



Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund(PBF)

<p><b>Project Title:</b> Joint UNIPSIL &amp; UNDP Project on Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone: <i>Building Effective and Accountable Institutions for Increased Citizen Security</i></p>	<p><b>Recipient UN Organization(s):</b> UNDP</p>
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<p><b>Project Number:</b> <i>To be completed by UNDP MPTF Office</i></p>	<p><b>Project Location:</b> Sierra Leone- National</p>
<p><b>Project Description:</b></p> <p>Ensuring democratic governance of the security sector on the basis of the rule of law is recognized as crucial to securing peace and sustainable development. Despite meaningful progress in Sierra Leone, concerns remain in key areas related to state institutions and their delivery of security services. These shortcomings, in turn, have undermined public confidence and perceptions of safety. With the exit of UNIPSIL at the end of March 2014, and in particular UNPOL, national partners have identified gaps the</p>	<p><b>Total Project Cost:</b> 3,280,000US\$</p> <p><b>Peace Building Fund:</b> 2,780,000\$</p> <p><b>UNDP BCPR TTF:</b> 500,000\$</p> <p><b>Total:</b> 3,280,000 US\$</p>

pending departure will bring to the sector. In response, a UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) undertaken in January 2013 recommended bridging these gaps through a joint project between UNIPSIL and UNDP. The Project would be for an 18 month duration, roughly dovetailing with the advent of the new UNDAF in 2015 as the UN system shifts from a mission context to solely that of a UN Country Team. After further examination and consultation with national partners, the Project's specific areas of focus are the following: (1) improved security sector governance, oversight and coordination; and (2) improved border security for enhanced citizen safety. These interventions are premised on the core principle that a more effective, accountable, and accessible security sector will increase citizen confidence and counter potential conflict vectors. The Project has been carefully tailored to avoid overlap with other bilateral assistance programmes supporting SSR. Developed by UNPOL/DPKO-Police Division and UNDP, the Project will be implemented jointly with national partners while invoking the new Global Focal Point arrangement on rule of law to ensure UN system expertise is best leveraged.

**Project Start Date and Duration:**

Project Start: 1 October 2013

Duration: 18 months

**Gender Marker Score<sup>1</sup>: 2**

*Score 3 for projects that are targeted 100% to women beneficiaries and/or address specific hardships faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations;*

*Score 2 for projects with specific component, activities and budget allocated to women;*

*Score 1 for projects with women mentioned explicitly in its objectives, but no specific activities are formulated nor is a budget reserved; and*

*Score 0 for projects that do not specifically mention women.*

**PBF Outcomes<sup>2</sup>:**

2: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR

**Project Outputs and key Activities:**

**Output 1: Improved security sector governance, oversight and coordination.**

**Activities:**

**1.1. Support SLP to achieve progress on its obligations on recruitment/promotion under its performance contract**

<sup>1</sup> The PBSO monitors the inclusion of women and girls in all PBF projects in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1612, 1888, 1889.

<sup>2</sup> PBF outcome areas

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.1) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Management of natural resources;

3: Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3):

(3.1) Short-term employment generation; (3.2) Sustainable livelihoods

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Public administration; (4.2) Public service delivery (including infrastructure).

*with the Anti-Corruption Commission, including a special focus on the career development of female officers*

- 1.2. Develop new internal asset management processes*
- 1.3. Improve SLP command and control structure for enhanced police governance*
- 1.4. Support the implementation of oversight mechanisms for the SLP*
- 1.5. Facilitate security sector public expenditure review to inform future planning*
- 1.6. Review and revise the Police Act, 1964*

**Output 2: Improved border security for enhanced citizen safety**

**Activities:**

- 2.1 Improve border security management*
- 2.2 Improve operational ability of the State to undertake border control through enhanced infrastructure and equipment*
- 2.3. Enhance functioning of local community policing structures in border areas*
- 2.4. Increase civil society engagement with and understanding of local community policing structures in border areas*

## PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

*(for IRF-funded projects)*

<p><b>Recipient UN Organization(s)</b></p> <p><i>Name of Representative:</i> Jens Toyberg- Frandzen</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p><i>Name of Agency</i> UNDP, SIERRA LEONE</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p><i>Name of Government Counterpart:</i> Hon. Dr Kaifala Marah</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p><i>Title:</i> Minister of Finance and Economic Development</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i>      13/9/13</p>
<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p><i>Name of Representative:</i> Kenneth Gluck o/c</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>Peacebuilding Support Office, NY</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Resident Coordinator (RC)</b></p> <p><i>Name of Representative</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>RCO,</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>

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## PROJECT COMPONENTS:

### COMPONENT 1: (The "WHY")

#### a) Situation analysis, financial gap analysis and assessment of critical peacebuilding needs

Sierra Leone has made significant progress in building stability after more than a decade of civil war ending in 2002. During the immediate years following the end of the conflict, the Government prioritized rebuilding state institutions as well as basic infrastructure. Peaceful elections were held in 2002, 2007 and most recently in November 2012. Despite progress, structural challenges remain rendering further gains more tenuous. Sierra Leone is ranked 180 out of the 187 countries in the Human Development Index, 60% of the population lives below the poverty line and a gender inequality index value of 0.662 places the country at 137 out of 146 in 2011.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the World Bank describes Sierra Leone as undergoing probably its most significant economic transformation in a generation underpinned by the extractives sector.<sup>4</sup> The country is also presently embarking upon a much anticipated constitutional review process. As with any major changes, these events hold the potential for both positive and negative repercussions for the country's growth and stability.

As Sierra Leone strives for progress and begins implementation of its Agenda for Prosperity (PRSP III), the future path has been shaped by the relatively recent history of conflict. In the aftermath of Sierra Leone's 11 year civil war, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) carefully examined both the causes and consequences of the war. The inability of the various governments both before and during the war period to provide security for its populace was deemed "largely the result of failures in governance and institutional processes".<sup>5</sup>

Since the findings of the TRC, the security sector has transformed in important ways. With the assistance of the international community and in partnership with national actors, significant security sector reforms have taken root. One critical example of progress was the establishment of the Office of National Security in 2002 which has provided a structure for improved coordination amongst security actors.

However, clear fault lines still exist within the security sector landscape. The rapid growth of the extractives industry has already brought challenges. In April 2012 a labour protest in Bumbuna against a mining company resulted in one death and allegations of excessive force by the police. An inquiry by the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone found a disproportionate use of force, revealing a "major gap of policing".<sup>6</sup> Although public perceptions of the security sector actors such as the police have improved, surveys still reveal a lack of public trust.<sup>7</sup> As noted by the Government of Sierra Leone in its *Agenda for Change, 2008-12 (PRSP-II)*, only through enhancing the capacity of security actors and building oversight mechanisms for the sector can economic growth and peace be sustained.<sup>8</sup> This conclusion resonates with the UN Secretary General's finding in 2005 that there is "no development without security and no security without development."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup>UNDP Global Human Development Report 2011, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011>

<sup>4</sup>Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone - FY10-FY13, IDA, IFC and MIGA and World Bank, [http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/23/000333037\\_20120723002431/Rendered/PDF/699130CASPOP1300official0Use0only090.pdf](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/23/000333037_20120723002431/Rendered/PDF/699130CASPOP1300official0Use0only090.pdf)

<sup>5</sup>Witness to Truth: Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Report, Volume 2, p.7.

<sup>6</sup>'Sierra Leone: Inquiry into Events at Bumbuna finds Gap in Policing', Commonwealth Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, October 31, 2012, <http://cfihri.org/sierra-leone-inquiry-into-events-at-bumbuna-finds-gap-in-policing/>

<sup>7</sup>Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Police and Broader Justice Sector Reform, Peter Alexander Albright, Danish Institute for International Studies (2010:07), pp.31-32.

<sup>8</sup>An Agenda for Change, 2008-12, The Republic of Sierra Leone, p.102. Please note at the time of program drafting the follow-up Agenda for Transformation, 2013-17 (PRSP-III) was in the process of finalization.

<sup>9</sup>Report of the Secretary-General, 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development Security and Human Rights for All,' General Assembly,

Both during the war and after its official end in January 2002, the need for security sector reform (SSR) remained a critical issue. Given the particular contours of the conflict, which included two military coups, a strong focus on reforming the armed forces was seen as key.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, it was also understood by the Government and its partners that although the process of security sector transformation needed a focus on the military, the brunt of the security tasks in a stable Sierra Leone would fall on its police.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, all interventions needed to be wed to a larger security sector architecture that brought coordination and oversight of the actors involved.

Per Sierra Leonean law, including the 1991 Constitution, the State's security architecture revolves around nine key security actors: the Republic of Sierra Leone's Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Prisons Department, National Fire Authority, the Immigration Department, the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of National Security (ONS, secretariat to the NSC), which includes the National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU). Within this grouping are also joint bodies such as the Military Aid to Civil Power (MAC-P), wherein the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) stand ready to provide support to the SLP to maintain internal security if needed.

The nine organizations operationalize their mandates through further interaction with the following line bodies: Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), National Review Authority, Sierra Leone Ports Authority, Sierra Leone Airport Authority, Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources among others. An International Security Sector Coordination Group (ISSCG), chaired by the ERSG of UNIPSIL, also exists as a means to provide coordination for international support to the sector.

The SLP traces its inception to 1808 when Freetown was declared a British Crown Colony, with the official designation of the 'Sierra Leone Police Force' by gazette in 1894.<sup>12</sup> Its original role was primarily to maintain law and order in Britain's colonial frontier in the region. Post-independence in 1961, the Sierra Leone Parliament passed *The Sierra Leone Police Act, No. 4, 1964*, which defined the role of the police and first laid out the composition of the Police Council (to be later revisited by the 1991 Constitution). In 1963, the first Sierra Leonean Commissioner of Police was appointed (revised to title of Inspector General of Police in 1985).<sup>13</sup> Since this history, the SLP has undergone massive changes and periods of massive upheaval to arrive at its present capacity of approximately 13,000 personnel.

By the end years of the Sierra Leone's civil war, the SLP was left with extremely little capacity, lacking in transparency, seen as unprofessional and unable to meet the population's needs. According to the SLP website, "the public who regarded the Police as being corrupt, completely lost confidence in the Force."<sup>14</sup> By way of response, the GOSL requested the services of the British Government to help restructure the SLP. The UK sent the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), whose head, retired Assistant Chief Constable, Keith Biddle (UK), was later appointed the new Inspector General of Police (IGP). Biddle was tasked to help restructure the SLP. Under his stewardship, new departments were established such as the

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Assembly, 59<sup>th</sup> Session, Agenda Items 44 and 55, UN Doc. A/59/2005

<sup>10</sup> Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements for the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project: A Case Study, Peter Albrecht (Saferworld: 2009), p.2, <http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/11972/120921/file/SierraLeoneCaseStudy.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Police and Broader Justice Sector Reform, Peter Alexander Albright, Danish Institute for International Studies (2010:07), p.13..

<sup>12</sup> Historical Background of SLPF, Official Website of the SLP, <http://www.police.gov.sl/content.php?p=10&pn=History>

<sup>13</sup> Becoming and Remaining a 'Force for Good' – Reforming the Police in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, Joseph P. Charley and Freida Ibiduni M'Cormack (IDS Research Report: September 2011), <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/rr70.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Historical Background of SLPF, Official Website of the SLP, <http://www.police.gov.sl/content.php?p=10&pn=History>

Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID), Media and Public Relations, Family Support Units, Community Relations and Local Needs Policing<sup>15</sup> (now under the 'Community Relations Division', see Annex 1 for current SLP organogram). Many reforms were maintained and continued by Biddle's Sierra Leonean successors, which helped steer the country through both 2007 and 2012 elections.

Despite the considerable regeneration of the police and the development of a strong senior officer cadre, concerns remained. Several interlocutors and observers have noted that low standards of police service delivery threaten to become conflict drivers as a result of insufficient internal security management and/or a population that may resort to inflammatory 'self-help' mechanisms. In a perception survey undertaken by the Anti-Corruption Commission in 2010, the SLP ranked highest with 34.6% of those surveyed finding the Police corrupt.<sup>16</sup> The frequent transfer of personnel (at times untrained for new posts) and the deployment of some of the most qualified police to UN Missions – although understandably a point of pride for Sierra Leone and a long term benefit to the SLP – affects the SLP's ability to deliver at least in the short-term. Several other key factors also contribute to emerging perceptions of a decline in police professionalism.

First, issues remain linked to the recruitment process and its effect on the quality of policing. It is important to note the widespread understanding that external interference in the recruitment process continues to undercut quality control. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has also noted weak vetting of candidates for recruitment in its 2011-2013 National Anti-Corruption Strategy as an "entity of focus" for the SLP to remedy. This, in part, goes to the identification of better internal management as one of the five goals in the SLP Strategic Plan, 2012-14. The Plan specifically notes that the "recruitment period is too short and screening process is not transparent".<sup>17</sup> Stakeholders have noted that in the years past, pressure to increase the strength of the SLP in a relatively short period of time has also contributed to a decline in competency, especially at lower and middle ranks. This is also in the face of less attractive remuneration packages, which can lead more qualified candidates to seek private sector employment instead.

Particularly challenging remains the recruitment and career development of women despite the creation of a Gender Unit under the Directorate of Corporate Affairs within the SLP and the *SLP Gender Mainstreaming Policy of 2008*. However, many aspects of both the Gender Unit and the Policy remain largely aspirational due to lack of resources and implementation (e.g. for affirmative action campaigns, mentoring networks) While the percentage of women in the SLP is approximately 20%, this represents an increase of only 3% since 2006.<sup>18</sup> At senior management levels, the disparity is even starker, with currently only one female member at the Executive Management Board out of approximately 13 (with two female observers). These statistics are all the more troubling when evidence has shown that increasing women's participation institutionally has generally resulted in women (as well as the general population) receiving better service delivery.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, if true national ownership is to be achieved, females who account for at least half of the populace should be able to access representative institutions.<sup>20</sup>

Thirdly the operational response of the SLP has been characterized in many cases as inconsistent and lacking institutional discipline. This has been raised as a particular concern as it relates to the Police taking a measured and uniform approach to civil disorder, with a focus on riot and

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> 'S.Leone: Police top corruption index', Africa News (April 6, 2011), [http://www.africanews.com/site/list\\_message/33988](http://www.africanews.com/site/list_message/33988)

<sup>17</sup> Sierra Leone Police Strategic Plan, 2012-14: Consolidating our Gains, SLP, p.8.

<sup>18</sup> Police Reform and Gender – Gender and SSR Toolkit, DCAF, (2008) p.4.

<sup>19</sup> Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, UN SSR Task Force, 2012, p.43.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.42.



crowd control. Currently, the Operational Support Division (OSD), the armed wing of the SLP, is in charge of public order management duties. The OSD virtually operates under a parallel chain of command with respect to the unarmed General Duty (GD) personnel, tasked with daily routine operational duties. As a result, there have been several instances of disturbances in which the command of the Local Unit Commander (GD) conflicts with that of the OSD leadership. The consequence has been the deployment of OSD, and at times, the use of lethal force that might have been avoided. The fallout is a gutting of public confidence in the Police. Clear enforced lines of authority would enable a staggered decision making process which ensures the use of force as a last resort. The need for adherence to clear lines of command and control ultimately go to the heart of police discipline.

It is well known and appreciated that the Police, as with many other agencies within the security sector, operate with minimal resources. This affects their capacity to deliver and to sustain gains made. A need remains on how to most effectively manage and optimize current resources. The SLP senior leadership has identified a need for an asset management plan and database that will enable rapid access to equipment and repair. In turn, this will enable faster response times to distress calls<sup>21</sup> and the ability to undertake what should be routine work more regularly (e.g. vehicle travel into more remote communities). During the course of the November 2012 elections the SLP reported to UNPOL that the lack of an asset management system was hampering organizational effectiveness.

Operating with limited resources and poor conditions of service also has implications for the performance of individual officers: petty corruption is perceived to have increased dramatically among uniformed officers. In a perception survey released in 2013 by the international NGO, Afrobarometer, and the Sierra Leonean Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), the Police were cited again as the most corrupt institution in the country.<sup>22</sup> The SLP Strategic Plan forthrightly states there is “indiscipline in the SLP with perpetual corruption within the rank and file”<sup>23</sup> The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2011-13 has cited the SLP body delegated to address these issues, the Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID), as suffering from weak corruption intelligence gathering systems and prevention structures. From the public’s side, in a 2010 Anti-Corruption Survey in Sierra Leone, almost twenty-five per cent of respondents “voluntarily” gave bribes to police and others, “as an appreciation.”<sup>24</sup> The consequence is that in order to address the issue of petty corruption, the issue must be tackled not only within the police, but also within communities and among citizens.

Finally, over the last ten to twelve years, the SLP have taken considerable strides in extending their presence throughout the country. Within the Sierra Leonean security architecture, the Provincial Security Committees (PROSEC) and District Security Committees (DISEC) regularly bring together key actors within the security sector, local government, civil society and traditional leaders. The Committees, which are run by the Office of National Security (ONS), have been an invaluable tool in finding solutions to security issues, often before devolving into serious incidents. However, gaps still remain in terms of strengthening dialogue and trust at local levels with the area of community security in border areas noted by the SLP in discussions with the UN as both critical and receiving little or no attention currently. The Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs) established in 2002-03 are another mechanism to forge public trust. The LPPBs are voluntary bodies of community members and the SLP designed to be set up in every police division to serve as a crime prevention and crime-fighting mechanism.<sup>25</sup> The ability of these LPPBs to extend into more remote areas, and particularly border areas, remains limited due to

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<sup>21</sup> Sierra Leone Police Strategic Plan, 2012-14: Consolidating our Gains, SLP, p.10.

<sup>22</sup> Source: CGG; report pending final release.

<sup>23</sup> Sierra Leone Police Strategic Plan, 2012-14: Consolidating our Gains, SLP, p.9.

<sup>24</sup> National Public Perception Survey on Corruption, ACC and JSCO (Freetown), 2010.

<sup>25</sup> The Integration of a Gender Perspective in the Sierra Leone Police, Dr. Aisha Fofana Ibrahim (DCAF: 2012), p.47

resource constraints. As such, the need for more robust community policing in border areas remains a live concern. This finding resonates with the SLP's Strategic Plan 2012-14 which specifically identified local police that is accessible and acceptable to the communities it serves as one of its five key outcomes. Moreover, the Plan makes a clear connection between more community policing in the face of increased conflict triggers arising from mining-related land disputes.<sup>26</sup>

The total budget for this project is 3,280,000\$. BCPR has committed 500,000\$ and this proposal is seeking \$2,780,000 from the PBF. If these funds are fully secured there will be no anticipated shortfall.

## **b) Project Justification**

The United Nations has accompanied the peace consolidation efforts in Sierra Leone through a series of Security Council mandated missions and the work of the UN Country Team (UNCT). After the third successive round of peaceful elections, the Security Council requested the mission in its current configuration, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to conduct, in collaboration with the UNCT, the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and bilateral/international partners preparations for transition. An inter-agency technical assessment mission (TAM) from UN headquarters was deployed in January 2013 to review progress made on mandate implementation and contribute with proposals for UNIPSIL drawdown.

Amongst its several recommendations, the resulting TAM Report concluded that the UN system should still remain engaged in the security sector. The TAM found that despite several achievements, there was a need to develop a joint UNDP/UNIPSIL program to address the remaining gaps vis-à-vis security sector governance, professionalization and coordination. It was highlighted that further support for the security sector in Sierra Leone was required in order to ensure the consolidation of peace in the country. This joint project has therefore been developed and is intended to be implemented within 18 months, enabling it to cover the transitional period of UNIPSIL's drawdown, departure and handover of responsibilities to UNDP. Further, this timeframe is aligned with the UN's framework of support to the Sierra Leonean government, the Transitional Joint Vision, 2013-14.

## **COMPONENT 2: (the "What")**

### **a) Project focus and target groups**

In light of the broad range of actors and the need for comprehensive restructuring, the GOSL concluded a security sector review in 2005 that was led by the Office of National Security. Key findings of the security sector review included the following:

- foster capacity building of security sector institutions to ensure better alignment and provide an enabling environment for development;
- enhance security sector coordination and oversight mechanisms; and
- increase security architecture on the local level as part of decentralization efforts.<sup>27</sup>

Although still in draft form and pending official approval by the GOSL, it is important to note that the follow-up Security Sector Review Report of 2012 builds upon the findings of the 2005 Review

<sup>26</sup> Sierra Leone Police Strategic Plan, 2012-14: Consolidating our Gains, SLP, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup> Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, Brigadier General (Ret) Kellie Hassan Conteh, (October 2008), p.4, <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SierraLeoneWPs/working%20paper%209.pdf>

with an even stronger focus on the nexus between security and development. To this end, the new Report seeks to forge greater synergy with a wider range of ministries, departments and agencies as well as civil society and the broader public to address security threats linked to the extractives industries, pervasive poverty, unemployment, youth violence, and poor governance.<sup>28</sup> In this way, the second Report broadens the discussion on the root causes of insecurity and conflict and how the security sector can best respond. The findings of the 2005 and 2012 draft Reports resonate with the purpose of engagement by international partners with the GOSL and provide a roadmap for this engagement with the SLP.

Democratic governance of the security sector, on the basis of rule of law and respect for human rights, is crucial to securing the peaceful and sustainable development of a state. As described by the UN Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes,

“A democratically governed security sector enhances the safety and security of individuals, and prevents abuses and violations by the sector’s personnel. This can be achieved through effective checks and balances, transparency, accountability, and effective disciplinary mechanisms built within and around the security sector...A governance-driven approach will also enhance coordination and thus lead to integrated initiatives by security sector actors at all levels of government. That will contribute to increased responsiveness to the needs of the entire population, and therefore have an impact on the safety and security of individuals.”<sup>29</sup>

As canvassed in the preceding section, the implications of a democratic governance approach for the SLP mainly fall under the rubric of an overall professionalization of the police (e.g. addressing the lack of public trust in the institution, recruitment processes, command and control structures and better resource management).

However, broader considerations exist sector wide as well, of which the SLP are also a critical part. Key areas that emerged for attention across the security sector include,

- bolstering sector wide systems of governance, including legislative frameworks;
- building independent oversight institutions and mechanisms for the sector;
- ensuring financial viability of sector-wide planning; and,
- enhancing security for citizens living in border areas.

Mechanisms and practices that facilitate and strengthen inter-institutional cooperation - coordination and oversight - are in place such as the Office of National Security (ONS) established by the *National Security and Central Intelligence Act, 2002*.<sup>30</sup> However, areas for greater inter-institutional coordination via the ONS can be leveraged. As discussed above, corruption has become an endemic issue that has seeped into many institutions, spurring the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission in 2000 with a heavy focus on public officers. Security actors openly acknowledge the sector is not immune to allegations of corruption. The draft 2012 Security Sector Review Report notes that security actors can “contribute to escalating insecurity in a state” by not remaining professional in duties.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The SSR Report – 2012 in an advanced stage; it was validated by local stakeholders through a workshop in March 2013 and has been forwarded to the Executive for official review and approval. DRAFT – GOSL Report of the Sierra Leone Second Security Sector Review (SSR) 2012, ONS – GOSL, pp.40-45.

<sup>29</sup> Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, UN SSR Task Force, 2012, p.92.

<sup>30</sup> The ONS further acts as the secretariat for the National Security Council, implementing policy, provides recommendations to the GOSL and chairs the Joint Intelligence Committee and the National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG). Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, Brigadier General (Ret) Kellie Hassan Conteh, (October 2008), p.4, <http://www.ssmnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SierraLeoneWPs/working%20paper%209.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> DRAFT – GOSL Report of the Sierra Leone Second Security Sector Review (SSR) 2012, ONS – GOSL, pp.26.

Sector wide governance is especially critical for areas such as border management. As noted in the Security Sector Review Report, 2012, border insecurity “poses a direct and significant threat to the fragile peace, security and development of Sierra Leone.”<sup>32</sup> The Report and others, including the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), have described the porous nature of Sierra Leone’s external frontiers has having resulted in cross-border crimes ranging from drug and human trafficking, smuggling of natural resources, small arms and light weapons. Indeed, the Review Report succinctly points out that “one of the outstanding effects of the porous nature of our borders was the devastating war that ended in 2002.”<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps no more than in any other area, engagement on border management requires a sector coordinated approach. In Sierra Leone, the following actors undertake border-related functions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MOFAIC), the SLP, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), National Revenue Authority (NRA), Immigration and the Office of National Security (ONS). The ONS’s Border Security Department has been mandated to coordinate the management of all border-related issues.

Since the Security Sector Review Report of 2005, significant strides have been taken on border management from an operational perspective. The ONS has decentralized its PROSECs and DISCECs, while 15 border chiefdoms have Chiefdom Security Committees (CHISECs). These committees, along with the RSLAF-SLP joint border patrols and decentralization of immigration operations at the regional level, constitute strong steps towards enhancing community security in border areas close to both Guinea and Liberia. However, while progress has been made, the capacity for Sierra Leone to effectively manage its borders remains among the most pressing areas within the security sector in need of support. Endemic to the nature of border work, the need for support is not specific to any agency but linked to a broader strategy, one that revolves around democratic control of a territory and in essence, governance. As highlighted by the border work analysis undertaken by WACI, capacity gaps – both in geographical coverage and technical expertise – must be bridged to ensure greater community security, legal trade and movements of persons.

At a system-level, anachronistic legislative governance frameworks also still remain. As a key example, the *Police Act* of 1964. Despite calls for review by many observers, including the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone in its 2009 State of Human Rights Report<sup>34</sup>, the Act has not been re-visited. The Act has been described as not reflecting modern policing principles and the reforms required to progress from a police force to a police service. More specifically, the Act’s stipulated rank structure is anachronistic, fails to encapsulate the Local Police Partnerships Boards (and the pending Independent Police Complaints Board discussed below). Although the Law Reform Commission was tasked to undertake the exercise, the lack of resources inhibited the process from moving forward. The review of this Act will need to ensure coordination and feed-in as needed into the constitutional review process currently underway.

The need to build independent oversight institutions and mechanisms for the sector also remains a key component of effective security governance. Presently, Sierra Leone has several recognized independent oversight institutions<sup>35</sup> including the ACC, Parliament and its specialized parliamentary committees, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone and the Ombudsman. with all have the jurisdiction to undertake queries about security actors.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, such bodies require varying degrees of capacity support in order to discharge their duties.

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<sup>32</sup> DRAFT – GOSL Report of the Sierra Leone Second Security Sector Review (SSR) 2012, ONS – GOSL, p.58.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> State of Human Rights Report – 2009, HRCSL, p.52.

<sup>35</sup> This list includes statutory bodies only (*i.e.* clearly the Judiciary is also an oversight institution).

<sup>36</sup> The Judiciary, of course, remains an overarching oversight mechanism at all times.

Further, given past fatal police interventions, a need has been identified for the establishment of the Independent Police Complaints Board (IPCB) led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The IPCB, which will act as an oversight and investigative body, will focus on complaints of excessive police force. Although the SLP took the commendable step to create the Complaint, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID), the body remains in fact and in perception 'the police policing the police'. The IPCB represents a completely independent body at arm's length from the SLP, investigating public complaints about police excesses. A proposed bill for the IPCB has received cabinet approval and with UK bilateral support, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has launched a nation-wide sensitization campaign. With the IPCB, the sector will benefit as a potential conflict vector at the police level may be defused through an independent and effective IPCB. However, as with any new institution, support will be needed to realize its existence (including the passage of its founding statute), to raise public awareness about its role and to ensure its mandate is met or risk becoming toothless.

Finally, from a sector-wide approach there is a need to ensure financial viability of security sector planning. Per the World Bank's work on a 'Sourcebook on Security Sector Expenditure Review', public financial management is more and more acknowledged to be an important part of the SSR agenda. The design of accountable budgeting, expenditure management and procurement arrangements are seen as important to sector governance.<sup>37</sup> Although a difficult exercise, it remains critical for overall planning and predictability. Most recently, the World Bank and the UN Mission in Liberia undertook a public expenditure review of the security sector, resulting in an assessment of its efficiency, effectiveness, financing of key agencies and also reviewed priorities to identify a 'core security package' and its costs.<sup>38</sup> Sierra Leone, with funding from DFID, undertook an expenditure review in 2006. A gap remains on assessing progress made since the last review. There is a need to focus on how to ensure the sector as a whole is integrated into the broader budgetary framework (adopting a 'whole of government' approach) so that it is financially enabled to meet the security needs of Sierra Leoneans.

**b) Theory of changes: (see proposal formulated in the results framework)**

The Project's underlying theory of change, which has shaped its particular interventions, is based on three main and inter-connected premises: (1) improved governance of the security sector will result in better service delivery to the populace; (2) improved service delivery will result in greater public confidence in security actors; and in turn, (3) increased public trust can counter potential conflict vectors that have the power to undermine peaceful long-term development.

As stated by the UN Transitional Joint Vision and the UNDP Country Program Document for Sierra Leone, 2013-14, Sierra Leone must steadily build the consensus, norms and institutions that can underpin peace and generate the stability and predictability essential for sustainable development. Further, peace consolidation efforts must continue to happen at the community level to be inclusive and build trust throughout the country. In order to further ensure inclusivity, gender issues will be of cross-cutting relevance and importance.

To achieve, these ends the Project will focus on providing a range of interventions that will raise professional standards as well as support the realization of development outcomes. To this end, two key areas of focus appear vital: (1) improved security sector wide governance and coordination; and (2) improved border security for increased citizen safety.

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<sup>37</sup> Concept Note: Security Sector Expenditure Review Sourcebook, World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1326399585993/8366509-1335465281364/SecurityExpenditureReviewSourcebook.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

Strategically the Project will strive to be inclusive and balanced in approaching the two identified areas. On the one hand, engagement with state and sub-state actors will be balanced with support for community organisations (CBOs/CSOs). Such a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ approach has become a core development principle, most recently validated by the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report. On the other, there will be a balance of activities between the centre and the periphery, for example, between the professionalization of policing capabilities at central and community levels. To further buttress reform, such interventions will be linked to larger policy and institutional change (*i.e.* a systems approach) such as supporting enhanced coordination and sector wide approaches for overcoming challenges.<sup>39</sup>

In terms of implementation, the SSR Project has been designed to make an immediate impact on strengthening the Sierra Leone security sector. The design and implementation strategies are aligned with Government priorities and initiatives (e.g. Agenda for Change, Security Sector Review Reports, SLP Strategic Plan), as well as with bi- and multilateral support to ensure coherence. Furthermore, the Project has considered fully the findings that emerged during intensive consultations with a broad segment of security sector, civil society and development partners, including through the TAM and program formulation missions in April-May 2013.

### **COMPONENT 3: (the “How” or Implementation Strategy)**

#### **a) Implementation approach**

Implementation of the activities will be undertaken in close coordination with national authorities and external partners. UNIPSIL and UNDP will also coordinate and consult with other UN partners, such as UNODC, in implementing activities within the Project where appropriate (*viz.* on corruption and border control). In particular, a monitoring and evaluation framework/plan to assist in measuring the progress and impact of UN assistance and Project outcomes will be developed and remain crucial.

A particular project for focus will be the West African Coast Initiative (WACI) supported by DPKO, DPA/UNOWA, UNODC and Interpol. The Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU), supported by WACI, engages several of the same security actors as the herein project and has same similar objectives. Therefore, opportunities should be sought for joint training and information sharing as much as possible. Anti-corruption efforts, border management, the development of an asset management system, monitoring of citizen security perceptions within this project (discussed further below) are particularly places for potential collaboration.

In sum, key principles to govern project implementation include the following,

- **National ownership:** This is **at the heart of the Project, and development principles more broadly**. UNIPSIL and UNDP have already established close linkages with the various national counterparts, in particular with the SLP, ONS, oversight bodies and representatives of civil society. The Project will continue to engage fully with these and other national counterparts to ensure mutual guidance and communication during the implementation phase.
- **Sustainability:** All activities undertaken in the course of the Project will be rooted in the need to ensure sustainability. This includes **building – not supplementing – national capacities, ensuring that training will be on-going, and that assistance is solidly institutionalized** in broader governmental structures and planning processes.

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<sup>39</sup> World Development Report – 2012, World Bank, pp.12-13, 18

The Project will actively seek to ensure interventions have an enduring effect through the linkage of activity level engagement with policy and system level change. This will include linking evidence-based programming to capital institutions via the development of strategy and governance structures, etc.

- **Creating Partnerships between State and Civil Society:** Project outputs are divided between those focused on building capacity of state institutions and those supporting the development of a strong civil society. The Project will use this unique position to **foster partnerships and trust between civil society and state organizations.**
- **Flexibility:** While the Project aims to support the creation of an environment that is conducive to development, the transitional period of UNIPSIL's departure will be highly fluid. Accordingly, Project outputs and suggested activities will be adapted as necessary to adjust to changes affecting the achievement of overall goals, including vis-à-vis national partners. A thorough risk log will be maintained and updated, and mitigation measures adopted as necessary. The Project will be reviewed at the end of each year, providing opportunities to assess for modification. Furthermore, has a Project Review Board (PRB), which will convene twice a year. The PRB builds into the programmatic cycle additional opportunities to assess what is working and what is not. Such **oversight and ongoing engagement enables the Project to "scale up" or "scale-down" activities in ways that respond most effectively to on-the-ground changes and context.**
- **Partnerships and Coordination:** The Project will take advantage of UNPOL's current participation in the NSCCG, JIC, JCC, ONS and the SLP's EMB to ensure alignment with national planning. Relatedly, UNDP participates in GOSL monthly meetings of the Justice Sector Coordination Office (JSCO), National Committee on Gender-Based Violence (NaC-GBV) led by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs (MSWGCA), and the United Nations Gender Thematic Team to ensure that activities are aligned and properly coordinated. At the same time, the UN has built partnerships with the ISATT, IRC, GIZ, the UK's Access to Security and Justice Project (ASJP). **Given the size of ASJP and the importance of ISAT, the SSR Project will be particularly engaged with these programs to ensure coordinated activities.** Further, UNDP's Access to Justice Programme works collaboratively with ASJP on gender justice issues as well as on issues related to strengthening the capacity of police prosecutors and investigators. Of particular relevance for monitoring purposes, UNDP participates in baseline data generation, such as perception surveys undertaken by ASJP, which can benefit both justice and security sector engagements.
- **Comparative Advantage:** As discussed above, the UN's comparative advantage in Sierra Leone lies in its strong relationship with national actors working in the security sector, with a history of using its good offices that includes providing advice based on international human rights standards, and best practices derived from global comparative experience.

The Project will use a **'whole of country office' approach to take advantage of related programs within the UNDP-Sierra Leone Country Office (CO).** Primarily, the Project will have a reporting line to the *Improving Access to Justice in Sierra Leone (A2J) Program* to ensure the justice side of the security coin can be considered in tandem. This is especially critical considering the A2J Program's engagement with the same actors identified by the Project, *i.e.* SLP, Human Rights Commission and civil society. Additionally, the Project can build on the CO's relationship with Parliament through the *Sierra Leone Parliament Program* to undertake security sector-related capacity building.

**For additional conflict-sensitivity, all work will also ensure complementarity and coordination with that of UN Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) , due to arrive shortly in Sierra Leone.** In particular, the Project will ensure coordination with UNDP's pending *'Developing National Mechanisms and Capacities for Prevention of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone Program'* which will look at establishing an early warning system, promote national dialogue, develop 'infrastructures for peace' to prevent conflict and support women's inclusion in peacebuilding. The Project Manager will also act as SSR Advisor to the Resident Coordinator (please see Terms of Reference in 'Annex 2'), supporting system level coordination and providing advice based on actual day-to-day programming in the sector.

The Project will work in synergy with sister agencies in the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) through the institutionalized coordination mechanism of the Transitional Joint Vision to ensure complementarity in our work and avoid overlaps. In particular, the Project will ensure synergy with the WACI, working in particular with UNODC especially as it relates to border control. As WACI moves forward in its next iteration and in a post-mission context, Project staff will explore how best to engage in a way that takes advantage of UNCT's comparative advantage (e.g. UNDP's experience on democratic governance of the security sector).

Finally, **the Project will leverage the new Global Focal Point (GFP) arrangement.** In September 2012, the UN Secretary General named UNDP and DPKO Global Focal Points (GFP) for rule of law (encompassing police, justice, and corrections work) in post-conflict and other crisis situations. Resulting directly from recommendations made during the Secretary-General's Civilian Capacities Review process, this arrangement is designed to enhance the delivery of effective and coordinated rule of law assistance by ensuring both bodies work more closely together, including the leveraging of expertise in both UNDP and DPKO for greater impact on the ground. Since the adoption of the policy decision, the GFP has worked to deliver assistance in crisis situations that serves both stabilization and development purposes, demonstrating a shift in assistance provision. **The Project represents GFP in practice as it was jointly developed by UNPOL & Police Division/DPKO and UNDP at both headquarters and field levels. The Project foresees considering the deployment of DPKO expertise (viz. Police) even post-UNIPSIL exit, leveraging DPKO expertise in the absence of a mission** (e.g. using facilities such as DPKO's Standing Police Capacity (SPC), based in Brindisi, Italy).

## **b) Budget**

### **Additional Budget Information**

**Staff** – The project will employ three project staff with contributions from the Peacebuilding Fund and BCPR. The three staff will consist of: Chief Technical Advisor / Project Manager (P4), National Officer (NOB), Project Association (G6).

**Contractual services** – The project will make extensive use of international and local technical expertise to fulfill specific functions on a contractual basis. This will include legal-drafting expertise in the review of the legislation, a specialist in command and control systems, a potential partnership with the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum to draw on best practice from the region when developing oversight and accountability mechanisms, and to secure expertise on border security. The contractual services will be delivered according to UNDP's procurement systems in a transparent and competitive manner.

**Transfers and grants to counterparts** – Components of this project will be delivered in close collaboration with national counterparts, including the Sierra Leone Police, the Office of National Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. UNDP is operating under the direct implementation modality in Sierra Leone and as such will follow the rules and procedures related to this execution modality. These transfers and grants will be



delivered via a Letter of Agreement with the counterpart and will be subject to close monitoring to ensure compliance.

<b>PBF PROJECT BUDGET</b>			
<b>CATEGORIES</b>	<b>Amount Participating Agency UNDP</b>	<b>Amount Participating Agency</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
1. Staff and other personnel	200,000	0	200,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	100,000	0	100,000
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	1,000,000	0	1,000,000
4. Contractual services	660,000	0	660,000
5. Travel	32,531	0	32,531
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	450,000	0	450,000
7. General Operating / Direct Costs (2%)	55,600	0	55,600
8. Monitoring and Evaluation (mid & end review)	100,000		100,000
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	<b>2,598,131</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,598,131</b>
8. Indirect Costs GMS* (7%)	181,869	0	181,869
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,780,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,780,000</b>

**c) Sustainability**

The Project will take deliberate steps to implement exit strategies by supporting the sustainability of its interventions through several measures:

- The Project will generate training materials, which can be systematized through institutional curricula. International and national experts will closely work with respective departments to enhance in-house training and technical capacities. The mechanism of ‘twinning’ international expertise with national counterparts will be explored for capacity building and greater sustainability.
- Key interventions are also targeted at a ‘systems level’ (e.g. development of strategic plans, security sector public expenditure review) enabling a cascading effect for longer-term impact;
- The Project is undertaking initial work that leaves enormous scope for “replicability” and scaling-up by national partners (e.g. expansion of border control); and

The Project Review Board will be informed of progress via bi-annual meetings, providing opportunities for the Project to ensure sustainability of its interventions.

**d) Risk management**

<b>Risk</b>	<b>Likelihood (high,</b>	<b>Severity of impact on</b>	<b>Mitigating Strategy</b>
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	medium, low)	project (high, medium, low)	
Institutionalized and serious abuse of human rights by police	Medium	High	<p>Implementation of the UN Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) including a strict monitoring and reporting regime.</p> <p>Prioritize the implementation of the Independent Police Complaints Board</p>
Police used as a political tool for repressing opposition	Medium	High	<p>Legislation review and constitutional review need to reinforce police independence.</p> <p>National Security Police and Strategy considers Police independence</p> <p>Include independence monitoring in IPCB mechanisms</p> <p>Third party monitoring with well-established benchmarks</p>
Incidents of corruption within the police increase	Medium	High	<p>Anti Corruption Commission to remain fully engaged with the police reforms work</p> <p>Review of Command and Control structures and procedures lays out clear accountability for corrupt practice</p>

**e) Results framework and monitoring and evaluation:**

**Results Framework**

**Purpose of PBF support:** To support a democratically governed security sector which enhances the safety and security of individuals, and prevents abuses and violations by the sector's personnel. The process will accelerate the transition from peacebuilding to a developmental focus.

**Theory of change statement:** If governance of the security sector and the quality of service delivery will be improved then the lack of trust of the population in the integrity and professionalism of SLP institutions and their agents— one major root causes of conflict – can be addressed.

(1) Outcomes	(2) Indicators	(3) Baselines and time-bound targets	(4) Outputs	(5) Indicators	(6) Baselines and time-bound targets <i>(please see target timeline in budget attached)</i>	(7) RUNO & party responsible for mobilizing inputs	(8) Inputs/ budget	(9) Assumptions
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> SLP institutions and agents perform their duties professionally and account for the integrity, quality and timeliness of their services for ensuring public safety</p>	<p><b>1.1 Indicator:</b> Change of perception: % of population - more satisfied with service quality - increase trust /confidence -feeling safer in communities</p> <p><i>(disaggregated in men/women/girls; communities within / outside border areas)</i></p> <p>1.2 % increased of qualified women recruited to the SLP (disaggregated per rank)</p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> 35% of population perceive SLP as corrupt (ACC perception survey; 2010) <b>Target:</b> Decrease o populations who perceive SLP as by 10 % (tbd)</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 20% women recruited overall, one female at ES <b>Target:</b> 10% (tbd) increase</p>	<p><b>Output 1:</b> Efficient coordination and security sector oversight mechanisms strengthened</p> <p><b>Output 2:</b> SLP senior leadership able to manage available resources more effectively</p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> 1.1 IPCB established and undertaking core functions 1.2 Transparent selection and recruitment criteria in place and rigorously applied in compliance with the ACC performance contract (gender disaggregated)</p> <p>2.1 Asset management database established 2.2 Results of SSPER</p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> - Draft legislation developed, but not passed, and no independent police complaints body in place  ACC coordination with SLP and other security agencies remains ad hoc</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> No SLP strategic asset management plan in place</p>	<p>UNDP, Global Focalpoint, SLP, MOIA</p> <p>Supporting Parties: ISAT, ACC, HRCSL, UNODC, WACI</p>	<p>1,380,000\$</p>	<p>Policy framework for IPCB in place</p>

	<p>1.3 Reduced incident of gender based violence</p>	<p>Baseline: Target:</p>		<p>review used for to initiate budgetary and financial reforms</p> <p>2.3 Response time to distress calls reduced (trend)</p> <p>2.4 Command and Control systems aligned and in place</p>	<p><b>Targets:</b> <b>(Year 1)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Asset management plan developed &amp; validated with accompanying training plan</li> <li>- EMB endorses command and control reforms</li> <li>- IPCB legislation passed, implantation plan agreed with civil society endorsement</li> <li>- Annual 'Performance Contract' targets met</li> <li>- SSPER and review of Police Act validated</li> <li>-Asset management plan endorsed with recommendations</li> </ul> <p><b>Targets (Year 2)</b></p> <p>Training delivered on new asset management system and first monitoring reports delivered</p> <p>Command and control reforms implemented and first monitoring report presented to Police Council, NSCCG and ISCCG</p> <p>IPCB operational with technical support and appropriately equipped</p>			
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					<p>Action plan for Corporate Services Department and CDIID implemented and tracked, with focus on 'Performance Contract' with ACC</p> <p>Action plan for implementation of SSPER developed</p> <p>Review of Police Act approved by Parliamentary Security Committee</p>			
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> <i>Improved border security for enhanced citizen safety</i></p>	<p><b>2.1 Indicator:</b> Change of perception: % of population in border areas - more satisfied with service quality - increase trust /confidence -feeling safer in communities  <i>(disaggregated in men/women/girls)</i></p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> % of population in selected border districts perceiving high levels of personal insecurity (drawn from ASJP Citizens Perception Survey of Security and Justice)</p>	<p><b>Output 3:</b> <b>Border security in 4 border districts (tbd) improved</b></p>	<p><b>Indicators:</b> 3.1 Four joint border control facilities in place and functional  3.2 Overall number of violent incidents reduced  (disaggregated per borer area)  3.3 Increased public confidence in border security units (disaggregated per border areas)</p>	<p><b>Baseline:</b> - 1 joint border control facility - No specific capacity building of LPBBs on border security issues in border areas -Limited CSO involvement in community policing and security in border areas  <b>Targets (Year 1)</b> 10 awareness raising sessions/year implemented  <b>Targets (Year 2)</b>  Number of border security officials to receive training in command and control procedures for border security</p>	<p>UNDP, Global Focal Point, ONS</p> <p>Supporting Parties: UNODC, TOCU, WACI Project Staff, CSOs, SLP (LPPBs), MRU/UNOWA</p>	<p>1,400,000\$</p>	

					Systematic reporting and monitoring undertaken	incident and being			
					10 awareness sessions/year	raising			

## Monitoring and Evaluation

Project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) will be conducted in line with CPAP and the UN Transitional Joint Vision for Sierra Leone plans. The Project Review Board will be in charge of overall project oversight. The Board will hold regular meetings to discuss the project implementation and assess its progress. The Results and Resources Framework (RRF) incorporated into this document will be the benchmark for performance monitoring and reporting. The Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP will be responsible for setting up the necessary M&E mechanisms (see further below) in order to ensure continuous M&E of the project's results and impact, as well as to ensure efficient resource utilization, accountability, transparency and integrity.

### ***M&E Plan***

Tracking the achievement of planned results for each activity within the annual work plan and reporting progress to the Project Review Board and giving feedback to the implementing partners will be the responsibility of the Project Manager via an M&E Plan. The Project Manager, in collaboration with the Project Review Board will ensure the selected implementing partners will develop a results-based monitoring plan. The plan will have gender-sensitive SMART indicators that will facilitate effective monitoring. The Project Manager will provide semi-annual reports to the Project Review Board or as often as is required by the Board.

The specific mechanisms that will be used to monitor the achievement of results will include:

- i. Semi-annual progress and financial reports, prepared by the Project Manager for review by the Project Board; a standard reporting format will be used;
- ii. Annual progress report, technical and financial report prepared by the annual work plan implementing agency and/or the ERP Atlas system at the end of the year;
- iii. At the end of 'Year 1' a Mid-Term Assessment will take place, which will include lessons to be learned and best practices; this report will be presented to the Project Review Board for consideration and action. A final independent review will take place at the end of the Project.; and
- iv. Semi-annual meetings of the Project Review Board will be convened to review progress reports and to ensure the Project results are achieved and where necessary, recommend a change in implementation strategy. The Project Review Board's Executive will report to the ERSG/RC post each semi-annual meeting.
- v. A final report will be prepared by UNDP, which includes lessons learned and good practices, within 3 months of the end of the Project and submitted for review and consideration by the Project Review Board.

All reports will be in compliance with the PBF/PBSO reporting procedures and will be shared with the PBF/PBSO in fulfillment of the half year and annual reporting agreements. The reports will also be shared with BCPR/UNDP's Rule of Law, Justice and Security Team, in addition to shorter quarterly reports to facilitate Multi-Year Results Framework (MYRF) reporting.

## **COMPONENT 4: (The "WHO")**


### **a) Implementing agencies and their capacity:**

UNDP will be the recipient UN Organization and will lead on implementation (to be conducted jointly with UNIPSIL until end of March 2014).

**b) Project Management Arrangements and coordination:**

The below organogram represent the management structure of the Project:

Layer 1



*\*One position serving two functions of CTA and Project Manager*

*\*\*UNIPSIL will remain on the executive of Project Board for the duration of the mission; upon its exit, UNDP will become the sole executive member. In turn, the ERSG/RC role will revert to solely RC.*

The project is being executed by UNDP under the DEX modality in an implementing partnership with UNPOL/UNIPSIL. Under this project, UNDP will also partner with relevant government ministries and other partners, notably the British Government's Access to Security and Justice Project (ASJP), ISAT, GIZ, and other UN Agencies, as well as NGOs, to implement activities specified in Annual Work Plans (AWPs).

The **Project Review Board (PRB)** will be chaired by a representative of the national counterpart (SLP), co-chaired by UNDP and UNIPSIL and its members will include donors to the Program as well as representatives from the UNCT. To ensure optimal Project coordination, the Project Review Board can invite other partners as needed. The role of the Project Board will be to:

- (i) Make management decisions when these are sought by the Project Manager
- (ii) Based on the approval of AWPs, review implementation progress
- (iii) Review and make recommendations on revisions to the Project, when tolerances have been exceeded
- (iv) Review and make recommendations on the funding of the Project
- (v) Review progress towards the Project's overall objective and intended outputs
- (vi) Review and recommend on other actions in special circumstances

The **Project Review Board** will also be responsible for resolving any emerging conflicts or problems that could negatively impact on the Project's implementation. The Project Review Board meets two (2) times a year or more frequently if need be and meetings will be recorded through minutes and participants lists. The Executive of the Project Board will report to the ERSG/RC after every Project Review Board meeting and as requested.



The **Project Team** will be composed of 1 SSR CTA/Project Manager (P-5), 1 National Officer (NOC), Administrative Assistant and Project Associate. The latter will be especially critical given the level of procurement envisioned through 'Output 4'. The SSR CTA/Project Manager (P-5) will have a dual reporting line: one to UNDP's Programme Manager for the *Improving the Rule of Law and Access to Justice Program* for project assurance and to ensure linkages to justice sector work and two, to the RC to provide technical advice. The Project Team will be in charge of the day-to-day management of the Project, including the work plan, budget planning and oversight, drafting terms of reference for the acquisition of services and goods, elaborating and implementing a procurement plan, and the oversight of operations in the field. The Unit will also be responsible for producing financial and progress reports as required.

The Project Manager and his/her team will be expected to work closely with UNPOL/UNIPSIL colleagues for the joint implementation of the annual work plan (AWP), which will be cleared by the Project Board. Additionally, the Project Manager should ensure regular engagement with WACI staff on the ground.

**c) Administrative Arrangements (standardized paragraphs – do not remove) – *this part was not changed***

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

**AA Functions**

On behalf of the Participating Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008)<sup>40</sup>, the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

**Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed

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<sup>40</sup> Available at: <http://www.undg.org/docs/9885/Protocol-on-the-role-of-the-AA,-10.30.2008.doc>

to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than July 31st;
- Annual narrative progress reports, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Final narrative reports, after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) of the year following the completion of the activities. The final report will give a summary of results and achievements compared to the goals and objectives of the PBF; and
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

#### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

## **Component 5: Annexes**

### **Annex A:**

#### **Donor Mapping in Peacebuilding Strategic Outcome Area/s (including UN agencies) and gap analysis:**

Under UN Security Council Resolution 2097 (2013) UNIPSIL will draw down by end of March 2014. The resolution specifically encouraged the United Nations Country Team and its component United Nations agencies to scale up their activities and programming during UNIPSIL's transition and after its liquidation. Areas of focus specified included support for the constitutional reform process.

As part of UNDP's overall mandate and with reference to the SC Resolution UNDP will lead this Project, "UN Support to the Constitutional Review Process 2013 – 2015".

**Annex B:**


**Mapping of UN Recipient Organizations**

Please include exhaustive information of annual budgets of each recipient agency (RUNOs) in the targeted outcome area.

UN Agency	Key Sectors (top five or fewer )	Annual Budget (last year) per Recipient Organization in key sectors	Annual Budget (this year) per Recipient Organization in key sectors	Projection of Annual Budget (next year) per Recipient Organization in key sectors	2012 Annual Delivery Rate (Agency Total)
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Poverty Reduction</i></li> <li>- <i>Democratic Governance</i></li> <li>- <i>Environment and Energy</i></li> </ul>	\$31,374,204.55	\$31,374,204.55	\$31,374,204.55	<i>Close to 100%</i>

## Annex C

Layer 1



## ANNEX D


### TARGET TABLE FOR OUTCOME AND OUTPUT INDICATORS OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

	<b>Performance Indicators</b>	<b>Indicator Baselines</b>	<b>Planned Indicator Targets</b>	<b>Targets actually achieved</b>
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<p>Percentage increase in public satisfaction with police service</p> <p>Number of women promoted to senior management positions in SLP</p> <p>Percentage increase in feelings of community security</p>	<p>Recent surveys reveal SLP to be seen as most corrupt institution in Sierra Leone (35% per 2010 ACC perception survey; 69% per 2012 Afrobarometer/CGG perception survey)</p> <p>One female member of the SLP Executive Management Board and two female observers</p> <p>Porous borders undercut feelings of community security (2012 Sierra Leone Second Security Review Report states porous borders lead</p>	<p>Decrease in corruption by SLP noted by public surveys</p> <p>3 female SLP officers participating as members of EMB</p> <p>Communities in border areas reporting enhanced feelings of security</p>	

		to a lack of safety and security <sup>41</sup> )		
<b>Output 1</b>	<p>IPCB established, with critical operational and policy frameworks in place</p> <p>SLP reports progress under "Performance Contract" with ACC</p> <p>Asset management database established</p> <p>Updated SSPER with implementation plan approved</p> <p>Review of <i>Police Act, 1964</i> initiated by the Parliamentary Security Committee</p>	<p>No independent police specific complaints body in place</p> <p>ACC coordination with SLP and other security agencies remains ad hoc</p> <p>SLP viewed as requiring improvement in key focus areas by Anti-Corruption Commission's (ACC) 'Performance Contract' with the SLP (June 2013)</p> <p>No SLP strategic asset management plan in place</p> <p>Security Sector Public Expenditure Review (SSPER) undertaken in 2006</p> <p>Anachronistic <i>Police Act, 1964</i></p>	<p><b>(Year 1)</b></p> <p>Asset management plan developed &amp; validated, and training initiated</p> <p>Position paper to advise EMB on command and control completed, including validation by EMB</p> <p>Roll out of command and control structure to LUCs and local stakeholders</p> <p>Supported creation of IPCB, with training on IPCB legislation for parliamentary and civil society actors</p> <p>Baseline survey undertaken of challenges for the CDIID and action plan developed</p> <p>Reports submitted to Corporate Services Department on progress meeting 'Performance Contract' targets</p> <p>Completed and validated SSPER with recommendations</p> <p>Completed review of Police Act with validation</p> <p>Asset management plan developed with recommendations</p> <p><b>Targets (Year 2)</b></p> <p>Training on new asset management system undertaken with monitoring report</p> <p>Monitoring report on adherence to command and control completed and presented to Police Council, NSCCG and ISCCG</p> <p>Provision of technical expert supports IPCB system planning (e.g. strategic planning, internal workflow systems)</p>	

<sup>41</sup> DRAFT-GOSL Report of the Sierra Leone Second Security Sector Review, 2012, ONS-GOSL, p.58.

			<p>Provision of furniture/equipment for IPCB offices</p> <p>-Action plan for Corporate Services Department and CDIID implemented and tracked, with focus on 'Performance Contract' with ACC and future steps required</p> <p>Action plan for implementation of SSPER developed</p> <p>Parliamentary Security Committee seized of review of Act</p>	
<b>Output 2</b>	<p>Comprehensive border strategy completed</p> <p>4 joint border control facilities in place</p> <p>Reduction in incident reports reporting non-adherence to command and control structures related to border security units</p> <p>LPPBs in border areas report enhanced effectiveness</p> <p>Increased public confidence in border security units in border areas</p>	<p>No comprehensive border strategy</p> <p>1 joint border control facility</p> <p>Lack of adherence to command and control structures in respect of border security</p> <p>No specific capacity building of LPBBs on border security issues in border areas</p> <p>Limited CSO involvement in community policing and security in border areas</p>	<p><b>Targets (Year 1)</b></p> <p>Completed development of strategy on border management</p> <p>Training needs assessment undertaken</p> <p>Review of command and control structures relating to border security effectiveness completed</p> <p>Needs assessment of LPPBs in border areas completed</p> <p>Strategy for LPPBs in border areas completed</p> <p>Identify security sector CSO partners in border areas through mapping</p> <p>10 awareness raising sessions/year implemented</p> <p><b>Targets (Year 2)</b></p> <p>Validation and finalization of strategy undertaken with stakeholders</p> <p>Training undertaken, including on command and control procedures for border security units as well as strategy and monitoring</p> <p>Enhanced capacity of LPPBs in border areas</p> <p>10 awareness raising sessions/year</p>	



## PEACEBUILDING FUND

### PROJECT SUMMARY

<b>Project Number &amp; Title:</b>	Joint UNIPSIL & UNDP Project on Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone: <i>Building Effective and Accountable Institutions for Increased Citizen Security</i>	
<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b>	UNDP	
<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>	<b>Implementing Partner(s) – name &amp; type (Government, CSO, etc):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sierra Leone Police</li> <li>- Ministry of Internal Affairs</li> <li>- Anti-Corruption Commission</li> <li>Office of National Security</li> </ul>	
<b>Location:</b>	Sierra Leone	
<b>Approved Project Budget:</b>	2,780,000 US\$	
<b>Duration:</b>	<b>Planned Start Date:</b> 1 October 2013	<b>Planned Completion:</b> 18 Months
<b>SC Approval Date: (Actual Dates)</b>		
<b>Project Description:</b>	<p>Ensuring democratic governance of the security sector on the basis of the rule of law is recognized as crucial to securing peace and sustainable development. Despite meaningful progress in Sierra Leone, concerns remain in key areas related to state institutions and their delivery of security services. These shortcomings, in turn, have undermined public confidence and perceptions of safety. With the exit of UNIPSIL at the end of March 2014, and in particular UNPOL, national partners have identified gaps the pending departure will bring to the sector. In response, a UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) undertaken in January 2013 recommended bridging these gaps through a joint project between UNIPSIL and UNDP. The Project would be for an 18 month duration, roughly dovetailing with the advent of the new UNDAF in 2015 as the UN system shifts from a mission context to solely that of a UN Country Team. After further examination and consultation with national partners, the Project's</p>	



	<p>specific areas of focus are the following: (1) improved security sector governance, oversight and coordination; and (2) improved border security for enhanced citizen safety. These interventions are premised on the core principle that a more effective, accountable, and accessible security sector will increase citizen confidence and counter potential conflict vectors. The Project has been carefully tailored to avoid overlap with other bilateral assistance programmes supporting SSR. Developed by UNPOL/DPKO-Police Division and UNDP, the Project will be implemented jointly with national partners while invoking the new Global Focal Point arrangement on rule of law to ensure UN system expertise is best leveraged.</p>
<p><b>PBF Priority Area:</b></p>	<p>2: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)</p>
<p><b>PBF Outcome:</b></p>	<p>(1.1) SSR</p>
<p><b>Key Project Activities:</b></p>	<p><b>Project Outputs and key Activities:</b></p> <p><b>Output 1: Improved security sector governance, oversight and coordination.</b></p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p><i>1.1. Support SLP to achieve progress on its obligations on recruitment/promotion under its performance contract with the Anti-Corruption Commission, including a special focus on the career development of female officers</i></p> <p><i>1.2. Develop new internal asset management processes</i></p> <p><i>1.3. Improve SLP command and control structure for enhanced police governance</i></p> <p><i>1.4. Support the implementation of oversight mechanisms for the SLP</i></p> <p><i>1.5. Facilitate security sector public expenditure review to inform future planning</i></p> <p><i>1.6. Review and revise the Police Act, 1964</i></p> <p><b>Output 2: Improved border security for enhanced citizen safety</b></p> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p><i>2.1 Improve border security management</i></p> <p><i>2.2 Improve operational ability of the State to undertake border control through enhanced infrastructure and equipment</i></p> <p><i>2.3. Enhance functioning of local community policing structures in border areas</i></p> <p><i>2.4. Increase civil society engagement with and understanding of local community policing structures in border areas</i></p>