportunity for UNDP to make a real difference in the planning, coordination and monitoring of its operation. But such opportunity must be seized with strong leadership and clear direction to drive the coordination and sharing of updated information that is vital in identifying solutions to so many planning problems. The establishment of the IMU is a hopeful sign that there is now some commitment in UNDP (CD and OSD) to take information management and evidence based planning seriously. The role of the IMU under the OSD needs to concentrate on re-training and refresher courses, so staff can utilise the process. Better still would be to re-design a project to continue the work and improve the products, ensuring of course that it is anchored firmly within an appropriate Federal Ministry. The successful utilisation of the CRMA products by UNDP in its planning and monitoring efforts would set a great example that would help the RC reach a common agreement with the UNCT to use this tool across the board as *"the"* planning, monitoring and reporting system. All UNDP Units and other UN Agencies need to recognise it as such and not as something in addition to their own systems.

3. Assessment of Project Impact on Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning (KMSP)

This section aims to highlight the common elements of the previous detailed analysis of the four expected Project Outputs and answer the overarching questions concerning the Project's accomplishments:

- ➢ The Project Strategy for Capacity Development;
- ➢ The extent to which CRMA has enhanced its partners' capacity in terms of improved conflict sensitive and evidence based analysis, strategic planning and programming and the degree to which this is sustainable;
- ➢ The impact of the early closure of the Project upon the Project's objectives and overall sustainability

3.1 Overall Project strategy and approach to Capacity development

The main purpose of Phase 2 was to build a sustainable working capacity within the targeted users of the CRMA products and methodology that would enable standardisation of approach, improved strategic planning and reliable monitoring of activities in an interactive and complementary manner between the many disparate parties involved in Development. The strategy called for the development of the tools and their accompanying manuals and guidelines, a great deal of *in-situ* training and the provision of hardware, software and technical support (both direct and on-line), to all parties, with a special focus on the Federal Government Ministries, while continuing the work in the States.

3.1.1 The CRMA Tool box

To this end, a great deal of effort was made to create the toolbox of technical instruments, manuals and interactive atlases, as well as a Situation Analysis of each of the targeted States, to enhance multi user skills in evidence-based Strategic Planning (see Section 1, Table 1). The CRMA Phase 2 strategy focused on institutionalising these tools, aiming to embed them within the client's analysis and strategic planning process. The tools were designed for effective knowledge management and, as such, their real usefulness and attractiveness depended on the quality of the data held in the underlying database – both the data's accuracy and its currency. The first required an agreed standard list of what information to gather and thorough verification of the input while the latter relied on the frequency of updating. To this end the IMWG was formed early in the process from the UNCT, to manage and update the available information across the agencies.

The Phase 2 strategy called for the formation and continued function of the IMWG, to ensure the frequency, quality and verification of data upgrades by the very agencies that need to use them. The Strategy recognised that this called for strong leadership and placed the chairmanship of the Group under the RCO. The IMWG ToRs require that each member acknowledges its responsibility to update its data, but there is almost universal failure to do so. This emphasises a major shortcoming in the perception and use of the programme – as the 2011 review noted "the very data sets that have served as

the basis for the CRMA database continue to be the key source of information for individual agencies" (p.23). In other words, very little if any updating had been noted and old information was consistently being used. The responsibility for updating data is NOT CRMA's but the individual Agencies and users of the data sets. Many Agencies and individuals simply stated that the CRMA information was outdated and unreliable and that they depended on their own data gathering; but they also admitted to not updating the database with this information. This evaluation found that in many instances the Agencies saw the IMWG data-set as an extra burden on their work rather than the main asset that it was designed to be. This demonstrates a lack of clear understanding of the purpose of the IMWG and knowledge management and sharing in general and a lack of leadership and coordination in insisting that this be the central tool of the overall planning and monitoring efforts.

i)   **The CRMA Methodology**: A fully participatory methodology to gather Crisis and Recovery perceptions and physical data at the Locality level was developed at a very early stage in Phase 1 of the Project. Efforts in Phase 2 were concentrated on simplifying the system, reducing costs and improving the methodology of updating the data to make the process more attractive and viable. The methodology continues to be used extensively and successfully by the JCRP, the Governance and Rule of Law unit and has been of significant assistance to the DDR.[15]

ii) **The Digital Atlas:** An interactive CD (Version 9) containing all the software required to run and interrogate the data base was disseminated in September 2013, and a limited short training in its use provided to Agencies and NGOs. The Atlas displays multi-layer data in a manner designed to enable analysis of correlations and associations. It is dependent upon a constantly updatable data-base. The latter has proven to be both its strength and its biggest weakness, for most of the data is time sensitive and strategic planning relies on the evidence being comprehensive, reliable and pertinent. Paper versions of the State Atlases, too, were prepared but these a mechanism for updating and standardisation that is not apparent – the information as presented is variable both in standard and in coverage. They each contain a disclaimer that they do not imply official endorsement by either the GoS or UN and are meant for planning only. Secondly, presentation of the data e.g. education – varies widely between states and in its usefulness for planning purposes – the disaggregation into primary and secondary schools (or teaching colleges, vocational schools, agriculture and veterinary training etc.) varies between the states or is simply not supplied at all. These atlases will quickly become simple baselines of the situation at a particular time, but be ineffectual for monitoring, or annual work programming to determine where investment is a priority.

iii) **The 4-component, IMWG Database and Mapping Tool:** Developed to allow the users to analyse the data collected and collated. The first component produced is referred to as the 4Ws: Who, What, Where and When. It is aimed at project managers and planners, and provides a platform for entering all individual projects by any particular user and making them available to a sector group for overall planning. The Projects can be monitored and the data updated in real time, using the web-based Ushahidi mechanism developed in the last months of the CRMA operation, and is synchronised immediately with all users. This removes the delays caused by preparation of reports and the responsibility for physically uploading the data.

The CRMA trained many people in different agencies and departments in the use of this tool (93 in the UN Agencies alone), with reportedly very mixed results (see analysis of Output 3 and 4 in Section 2). There are three other components of this tool: Incident and Event Mapper (IEM); Basic Services Mapper (BSM); Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM), the training

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[15] Questions have been raised by some parties as to the inherent risk of developing the Government's capacity to gather conflict sensitive information, given the current conflict situation in many areas of Sudan. CRMA created a system to standardise and verify information transfer in conflict areas, but is not adding anything to what it already collected by the various State security organs. Information is more dangerous when it is exclusive and the CRM methodology addresses this through wider dissemination. Therein lay one of the Project's major problems – suspicion of the Project's purpose and intent, which should have been addressed at the highest levels, not left to the Project technical team. This was a strategic error.

manuals of which were all still in production at the closure of the project and have not been disseminated or utilised at this point.

However, all of these are time sensitive and unless there is a comprehensive and reliable mechanism of updating existing data and collecting, verifying and inputting new developments, then the 4W's database will remain a detailed snapshot of a particular period.

iv) **State Situation Analyses**: CRMA assisted the State governments in the three Eastern States, South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and West Darfur to produce a State Situation Analysis, through the use of the CRM methodology and the Digital Atlas. These SAs demonstrate the need for consistent and reliable updating if they are to prove useful to pro-active, strategic planning and not simply decorate reports and proposals. For instance, the SAs currently available were completed between 2009 and 2011 – pre-secession of South Sudan and prior to the current serious conflict in BNS and SKS (the boundaries of the latter have also since changed with the re-formation of West Kordofan State by decree in July 2013). The SA for West Darfur was published in 2011, by which time the State had been divided into West Darfur State and Central Darfur State. The Document was utilised in the DJAM in both states but the multi-agency working groups, found that the information was already dated and in many cases incomplete and conducted further detailed consultations to elicit the necessary information to form a real-time SA. Where it has been possible to follow-up these documents during the evaluation, the respondents all expressed the need for continued assistance in updating information and for more training.

To support the dissemination and use of these tools a series of Working Documents, training manuals and guidebooks was produced, most of which have been disseminated to the States, Donors and UN Agencies, in a single package at the early closure of the project. A full list of the documents contained in the package is given in Annex 6. But no matter how comprehensive this package is, just the simple act of disseminating it to the target users is no guarantee that it will be read, let alone used and institutionalised, which it must be if it is to have any sustainable future. Not that that Project had much option in the manner of the dissemination given the restrictive circumstances of time and travel bans, which prevented the planned workshops and additional training.

3.1.2   The Capacity Building Strategy

The production of the tools was one thing, but the development of efficient strategic planning relies on their proper and consistent use. A major part of the Phase 2 Strategy was therefore developing the necessary skill sets and IT support in the States and Federal Ministries to permit full adoption and utilisation of the standardised package. The Phase 2 Strategy was designed to be accomplished over 3 years. In the event and as previously discussed, many restrictions were placed on the capacity building programme in the States and federal Ministries, while the Government reviewed the whole project process and proposal. It is evident that the Strategy proposed in Phase 2, had not been sufficiently shared or prepared with the Federal Government agencies, prior to its initiation and this caused unforeseen delays in implementation. Nevertheless, the Project used the time to refine the documents and tools, in preparation of a concentrated activity phase once the restrictions were lifted. However, despite having a signed LPAC and a Steering (Technical Advisory) Committee established, due apparently to the lack of action in fulfilling its Outputs and to the uncertainty of when the restrictions would be lifted, DfID terminated its project funding, after only 15 of the 36-months the Strategy had allowed for. The technical package may well have been almost complete and functioning but the users were left ill-prepared.

3.2.   Enhancement of CRMA partners' capacity

The extent to which CRMA has enhanced its Partners' capacity in terms of improved conflict sensitive and evidence based analysis, strategic planning and programming and the degree to which this is sustainable

a) **State Governments:** Unfortunately no *in-situ* verification of achievement in the States was possible due to travel restrictions. What is evident from the documentary evidence, such as: (i) Kassala State Strategic Plans; (ii) WD Situation Analysis; and, (iii) Project and Agency reports, as well as

from interviews with Agencies working in the States and with a single State Minister, while he was in Khartoum, is that three of the target States have produced Strategic plans with the technical assistance of the project. Whether the States are capable of continuing the process on their own is yet to be ascertained. Five out of the eight target States have received the technical document package, but, reportedly, it is not being used. They require more training and equipment to confidently use the methodology and tools. New States and changes in government institutions mean that new training and support is urgently required if there is to be any sustainability of the process.

b) *Federal Government:* Very limited training has been received in a very limited number of departments. Though great interest in the process and what it can bring to the planning system has been expressed by many ministries, the enhancement of planning capacity has not been realised, nor will it be without its active promotion, which in itself relies on the positive resolution of the suspicions and misconceptions raised by the CRMA project. What has been accomplished is the recognition that reliable, digitised data has enormous potential for the evidence-based planning resolving the current and historical shortcomings of information management at all levels.

c) *United Nations system*: UNDP, WFP and UNICEF are regularly using the Database, to greater or lesser extent. UN Habitat used the shared data inputted into its own system to develop its special plan for Darfur. However, most UN agencies, funds and programmes are not comfortable using the Tools, other than, to some extent, the Digital Atlas. Once again, the common complaint was the brevity of training and the lack of follow-up. Plus, there has not been a strong push through the IMWG for the system to become the mapping tool of the UN and thus most concentrate on their existing systems, even though these have proven to be inadequate to the task of data sharing, strategic planning and standardised data collection and monitoring. The IMWG has remained restricted to the UN Agencies and attempts to open it up to Government and NGOs have not been successful. Without the latters' input and participation in the whole process, genuine overall strategic planning and monitoring is not possible. There is little confidence in all agencies consulted that the tools and process will be maintained. There is serious concern that the agencies will revert to the pre-CRMA days of multi-platforms and data incompatibility.

d) *UNDP programmes:* the CRMA processes and tools have not generally been adopted in the day to day management of programmes addressing governance and conflict related challenges, except for JCRP, which is fully engaged in their use. The CPRU uses the CRMA products more and more in the design and monitoring of its programmes. As the Head of Unit says, "it is by no means perfect, but there is some good progress." The lack of direction and resolve at the senior level to bolster the tool use throughout the system is evident, as is the lack of provision for recognising the skill-set in job descriptions and time allocations. Most of the work is done on a "voluntary" basis and as for the UNCT as a whole, the same lack of confidence in the use of the tools is expressed in all the UNDP programmes and Units. The main causes are the lack of training, the reluctance to develop skills through using the technical manuals and the turn-over of staff with resulting loss of whatever skill base there may be. The CPRU has used the 4Ws tool with the assistance of JCRP for its own extensive programming and monitoring but it has not been widely adopted by UNDP itself for the development, management or monitoring of the AWP. Whether this will change with the activation of the newly established IMU in the OSD remains to be seen. As it is, without major intervention and a central decision to adopt and promote the process, sustainability must seriously be considered doubtful.

e) *Donors and NGOs:* The CRMA products and process have had no lasting impact on the Donor planning – though many of the proposals and projects have used the Atlas and database to display information, much of this has been created by CRMA at the clients' request rather than self-generated. None of the Donors has institutionalised the tools in their own planning or insisted that Consultants formulating projects or NGOs submitting proposals use the database and tools to provide evidence to support their identification of needs and location of priorities. Certainly there has been no Donor requirement for regular updating of all project information and accomplishments on the common database. Thus data sharing is not seen as a priority and this compromises strategic planning, monitoring and assessment of impact. The NGOs have expressed great interest in the tools, but were only appraised of the system very late in the Project. They

received scant training and have been denied participation in the IMWG. The opportunity to gain from their experience and creative suggestions on information needs, learning methodologies and standardisation of approach has been missed.

3.3.   Impact of the early closure of the Project

As predicted in the March 2013 Options Paper, the early closure of the project has seen an overall failure of the Project to achieve sustainable improvements and capacities with respect to knowledge management and strategic planning, other than to produce a technically sound and comprehensive tool kit for evidence-based strategic planning, monitoring and reporting. The reduction in time simply meant that despite the refinement of the tools and the comprehensive support package of manuals, guides and training material, actual familiarisation with the tools and process was not possible, so most potential users lack confidence in utilising the product. Plus, there was insufficient time to promote the use of the product to all parties and have it adopted as the central Information Management asset. As it stands, the overall sustainability of the products is unlikely, though limited use in UNDP (CPRU and JCRP) is evident. Its continued use and possible expansion will depend a great deal on the work of the IMU and UNDP's willingness to fund the Unit to maintain the tools.

The decision to close the project prematurely was therefore questionable in terms of achieving sustainable changes in knowledge management and strategic planning capacities of project partners. After all the time, effort and funds expended and, given the apparent success of the process elsewhere, the UN, DfID and the EU should have made greater efforts and exercised greater patience to identify the real issues. Wider consultation among all the potential users as to exactly what was wanted and what needed to be done to get there, should have been conducted and all parties should have made every effort to understand exactly what the Project had achieved – both prior reviews had identified the Project's great potential and emphasised the expected difficulties in achieving it. The whole process required a mind-set change and this takes time and political will to achieve. This should have been recognised.

The quarterly and annual reports recorded the positive response of the parties engaged in utilising the tools – even those who did not fully understand them. Given the enthusiasm of many of the tool users and the ongoing refinement of the tools and manuals, the Project was genuinely on the cusp of realising its aims. But such realisation of its possibilities requires familiarity, training and systematic adoption into annual planning, and this needs time, which unfortunately was truncated.

4. Sustainability and Replication Strategies

4.1. Sustainability Strategy

The original Strategy was to ensure that all users at all levels in the Government and UN system were fully aware of the tools and methodology, well trained in their use and with the appropriate hardware and software technology required. It was foreseen that with sufficient iteration of successful planning to demonstrate the systems value in overcoming the identified serious lack of strategic planning capacity and knowledge, there would have been the time to strengthen the development mind-set and establish the autonomous use of the system. The long-term aim was to have the central support and maintenance of the database embedded in the Central Bureau of Statistics.

As previously analysed and detailed in Section 3.3 above, this strategy is not viable. Despite being enthusiastically accepted by a series of State governments and commented on favourably by federal ministries as answering the very serious planning questions that confront them, the system is not sustainable as it stands today. The system was not adequately transferred and is not being widely used. Without the necessary training and continued technical support all that has so far been achieved will attenuate and have no lasting effect.

There appears to be hope of maintaining some effect within the UN Agencies and UNDP itself. JCRP is continuing to use the tools and is advising and helping the CPRU in its use. The IMU, which became operational in February 2014, should maintain the database and could conduct training. The uptake of the tools and mapping system within the UNCT and wider development community will depend on:

- The reorganisation and re-tasking of the IMWG to advise and assist its members correctly;
- The leadership of the RCO in driving the standardisation of Information Management and the adoption of these tools as the central system to develop and monitor the AWP.
- Opening the doors to the INGOs and NGOs in Information Management sharing;
- The development of simplified training tools, such as on-line training videos; and,
- The continued dialogue with the Government parties to overcome the underlying suspicions about the purpose of the system and promote the technological support for the development of a mutually beneficial, evidence-based, strategic planning and monitoring tool. The importance of the latter to the imminent expansion of DRA activities in Darfur cannot be over-emphasised.

These relatively simple and immediate tasks will go a long way to promote the system's continued use and development. It is abundantly clear from the advances made in technology in the last 6-months of the project and the impact on the simplification and efficiency of the tools that the tools must continue to be developed as technology improves, otherwise they will be overtaken by different systems and the sharing of data will once again become more difficult.

4.2. Replication strategy

The CRMA Phase 1 review (External DfID BCPR Review, 2010), stated, inter alia, that:
"The CRMA project …… holds the potential to improve how the UN system operates in the Sudan – as well as elsewhere. For that very reason it is worth emphasizing that for now focus must be on making the system work properly in Sudan to ensure that there is, in fact, an established system to replicate."

From this, came the eventual Phase 2, which was intended to establish the system in Sudan. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, this has not been successfully completed as a working system. However, the manuals and tools are detailed and comprehensive and could easily form the basis of a packaged transfer to other post crisis situations – provided that the central issue of embedding them in a central government institution responsible for statistics and planning, as an initial requirement, is recognised.

The programme has in fact been replicated in South Sudan and, according to the End of Project Report (see Annex 2), is working well under the central authority of the National Statistics Bureau. It has also been tried in Myanmar (see Myanmar Trip Report) in which staff from CRMA presented the methodology and tools to the UN Counterparts in-country. According to the report, Myanmar has adopted the strategy wholeheartedly and has formed the Myanmar Information Management Network based on the TORs of the Sudan IMWG, which reportedly has initiated the Atlas and is currently customising the 4Ws for Myanmar. This information comes from the single report and there has been no follow-up or verification. This needs to be done so that the package may be shown to be viable and thus, worthwhile introducing and supporting in other development situations.

5 Lessons Learned

The CRMA evolved into a major system for collecting and collating multi-level data (point level to State level) from myriad sources and presenting it in a standardised, rational manner that was much appreciated by all parties who understood the process. However, it deliberately focused on the States in its early development to meet its initial design. As it expanded, it recognised the need to gather interconnecting data between States, as many factors (transhumance, markets, road infrastructure etc.) have inter-State influence. Also, having proved its value in assisting State Governments to adopt planning methodology to develop State Strategic plans, the national significance of the programme, for all users, whether it is the UN or Government became apparent. The reviews emphasised the importance of federal Government ownership and the need to build its capacity in strategic planning, an area of universally acknowledged weakness. In the event, this led to many problems through poor communication, misunderstandings, misconceptions and multi-party actions without common purpose or recognition of what the actual areas of contention were. The Project ended as a result of all the negative implications, which had very little to do with the actual technical products, but more to do with the organisational context in which they were embedded.

a)   It is therefore evident, that first and foremost is the need to identify and partner the pertinent Federal Agencies that have mandates for the subject of interest. However long this takes, the time must be spent to ensure a solid grounding and understanding of what is being proposed. The evidence of the success of the process in South Sudan, that duly followed this route and the equally successful report from Myanmar bear this out. It must be understood that there are no short cuts and complex situations and multiple mandates take more time to resolve. It is also important that all the personnel involved in proposing the project and later managing it are very clear in what support and funding is being offered, so as to present a unified stance and avoid confusion.

b)   The lack of communication at the Federal level between the UN and the appropriate Government ministries led to so many misunderstandings and misconceptions of the Project and its purpose. Thus, it is vital that such liaison is created at the start and preferably at the planning stage so that the UN is seen to be supporting the Government's long term strategic planning, not leading it.

c)   Such a project that involves multiple Agencies - Government, UN, Donors and NGOs - requires a clear vision of what the overall product should be and strong leadership to guide and coordinate the many different parties to achieve it. This has to be recognised at the beginning and all parties to the project must agree to be coordinated and meet their responsibilities in the conduct of the project. Information Management involves non-restrictive sharing of data and often this involves a major change in the management mind-set. Such changes take time and constant communication and rigorous coordination of all parties to achieve and this must be allowed for in the project design. Specifically, the IMWG should have encompassed all implementing agencies (especially NGOs or even a technical secretariat of the NGO Forum who could further disseminate the information to its members).

d)   Once the focus of the Project moved to information gathering for strategic planning, then it should have made provision for gathering data on all new developments and funding sources. The involvement of the non-traditional donors is missing in this process. They deal unilaterally with the separate states and with the Federal government and provide significant funding. It is logical that if strategic coordination of development activities and humanitarian response is to be truly effective

then the Atlases/database need to be updated if they are to remain properly useful. Thus, a mechanism for capturing these additional inputs and planning priorities needs to be established and the use of the common process promoted.

e) The CRMA activities in Phase 1 grew *ad hoc* to address problems and technical issues as they arose. The design of Phase 2 provided an opportunity to reach agreement on what the Project should achieve and plan how to get there. But it proved difficult to bring on board many parties who had not been involved in the development of the process. It is essential that from the very start there is a clear understanding through comprehensive consultation of what is wanted, who is going to do what and how the project will achieve what is agreed and in what time frame. Likewise, there must be a clear and functioning mechanism of review that checks progress and examines deviations for their value or impact on the desired outcome. Such a mechanism – the Project Executive Board (PEB) – was established for the CRMA but one of the major issues was that it was not functional – through the last 15-months of the CRMA Project when so many problems and doubts were evident it had proved impossible to convene a meeting of the PEB to address them.

f) There must be an exit strategy acknowledged from the start with final ownership, maintenance of outputs and continued use identified. Finite-period Project funding does not ensure the long term continuation of the achievements no matter how successful they have been. Where the eventual intention of the programme is for it to be nationally executed then adequate budgetary arrangement at the various levels of national support (Federal, State and Locality) must be acknowledged and planned for from the beginning, not left to the end of the external funding, hoping that vague promises of financial support will be forthcoming. Systems of cost recovery on such projects should be investigated from the start.

g) One of the difficulties encountered in the CRMA training was that the work was often seen as "extra duties" or simply a burden, with poor training, low status and no disciplinary action for non-completion, so it was simply not done. Information Management should be seen for the valuable tool that it is in assuring strategic planning and standardised monitoring and reporting of activities, and enabling a genuine assessment of impact and accountability over time. It requires the skills to be present in every participating unit, agency or department and thus requires a clear job description and qualification requirement built into the individual Terms of Reference for such positions. This will ensure standardisation of the skill set and help with the reliability and quality verification of the data input. It should also ensure that the tasks are permanently covered and the skill set recognised by adequate financial reward.

h) One of the major realities in any Donor funded, Agency led and implemented programme, as well as in Government departments and Ministries, is the turn-over of staff either by end of contract, reshuffling of departments or retirement and the subsequent loss of institutional memory. Long term projects that require the development and retention of a specific skill base should build mitigation activities into the initial plan to ensure sustainability and continued generation of the skill base.

6 Recommendations and Conclusions

The Project has been closed, but this does not mean that nothing further can be done. The tools should not simply be discarded nor should the identified need for a standardised system of needs assessment, strategic planning and just as importantly, project monitoring, reporting and impact assessment be set aside until some new idea is tried. It is true that mistakes were made in the implementation of this programme. These have been identified and hopefully will not be repeated. But the clear recommendation from all of the foregoing, is that the technical advances made by the CRMA and the information sharing platform that it created should not be simply shelved.

Detailed conclusions for the achievements in each Output have been given in Section 2. What is common to all is that the closure of the Project represents a major missed opportunity in addressing one of the most aggravating shortcomings in assuring a comprehensive and effective development programme in Sudan – the lack of accurate, timely data across a wide range of different subject areas and disciplines and the lack of a standardised and thus comparative means of presenting such data that enables dependable analysis of the genuine needs and priorities.

There are many parties to such a programme, all with different timetables, budgets and agendas that make any attempts at standardisation fraught with difficulties and frustrations, but that does not mean it should not be pursued. Those more familiar with the CRMA tools, recognised the real monitoring possibilities that would provide greater opportunities for coherent coordination and accountability with genuine potential for assessing impact of interventions. The major problems were seen, not as technical but as political. In the event, this Evaluation concludes that the Project was terminated prematurely, due mainly to concerns over the political ramifications of the uncertainty and misconceptions of the Project's purpose – while a more creative engagement between the UN, DfID and the EU, with wider consultation of the targeted users of the products, in particular influential sections of the Government of Sudan, could have found a more creative and constructive way to proceed.

The Project demonstrated a major dichotomy – the technical staff responsible for data management is appreciative of the CRMA products and clearly sees the potential for coordination, planning, monitoring and reporting. The senior managers see the end results but also the political difficulties. They seem not to have grasped the importance of unifying the approach to data collection and the importance of the role the IMWG should have taken and in fact still must take in assuring that there is a single shared system. The RC stated that "ideally there should be one mapping system for the UN".

Thus, the RCO should immediately re-examine the role and function of the IMWG, strengthening the data updating methodology and compliance. It should make a clear decision as to what form the common data sharing, planning, monitoring and reporting tools should take and, through strong coordination and leadership, insist that the UN adopts and follows what is agreed. It should re-examine the membership. The IMWG should: be co-chaired by a Federal Authority (e.g. the Central Bureau of Statistics); include representation from the NGO Forum, to ensure further dissemination of information and materials to its members who constitute a major portion of the UN implementing partners and who should provide regular updates of performance against the AWP; and, include representation from the donors (both Traditional and non-traditional) who need to maintain awareness of the status of the development environment and take the changing priorities into account in their long-term planning. It should continue dialogue with the Project Steering Committee to secure understanding and government ownership of the software and process.

In the short term, the UNDP should endeavour to maintain the valuable products that they have created over the last five years, through careful attention and support to the IMU, so that it may concentrate on re-training and refresher courses for all those staff of UN and government departments to ensure utilisation of the process; taking up the offer of the NGO Sudia to create training videos may well be a great place to start. Better still would be to re-design a project to continue the work and improve the products, anchored by a strong and convincing Federal Government champion.

The successful utilisation of the CRMA products by UNDP in its planning and monitoring efforts would set a great example that would help the RC reach a common agreement with the UNCT to use

this tool across the board as **"the"** planning, monitoring and reporting system. All UNDP units and other UN Agencies need to recognise it as such and not as something in addition to their own systems.

An immediate issue to be addressed is the very real need for an effective planning and monitoring tool for the DRA in its major recovery and development programme in Darfur. Every effort should be made to ensure that the 4Ws tool and its monitoring capability is made available to the DRA Technical Secretariat and fully supported by the UN and donors.

In the long-term, the future of any such system depends on its adoption and use by the Government of Sudan. Every effort should be made to initiate a new project anchored by a strong and convincing federal government agency. There is a need for strong, focused leadership and a willingness to discuss and support the development of the system within the Federal and State governments that will fulfil a real need for coherent and reliable, evidence-based, strategic planning, project monitoring and impact assessment for all parties involved in the development and welfare of Sudan.

Annexes

- Timeline of the Project
- Executive Summary of the South Sudan CRMA Final Report, Dec. 2013
- Online Survey Questionnaire
- The Terms of Reference of the evaluation
- List of persons/organisations consulted
- Literature and documentation consulted

Annex 1: Timeline

CRMA Timeline

Focus: July 2011 (second evaluation) to December 2013 (closure)[16]

1. Background: First Phase: TRMA, January 2008 to December 2009

In January 2008, UNDP launched the Threat and Risk, Mapping and Analysis (TRMA) project to provide a diversity of stakeholders with strategic planning and decision-making tools for crisis, recovery and development programming. The project assists in compiling geo-referenced state-by-state information on human security and socio-economic recovery risk data to provide state and non-state recovery and development actors with key inputs for their analysis and strategic planning processes.

Key Results by end Phase I (Dec 2009)
- Information Management Working Groups (IMWG) established in Khartoum, and Darfur with quarterly ArcGIS Atlases produced covering South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Abyei, the Darfur and East Sudan states.
- Participatory mapping of security threats and socio-economic risks completed for all states of East Sudan, South Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile states;
- State Situation Analyses developed for all states of East Sudan, and a State Strategic Plan revision undertaken in Kassala State, based on this analysis;
- Support to UN and INGO recovery and development planning processes and project developments provided;
- State Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) system diagnosis and enhancement plan completed for South Kordofan and Kassala states.

2. Phase II: CRMA

In January 2010, the project was renamed Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA). The project underwent an **external review at the beginning of 2010**, which found that "*CRMA has made remarkable progress towards creating the capability for impac*t". Building on the achievements of the first phase, a Phase II of the project was developed focusing on three inter-linked components. With delays in the disbursement of committed funds, 2010 was used as an inception phase, with considerable scale-up in its activities in 2011. Achievements included:

- Component 1: Information and Knowledge Management Capacity Enhancement in East Sudan and the Transitional Areas; Design and roll-out of three training modules and follow-up across East Sudan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile (data Collection, processing and analysis for Strategic Planning).
- Component 2: CRMA in Darfur; Continued management of Darfur IMWG in support of humanitarian, recovery and development actors. Information management and analysis support to the Early Recovery Working Group. IDP camp mapping in coordination with OCHA. Roll-out of a full crisis and recovery risk mapping cycle across West and South Darfur states with West Darfur State Situation Analysis launched December 2011
- Component 3: CRMA in South Sudan (January 2010 – June 2011); Successful hand-over of activities in South Sudan to an independent CRMA project of the UNDP South Sudan Country Office as of July 2011. Technical assistance to the CRMA South Sudan project continued to secure investments already made.

3. Revised Phase II: January 2012 to December 2014 (planned)

Based on the recommendations of the PEB External Review of CRMA's capacity development strategy conducted in July – September 2011, substantive amendments were made to include **capacity building activities targeted at the federal level** engagement in Phase II and include an enhanced and extended hand-over period to ensure sustainability of the processes and products developed through CRMA. The original aim was therefore expanded, both in time and scope of CRMA support, to ensure relevant state and non-state

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[16] This timeline was established during the Evaluation with the assistance of Max Halty, Ex CTA CRMA and Ahmed Hussain, Ex Director, UN Agencies Liaison in MIC (2011-2013) and now Head of the Aid Effectiveness Unit in the RSO

actors were able to sustainably incorporate evidence-based and conflict-sensitive analysis into their knowledge management for strategic planning processes.

Suspension in January 2012: Consultations through MIC with key stakeholders started in November 2011, which led to an initial suspension of activities until the review was completed. CRMA first knew of the suspension in January 2012 when the government sent letters to three states (Kassala, Red Sea and South Darfur) informing them of the project's suspension of state level activities. CRMA heard verbally of this suspension of activities from the government, but never received written notification. On the contrary, on 28th February, the Ministry for International Cooperation (MIC) formally communicated to UNDP that the review process had been satisfactorily completed, that Phase 2 was approved and suspension would be lifted, calling for Project Executive Board (PEB) and Steering Committee meetings to follow. **This is the first and last formal communication on the subject from MIC**. (*See letter from MIC to UNDP CD of this date*).

According to Maximo Halty and confirmed by Ahmed Hussain, at the end January 2012, with the consultation process completed with positive result, the Minister of MIC received instructions from the Presidency to close down the CRMA project. It appears that the head of the Survey Department had gone to the Defence Minister, and together they raised the matter to the Presidency, who instructed MIC to close the project. The Undersecretary of MIC, together with AH, who had led the whole consultation process, explained to the Minister that this was totally contrary to the established procedure, as all key stakeholders had gone through an extensive consultation process and had all (including the Survey Department) agreed to proceed (Minutes of second Consultative meeting at MIC January 2012). Despite this agreement it appeared that the Survey Department had taken a back door way to block the project, against the formal decision of the newly created Technical Advisory Committee of the CRMA, led by MIC. At their urging, the Minister raised the issue in the following Cabinet meeting and obtained the green light to proceed. Based on this, MIC issued the abovementioned approval letter of 28 February 2012, signed by the UnderSecretary of MIC and addressed to the CD of UNDP.

AH Informed CRMA of the outcome of the process, and that the letter had been sent. CRMA CTA contacted the UNDP CD to inform him that MIC had given the green light to proceed. The CD had a contrary understanding of the issue, stating that there were many unresolved issues still to be discussed. In a follow-up meeting the CD stated that the CRMA should be turned into a NEX project for the Government to run. The CTA explained that this was totally unfeasible, as the donor (EU at the time, but also DFID whom CRMA had approached for an additional round of funding) would not accept this change, especially considering that it was a capacity-building project, which clearly required substantive external input.

The following week, CRMA was informed by AH that the CD had asked for a meeting with the Minister in which he had proposed turning the project into a NEX project, which to them made no sense, as they understood that all existing and future funding would not be forthcoming. As a result the CTA requested a meeting with the RR. Due to a time clash the meeting had to be re-scheduled at the last moment. According to the CTA, no meeting was ever arranged nor communication made directly to the CRMA office, though there were many administrative queries sent by the RC via the DCDP head of the CPRU, requiring peremptory responses from CRMA on various issues. The CTA claims that the RC was not directly briefed on the Project nor given a demonstration of its processes or products.

4.   Approval of Revised Phase II: May 2012

May 2012: With the RR and the CD out of country, the DCDP, as acting CD, agreed with MIC to proceed with the planned LPAC, as per MIC letter, and their subsequent insistence in proceeding with the project as it had been consulted and approved, in spite of the apparent senior management insistence to change it to NEX. With the presence of the key national counterparts, the Phase 2 project document (Pro Doc) was approved by the LPAC on **29 May 2012** paving the way for the PEB and newly formed Steering Committee to finalise work plans for the next period. (*See minutes of LPAC meeting*) The PEB scheduled for 26 June was postponed for 15 days. Within that period the Government re-shuffled its ministries and MIC was dissolved and incorporated into the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. This caused a further delay in scheduling the planned PEB meeting.

In July 2012 DFID **confirmed its funding** of the project, based on UNDP informing them of the approval of the LPAC. Roll-out of Phase 2 activities with state and federal government however, continued on hold pending the project's Steering Committee meeting, under the new Ministry arrangement, to approve the CRMA engagement plan at the federal level, which was supposed to formally lift the suspension of CRMA activities in the States where it had been suspended.

September 2012: CRMA/UNDP continued to engage with former MIC representatives. CRMA's new primary government counterpart was re-established in **September 2012** as the Directorate for UN Agencies, General Directorate for International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and National Economy. As the new staff of the General Directorate for International Cooperation was not familiar with the CRMA and its recent consultation process, the project experienced further delays in the scheduling of the planned PEB and Steering Committee meeting. Additionally new security concerns re-surfaced in **November 2012** (originating from Military Intelligence, and tracing back again to the Survey Department). CRMA/UNDP therefore engaged with these government partners to clearly explain the project's objectives and planned implementation of the revised Phase II. There were then multiple reassurances from key government counterparts that the lifting of the suspension would be imminent (refer to 2012 Quarterly and Annual reports for progress). However, according to the CTA and AH, there was no attempt from senior management of UNDP to follow up with the International Cooperation ministerial counterparts for the scheduling of the agreed PEB, and final signature of the ProDoc initially approved by the LPAC in May. The support package proposed by CRMA to the RCSO, including the recruitment of a GIS officer with experience in coordinating the IMWG, was also refused even though this was expressly included in the CRMA Log Frame as one of the expected outputs of the project and was critical for the long term sustainability of the achieved outputs.

In February 2013, with no formal communication received from the government regarding the suspension, DfID requested an options paper on CRMA (discussed in main text).

In March 2013, DfID informed UNDP that it was terminating its' funding of the CRMA, as of end June 2013. A 3-month Workplan was agreed between UNDP and DfID to assure the best possible hand-over of project resources to all counterparts, Government and UN (*See Workplan April-June 2013).*This workplan included preparation and publication of all CRMA manuals, and packaging of all its tools, and then a formal hand-over to the State and Federal counterparts. On the UN and Donor side, it included the development and support to implementation of 2 initiatives: the Sudan Information Management Unit (SIMU), as a support mechanism for OCHA and the RCSO to continue with the work of the IMWG and to roll-out and support the 4Ws; and the IMPACT, a similar initiative for capacity building of the DRA and its state government counterparts in Info Management for coordination, planning and M&E.

Though all the materials and proposal were developed by the CRMA team, the MoFNE informed CRMA that it was not authorised to set up the proposed workshop with all key government counterparts to hand-over the materials *because the government had not taken the decision to close down the project.* The CRMA national staff therefore set up direct meeting with the State government counterparts to hand over the materials directly, without carrying out the planned workshop.

On the UNDP/UN side, the RR instructed senior programme management that neither the SIMU nor the IMPACT would be pursued, and that CRMA should be closed down as soon as possible.

CRMA team completed all planned tasks by the year end closure, as per the updated results report.

In **December 2013,** with the support of all senior management and the head of RCSO, a "bare-bones" version of an IMU was finally approved, in order to provide minimal support to the UNDP 4Ws incipient roll-out and internal GIS needs, including maintenance of the IMWG digital Atlas and the IMWG database. No other tasks (follow-up training, Agency and government technical support etc.) are foreseen with this structure and its current, very limited, mandate, within the OSD.

Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in South Sudan

Annex 2:   Extract from Final Report (September 2011 – February 2013)

1.   Executive Summary

1.1   Context

The Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) project in South Sudan separated from the project in Sudan at independence in July 2011.The complexity and the breadth of Sudan's security, political and socio-economic situation poses immense challenges to recovery and development. This calls for the deployment of effective strategic planning tools that assist actors in identifying and prioritizing interventions that can enhance peace and stability. The CRMA project addresses this urgent need by working with key international, government and community actors across Sudan's conflict-affected areas with a view to enhancing coordination, information management analysis and resource targeting. This report presents the accomplishments, challenges, and lessons learned during the first implementation phase of the CRMA in South Sudan focusing, in particular, on the period funded by the European Union from the 1 September 2011 to 28 February 2013.

1.2   Key Results:

Output 1: National capacities for info management, analysis and mapping of socio-economic risks enhanced.

The CRMA project facilitated the establishment of the Information Management Working Group in May 2010 (IMWG). The IMWG platform provides an effective information sharing mechanism amongst government agencies and international actors using common integrated information tools to source, share and manage baseline and other data for effective planning with particular emphasis on early recovery. Upon confirmation of funding from the EU in the last quarter of 2011, the project kicked off its activities by conducting an information management capacity assessment of the national counterpart, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and resumed mapping of community socio-economic risk and security threats, which is the key basis of the CRMA methodology. The outcome of the capacity assessment was used to develop a capacity building strategy for the NBS aimed at ensuring effective performance of its role as the lead government agency for coordinating data production, management and analysis, as well as supporting other government agencies in their information management and planning activities.

The strategy agreed with the NBS was a technical assistance package consisting of a "hard" element including the establishment of a modern equipped Geographic Information System (GIS) Laboratory/Information Centre and a "soft" component including tailored training plan for NBS staff (soft in this sense refers to benefits such as training and on the job mentoring as opposed to the more visible outputs such as buildings or equipment which fall under the hard component). The capacity development activities combined classroom training on a wide range of data management skills such as basic computer data essentials, data collection, surveys, GIS, databases, and on-the-job application through mentoring and the provision of technical equipment for the facility- all of which have been completed.

During the reporting period, CRMA supported the NBS-based IMWG Secretariat, to increase its membership and broaden the scope of activities. This included collaborating with the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) to assist the NBS in co-chairing IMWG activities, on behalf of UN agencies. Simultaneously, the Secretariat also worked on improving the quality of the IMWG digital atlas by developing user-friendly features, a newsletter and promoting its use especially among government and partners. The key results include the increase of IMWG membership to 35 organizations and improved quality of participation during scheduled technical meetings.

These activities resulted in:
- ➢ A functional national IMWG serving as a permanent information management and coordination platform for government, international partners and other stakeholders.
- ➢ The production and dissemination of three (3) IMWG digital atlas versions with the latest available IMWG data.
- ➢ Production and use of a standardized community consultation toolkit developed jointly with the UNDP Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) project.

➢ Facilitated information sharing among government institutions and key development actors in South Sudan through Secretariat services to the national IMWG forum. Through the IMWG platform, the government and its international partners have been able to access a wide range of information pertinent to all key development sectors from one easily accessible platform. Production of thematic and sectoral analysis maps and programming support to government ministries, donors, UN, and NGO clusters, which were utilized to enhance programme targeting through visualization and analysis of the geo-spatial data layers to identify community level conflict risks and socio-economic gaps.

➢ Design and development of a preliminary web-based 4W (**W**ho does **W**hat- **W**here -**W**hen) tool for the UNCT in the monitoring of projects implemented under the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in South Sudan. All UN agencies contribute their project progress and financial information into the 4W tool, with a special link to the government Aid Information Management System.

➢ In March 2012, facilitated the NBS contribution to the international partnership on human security data coordination during the establishment of the World Wide Human Geography Data (WWHGD) based in Washington DC. NBS shared the South Sudan experience in data sharing through the IMWG and community consultation methodology endorsed by the WWHGD as best practice to be used in informing the taxonomy of the WWHGD data collection process.

➢ Facilitated development of collection tools and validation activities of various service sector data sets, most notably education, water and health. This common approach to information collection and processing has allowed sectors to begin standardization of information and enhance its quality for planning, monitoring and evaluation.

Output 2: Gender and age sensitive socio-economic risk mapping completed in key states in South Sudan and results incorporated into state and county governments.

Another important output is the ongoing data review process which began in early 2012 resulting in improved quality of baseline sectoral data in the digital atlas such as water, food-security-livelihoods and health datasets. In particular county level gender and age sensitive socio-economic risk mapping was completed in all 10 states and in 74 out of 80 counties. This data was fed into contextual analysis for mid-term (3-year) state and county strategic plans and incorporated into the Arc Reader digital atlas distributed to 10 states to support the planning process .In addition CRMA's gender sensitive and conflict sensitive methodology was adopted by UNDP's Support to development Planning and Public Financial Management (SPDFM) project as key principles for facilitating planning and budgeting.

Output 3: Capacity for crisis sensitive recovery and development programming enhanced at state level.

In addition to these key results above, the CRMA project provided client data and analysis support to a wide range of partners. At the state level CRMA supported the establishment of IMWGs. Unlike the national IMWG, however, whose focus primarily remains on information sharing and management, the 9 state IMWGs[1] established, are also developing M&E frameworks to assist state spending agencies in tracking the implementation of state strategic plans. These state IMWGs contribute significantly to enhancing capacity at the state level for crisis sensitive recovery and development programming and delivered the following results:

➢ Completion of community socio-economic and conflict risk mapping at state level for all 10 states (100 percent) and 74 out of 80 counties (92.5 percent). As a result, the community socio-economic and conflict risk mapping and data obtained through the IMWG data sharing platform have been utilized to set priorities for state transitional strategic plans and county plans.

➢ State IMWGs established in nine out of 10 states, supporting data management and M&E processes. A well established and competent GIS department within NBS measured through evaluations on tasks assigned and work produced, including the cleaning and processing of data, production of maps and physical and digital atlases following training provided by the CRMA project.

➢ The production of hard copy atlases for the 10 states of South Sudan used for planning in states and counties.

➢ Data collection and analysis support to state transitional strategic planning process in the last quarter of 2011; and to the development of the South Sudan Development Initiative (SSDI) in 2012.Through CRMA support, all 10 states were able to develop evidence based and conflict sensitive transitional strategic plans through visual analysis of layers of socio-economic data and community risk perceptions.

Annex 3:   Final Evaluation Survey

The *Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) Project* closed on 31st December 2013. The Project produced a number of planning and monitoring tools for Information Management amongst the UN Agencies State Governments and various NGOs in Sudan over the period 2007 – 2013. Details of its work may be found at http://imwgweb.4wsimwg.net/index.html

The following survey looks at the way the tools have been disseminated to the targeted users and the effect of the training undertaken. It is aimed at estimating the continued usage of the tools after the project closure and the impact of that closure on the recipient users.

If you are new to the CRMA or were not one of those trained in the tool use within your organisation, please share this survey with those of your colleagues who were involved over the last three years. *Please Note:* that though the questionnaire is in English, answers written in the information boxes may be in Arabic, if this is preferred.

1) Type of institution?
   a) Government   ☐
   b) Donor   ☐
   c) UN Agency   ☐
   d) NGO   ☐

   (Depending on which the respondent clicks on above the survey will open the appropriate string below – The aim is to analyse different groups according to the 4 Log-frame outputs, but also allow an overall analysis of the project).

Government String:

First question of subset a):

2) What level of government do you represent?
   a) Federal   Ministry/Department: _____
   b) State   State/Ministry/Department: _____
   c) Locality   State/Locality/Department: _____

3) What is your understanding of the purpose of CRMA?

Write a Brief description

4)   How familiar are you with the following CRMA Tools?

	Full working Knowledge	Aware-	Unaware
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool			
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐

5) How many staff in your organisation have been trained in the application of the CRMA tools:

	Nil	1-2	3-5	6+
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

6) What level of training have you/they received in each of the following tools?

	Fully trained with follow-up, on-the-job	Short training 1-2 days	Nil
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool			
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐

7) Do you/they feel confident in using the tools and teaching others how to use them?

	Very Confident Full autonomous user	Confident (With a little more training)	Not confident
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool			
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐

8) How many currently active users of the following tools do you have in your organisation?

	Nil	1-2	3-5	6+
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

9) How has staff turn-over affected your organisation's use of the tools and the CRMA processes?

a. No staff turn-over, capacity not affected	☐
b. Some trained staff have left, but replacements trained so capacity unaffected	☐
c. Some trained staff have left and no replacement staff trained - capacity affected	☐
d. Trained staff have left and no capacity remains	☐

10) Which of the following CRMA tools are used in your organisation's Annual and project planning?

	All the time	Frequently	Infrequently	Never
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

11) Which tools are used in the monitoring of your organisation's AWP and Project implementation?

	All the time	Frequently	Infrequently	Never
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

12) Which tools are used in your organisation's reporting?

	All the time	Frequently	Infrequently	Never
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

13) Which tools do you use in your organisation's proposal writing?

	All the time	Frequently	Infrequently	Never
a. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

14) What impact has the CRMA tools and process had on the way your organisation's planning is conducted?

	Fully integrated	Use maps Created by CRMA	Little Impact	No Impact
a. Crisis Risk mapping methodology				
b. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

15) What impact has the CRMA process and tools had in deciding the priority allocation of available investment funds in annual Project budgeting?
a. Very much used in strategic planning and resource usage.   ☐
b. Sometimes used in support of planning decisions   ☐
c. Not used.   ☐

16) What has been done in your organisation to ensure updating and information sharing?
a. Update all project information on a systematic and regular basis   ☐
b. Update all project information when asked, but at least once per year   ☐
c. Update project information only when needed for new proposals or reports   ☐
d. Update project information for reports but not add it to the database   ☐
e. No update   ☐
f. Other: _____

17) What is your opinion of the Project's overall capacity development strategy and approach?

> Write a Brief description

18) What impact will the Project's early closure have on the work of your organisation? *(Tick as many as applicable)*
    a. Serious disruption to strategic planning and monitoring processes ☐
    b. Will have to develop alternative system ☐
    c. Increase labour and resources required to gather information ☐
    d. Limited effect ☐
    e. No effect ☐
    f. Other: _____

19) Has your Ministry/Department made budgetary provision to support:

	Yes	No
a. database management (data gathering and processing)	☐	☐
b. in-service data management training (for new and transferred personnel)?	☐	☐

20) Has your Ministry/Department made any requests to CRMA for particular information to address a specific situation, presentation or report?
    a. Frequently ☐
    b. Occasionally ☐
    c. Never ☐

Donor String

First question of subset b):

2)   Did you contribute financially to the CRMA? (Yes/No)

Questions 3-9 are the same as in the previous subset

10) Have you, as a donor to the CRMA, adopted/used any of the CRMA Products in your priority identification and long term programme planning?

	Institutional Requirement	Occasionally	Never
a. Crisis Risk mapping methodology			
b. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐
c. IMWG Information Management Tool			
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐

11) Have you, as a donor to the CRMA, required Consultants to formally make the use of the IMWG database and tools in all project formulation exercises to identify and support the choice of priorities?
    a.   Inserted in ToRs ☐
    b.   Verbally instructed ☐
    c.   Not formally considered ☐

12) Have you, as a donor to the CRMA, required NGOs to formally make use of the IMWG database and tools to identify and support the choice of priorities in their project proposals submitted to you?
    a.   Inserted in CfP Guidelines ☐
    b.   Verbally encouraged ☐
    c.   Not formally considered ☐

13) Do you formally utilise the IMWG database and tools to monitor the performance, geographical coverage and impact of your programs, and require Contractors and NGOs to do the same?
    a. Yes, formally adopted as monitoring tool ☐
    b. Sometimes, not formally adopted ☐
    c. Never ☐

14) Have you made any requests to CRMA for particular information to address a specific situation, presentation or report?
    a. Frequently ☐
    b. Occasionally ☐
    c. Never ☐

15) What impact has the CRMA tools and process had on the way your organisation's planning is conducted?

	Fully integrated	Use maps Created by CRMA	Little Impact	No Impact
a. Crisis Risk mapping methodology				
b. IMWG Digital Atlas	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. IMWG Information Management Tool				
• 4Ws (Who, What Where & When)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Incident & Event Mapper (IEM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Basic Services Mapper (BSM)	☐	☐	☐	☐
• Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM)	☐	☐	☐	☐

16) What impact has the CRMA process and tools had in deciding the priority allocation of available investment funds in annual Project budgeting?
    a. Very much used in strategic planning and resource usage. ☐
    b. Sometimes used in support of planning decisions ☐
    c. Not used. ☐

17) What has been done in your organisation to ensure updating and information sharing?
    a. Update all project information on a systematic and regular basis ☐
    b. Update all project information when asked, but at least once per year ☐
    c. Update project information only when needed for new proposals or reports ☐
    d. Update project information for reports but not add it to the database ☐
    e. No update ☐
    f. Other: _____

18) What is your opinion of the Project's overall capacity development strategy and approach?

> Write a Brief description

19) What impact will the Project's early closure have on the work of your organisation? *(Tick as many as applicable)*
    a. Serious disruption to strategic planning and monitoring processes ☐
    b. Will have to develop alternative system ☐
    c. Increase labour and resources required to gather information ☐
    d. Limited effect ☐
    e. No effect ☐
    f. Other: _____

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UN Agency String

First question of subset c):

2) Member of IMWG:　　　　Yes ☐　　　　No ☐

Questions 3-18 are the same as in subset (a)

NGO String

First question of subset d):

2) a. International NGO:　☐　States working in:　RSS ☐, KS ☐, GS ☐, SKS ☐, BNS ☐, WKS ☐, NDS ☐, SDS ☐, WDS ☐, CDS ☐, EDS ☐

　　b. National NGO:　☐　States working in:　RSS ☐, KS ☐, GS ☐, SKS ☐, BNS ☐, WKS ☐, NDS ☐, SDS ☐, WDS ☐, CDS ☐, EDS ☐

　　c. CBO:　☐　States working in:　RSS ☐, KS ☐, GS ☐, SKS ☐, BNS ☐, WKS ☐, NDS ☐, SDS ☐, WDS ☐, CDS ☐, EDS ☐

Questions 3-18 are the same as in subset (a)

Annex 4:   Terms of Reference

FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)

Position Title: EVALUATION CONSULTANT

Duty Station: Khartoum, with travel to Field offices

Classification: Unclassified

Type of Appointment: Short-term consultancy (18 working days)

I.   SUMMARY

This document sets out terms of reference for a final evaluation of the UNDP Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project. After a partial freeze of operations at state-level since December 2012 and continued questions around federal level ownership of the process, DFID made a decision to halt its support to the CRMA project as of end-June 2013. To this end, a final project evaluation is called for to review the achievements made to date through DFID's support and evaluate the sustainability of the tools and products developed for the partners throughout the project's lifetime.

II.   RESPONSIBILITIES

The Final Project Evaluation Consultant will build on previous external project evaluations and undertake the following activities:

- Determine the degree to which the project has delivered on its goal, purpose and outputs as set out in the log frame. This assessment should include appraisal of:
  - ➢ CRMA data collection and validation;
  - ➢ the use of the data for decision-making in areas such as conflict analysis, support conflict sensitive and evidence based development planning and programming, specifically:
    - integration of information into state planning processes and national interventions;
    - capacity development of national planning partners;
    - impact on UNDP Sudan, UN/donor and NGO project selection, design and development;
    - the extent to which CRMA has contributed substantively to overall human security and recovery, as set-out in the project goals throughout Phase I;
- Assess lessons learned in terms of best practice, including any assessment of the Programme management, methodology, approach and processes for crisis and recovery risk mapping;
- Assess the project's knowledge management for strategic planning (KMSP) capacity development overall strategy and approach, in consultations with key stakeholders and building on CRMA findings from the Phase II assessments;
- Evaluate CRMA's contribution to partners' capacity enhancement and its sustainability in terms of improved conflict sensitive and evidence based analysis, strategic planning and programming;
- Assess lessons learned in terms of building and managing relationships with government, state and local authorities;
- Assess coordination and complimentary of CRMA support with wider UNDP programmes focused on addressing governance and conflict related challenges;
- Determine the degree to which the outputs have delivered outcomes in terms of sustainable improvements;
- Assess the relevance and application of CRMA's information management tools and products beyond the project's lifetime;
- Determine impact upon objectives and sustainability of the early closure of the project;

- Analysis should differentiate amongst issues in different regions (Darfur, East Sudan, Three Protocol Areas and federal level), as well as by gender, where relevant Analysis should also disaggregate between results achieved during Phase I and during Phase II;

- Assess the relevance/appropriateness of the CRMA model in terms of replication in other post crisis settings.

III.   THE RECIPIENT

The recipients are DFID Sudan and UNDP Sudan Country Office.

IV.   THE SCOPE AND TIMEFRAME

This consultancy will need to start ultimo November/primo December, and will require 18 working days. Of these approximately 10 days will be spent in Khartoum, Sudan. It is expected that the final report will be submitted no later than 31 December 2013.

The detailed timeframe should be:

Activity	Time
Initial briefing, desk review and writing inception report ((including circulation of inception report for comments and integration feedback)	3 days
Interviews Khartoum	3 days
Interviews field location	5 days
Debrief and supplementary interviews Khartoum	2 days
Write up draft report	3 days
Write up final report after round of comments	2 days
Total	**18 days**

V.   METHODOLOGY

This assessment will be carried out by an international consultant, identified by DFID and UNDP. The consultancy will involve:

- Initial briefing with DFID Sudan and UNDP Sudan Country Office;

- Conducting a literature review of reports (see Annex for details);

- Conducting interviews/discussions with:
    - CRMA team in UNDP (Khartoum);
    - Organisations from which data is collected (e.g. IMWG members);
    - National partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders in Khartoum;
    - National partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders at state level;
    - UNDP Sudan Country Office programme units;
    - DFID and other donors;

- Time should be split between Khartoum and at least one field location where CRMA processes have been rolled out.

The methodology via which the consultant selects whom they interview, as well as the guiding questions that will be asked, should be provided to DFID and UNDP before the process begins, as an inception report, and in time for them to critically evaluate the proposed methodology and make any recommended changes.

VI.   THE OUTPUTS

The following outputs are required:

- Inception report, including detailed evaluation methodology, (interview selection, guiding questions for interviews, report outline), and including the methodology used to select whom was interviewed out of the total population of potential interviews;
- Debrief meeting of preliminary findings with DFID and UNDP in Khartoum;
- Draft report: A report of no longer than 15 pages, including an executive summary with a matrix of key evaluation results at the front of the review report;
- Final report.

VII.   DFID AND UNDP COORDINATION AND REPORTING

UNDP will hold the contract with the consultants. The consultant will be responsible for making his/her/their own travel arrangements and covering other logistical matters, but some logistical assistance and advice in Khartoum will be provided by UNDP Sudan where possible. DFID will also try to support the consultant through security briefing. CRMA will assist with any visits beyond Khartoum.

UNDP will compile the initial documentation for the evaluators to review. DFID will input into the compilation of documents.

DFID Sudan focal point for this consultancy is Christine Marsh (Deputy programme Manager) and Hisham Tajeddin Hussain (Programme Officer). The UNDP focal points for this consultancy will be Maximo Halty in CRMA and Pontus Ohrsted of UNDP CPRU.

The consultant will report to Christine Marsh in DFID Sudan, and to Pontus Ohrstedt in UNDP Sudan. The draft report is expected to be submitted to DFID and UNDP within two weeks of the completion of the interviews and site visits.

It will be reviewed and comments provided by DFID and UNDP within two weeks of its receipt. Report should be finalised within one week of receipt of comments.

VIII.   DESIRED QUALIFICATIONS

- Completed advanced university degree from an accredited academic institution, preferably in information management, strategic planning or other relevant degree or other related field;
- At least 7 years of postgraduate professional experience within programme-/project evaluation, ideally in post-crisis environments;
- Experience in drafting high quality analytical products as well as experience in political, social and/or economic development;
- Good computer skills, including proficiency in word processing, databases, design- and presentation software;
- knowledge of or experience in coordinating the development of enhanced data management and visual display facilities, including the integration of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) into operational support tools would be an asset;
- Proficiency in English. Working knowledge of Arabic an advantage.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The complexity of Sudan's security, political and socio-economic situation is difficult to overstate. The constantly shifting and intertwined landscapes of humanitarian, early recovery and development contexts are manifestations of a vast country which despite the signing of three peace agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement and Darfur Peace Agreement) still struggles with ongoing political tensions and regional crises. A multitude of actors are working in Sudan to alleviate poverty and promote peace: two UN peacekeeping missions, almost all UN agencies in existence, over 300 international aid agencies and more than 2,000 national NGOs, work in partnership with the government to deliver critical humanitarian and development aid.

However, unless key triggers of volatility are not mitigated, as the country prepares for South Sudan's independence in July 2011, two of Africa's largest countries risk returning to conflict and instability.

The breadth of these challenges calls for effective tools to assist actors in identifying and

prioritizing interventions that can enhance peace and stability. Coordination is a key aspect of crisis and recovery responses, and UNDP, as lead agency for early recovery and host of the RCO, has a key role to play in assuring effective coordination support.

To this end, CRMA1[17] is working with key international actors, government and community actors across Sudan's conflict-affected areas to respond to the need for enhanced coordination and prioritization through three principal, interconnected mechanisms.

Firstly, a core component of the support has been the establishment of an *Information*

Management Working Group (IMWG) of the UNCT – the first of its kind at country level – which includes the UN's leading field-based agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, WFP/JLC, OCHA, IOM, UNFPA, FAO, UNMAO and UNDP). The IMWG has developed a formal information-sharing platform and updating mechanism that provides all recovery and development actors with a common basic package of available and relevant information for their individual analysis, planning and programming efforts. The success of this Working Group at the national level has led to the set-up of a regional IMWG for Darfur and one in South Sudan. The membership of the IMWG will extend in the near future to include UNMIS (in South Sudan), UNAMID (in Darfur), (I)NGOs and national and state government counterparts.

Secondly, CRMA has worked with government and community actors to develop a template for state and community-level participatory workshops that capture *community perceptions of priorities and emerging risks*. Priorities and risks are grouped along socio-economic and security lines and identified for specific geographic and thematic areas. Qualified participants are drawn from a socially and culturally diverse group of people that seeks to ensure as wide a representation as possible. The aim is to capture the full spectrum of dynamics in any given locality or state.

Reflecting the complex contexts in Sudan, participation has included youth representatives, cultural and religious leaders, women's unions, pastoralists and farmers unions among others. This community level process serves to provide a link between state and population with the findings feeding directly into state policy.

Thirdly, community perceptions of threats and risks are systematized through the information management platform and used by state governments, with CRMA support, to feed into the *development of their State Situation Analyses and State Strategic Plans*. The community level information also informs UNDP efforts to develop solid Conflict Development Analyses to guide their programming. These situation/conflict analyses cover the range of conflict, recovery and development issues from peace-building; governance and rule of law to livelihoods and basic services. The methodology focuses on a participatory and consultative approach, ensuring leadership and ownership of the process is firmly embedded with the project's counterparts.

Producing a joint analysis brings a multitude of actors together and provides a solid platform for coordinated and evidence-based designing and targeting of programmes. CRMA maintains this support to partners throughout their planning and programming processes.

Furthermore, CRMA offers tailored support to UN agencies, government partners, INGOs and other actors in their work on needs assessments, disaster risk reduction and early warning as well as monitoring and evaluation. This is done using CRMA's full range of analysis and planning support tools.

A Phase II of the CRMA project was initially developed for 2010 – 2012, with a further extension to 2014 following an external DFID – BCPR review of the project. Phase II carried a particular focus on enhancing knowledge management capacities of state and non-state actors in Sudan to analyze and plan in a conflict-sensitive and evidence-based manner. In line with the recommendations of the Project Executive Board, Phase II implementation would focus also on federal level engagement in order to ensure sustainability of the impact and achievements of Phase I at state level.

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[17] The CRMA is a UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) project, and approved as such by the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC). The purpose of the project is to support programming and strategic planning at state level in Sudan. IOM (International Organization for Migration) is an implementing partner responsible for human resources management and operational support, while UNDP retains overall responsibility for the project.

The project developed a strategy for implementing Phase II, incorporating priorities articulated by the beneficiaries. For the government at federal and state levels, the strategy proposed that the CRMA team applies a systematic approach to assess, develop and sustain the government's capability for evidencebased and conflict-sensitive strategic planning processes.

The CRMA team drew from previous learning and experience of working with the government at the state level to develop a CRMA roadmap that would enable clients in the government to seamlessly realize the benefits of improved knowledge management process and tools developed by CRMA and incorporate them into their strategic planning process.

CRMA regional teams would continue to be responsible for managing the relationship with the government at both federal and state/locality levels.

The regional teams will receive permanent support of a technical team specialized in three competence areas: a) CRMA toolkit, b) CRMA training, and c) CRMA coordination and process development.

To increase the rate of success of the transition to sustainable in-house CRMA processes within government organizations, CRMA teams expected to be co-located in client premises through the establishment of dedicated knowledge management units.

For the UNDP and CSO, the objective was to ensure a sustainable integration of the CRMA toolkit in programming and coordination activities after the CRMA project phases out. The strategy was for the CRMA project to sponsor the secondment of a knowledge management officer and jointly plan and work on the transition of CRMA technologies, processes and skills to UNDP and CSO operations.

The latter would include continuing to liaise with other relevant UN agencies and NGO/donor counterparts, and managing the Information Management Working Group (IMWG).

The expected outputs for CRMA Phase II in Sudan were as follows:

Output	Target 2014
Output 1: National Capacity building; National knowledge management capacities enhanced to support conflict-sensitive and evidence-based analysis, strategic planning and programming.	• 8 States and 4 Federal Ministries/Agencies have implemented and institutionalized Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning strategies that have been developed. • 8 States with common standards, processes and tools for crisis and recovery knowledge management across at least 3 Ministries/agencies, and linked to at least 4 Federal Ministries/agencies. • 8 states preparing State Strategic Plan Mid Term Review applying crisis and recovery knowledge management tools and processes.
Output 2: Regional and/or state early warning mechanisms enhanced for effective early response.	• 2 early warning mechanisms designed and established for effective early response. • Existing government led conflict management and resolution mechanisms supported with KM tools and training. JCRP has • the capacity to develop KM in new mechanisms. • 4 conflict management mechanisms supported with information management tools and training.
Output 3: Knowledge management tools provided to and used by UN Agencies, mission(s), NGOs, donors to improve coordination and planning.	• Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools managed by CSO and available for all UN agencies and missions, and all INGOs, NNGOs and donors. • Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools utilized by CSO and all key UN agencies and missions, and key INGOs, NNGOs and donors in a sustainable and consistent manner for their programming and coordination. • UNCT members, key INGOs / NNGOs become IMWG members. Full handover of support functions to CSO and national counterparts.
Output 4: UNDP capacities for conflict prevention, analysis and crisis sensitive recovery and development programming enhanced.	• Crisis and recovery knowledge management tools utilized in UNDP programmes for planning and programming purposes. System in place for tools to be used in development of all new programming.

The ToRs were slightly modified during the Mission following discussion and agreement of the Inception Report with the following clarifications:

1. The Final Report should commence with an analysis of the final Log Frame indicating level of Output delivery. The analysis will be based on the DAC principles, though detailed analysis of the financial aspects (DAC "Efficiency" is not required).

2. It is understood that the final report should be a balanced review of the technical achievements and the lessons learned from the implementation and design of the project.

3. The proposed guiding questions for interviews – section 2.2 – are accepted. Additional questions should be added that will enable a full assessment of **Output 2:** Regional and/or state early warning mechanisms enhanced for effective early response; recognising that verification by the consultant is only possible in one state (Kassala) and that accomplishments in the other States will have to be drawn mainly from the project reports.

4. The caveats to the Terms of Reference stated in Section 3 are accepted:

   ToRs Section 2: Responsibilities:

   - *Analysis should differentiate amongst issues in different regions (Darfur, East Sudan, Three Protocol Areas and federal level), as well as by gender, where relevant Analysis should also disaggregate between results achieved during Phase I and during Phase II;*

   As explained in the Section 2.1, the time and security limitations on the evaluation will not permit direct investigation into the Darfurs or protocol areas – the very use of the phrase "protocol areas" demonstrates the pre-secession terminology in use in the ToRs – as of the end of the CPA and the secession in 2011, apart from Abyei, which has still not enjoyed its determining referendum, the other two states are firmly part of the Republic of Sudan, albeit destabilised by intense insurgent activity. Thus, any differentiation of the available data will be from a review of the available literature and this has been adequately covered by two earlier assessments. The same should be said of the disaggregation into Phase 1 and Phase 2 results – analysis of Phase 1 will be dependent on the literature with little possibility of verification. Secondly, the gender issue is difficult, there is very little disaggregation by gender in the project literature – the training manuals, atlases etc. are gender neutral.

   - *Assess the project's knowledge management for strategic planning (KMSP) capacity development overall strategy and approach, in consultations with key stakeholders and building on CRMA findings from the Phase II assessments;*

   There is a singular quarterly report available for 2013. The 2012 Annual Report expresses a great deal of intent and possibility should the operational ban be lifted, but little of achievement in KMSP in any other capacity than the IMWG. Neither report can be called an assessment, at least not an independent one. The strategy will be assessed as part of this evaluation to best extent possible.

   - *The perception of the extent to which CRMA has contributed substantively to overall human security and recovery, as set-out in the project goals throughout phase 1;*

   Again, this is difficult to achieve given the lack of access to key areas and personnel. It has been extensively reviewed in two assessments in 2010 and 2011. Both reports were accepted thus their findings should be accepted and not necessarily re-visited.

   - *Start date & Period of implementation of tasks:*

   The start date has been modified in the Contract to cover the period 1st January 2014 – 15th February 2014. The period in-country shall be from 11th January – 23rd January, 2014. The report writing shall be home based and the time allowances for the delivery of the draft and final products are according to the timetable set out in the ToRs.

   In addition, there is no need for gender disaggregation. The late availability of the 2nd quarterly report 2013 was noted and will be included in the analysis.

5. The sampling methodology should include a list of key interlocutors that were unable to be interviewed, so that a clear indication of the extent of the assessed information sources is apparent to the reader.

6. The donors list should be restricted to those having had Input (Financial or otherwise) to the Project.

7. The appraisal of the Phase 1 activities is to be based on the existing reviews, though additional information on historical perspectives, elicited through direct interviews will be included.

8. The requirement for a matrix of key evaluation results, as stated in Section VI of the ToRs is struck out and the structure of the Executive Summary is left to the Consultant to devise.

Annex 5:   Meeting schedule, & Organisations/Persons Consulted

#	Date	Organisation	Persons Met
1.		Initial briefing IOM/CRMA	Anders Haugland
2.		Initial briefing OSD/UNDP	Jorg Kuhnel HoU OSD Omer AlHaj Assad Abdalla (M&E, Planning and evaluation – ex DfID Global Fund)
3.	12th Jan.	IOM/CRMA	Max Halty – ex CTA CRMA
4.		OSD/UNDP	Jorg Kuhnel HoU OSD Assad Abdalla
5.		IOM/CRMA	Anders Haugland
13th January		o *National Holiday*	
6.		Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (UNDP)	Adnan Cheema Margunn Indreboe Alshaikh Adil A. Hussein
7.		Governance and Rule of law (UNDP)	Maha Elshafie Abdel-Rahman
8.	13th Jan.	Poverty reduction Unit (UNDP)	Elmoiz Ismail – programme specialist Nahla Hassanein – Programme Specialist
9.		Country Director (UNDP)	Yvonne Helle
10.		RCSO (UNDP)	Natalie Boucly
11.		OSD (UNDP)	Jorg Kuhnel
12.		CPRU (UNDP)	Musa Ibrahim - Peace and Development Advisor
13.	14th Jan.	DDR and CSAC (UNDP)	Kumar Srinivas
14.		RC UNDP	Ali Al Za'atari
15.		Initial briefing at DfID	Iris Wielders, Conflict Advisor DFID Sudan Alexander Hamilton Jorg Kuhnel (UNDP)
16.		OCHA -co-chair of IMWG	Eva Vognild, CIS, IMO
17.	15th Jan.	Remote Sensing Authority	Dr Amna Dirar, Director
18.		CRMA	Max Halty, ex CTA
19.		Sudia	Abdel Rahman elMahdi, Executive Director
20.	16th Jan.	Aid Effectiveness Unit, RCO UNDP	Ahmed Hussain – head of Unit and ex, UN Agencies Liaison at MIC
21		Follow up with JCRP	Margunn Indreboe Alshaikh
17th-18th Jan.		*Weekend*	
22.		OSD (UNDP)	Jorg Kuhnel HoU OSD Assad Abdalla
23.	19th Jan.	RPCM	Gidei Sayid – Programme coordinator (now at JCRP)
24.		CBS	Abdel Gadi Mohamed Achmed, Dir GIS sector
25.		UNOPS	Salim Maloof, HoO

Cont'd

#	Date	Organisation	Persons Met *(Cont'd)*
26.		*UNDP CRMA project*	*Judith Omondi (+254722318802) by phone*
27.	20th Jan	HAC	Monahil Ali – Deputy Director Early Warning Centre Hafza Mohamed – former Director EWC and GIS Officer.
28.		DCPSF (UNDP)	Chikako Kodama, Head of Section
29.		CRMA (Log Frame Mtg)	Max Halty, Ex-CTA
30.		Progress Briefing UNDP	Pontus Ohrstedt, HoU CPRU
31.		DRA	Hashim Hamas Abdel Rahman – Gen. Sec. M.T. Osman – consultant DRDF
32.	21st Jan	JCRP, Follow-up	Margunn Indreboe Alshaikh
33.		WDS Government	Mohamed Osman, State Minister of Finance
		Resident Coordinator	*Meeting Postponed*
34.		Donors	EU – Francesca Arato, Jonas Horner DfID – Iris Wielders Japan – Midori Nakata, Masayuki Sorimach Sweden - ???
35.		WFP	Nada Ahmed, VAM GIS Officer. (0912170380)
36.	22nd Jan	NGO Forum	Manoj Kumar – NGO forum Chair and CD Plan Int'l
37.		UN Habitat	Abdel Rahman Mustafa – National Programme Coordinator
38.	23rd Jan	UNAIDS	Elfatih Abdulraheem – Strategic Information Advisor
39.		JCRP Tool training	Monica
40.		IOM	Anders Haugland
24/25th Jan			*Weekend*

41.	26th Jan	IMWG & GIS Meeting*	*Co-Chair:*
			Arthur Muhlen, CSO, Coordination Specialist
			Eva Vognild*, OCHA,
			Members:
			OCHA -Claudia Hargarten, CIS
			    - Ahdi Hassan*, CIS, Data Analyst
			UNICEF - Mara Nyawo, Nutrition, Surveillance
			    - Dina Ali*, KM Officer
			    - Amina Akasha*, Education sector IMO
			UNHCR - Andy Cooper*, Senior registration off.
			    - Abdelrahman Jaber*, Database officer
			    - Maria Sarah-Johansson, Intern protection unit
			IOM - Mohamed Elaraki*, GIS
			    - Anisha Thapa*, GIS Coordinator
			WFP - Nada Ahmed*, Logistics, GIS Assistant
			Absent:
			FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNMAS, UNOPS, UNEP, WHO

Cont'd

#	Date	Organisation	Persons Met *(Cont'd)*
42.		RSS Government	*Afra Hussein, CRMA focal point in Ministry of Planning by Telephone*
43.	27th Jan	UNICEF	Dina Ali, KM Officer
44.		UNHCR	Andy Cooper, Senior registration Officer
45.	28th Jan	Steering Committee	• Omer elhag – chair MoFNE • Sawson Ali – MoFNE • Mohamed Issa – MoFNE • Abdul Rafia I Ahmed - Min Labour • Mohamed Babiker - FAS/FP • Abdel Rahim Mahmoud El Tom – The National Council for Strategic Planning • Dafalla Hamid – MI • Sawson Omer – HCDG • Yassin Ibrahim – CBS (UNDP – Pontus Orhstedt & Omer Elhaj)
29th Jan		*Debrief presentation preparation & Administration Meeting at IOM*	
46.		CD, UNDP (Debrief)	Yvonne Helle and Pontus Orhstedt
47.	30th Jan	RCHC (Debrief)	Ali Al Za'atari, RR UNDP Yvonne Helle, CD UNDP Pontus Orhstedt, CPRU UNDP
48.		DfID (Debrief)	Iris Wielders, Conflict Advisor DFID Sudan
End of Mission - Consultant leaves Sudan 19.30, Thursday 30th Jan. arrives Adelaide, South Australia 20.50 Saturday 1st Feb.			

Annex 6: Documents reviewed

Document Package distributed to the States, Donors and UN at Project closure:

- Crisis and Recovery Mapping – Methodology and Best Practice – 24pps with 19 pps of resource materials;
- Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis – Manual – 181 pps;
- Enhancement of Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Guidelines and Resource Materials – 74pps;
- Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Training Course, Facilitator's Guide, 182 pps. *
- Knowledge Management for Strategic Planning: Training Course, Participants' Manual – 110 pps.
- IMWG Digital Atlas V. 9 May 2013 - CD
- IMWG: Digital Atlas User manual – 25pps
- State Atlas: An A3 printed paper Atlas, accurate to May 2013 Data sets giving up to 11 "maps" or visual data sets of various resources from administrative boundaries, transport infrastructure, soils and hydrology through access to Water, Health, Education Markets and Rule of Law. The Atlases were pertinent to each receiving State and did not always cover the same data sets or present the data with the same consistency and detail.
- West Darfur State – Situation Analysis, 2011 – 90 pps (An Arabic translation was also available).
- IMWG Database and Mapping Tool: 4Ws Application – Tutorial v.1 – 39 pps *

✳ These two documents were not included in the hand-out package. As mentioned in Section 2.1(b), three further tutorials for the remaining components of the IMWG Database and Mapping Tool –the Incident and Event Mapper (IEM), Basic Services Mapper (BSM) and the Crisis and Recovery Mapper (CRM), were still in production at the closure of the project and have not been disseminated or utilised at this point.

- Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in South Sudan. Final Report (September 2011 – February 2013). CRMA, UNDP SS, December 2013.
- TRMA Annual Progress Report, 1st Jan. – 31st Dec. 2008. CRMA. 26.04.2009
- TRMA Annual Progress Report, 1st Jan. – 31st Dec. 2009. CRMA. 30.05.2010
- CRMA Annual Progress Report, 1st Jan. – 31st Dec. 2010. CRMA. 15.05.2011
- Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in Sudan.CRMA Phase 2, Annual Progress Report, 1st Jan. – 31st Dec. 2011. CRMA. ??. 2012
- Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in Sudan.CRMA Phase 2, CRMA Annual Progress Report, 1st Jan. – 31st Dec. 2012. CRMA. 04.02.2013
- Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in South Sudan, Final Report September 2011 – February 2013. UNDP SS. Dec. 2013 - 49pps
- Kassala State – Situation Analysis, April 2009, KSG/UNDP – 50 pps
- Red Sea State – Situation Analysis, April 2009, RSSG/UNDP – 61 pps
- Blue Nile State – Situation Analysis, March 2010, BNSSG/UNDP – 57 pps
- Gedaref State Situation Analysis, May 2010, GSG/UNDP – 96 pps
- West Darfur State Situation Analysis, 2011 WDSG/UNDP– 90 pps (An Arabic translation is also available).
- Central Darfur State Atlas, last updated May 2013 CRMA. 14 pps
- West Darfur State Atlas, last updated May 2013 CRMA. 14 pps
- South Darfur State Atlas, last updated May 2013 CRMA. 13 pps
- Gedaref State Atlas, last updated May 2013 CRMA. 14 pps
- Kassala State Atlas, last updated May 2013 CRMA. 11 pps
- Red Sea State Atlas, last updated May 2013CRMA. 12 pps

- Blue Nile State Atlas, last updated May 2013CRMA. 12 pps
- Sudan Admin Map Nov 2012 CRMA. A3 1 pps
- CRMA Project Phase 1 Review, David Nyheim & Peter Albrecht (DfID/BCPR). 29th March 2010. 39 pps.
- CRMA Capacity Development: A Way towards Sustainable Evidence Based Strategic Planning – An Independent Review, Ananda S. Millard & Afaf Abu-Asabo, Nordic Consulting Group, 9th September 2011. 46 pps.
- Building National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in Sudan, *First Quarterly Progress Report 2013 (January - March). CRMA/UNDP. 13pps.*
- Building National Capacities for Conflict Management and Prevention in Sudan, *Second Quarterly Progress Report 2013 (April - June). CRMA/UNDP. 21pps.*
- 4Ws Application, Tutorial. IMWG Database and Mapping Tool V.1. CRMA/UNDP, 2013. 40pps
- CRMA Mission Report – Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. 4-13th March 2012, CRMA. 4 pps
- Minutes of Local Project Appraisal Committee: Substantive revision of project titled: Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Mapping, Analysis and Transformation in Sudan (CRMA) Phase II. 29th May 2012. MIC/UNDP – 5 pps
- Integrated Early Warning System for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience. CRMA Concept Note 2013. 11pps
- CRMA Workplan April – June 2013, CRMA. 4 pps
- CRMA Options Paper, February 2013, UNDP. 3 pps
- Project Annual Workplan 2013, UNDP. 6 pps
- CRMA South Sudan, Continuation (Jan-Dec 2014) Concept Note to BCPR. UNDP SS. 9 pps
- Information Management for Planning and Coordination Team (IMPACT). UNDP April 2013. 7pps.

Annex 7:   DFID Comments

The following comments from DFID were received by UNDP, with the request to be added as an Annex to the final version of the evaluation report:

"1. The report includes concluding statements referring to a premature closure of the project. We strongly disagree with these statements and have passed this on in our comments.

2. The report would have benefited from a tighter focus on the findings per output, that are then each drawn into a concluding section, which then can be found again in summary in the lessons learned and recommendations. The report at the moment remains too close to a write up of "what people said". There is a level of analysis missing. the ultimate conclusions related to the key questions around the project remain unclear. Different parts of the report have different key conclusions, but they are not weighed up systematically, in particular the questions around the early closure of the project. There are points about it being premature, about the project being "on the cusp" of greatness, but then elsewhere a number of serious constraints are pointed out. If the project had kept going, how would all the other constraints mentioned have been overcome?

3. There is little consideration of the conflict sensitivity/DNH/political aspects of the CRMA project."