

# **South Sudan Recovery Fund**

## **Round 3: UN Joint Stabilization Programmes**

### **Outcome Evaluation**

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**All findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are the responsibility of the evaluation team, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or positions of any SSRF stakeholder.**

## Acronyms and abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
DFID	Department for International Development
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
EESSP	Eastern Equatoria State Stabilisation Programme
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HQ	Headquarters
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDT	Joint Donor Team
JS	Jonglei State
JSSP	Jonglei State Stabilisation Programme
LS	Lake State
LSSP	Lake State Stabilisation Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPTF	Multi Party Trust Fund
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PUNO	Participating United Nations Organisation
RSF	Rapid Stabilisation Facility
SC	Steering Committee
SPLM	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement
SRF-SS	Sudan Recovery Fund South Sudan
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSRF	South Sudan Recovery Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNDAF	United Nations Development Action Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Missions in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPOL	United Nations Police
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WMC	Water Management Committee
WS	Warrap State

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# **1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## **INTRODUCTION**

In Round 3 of the SSRF approximately USD 102 million was allocated to restore post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure, increase security and reduce the level of ethnic conflicts in four states of South Sudan: Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap. This evaluation undertaken covers Round 3 of the SSRF covering the period from 2009 through the closure of the SSRF Round 3 (30 June 2015). The stated purpose for of this evaluation is to assess the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) Round 3 composed of four distinct State Stabilization Programmes, and identify good practices and lessons to feed into future programming in post-conflict and fragile state contexts. It must be noted that after the political crisis in December 2013 and the attack, looting and destruction of SSRF assets in Jonglei State, the SSRF supported infrastructure projects were closed and formally terminated in January 2015. The evaluation covered outputs in the three remaining states.

The evaluation was conducted during the period 15 May 2015 to 6 August 2015. The programme results framework was used as the foundation for the evaluation and a range of evaluation tools such as an evaluation matrix, a review of the documents, interviews and field visits made to sampled projects. There were some limitations and constraints experienced but this did not detract from the overall findings.

## **OUTCOMES**

SSRF indicators were not designed to quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically determine the actual outcomes of the SSRF interventions where they were located - and there was no measure that could determine whether the real causes of the conflicts were being reduced. The use of UNOCHA data as the only means for measuring outcomes did not enable an accurate assessment of the achievement of the designed outcome indicators and SSRF did not investigate additional sources of information to correlate UNOCHA data. However it can be reasonably concluded, using qualitative data from interviews that the SSRF interventions have contributed and may continue to contribute to reducing inter-communal conflicts, displacement and deaths. Attribution to SSRF outputs is not clear or able to be accurately defined. The evaluation received comparator data from UNMISS, in one state (EES) to test the validity of the UNOCHA data.

The available UNOCHA data, used by the SSRF to measure its indicators, shows that there has been an overall reduction in violence in three out of four states where the programme was implemented - Lakes State being the exception. However, the evaluators do not consider the data complete, comprehensive and not consistent over time. By 2014 Eastern Equatoria State, using UNOCHA data, showed that incidents decreased by 83% and there was a corresponding 93% decrease in deaths from the baseline in 2010. No displacements were recorded over the years of the project (highly unlikely). A review of UNMISS data (as a comparator) indicates that in 2014 there was a 107% increase in incidents from 2013 and a 268% increase in deaths over the same period. These discrepancies further reinforce the limitation of utilization of UNOCHA

available data. It must be recognized that it is very difficult to gather accurate data overtime, in situations like South Sudan, and relevant indicators must be selected at the onset.

Because the quantification of outcomes cannot be considered consistent, interviewee perceptions are important in assessing how the beneficiaries feel about the change that has occurred in security as a result of the SSRF interventions. These interviews, carried out in three states provide a positive view of the outcomes. Most interviewees and community members consulted indicating that the SSRF assets have made their lives safer by reducing the incidents of inter-communal conflict, cattle raiding, cattle theft, criminality and competition over water resources. Some indicated that if the asset was not operational, it had no impact. There were no indications, through the interviews, that the assets exacerbated or promoted conflicts. Additional positive outcomes included greater accessibility to goods and state services such as clinics.

## **OUTPUTS**

The SSRF Round 3 State Stabilization Programmes were ambitious in building local infrastructure in remote, insecure locations in four states in South Sudan, so as to increase security at community level. Logistical, political, security and seasonal challenges, over the life of the programme, severely impacted their realization of results. Two of the State Stabilization Programmes (Warrap and Eastern Equatoria State) impressively achieved all outputs, while one state (Lakes State) achieved most outputs with some projects showing partial results. The Jonglei State Stabilization Programme was terminated, due to attacks, losses and damages associated with the military conflict following the December 2013 crisis. No outputs were achieved. As the operational assets of the Jonglei Public Radio station were stolen or damaged, neither the Government nor the Opposition Forces could use a functioning radio station to incite further violence.

A summary of the output achievements is described below:

### Output 1: Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State

- The Jonglei Public Radio was built and radio equipment installed in 2013. Forty staff were trained in 2013 and the station was broadcasting 3 hours a day between September and 15 December 2013.
- Broadcasting ceased after the station was attacked and looted during the conflict of December 2013. Salvaged equipment is stored at the UNMISS-Bor.
- The project was terminated and it did not realize its intended output. Negotiations are on-going to determine the disposition of the remaining equipment and assets.

### Output 2: Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)

- All security access roads in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap States are being used by security services to quell conflicts and to reduce cattle rustling and theft. Citizens are using the roads for trade, to access markets, health posts and other state services. The Akobo- Pochalla Road in Jonglei State project closed and it did not realize the desired output.

#### Output 3: Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)

- All the 32 planned buildings were constructed; namely 14 Police stations (7 in Lakes State and 7 in Warrap State); 7 Courts in Lakes State; 4 County headquarters in Eastern Equatoria State; and 1 Prison in Eastern Equatoria State. The evaluators visited 10 of these buildings.
- SSRF reports and the evaluators' findings concur that the facilities were mostly in use by the state officials for the purposes for which they were intended.

#### Output 4: Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)

- As many inter-communal conflicts are linked to access to water during the dry season for cattle, the building of water sources in key locations identified to reduce incidents of conflict, was an important part of the SSRF. The adopted approach was to build haffirs with boreholes for human consumption nearby.
- Three States (Eastern Equatoria State, Lakes State Warrap State) identified water sources as a component of their Stabilizations Plans. All SSRF Round 3 water projects were completed. Ten haffirs were constructed (4 in Eastern Equatoria State, 4 in Lakes State, 2 Warrap State) and have been used by the communities. The evaluators found that 5 haffirs were not functional due to apparent lack of (or insufficient) handover to communities and no training of Water Management Committees from the PUNOs (Lakes),
- There were 28 boreholes constructed in the three states (Warrap, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria) with the highest concentration in Lakes (16 Boreholes.) Of the boreholes inspected (or through interviews), it was apparent that many were not functional due to the lack of maintenance and spare parts.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

### Relevance

Round 3 SSRF's stabilisation model was considered very relevant by state and community level stakeholders and beneficiaries- both in its inception and after its completion. SSRF donors changed their view on the 'relevance of model' after Dec 2013; diverging from the end users and beneficiaries.

SSRF-Round 3 stabilization model (2009), recognizing the peace-building imperatives and security challenges of the CPA interim period, incorporated local and state priorities through robust state based consultation and prioritization processes. Separate state-based Joint UN Stabilization Plans followed a common strategic framework in defining outputs, but ensured local relevance through the selection and location of specific projects. State Boards were established to monitor the SSRF Implementation

SSRF supported infrastructure became relevant and could have desired impact and continued relevance through their utilization for intended purposes. Failure to include labour-based approaches in building projects, limited capacity building of SSRF state ministries and communities, and lack of social responsibility clauses within contracting limited the relevance, reducing the utility of the investments over time.



The fiscal crisis of 2012 reduced the revenues and budgets of the states. The SSRF failed to undertake a comprehensive and strategic review what actions may have been required to adapt to the changing context and what additional investments might be required to ensure the continued use and relevance of its assets.

Donor response to the political conflict of December 2013 was to inform the South Sudan Government, without consultations at state and local levels, that SSRF donors would not endorse new or future support for SSRF - as a political signal of disapproval.

The approved SSRF Strategic Framework and Theory of Change, that placed state-building at the centre, was therefore no longer endorsed by the donor partners - de facto redefining the outputs as “not relevant” to contribute to the outcome even stating that “some activities and assets’ may exacerbate rather than reduce tensions”.

### Effectiveness

The SSRF was effective in terms of achieving its results in relation to outputs, and contributed positively to its desired outcome. However, during the life of the programme the lack of robust monitoring, and strategic assessment of changing conditions, reduced its effectiveness over time.

All intended SSRF outputs of public administration buildings in Lakes, Warrap and Eastern Equatoria States were completed and handed over to state authorities. Water resources (haffirs and boreholes) were handed over to community-based water management committees, with the exception of many boreholes in Lakes where the PUNO did not provide the support to form the committees, as the SSRF failed to provide additional funding.

Security roads completed in Lakes, Warrap and Eastern Equatoria States are in use and considered a contribution to improved circulation of security forces to quell inter-ethnic conflict, in particular cattle raiding. Visits and interviews carried out in the three SSRF states with completed outputs (Warrap, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria States), indicated a “perception’ that the SSRF assets contributed to the SSRF Outcome of improved security and a reduction in inter-communal conflict. Strongly recognized for County Headquarters (EES) and haffirs. Contribution of police posts and courts dependent upon staffing.

SSRF UN Joint Jonglei State Stabilization Plan outputs (road, radio station) did not achieve the intended results in terms of outputs or outcomes, as it was attacked, damaged and looted during the political and military actions following the December 2013 crisis. The Jonglei Public Radio started broadcasting in September 2013, and was attacked and looted, in December 2013, therefore ceasing broadcasts. As a result of this looting of equipment, neither the Government nor the opposition forces could occupy a functioning radio station nor use it to incite further violence. The road in Jonglei state, due to continuous security problems, was only partially completed by December 2013 conflict. The remaining radio assets are now under UN control, underscoring the high risk nature of state linked media projects in volatile environments. The future use of this equipment is still under-discussion. Both Jonglei SSRF projects were terminated in January 2015 by the SSRF Steering Committee. 2015.

Despite a statement by SSRF donors in March 2014, that they would ‘support the consolidation of the existing benefits of Round 3’, in conjunction with their termination of support for the SSRF; there was no evidence of a concerted effort nor a resourced plan to ensure that intended

beneficiaries would continue to benefit from these SSRF investments. This was particularly evident in the case of haffirs and boreholes that required functioning water management committees to ensure their continued use and contribution to the reduction of conflict over water resources.

### Efficiency

The systems and processes utilized by the SSRF can be considered to be efficient in fund and project management terms. The Coordinating Agency efficiently managed a diverse SSRF portfolio and, through regular engagement with State Boards provided reduced programme risks but did not have the capacity for robust independent M&E at the state level. There were gaps in the monitoring of the detailed outputs of the PUNOs, especially after the December 2013 crisis, resulting in residual issues

Although the SSRF governance structure and Steering Committee accepted the principle that Government should be in the lead, it functioned differently in the implementation phase with donors dominating. After the political crisis in Dec 2013, governance of the SSRF became a parallel process excluding government in the formal decision making processes. Without standard operational rules and procedures, the different governing and management structures were not clear on their roles and mandates. The SC also created duplication in the processes by introducing multiple points of intervention often causing delays – especially in the final approval of projects

The PUNOs had the capacity to deliver the SSRF assets. Most projects were delivered within budget and on time although there are some problems related to quality and durability. Puno performance and efficiency was often hampered by the availability of good contractors. Contractors, in many cases, supplied lesser quality materials that were not appropriate or durable for public use buildings in remote rural areas of South Sudan. More quality assurances should have been integrated into both the contracting and the monitoring processes.

‘Value for Money’ seemed to be consistent with conditions in South Sudan and costs were generally in line with market conditions. The high costs (which increased over the project life) were largely influenced by transport, security, fluctuating material prices, sourcing of inputs outside of South Sudan and seasonal access to sites.

### Sustainability

Although there may have been initial State Government agreement to assume the recurrent and maintenance costs of the assets, the lack of SSRF comprehensive capacity building and soft interventions did not provide them with sufficient capacity to do this, even if they had the financial resources. This was further compounded by the intervening fiscal crisis that drastically reduced the available financial resources of the state governments.

Despite weak state and county capacities being identified as a significant risk in the design of the SSRF, there was no focused or resourced capacity building component for communities (water projects) or state ministries (public administration buildings, roads) to secure the sustainability of these critical investments.

By not responding to the lack of capacities and the changing fiscal context, and not providing the stronger capacity development, transitional financial resources and post project support period, the SSRF has put the assets at risk and reduced the sustainability of outcomes. For example half

the haffirs and many boreholes are already not functioning and can't be used in next dry season unless repaired. This could increase incidents of conflict.

Although it is stated in the initial Joint Programme Documents (and in the 2012 Lessons Learned Exercise) states, counties and communities were not assured resources for carrying out their handover agreements, the SSRF did not develop alternative plans or contingencies - even after the problem became more acute with the fiscal crisis in 2012 and the political crisis of December 2013.

Although the SSRF processes engaged communities and beneficiaries in the initial consultation, there was no continued community engagement, funded or staffed within the implementation process. The failure of the SSRF to incorporate 'social responsibilities' within their contracting procedures, missed opportunities to cement stronger community ties to and 'ownership' of the assets.

The absence of a balance between the 'hard' infrastructure activities and the 'soft' capacity building, community engagement and active, local level monitoring and evaluation interventions within the SSRF compromised the possibility of long term sustainability and continuing use of the assets created has been degraded.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SSRF TO "CONSOLIDATE THE EXISTING BENEFITS OF SSRF ROUND 3"**

SSRF round 3 consider supporting a community capacity building programme for maintenance and repair of boreholes and haffirs. Financing and implementation could be through a different entity, to ensure that SSRF assets continue to contribute to the reduction of ethnic conflict related to water resources. Could also include haffirs or boreholes constructed through other organizations.

SSRF road works could be included in possible labour-based road maintenance programmes carried out by other organizations, so that the assets are not lost. SSRF could cover at least a three year period.

SSRF donors and all partners should continue the dialogue on how to move forward in future programmes in support of South Sudan's stabilization and recovery. Existing SSRF supported assets must be preserved while future initiatives are planned and developed.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL RECOVERY PROGRAMMING**

##### Programme design and planning

The underlying causes of the conflicts should be identified in the design phase through participatory research analysis and engagement of local institutions. Geographic area of programming, may be regional, state or area based, cutting across or combining formal governing administrative units so as to address social, economic and conflict dynamics. Baseline studies should be undertaken and localized indicators designed for results and outcomes of interventions.

Planning frameworks should be strategic, forward looking and comprehensive enough to monitor a changing and often volatile political and physical implementation context, and have built in financial and institutional capacity to respond.

Indicators should be carefully designed to allow for the measure of the outcomes as well as detecting emergent problems in the implementation process so that the programme/project can be modified accordingly. To be effective, outcome indicators should be able to accurately determine attribution by using both quantitative and qualitative measures which will provide contextual detail to the numerical findings. Appropriate sources of data should be established to measure the indicators and rather than using a single data source, use should be made of a range of data from appropriate agencies as well as using focus groups, public and expert surveys.

Sustainability of development results is an essential criteria in the planning, consultations, design and fund allocations of any recovery programme- especially with infrastructure or socio-economic interventions. The dynamic nature of capacity building should be recognised and particular attention should be given to the design of specific indicators for assessing the success of community and institutional capacity building. These indicators should be monitored periodically to drive mid-course corrections and refinements.

#### Programme governance

Multi Partner Trust Funds are valuable modalities for pooled support to agreed programmes. However, from the onset, the MPTF should have clear governing and management structures at all levels. This requires an operations manual so each level operates within its given mandate and competency. The high level governance body should focus only on strategic and broad oversight issues

Partnerships and coordination are important elements to maximize the impact and linkages in recovery and stabilization programmes. However, they must be formalized, so that the attainment of results are not compromised if partners cannot assume responsibility for key elements of the programme.

#### Implementation

Appropriate staff is difficult to retain in conflict settings, but programmes must ensure that essential staff are at the appropriate level and are suitably qualified. Staff should not only possess a project management orientation, but the leadership must have the capacity to assess the impact of project management decisions on the political and developmental imperatives of the interventions.

Robust monitoring coupled with continuing conflict assessments throughout the life of the programme, facilitate programme adjustments as the circumstances change – whether positively or negatively. M&E units must be anticipated, staffed and resourced- and placed at programme implementation level. There will be high costs attributed to flexibility and alteration of programmes to achieve the intended outcome, but this may be less costly than the losses linked to non- attainment.

#### Sustainability of programme outcomes and results

Countries in continuing conflict, with weak or emerging state structures, require embedding robust and realistic capacity building components within sub-national stabilization and recovery programmes. A strategic approach ensures that community or local (government) beneficiary leadership and ownership of the capacity building interventions and beneficiary inclusion are not only in initial assessment processes, but continue throughout the life of the programme.

If building projects are anticipated, national construction contractor formation should be incorporated into the design. Contracts awarded to international contractors should include protocols that develop national contractor capacity. This could be done by enforcing joint venture arrangements and supported by ancillary contractor formation support through a contractor development programme.

Construction contracts awarded should include protocols that cover standard “social and economic impact” conditions. This could ensure, for example, employment benefits for local residents, attention to opportunities for youth and women, elements of vocational and technical training, small business opportunities to support the programmes that are appropriate to the asset being constructed. These protocols may increase the cost of the contracts, but will provide cash injections into local economies and leave some technical capacities in place that will facilitate asset maintenance and engagement in future community projects.

## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Background

The South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) is a UN Multi Donor Trust Fund that was established to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance. Endorsed by the Sudan Donor Consortium in May 2008, SSRF aimed to address post-conflict recovery and reconstruction needs of South Sudan through delivery of catalytic, high impact projects for demonstrating peace dividends. The Fund was chaired by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) as it was seen as a critical part of the state-building agenda. Since its inception, three rounds of funding allocations under the SSRF were delivered in South Sudan.

This evaluation covers Round 3 of the SSRF covering the period from 2009 through the closure of the SSRF Round 3 (30 June 2015). The current context of the SSRF is important, as it informed and affects the evaluation content and process. The SSRF original design and concept was supported by Government, donors and the UN. Despite predictable challenges of working at the state level within South Sudan in the pre-independence and immediate post-independence period, the SSRF was viewed as making positive contributions to the recovery and stabilization process in the states it was operating in until the 15 December 2013 political crisis. Subsequently, there was a complete turn-around by the donors in relation to the SSRF in response to the actions of the Government. No new funds or SSRF programs would be considered (as it was a fund chaired by Government) and it was decided to close SSRF Round 3, and Government was informed that there would be no consideration of further SSRF programming or funding.<sup>1</sup>

The evaluation, therefore, is reviewing a program that was closed by donors due to political considerations at national level, but the SSRF for most of its life was operating at state and local level in four states within South Sudan. Therefore, it must review progress, impact and contribution towards its stated outcome, at that level of operation. Three of the four SSRF State Stabilizations Programmes were completed (Warrap, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes) and can be evaluated in terms of delivery of outputs and progress towards outcomes. Jonglei State Programme suffered significant damage and loss during the political crisis, and the programme was suspended and closed. There were no completed outputs to assess.

Round 3 of the SSRF aimed to restore post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure, increase security and reduce the level of ethnic conflicts in four states of South Sudan: Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap. Approximately USD 102 million was allocated to deliver the intended results under Round 3: USD 23,449,683 under the Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme; USD 28,456,008 under the Jonglei Stabilization Programme; USD 31,277,662 under the Lakes State Stabilization Programme; and USD 19,645,840 under the Warrap Stabilization Programme.

No previous SSRF reviews or assessments have been carried out. In the SSRF monitoring and evaluation framework, a mid-term outcome assessment was planned but not carried out. However, a Lessons Learned Exercise<sup>2</sup> was carried out in June 2012 to identify what was learned

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<sup>1</sup> Letter to SSRF Steering Committee, 21 March 2014, Signed by Embassy of Norway, Embassy of Netherlands, UK AID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark.

<sup>2</sup> See *South Sudan Recovery Fund Lessons Learned Exercise. Final Report June 2012*. Available from the SSRF secretariat

in terms of development and operational effectiveness over the three rounds of the fund, to that date. The exercise also made recommendations on future strategy, operational and management improvements and design considerations for future funding.

A plan to undertake a perception survey in 2013, which could have served as a form of baseline for this evaluation, was cancelled after the outbreak of the December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013 conflict. At the time, it was considered that the absence of previous baseline would render a perception survey largely meaningless from an evaluative standpoint. However, the absence of both the baseline and the perception survey, implies there is no standard of reference for the current evaluation.

It should be noted that the Governing body of the SSRF, the Steering Committee (SC) chaired by Government (Ministry of Finance) and co-chaired by the UN did not hold any meeting during 2014. Donors met amongst themselves and with the SSRF Secretariat and Coordinating Agency. A Damage and Loss assessment was completed in August 2014, to assess the impact of the political crisis on SSRF assets. A meeting was called in late January 2015, so that the SSRF SC could formally endorse the closure of the SSRF Programme and this Outcome Evaluation was approved.

Given this working context, the stated purpose for of this evaluation<sup>3</sup> is to assess the validity of the SSRF Round 3 ‘implicit’ Theory of Change in post-conflict and fragile state contexts, such as South Sudan, and identify good practices and lessons to feed into future programming. More specifically, the evaluation:

- a) assesses the relevance, ownership, effectiveness and efficiency of the Stabilization Programmes;
- b) determines the extent to which the Stabilization Programmes contributed to forging and strengthening of partnerships among key stakeholders;
- c) assesses the management arrangements and capacity in place by the Stabilization Programmes, Government and the beneficiary communities in sustaining the results achieved;
- d) assesses opportunity costs of engaging in infrastructure investments in South Sudan; and
- e) draws lessons learned and best practices and makes recommendations for future programming of projects of similar nature.

## 2.2 Approach and methodology

The foundation of the evaluation was the approved SSRF programme results framework as outlined in an abridged form below<sup>4</sup>.

SSRF Expected Outcomes and Outputs	Indicator	Indicator Definition	M&E Event/data collection methodology	Means of verification
<b>SSRF Outcome:</b> Increased security and reduced level of ethnic conflict in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Warrap, and Lakes states.	% change in the number of inter-communal conflicts	This measures the level of conflict in the four states. Count the # of ethnic conflict incidents in the reporting period and present it as percentage change compared to the baseline value.	Conduct outcome evaluations or assessments; joint field visits; desk review of reports and consultation with relevant institutions.	Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports; progress reports; monitoring reports; monthly UNOCHA incidents report.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 1 for the detailed terms of reference

<sup>4</sup> See Annex 2: Inception report (annex 1 of the report) for the complete SSRF Results Framework

SSRF Expected Outcomes and Outputs	Indicator	Indicator Definition	M&E Event/data collection methodology	Means of verification
	% change in the number of deaths due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four States. Count the total # of deaths due to ethnic conflicts in the reporting period and present as percentage change compared to the baseline value.		
	% change in the number of displacements due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four states. Count the total # of IDPs due to ethnic conflicts during the reporting period and present as percentage change compared to the baseline value.		
<b>Output 1:</b> Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State	Number of counties reached by the State managed radio station	The radio station is assumed to cover the whole state. Count the Counties that have access to the broadcast from the State managed radio station.	Conduct assessments; joint field visits; review meetings; desk review of technical and regular reports as well as consultation with relevant institutions, such as MoIC.	Assessment, progress, training and monitoring reports; review meeting minutes.
	Extent of broadcast on security alerts, peace building and educational programs/messages in local languages.	Count the number of security alerts, peace building and educational programs/messages transmitted through the State managed radio station in the reporting period.	Conduct assessments; joint field visits; review meetings; desk review of progress and monitoring reports as well as consultation with relevant institutions.	
	Number of radio station staff received capacity building trainings on broadcasting and maintenance of equipment.	The total number of radio station staff received training through the SSRF stabilization programme, disaggregated by sex and type of training.	Conduct desk review of the periodic reports, training reports as well as monitoring reports; review meetings; joint monitoring visits.	
<b>Output 2:</b> Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)	Kilometres of access roads constructed/rehabilitated	This indicator tracks the length of roads, in kilometre, constructed and/or rehabilitated by the SSRF stabilization programmes.	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct joint field visits.	Progress, training and monitoring reports; review meeting minutes.
	Number of MoPI staff trained on road maintenance and machine operation	This indicator tracks the total number of MoPI staff trained by the SSRF stabilization programmes, disaggregated by sex and type of training.	Review progress, training and monitoring reports; consult PUNOs and MoPI; conduct joint field visits and review meetings.	
	Number and type of road maintenance machineries procured and handed over to the government	Count the number of machineries handed over to the government, disaggregated by the type of machineries.	Review progress and monitoring reports; consult PUNOs and MoPI; conduct joint field visits and review meetings.	
<b>Output 3:</b> Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes,	Number of county headquarters, police posts, prisons, court houses and ranger posts	Count the number of local administration infrastructures constructed by the SSRF stabilization programmes. Disaggregate the data based on the	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct monitoring visits and review meetings.	Progress and monitoring reports; progress review meeting minutes.



SSRF Expected Outcomes and Outputs	Indicator	Indicator Definition	M&E Event/data collection methodology	Means of verification
Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	constructed	purpose of the buildings.		
<b>Output 4:</b> Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	Number of hafirs, boreholes and water filtrations constructed	Count the # of hafirs, boreholes and water filtration units constructed under the SSRF stabilization programmes.	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct monitoring visits and review meetings.	Progress and monitoring reports; progress review meeting minutes.

An output evaluation, a necessary element of the outcome evaluation, could be carried out with the existing information base and additional data collected in interviews and field visits. However, determining actual outcomes and impacts proved to be challenging. While the methodology gathered and analyzed both quantitative and qualitative information, it is important to recognize that this is not sufficient for evidence based conclusions or attributions on outcomes. Most of what can be verified is a contribution to the outcomes,

Quantitative data, over time, on incidents of violence in the targeted counties was initially obtained from UNOCHA to analyze outcome indicators, as the UNDAF had used this data in the original project documents. Additional data was obtained from UNMISS, in one state (EES), for verification purposes. This analysis, revealed divergences and inconsistencies in data collected by each UN entity, over time, so at best the data may considered indicative, inconclusive and incomplete.

A quantitative analysis of each State Stabilization Plan and its projects was carried out using available documentation from the SSRF coordinating agency (UNDP), PUNOs, other partners, government (state level) including quarterly and annual reports on all four state plans.

Programme progress towards outputs was substantiated through both quantitative (SSRF reports) and qualitative information collected through interviews with stakeholder individual and group interviews – both in Juba and in the states as well as observation through site visits to selected projects in three states.

## Evaluation tools

### Evaluation matrix

An evaluation matrix<sup>5</sup> was developed by the evaluators based on the evaluation questions processed from the Terms of Reference. The approved matrix and processed questions were used as the primary tools for the evaluation.

### Document review

The SSRF provided the consultants with extensive documentation<sup>6</sup> and other documents were provided by PUNOS, donors, state authorities and other partners.

<sup>5</sup> See Annex 2: Inception report (see annex 4 of the report)

<sup>6</sup> See Annex 3 for the list of documentation consulted

### Interviews

Interviews were conducted in Juba and in three states with a wide range of stakeholders. Community consultations and discussions were held with groups of direct and indirect beneficiaries, and with communities linked to projects visited<sup>7</sup>. A semi-structured set of interview questions was used for state, county and community interviews, to ensure consistency and comparability between interviewees<sup>8</sup>.

### Field visits

A project sample was agreed to ensure inclusion of all four output areas. Prior to the evaluators' field visits, preparatory visits were made to the states by the SSRF Coordinating Agency to verify that the projects were accessible - and to assess the availability of interviewees. The field visits were carried out by two teams in Lakes, Eastern Equatoria and Warrap<sup>9</sup> States between 15 June and 2 July 2015 where 18 project sites were visited. In consultation with the SSRF Secretariat a decision was taken not to visit Jonglei State due to the sensitivity relating to the ongoing negotiations regarding the closure of the radio project, and the scheduling changes in field visits to completed projects in other states.

## **2.3 Constraints and limitations to the evaluation**

The evaluators have noted the limitations experienced in carrying out this evaluation. A number of these limitations were outlined in the inception report. However, the evaluators are of the opinion that the limitations experienced do not detract from the overall findings and conclusions made.

- Consistent data to assess outcomes was not available. UNOCHA data collection and collation processes changed over the time of the programme implementation and this posed challenges in analyzing the programme outcomes.
- There were considerable challenges in ensuring that selected interviewees were available for interview. At national level, the evaluators were able to only meet with the Minister of Transport and the deputy Minister of Finance who is the chair of the SSRF Steering Committee. At state level, the evaluators were able to meet with a limited number of state ministers, County Commissioners, Director Generals and Directors, and one Governor.
- During the State visits, especially in Warrap and Lakes State, it was apparent that, although appointments for interviews were prearranged by the Secretariat, many state ministers and officials were not available at the time of the visits. Given the ongoing political and military conflict within South Sudan coupled with the economic crisis, State ministers and government officials understandably had other priorities and may not have viewed an evaluation of a closing program as a priority.
- It was also apparent in interviews that many standing state officials were not involved in the discussions of programme concept nor the programme implementation processes. Many of those involved in the conceptualization and implementation of the SSRF up until 15 December 2013, are no longer in their governmental position with the exception of Eastern Equatoria State.

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<sup>7</sup> See Annex 4: List of Interviewees

<sup>8</sup> See Annex 5: Interview questions

<sup>9</sup> See Annex 6: Projects visited

- There has been high donor, UN and partner turnover and it was difficult to interview persons who possessed an understanding of the original programme concept and detailed knowledge of the programme. While the SSRF SC did not meet during 2014, SSRF donors held meeting amongst themselves and often with the UN. There were no minutes of these meetings to document the discussions and decision-making process regarding to closing of the SSRF Round 3. The only information for 2014 is the output data from the Coordinating Agency, and interviews, aside from the Letter to the SC Steering Committee in March 2014.
- Although the evaluators requested of the SSRF Secretariat that women, youth be included in field-based interviews, the particular context of communities and the short preparatory time negated this.
- The evaluation was held in the rainy season, which complicated logistical access and also meant that the haffirs were not in use, as they are normally used in the dry season to prevent conflicts.
- Availability of flights, road access and the current security situation in the intended locations identified required continual monitoring and, in some case, change of plans. Some project sites scheduled for visits were not accessible due to weather and road conditions.
- Some areas, required UNMISS support for force protection, logistical assets and helicopters. This delayed some of the visits and others were canceled.

### 3 THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES OF SOUTH SUDAN

The time frame covered by the SSRF, from its establishment in 2008 to its closure in 2015, requires an analysis of the varying development contexts and challenges throughout the period. To assist in this evaluation, we will briefly examine the development context of (1) the initial period of the establishment of the SRF-SS in May 2008; (2) the 2009/2010 period in anticipation of the referendum and likely independence that framed Round 3 of the SSRF; (3) post-independence political and economic challenges that are reflected in the current continuing crisis. The first two periods are characterized by a generally accepted (at the time) post-conflict recovery and development response in which the GoSS and its development partners endorsed a common approach. The current period has exposed weaknesses, contradictions and gaps in the dominant analysis that had implications for the SSRF in the period subsequent to the December 2013 political/military crisis.<sup>10</sup>

#### Why a Recovery Fund

A Sudan Donor Consortium meeting in Oslo, Norway in May 2008 endorsed the setting up of a Sudan Recovery Fund- South Sudan (SRF-SS) recognizing the need for a flexible and agile funding mechanism that could focus on recovery programming as the bridge between humanitarian assistance and longer term development programs. Following the signing of a CPA, the two parties had requested an UN-World Bank coordinated Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to produce a recovery and development plan, including funding mechanisms, for the interim period (2006-2001). A World Bank managed MDTF was set up, but by early 2008, it was recognized that an additional complementary UN managed fund could enhance short term recovery initiatives and might bring more visible peace dividends to the population. The Recovery Fund was chaired by the GoSS (Ministry of Finance) and initially co-chaired by the UN and the Joint Donor Team (JDT), until 2010 when it was passed to the UN, due to changes in the JDT.

In the immediate post CPA period, state-building, with a focus at central level, was prioritized by both Government and donors. The GoSS had its own flow of financial revenue due to the wealth-sharing provisions of the CPA, and quickly expanded the public sector at all levels. The WB MDTF and other donor programming provided technical assistance and infrastructure for these emerging central ministries.

The SRF-SS (Pre-independence name of SSRF) moved in to fill the 'recovery gap' through NGOs, by supporting local level projects in all ten states, that would expand service delivery, support livelihoods, improve security and demonstrate "peace dividends". State institutions were just emerging at state and county levels, so the first rounds of the SSRF operated separate from or parallel to these emerging governing institutions following essentially a supply driven projectized model of development assistance.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *When Peace is the Exception: Shifting the Donor Narrative in South Sudan*. (CRU Policy Brief, June 2015, by Jort Hemmer and Nick Grinstead, Clingendael; Netherlands Institute of International Relations) expands on the challenges in the current period and its links to development approaches of previous periods.

<sup>11</sup> *Lessons Learned Exercise: SSRF, September 2012*. This details the shift to the 'Implicit' Theory of Change adopted by SSRF Round 3, a response to the shortcomings of Rounds 1 and 2.

Most of the higher-level political focus of UNMIS and the international community in 2007 and 2008 focused on the tensions between the two parties to the CPA and the continuing dialogues on unresolved issues. By 2009, growing ethnic and inter-communal conflict became evident as did the challenges for state and local political and security authorities to manage these incidents. Support for state and local government, including capacity building initiatives building, was increasingly seen by GoSS and donors as an important peace building priority. UNDP, USAID, GIZ and others initiated capacity building support to the states in this period.

### **Expansion of State Authority as Driver for Stabilization and Recovery**

The 2010 elections and 2011 Referendum underscored the importance of building state governments and expanding state presence to local level, while giving primacy at a national level to Southern political unity. Increased incidents of inter-communal and ethnic violence, exposed the states inability to establish public security. While the donor concerns was on the 'legitimacy' of the GoSS and the development of its national institutions, there was an increasing awareness that investments at in areas of conflict and hot spots could push forward a stabilization process.

This was coupled with a growing consensus that just as national government institutional building was a priority in the early years of the CPA interim period, that support for state and county level institutions and capacities were equally important for the stabilization required to propel recovery and development programming.

The referendum overwhelmingly endorsed separation. Subsequently, the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) was developed in early 2011 to guide development through 2015. The SSDP defined key nation building, state building and peace-building objectives to place the new nation on a hoped for fast-track to development. "Insecurity was highlighted in consultations as a continuing concern" with "numerous causes, including clashes between communities over cattle and access to grazing land, breakdown of cultural values and norms, the availability of arms, and lack of economic opportunities. The consequences of insecurity include large numbers of displaced persons, continuing food insecurity, disruption to social services and increased poverty."<sup>12</sup>

### **Fiscal Crisis of 2012 and Political/Military crisis of 2013**

The development context began to change dramatically within 6 months of independence. The new state was challenged on all fronts. Continued disputes with the Republic of Sudan, led to the cut off of oil flows and the resulting revenues. With 98% of Government revenue dependent upon oil, this forced the new state to draw down its reserves. In addition, widespread corruption exposed by the President further reduced both internal and external confidence and support.

Fiscal transfers to the states and counties were further reduced due to the financial squeeze. The states could not cover their own budget commitments to basic service delivery, nor their obligations to the SSRF and other programmes. The economic situation continued to deteriorate.

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<sup>12</sup> South Sudan Development Plan, July 2001. P 12.

The conflicts with the ruling SPLM came to a head in July 2013 with the dismissal of the cabinet and the Vice President. International partners did not recognize the significance of the tensions, and therefore many admitted they were taken by surprise by the events of 15 December 2013, that led to charges of a coup attempt by the ruling party and the ensuing civil war and fierce military conflict that has wracked the country since. While international support for recovery and development began to reduce in 2012, by 2015, close to 80% of all assistance is now for life saving humanitarian programmes. The withdrawal of support for the SSRF, by its donors followed the pattern of the shifting balance between support for recovery and humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian needs have grown exponentially as has the suffering of the South Sudanese people, especially in the war-affected states.

## 4 SSRF UN JOINT STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES RESPONSE AND CHALLENGES

### 4.1 SSRF Response

By early 2009, in light of the changing conditions and context, a revised allocation strategy emerged for SSRF Round 3 to support state based programs that would help to stabilize or 'transform' conflict. A key feature was the extension of 'legitimate' and 'visible' state authority in areas affected by inter-communal conflicts, through the construction of visible infrastructure (county headquarters, police posts, local courts). There was recognition that ethnic or inter-communal conflicts were an obstacle to recovery and development that required an expansion of state presence in more isolated, conflict prone areas. In addition, the new modality was a shift to greater emphasis on the importance of state and county level authorities and communities in the definition of program priorities that would improve their own security, rather than having central ministries to dominate the decision –making.

Both donors and government subscribed to and endorsed this approach<sup>13</sup>. Jonglei was selected as the first state to be included in this new round. This was followed by Lakes State, and later Warrap and Eastern Equatoria States. Four distinct State Stabilization Programmes, investing in infrastructure, were developed during 2010 to increase security and reduce levels of ethnic conflict in the targeted areas. In the SSRF Steering Committee (SC) in November 2010, while discussing the proposed Stabilization Programme for Eastern Equatoria, the Deputy Governor underscored important underlying principles and desired practices for the SSRF roll out:

*"The Deputy Governor stressed the importance of ensuring that the SRF projects in Eastern Equatoria follow best practice. In this regard, he noted that:*

- *Contracts will require a minimum percentage of female labor.*
- *Measures will be put in place to ensure sustainability. This includes commitments by the state*

*Government to staff police posts and guarantee resources in state budgets for maintenance and operational costs of roads, police posts and haffirs.*

- *Assessments are currently underway to ensure that projects will have a positive impact on the security, stabilization and the socio-economic situation.*
- *A State Management Support Unit will be established in the State Ministry of Finance to ensure capacity building in planning, overseeing and coordinating large development initiatives. "*

At the same meeting, DFID commented positively on the steps planned to ensure sustainability and to analyze the socioeconomic impact of the projects. He suggested that at least 10 percent of the road cost should be for maintenance and that provisions need to be made for fuel, power, etc.

Responding to the hopes and aspirations of the later part of the CPA Interim period, government officials and donors alike in 2010 saw the SSRF Stabilization Programmes as much more than an 'infrastructure for peace' initiative. While Jonglei started up in late 2010, all other state programs began in early 2011, shortly after the overwhelming vote for Separation for


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<sup>13</sup> SC meeting minutes, October 28. 2009

Sudan. Four State Stabilization Boards, chaired by the Governor or the state Minister of Finance, to oversee implementation of monitoring of the programme.

### Governance and management arrangements of the SSRF

The governance arrangements for the SSRF that were introduced when the Fund was established in 2008 were modified during the implementation of Round 3, to take into account the four distinct State Stabilization Programmes. These arrangements can be described in the diagram below:



To extend Government leadership in the SSRF to the state level, State Stabilization Steering Committees (Boards) were established in each state to function as the state-level forum for planning, coordination, oversight and monitoring of the implementation of each state Stabilization Programme. They were usually chaired by the state Minister of Finance and included representation from the relevant state ministries (i.e. Local Government, Infrastructure, Transport and Roads, Water Resources) engaged as implementing partners in the SSRF projects; the PUNOs working in the state and the SSRF Coordinating Agency (UNDP).



The SSRF Steering Committee chaired by Government and co-chaired by the UN DSRSG/HC/RC, was intended to provide strategic guidance, and make decisions on fund allocations, coordination and oversight. All decisions were to be made by consensus. The composition, according to the Revised Terms of Reference, in addition to the Chair and Co-Chair, included representatives from two Government ministries, two donors, representative of UNCT, one representative of NGO Forum (observer), one representative from Administrative Agent (UNDP) participated (ex-officio capacity). The Chairperson could invite others as observers to particular meetings. The body was to meet four times a year, at minimum.

The SSRF Secretariat (initially called the Technical Secretariat) was established to support the Steering Committee. It supported the overall planning of SSRF resources, monitored the SSRF portfolio including the preparation of consolidated quarterly and annual reports and the certified annual and final financial statements, supported the review and approval processes, and initiated the transfer of funds to the agreed projects. The Secretariat was responsible for the organization of Steering Committee Meetings, tracking all SC approvals, allocations and implementation progress to report to the SC. The SSRF Secretariat coordinated with the UN Coordinating Agency in reporting on the results of the SSRF. The SSRF Secretariat was to monitor and ensure that the SC was adhering to its Terms of Reference and that the SC was following the norms and procedures of MDTFs. The administrative support to the Technical Secretariat was provided by the Coordinating Agency (UNDP). The Coordinating Agency (UNDP) was responsible for programme oversight, coordination as well as monitoring and evaluation reporting to the SSRF Secretariat.

## **Challenges**

The SSRF entered within a context of multiple challenges. All states were characterized by extremely weak public administration, almost no rule of law institutions yet very high expectations that there would be an increase in basic services and a visible “peace dividend”. The human resource base within the state ministries and counties was inadequate and this coupled with poor systems and procedures, a lack of baseline data and poor infrastructure placed the states and counties in a difficult position to absorb and utilize the SSRF investments, without the capacity building support highlighted in the SSRF concept notes.

In addition, seasonal constraints of a short dry season when building could take place, a rainy season with almost no access and insecurity meant work could be stopped for months at a time, thus implied that the delivery of these planned investments would take more time, than initially planned. In addition, there were landmines that had to be cleared before any construction work could be undertaken in some areas. Together, this meant that higher construction costs be high most of the projects would be considered high risk.

## **4.2 SSRF Joint SSRF Stabilisation Programme outcome model**

Within the overall UN system, the outcome of the SSRF Stabilisation Programme is meant to contribute to UNDAF Outcome 1: Peace-building<sup>14</sup>. The outcome of the SSRF is specified in the SSRF results framework as “increased security and reduced level of ethnic conflict in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap states”. This outcome is to be derived from the aggregated


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<sup>14</sup> As per the SSRF framework provided and approved in the Inception Report

sub-outcomes of the four states. The specified outcome of each state is “increased security and reduced level of ethnic conflict”.

Each state has its own similar outputs (with Jonglei being an exception). The results of these outputs should, in theory, bring about the specified state outcomes. Each state outcome is a contribution to the overall SSRF outcome.

The four outputs of the UN Joint Stabilization Programme are made up of the outputs of each State Stabilisation Programme as described in the diagramme below. The inter-relationship between the programme level outputs and state outputs are also described.



### 4.3 SSRF Joint SSRF Stabilisation Programme outcomes

#### 4.3.1 Overview

At the time of design, the outcome was framed to contribute to the UNDAF Outcome 1: Peace-Building. The SSRF outcome is outlined in the Results Framework for Round 3: Stabilization Programmes in Warrap, Jonglei, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria as follows:

SSRF Outcome	Indicator	Indicator Definition
Increased security and reduced level of ethnic conflict in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Warrap, and Lakes states.	% change in the number of inter-communal conflicts	This measures the level of conflict in the four states. Count the # of ethnic conflict incidents in the reporting period and present it as percentage change compared to the baseline value.
	% change in the number of deaths due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four States. Count the total # of deaths due to ethnic conflicts in the reporting period and present as percentage change compared to the baseline value.
	% change in the number of displacements due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four states. Count the total # of IDPs due to ethnic conflicts during the reporting period and present as percentage change compared to the baseline value

For the purposes of quantifying the outcome of the SSRF Joint SSRF Stabilisation Programmes, the indicators above are devolved to state level. In the quantification tables detailed in the sections below, state level data (obtained from UNOCHA) has been used. This data was synthesised and only communal level conflicts were utilised in the analysis. In addition, the data used only refers to the counties where the SSRF projects are located.

#### 4.3.2 Limitations in quantifying outcomes

Data used to quantify the SSRF outcome and state level outcomes in the tables in the sections below is solely derived from the UNOCHA database.<sup>15</sup> The use of this data cannot provide an accurate quantification of the contribution or attribution<sup>16</sup> of the SSRF activities towards achieving its indicators, as discussed below.

##### Inconsistency of UNOCHA data

The SSRF Round 3 evaluation framework states that verification of outcomes will be done using UNOCHA data. UNOCHA data is compiled from a range of agencies using a multiplicity of fields. The various agencies collect data based on their own particular needs and interests and use different definitions of descriptors. These also can change over time.

Accurate data on inter-communal conflict was more difficult to collect after the violent conflict that erupted in mid-December 2013. Evaluators were informed by UNOCHA that the collection source and methodology changed at that time, and that fields and details were no longer

<sup>15</sup> The selection of UNOCHA data as the sole source of quantitative data tracking outcomes, was decided by the SSRF Round 3 in its initial programme documents.

<sup>16</sup> See the section below on perceptions obtained through interviews which provides another view of the outcomes.

recorded in the same manner as previous to the conflict of December 2013. Accordingly, the data for SSRF outcome indicators could be considered relatively consistent up until 2013, though still incomplete and divergent from UNMISS data (see below).

The recording of incidents of conflict and related displacements and deaths occurring after December 2013, by UNOCHA, cannot consistently be attributed to inter-communal conflict. In the context of the conflict at the time, it is doubtful that the recording process could always determine the true nature of the cause of the conflicts i.e. whether they were cattle, or water related or part of the underlying political tensions at the time. This would be especially relevant in Jonglei and Lakes States.

At the start of the evaluation, the full data base of UNOCHA was requested, received and analysed. A later request to verify the data extrapolated for Eastern Equatoria was sent to UNMISS/EES. In the returned verification, it was clear that the OCHA original data differed substantially from the data provided by UNMISS (JOC/SOC). UNMISS, also informed the evaluators by email, that some data in their records may be incomplete. UNMISS indicated that due to the nature of their work, numbers of displaced persons were not collected, so they provided data for two fields: (1) numbers of incidents of intercommunal violence (2) numbers of deaths attributed to these incidents, by year. The table below demonstrates the significant divergences in the two data sources for Eastern Equatoria:

	Number of Incidents				Number of deaths			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015
UNMISS	14	18	29	11	19	39	70	23
UNOCHA		3	3	3	1	16	3	

It would appear that UNMISS has a much broader coverage than UNOCHA as it uses a multiplicity of UN sources (Military observers, RRP, HR, UNPOL, UNDSS, Civil Affairs) and goes deeper into the counties and payams. UNMISS also supplied narratives, from their monthly reports, that described in more detail each incident. This comparison reinforces the unreliability of the UNOCHA base data to accurately assess the SSRF outcomes.

In reviewing these two data sets, the much lower number of incidents of inter-communal violence and deaths recorded by UNOCHA in Eastern Equatoria State than UNMISS, underscores the difficulty in gathering information and how it depends upon varying patterns of deployment of staff that gather information based on where they are, rather than consistently gathering information in the same locations over time. In discussions with state authorities, members of the Peace Commission and the Catholic Church in Torit (EES), most indicated that quantitative data on such incidents, over time, is very difficult to gather and that few entities actually can provide such information, or will publically disseminate it, at this point in time.

### SSRF indicators

When the SSRF overall Results framework was designed there were no base lines set for the outcome indicators. The baselines used in the tables below are based on the UNOCHA data of preceding years.

The SSRF indicators are designed to show a year on year percentage (from baseline) of the increase or decrease the incidents of communal conflict and related displacements and deaths. However, a better way to demonstrate the increase or decrease may be to rather look how the numbers of incidents of communal conflict and related displacements and deaths increased or

decreased. Bar charts to this effect have been provided in the tables below. However, the consistency of the data throws into doubt the validity of information displayed in these bar charts.

Some of the indicators seek to measure change that cannot be attributed only to the SSRF, or have little to do with its activities because there are a multiple of variables at play. A significant logic gap exists between the programme outcomes and outputs which makes attribution unquantifiable. There are multiplicity of actors and factors that contribute to a reduction of inter-communal conflicts, displacements and deaths. At best, it can only be stated the SSRF (as one of the actors) has partially contributed to such reduction.

The SSRF state programme interventions take place at a localised level<sup>17</sup>, however the indicators are geared towards state level outcomes. This makes it difficult to determine actual attribution.

### UNDAF

This evaluation was not tasked to evaluate the SSRF contribution to the UNDAF outcomes. However, it is pertinent to note that UNOCHA data collection was geared towards providing progress towards UNDAF outcomes and was consistent with the UNDAF outcome indicators. In the 2009-2012 UNDAF the SSRF relevant outcome was *Outcome 1: Peace-Building* (as reflected in the SSRF framework). With the change in UNDAF outcomes in the 2012-13 UNDAF in, the relevant outcome was *Outcome 4: Violence is reduced and community security improves*. The changes in the outcomes also brought about a corresponding change in the data collection fields of UNOCHA and other agencies. It may therefore may have been initially appropriate for the SSRF to use UNOCHA data to gauge its outcome – the change in 2012-13 made it no longer appropriate. The change in the UNDAF indicators appear not to be reflected in the SSRF framework provided to the evaluators.

In addition, the UNDAF indicators to which the SSRF reports to in its results framework are high level and the outcomes are to be achieved by the different actors within the UN system. When the UNDAF indicator were designed, no calculation was done to allocate the contribution by each agency to the indicators. For this reason, the SSRF cannot determine what its contribution would be to either of the UNDAF outcomes outlined above.

#### **4.3.3 Quantification of outcomes**


Bearing in mind the limitations of the UNOCHA data, the data shows that there has been an overall positive outcome in the areas where the programme was implemented. The data shows that there was a reduction in violence in three out of four states. Lakes State being the exception.

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<sup>17</sup> No local level indicators were designed by the SSRF. The evaluation was guided by the designed indicators i.e. as outlined in the SSRF framework and as approved in the inception report. No evidence was found of the SSRF pursuing alternative data sources to analyze local level outcomes. Due to the limited time available, insecurity and the inaccessibility of project sites, the evaluators did not pursue any local level data collection – other than anecdotal information provided in interviews with officials and communities (see section below on perceptions of outcomes).

### Warrap State


In Warrap State the data indicates that there was an overall positive outcome with incidents in 2014 having decreased by 11%, displacements by 100% and deaths by 61% from the 2010 baseline. The state was largely unaffected by the conflict of December 2013 and, accordingly, the data could be considered consistent.



Source:UNOCHA

### Lakes State

In Lakes State the data shows that in 2014 there was a 248% increase in incidents, 100% decrease in displacements and 285% increase in deaths from the 2010 baseline. This does not make logical sense because it would be expected that with the dramatic increase in incidents and deaths, there would be a corresponding increase in displacements. The larger conflict could only have created significant displacements – yet the data does not demonstrate this. Lakes was affected by the conflict of December 2013 and this could be why the data shows that there was an increase in the number of incidents and deaths. One could conclude that there was an inability to accurately distinguish the actual causes of the incidents in the data collection processes.



Source:UNOCHA

### Eastern Equatoria State


The UNOCHA data in Eastern Equatoria State showed that by 2014 incidents decreased by 83% and there was a corresponding 93% decrease in deaths from the baseline in 2010. No displacements were recorded over the years of the project. This would appear consistent due to the state not being affected by the 2013 conflict. However, UNMISS data indicates that in 2014 there was a 107% increase in incidents from 2013 and a 268% increase in deaths over the same period. This further reinforces the inconsistency of available data as noted in the limitations above.

Number of Incidents					Number of IDPs					Number of Deaths				
Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014
18	12	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	42	16	1	16	3

% Incidents year on year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
-33	-83	-83	-83

% IDPs year on year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
0	0	0	0

% Deaths year in year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
-62	-98	-62	-93



Source: UNOCHA

### Jonglei State


In Jonglei State the data shows that in 2014 there was an 84% decrease in incidents; 100% decrease in displacements and 60% decrease in deaths from the 2010 baseline. Jonglei State was most affected by the conflict of December 2013 and one could conclude that there was less inter-communal conflict because of the larger conflict or that the incidents were not counted as inter-communal due to the inability to distinguish between the two. The larger conflict could only have created significant displacements - yet there was a 100% decrease in displacements due to inter-communal conflict. As in the case of Lakes State, this could also be attributed to the method of recording the actual causes of the incidents

Number of Incidents					Number of IDPs					Number of Deaths				
Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014
116	209	145	159	19	48 608	252 663	123 662	59 298	-	284	1 705	1 020	294	113

% Incidents year on year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
80	25	37	-84

% IDPs year on year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
420	154	22	-100

% Deaths year in year			
2011	2012	2013	2014
500	259	4	-60



Source: UNOCHA

### 4.3.4 Perceptions of outcomes

As outlined in the data limitations above, the quantification of outcomes and related bar charts as described in the state outcome tables cannot be considered consistent. For this reason the evaluators have provided additional interviewee perceptions of the outcomes below. Such perceptions are important in assessing how the beneficiaries feel about the change that has occurred in security as a result of the SSRF interventions.

Based on perceptions of interviewees and community meetings, achievement of indicators can be anecdotally gauged. These perceptions provide a positive view of the outcomes with all interviewees and community members consulted indicating that the SSRF assets have made their lives safer by reducing the incidents of inter-communal conflict, cattle raiding, cattle theft, criminality and competition over water resources. Additional positive outcomes included greater accessibility to goods and state services such as clinics. These perceptions are described below under the four SSRF outputs carried out to achieve the designed outcomes.

### Radio station

*Rationale Public radio telecommunication infrastructure and services broadcasting messages that promote peace-building and educational issues will bring about social cohesion and a corresponding reduction in conflict.*

There are no outcomes in respect of the radio station. No interviews were done in Jonglei and the radio station ceased operation in the conflict of December 2013. Therefore no perceptions are available. It had been broadcasting for three hours a day from September to mid December 2015, with positive feedback according to the internal reporting, in terms of peace promotion. No impact in terms of outcome could be verified.

### Security access roads

*Rationale: Roads improve state government and police access to the remote, underserved and conflict prone areas as well as promote trade and citizen access to state services such as health. State and police access ensures rapid response to inter-communal conflicts.*

Community members met in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap indicated that roads made them feel safer because they had quick access to assistance in situations of conflict. They also indicated that the presence of police on the roads also reduced cattle rustling and theft. It was noted that there was easier access to markets to sell their goods, traders moved into areas that they had not previously services and the population could more easily purchase supplies. Women noted that they had faster and easier access to health facilities particularly when giving birth and obtaining health service for children.

The evaluators noticed in Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Lakes that communities were beginning to create settlements alongside the roads, which is also a sign of increased confidence in the security situation. During the evaluators visit to Warrap State, Ministers, state officials and police were using one SSRF road to access an area where there was an incident of inter-communal conflict. In EES, during the time of the visit, the Security road constructed with SSRF also facilitated access to cattle raiders and allowed a county commissioner to facilitate the return of cattle.

Interviews carried out by previous monitoring missions, confirmed the perceptions, that SSRF supported roads increased the confidence of the population in security. There, however, were no systematic surveys or monitoring undertaken by the SSRF during the life of the project to confirm the use of the roads for economic trade, improved service delivery, police actions to reduce cattle raiding, or other confidence building measures.

### Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas

*Rationale: By extending the authority of the state into remote, conflict prone areas, through the construction of security and rule of law institutions (i.e. county headquarters, courts, police posts and prisons), levels of inter-communal conflict can be reduced.*

Community interviews in Warrap and Lakes were unanimous that police stations provided them with greater levels of security. They noted instances where police were able to effectively respond to localised conflict and crime. They noted that there were less cattle thieves evident as a result of the police stations and road access. It was noted by the evaluators that not all police stations were



operational due to lack of accommodation and food for policemen, as well as a shortage of trained, qualified police officers. In one community it was stated that the closing of the police station (due to lack of food supplies delivered to the officers) made them feel more vulnerable. Even in an area, where a police post was being used as a prison, communities indicated that the presence of prison officials and police provided them with a greater sense of security. The evaluators also noted that communities were settling close to the police stations and prisons. The UNMISS State Coordinator in Warrap reports that Commissioners said the SSRF projects have had positive impacts on the communities in the different locations where they have been constructed. The Police Stations built have helped to improve the security situation as Police are deployed in areas where the stations are located and that the communication equipment helped to improve communication between the payams and the County HQ by enabling daily briefings on security and interventions.

In Lakes State, evaluators were informed that the presence of the courts had provided communities and individuals with an objective dispute resolution mechanism. Prior to the establishment of the courts, disputes were resolved through conflict, or tribal courts. The evaluators were informed that the tribal courts still operated to resolve conflicts but, when no resolution was reached, communities or individuals took the issues to the courts. According to one judge, the presence of the courts has contributed to the reduction of communal violence.

In Eastern Equatoria State, the Stabilization Plan prioritized the building of County Headquarters as a way to expand state presence and to deliver services. The SSRF supported four, while the state government with public funds constructed the other four. Eastern Equatoria is the only state in South Sudan which had improved and adequate County Headquarters as the centre of Government in all counties. There was unanimous agreement among all interviewed, that bringing the local government closer to the people increased the sense of security and also allowed closer access by all levels of state officials to the payams within the county.

#### Improved access to water sources

*Rationale: Water access points (haffirs and boreholes) provide communities with water close to home and prevent travelling long distances to access water. Water, particularly for cattle is often a source of inter-communal conflict. Moving cattle over long distances also increases the chances of cattle raiding and theft - an additional cause of inter-communal conflict. Construct water reservoirs to prevent competition and conflict over scarce resources – particularly, water and grazing land.*

Communities interviewed who had used the haffirs indicated that they felt safer by not moving their cattle long distances, into often disputed grazing areas. Boreholes also provided them close access to potable water and decreased their exposure to conflict. As a counterpoint, one community interviewed indicated that their haffir was not operating and that they were overusing their boreholes to water their cattle. As a result, only one of the four boreholes were now functioning. As the chief ominously said “when the dry season comes and we have no access to water because our haffir and boreholes are not working, we will be prepared to fight for water.” The UNMISS State Coordinator in Warrap reports that provision of boreholes and water points to have helped in reducing conflicts associated with access to water and improving sanitation. County authorities reported significant reduction in the outbreak of diseases.

In Eastern Equatoria, where the haffirs were working over the last two dry seasons, the communities reported that conflicts has significantly reduced. This evaluation was held during the rainy season, so it was not possible to observe haffirs in use.

## 4.4 Overview summary of SSRF Outputs

The SSRF Round 3 State Stabilization Programmes were ambitious in building local infrastructure in remote, insecure locations in four states in South Sudan, so as to increase security at community level. Logistical, political, security and seasonal challenges, over the life of the programme severely impacted their realization of results.

Two of the State Stabilization Programmes (Warrap and Eastern Equatoria State) impressively achieved all outputs, while one state (Lakes State) achieved most outputs with some projects showing partial results. The Jonglei State Stabilization Programme was terminated, due attacks, losses and damages associated with the military conflict following the December 2013 crisis. No outputs were achieved.

The summary table below has been extracted from the detailed outputs<sup>18</sup> and are further described in the narrative below

SSRF Outputs	Achievement summary
<b>Output 1:</b> Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State	<p>The project was terminated and it did not realize its intended output.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Jonglei Public Radio was built and radio equipment installed in 2013 but never formally handed over.</li> <li>• 40 staff were trained in 2013 and the station was broadcasting 3 hours a day between September and 15 December when it ceased after the station was attacked and looted</li> <li>• Salvaged equipment is stored at the UNMISS-Bor and negotiations are on-going to determine their disposition.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 2:</b> Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)	<p>All the security access roads in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap States are being used</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jonglei State: 15km of the 148 KM Akobo-Pochalla road in Jonglei State completed and the bridge was partially constructed.</li> <li>• Lakes State: 60.8 kilometres of the Karich-Amok Piny-Panyijar road is in use. 46 km of the AluakLuak-AkuocCok road was completed, with 6 km incomplete</li> <li>• East Equatoria State: The 140 km Lobira –Kanangok road was completed and in use, but showing signs that maintenance is required.</li> <li>• Warrap State: The 70 km Warrap – Akop-Pakur constructed and is in use</li> </ul>
<b>Output 3:</b> Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	<p>All the 32 planned buildings were constructed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 14 Police stations (7 in Lakes State and 7 in Warrap State);</li> <li>• 7 Courts in Lakes State;</li> <li>• 4 County headquarters in Eastern Equatoria State;</li> <li>• 1 Prison in Eastern Equatoria State.</li> </ul>
<b>Output 4:</b> Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	<p>All SSRF Round 3 water projects were completed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 haffirs (4 in Eastern Equatoria State, 4 in Lakes State, 2 Warrap State) and have been used by the communities. 5 haffirs were found not functional</li> <li>• 28 boreholes constructed Warrap, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria states) with the highest concentration in Lakes (16 Boreholes.) Inspections and interviews showed many were not functional</li> </ul>

<sup>18</sup> See Annex 8: Detailed output data and information on all SSRF Round 3 Projects

In response to changing context and conditions, the SSRF Round 3 Joint Programme Documents were amended three times. The first two amendments (January and December 2012) were related to budget allocations, extension of time frame or change of scope (increase or reduction), for example in number of boreholes or haffirs, capacity building, training, environmental impact assessments.

This reflected the growing awareness that the SSRF, in its initial programme documents and concept, had not adequately addressed the issues of capacity building and support for state and community-based institutions that were to assume 'ownership' of the SSRF investments. While these measures did mitigate some of the problems, the capacity building was of limited duration and time bound by the duration of the construction contracts in most cases. In particular, PACT, a key partner in the water sector that trained Water Management Committees (WMCs), noted that the contract did not allow for continuing engagement with the communities as they were operationalizing the WMCs, thus reducing their impact in ensuring management and sustainability of the haffirs or boreholes.

The Jonglei Public Radio, had not factored in any costs for capacity building of state personnel to manage, maintain or engage in radio production and broadcasting in its initial Programme Document. The first SSRF Round 3 amendment in January 2012, approved a training package of \$1.5 million for the radio. At the same time, an environmental assessment was added on the proposed road between Akobo and Pochalla, as it bordered on wildlife areas. These lapses in planning and programming in the initial stages, delayed the projects and underscore the importance of impact assessment and a capacity building strategy from the onset.

The final amendment in January 2015 was focused on closing the SSRF Round 3. Water Management Committees in Lakes State. The committees were not established due to 'shortage of funds', putting a risk the sustainability of valuable water assets. No other initiatives for the 'consolidation of the benefits' of the SSRF Round 3 were discussed at that time.

#### **4.4.1 Output 1: Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State**

The Jonglei Public Radio was built and radio equipment installed in 2013. The building was never formally handed over to the State Ministry of Information. Forty staff were trained in 2013 and the station was broadcasting 3 hours a day between September and 15 December 2013. A management and training needs assessment was carried out in November/December 2013. Broadcasting ceased after the station was attacked and looted during the conflict of December 2013. Salvaged equipment is stored at the UNMISS-Bor. The project was terminated and it did not realize its intended output. Negotiations are on-going to determine the disposition of the remaining equipment and assets<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> This evaluation did not undertake field visits to Jonglei. As the closure of the Radio Project is not yet complete, and under negotiations, it was not considered appropriate to have the evaluation team visit at the time. It could be considered, in the future, to perhaps undertake a case study of the Jonglei State Stabilization Programme to identify points in which inform future programming. In particular, investments in public radio stations in highly volatile environments should be examined.

#### **4.4.2 Output 2: Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)**

All the security access roads in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap States are being used by security services to quell conflicts and to reduce cattle rustling and theft. Citizens are using the roads for trade, to access markets, health posts and other state services. Settlements are beginning to be created alongside the roads. The Akobo-Pochalla Road in Jonglei State project closed and it did not realize the desired output.

- Jonglei State: Only 15km of the 148 KM Akobo-Pochalla road in Jonglei State was completed by December 2013 at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, with a mere 500 meters useable (November 2014) due to overgrowth. The bridge was partially constructed. Damage, loss and theft attributed to the December 2013 conflict is estimated at USD 7,594,069.
- Lakes State: 60.8 kilometres of the Karich-Amok Piny-Panyijar road is in use. The remaining 58km from Amok Piny to Panyijar was suspended and subsequently, terminated due to the limited prospect for completion; as the result of the ongoing political instability and conflict in the area. 46 km of the AluakLuak-AkuocCok road was completed, with 6 km incomplete, due to insecurity and lack of funds.
- East Equatoria State: The 140 km Lobira –Kanangok road was completed and in use, but showing signs that maintenance is required.
- Warrap State: The 70 km Warrap – Akop-Pakur has been constructed and is in use but the 12 km section from Pakur –Mashraar road that was cleared has become overgrown as it has been not used for over two years.

All road projects had components of capacity- building and training for engineers linked to state Ministries of Infrastructure. The PUNOs and the contractor were responsible for providing this in-service training and support. In Jonglei, Warrap and Lakes States, some states, road maintenance equipment was provided to the State Ministries of Infrastructure and training was provided as a part of the SSRF security road outputs. The PUNO was again, responsible for training in the use of the equipment. The equipment handed over in Jonglei was located in Bor, and it was damaged and looted during the political crisis.

Initially there were hopes, as evidenced in the State Stabilizations Programmes, that the road projects could provide temporary employment for the local populations using a mix of labour-based and mechanized approaches. In reality, there were few employment opportunities provided through the SSRF road projects, with the exception of WFP managed roads in Lakes States that employed local residents to clean bush before the road building, as security guards and as community sensitizers in the preparatory phases of the road works

#### **4.4.3 Output 3: Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)**

All the 32 planned buildings were constructed; namely 14 Police stations (7 in Lakes State and 7 in Warrap State); 7 Courts in Lakes State; 4 County headquarters in Eastern Equatoria State; and 1 Prison in Eastern Equatoria State. The evaluators visited 10 of these buildings.

There were common factors relating to the condition of the buildings visited, namely less than durable components and fittings used in the construction, less than quality furniture (many broken chairs and tables); over specification of generators in the smaller facilities and a lack of fuel; submersible electric pumps not working where hand pumps would have been more appropriate. While solar components were introduced in some buildings as an energy savings initiative designed to improve sustainability, the maintenance and spare parts proved difficult and some were no longer working. In all states visited, there was often a lack of general maintenance and cleaning. This is also partially attributed to lack of funds for materials and cleaning staff.

SSRF reports and the evaluators' findings concur that the facilities were mostly in use by the state officials for the purposes for which they were intended. A few exceptions were found such as a police station being used temporarily as a prison and police and army using an empty court facility, both in Lakes State. A few facilities such as courts and police stations were verified as underutilised or not used at all due to the inability of the state to fund and deploy personnel.

#### **4.4.4 Output 4: Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)**

As many inter-communal conflicts are linked to access to water during the dry season for cattle, the building of water sources in key locations identified to reduce incidents of conflict, was an important part of the SSRF. The adopted approach was to build haffirs with boreholes for human consumption nearby.

Three States (Eastern Equatoria State, Lakes State Warrap State) identified water sources as a component of their Stabilizations Plans. All SSRF Round 3 water projects were completed. Ten haffirs were constructed (4 in Eastern Equatoria State, 4 in Lakes State, 2 Warrap State) and have been used by the communities. The evaluators found that 5 haffirs were not functional due to apparent lack of (or insufficient) handover to communities and no training of Water Management Committees from the PUNOs (Lakes), vandalism, poor pump house construction, inappropriate technology and technical failures. There was evidence of informal use by the communities who had taken down fences to bring their cattle to water.

There were 28 boreholes constructed in the three states (Warrap, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria) with the highest concentration in Lakes (16 Boreholes.) Of the boreholes inspected (or through interviews), it was apparent that many were not functional due to the lack of maintenance and spare parts. This could be extrapolated to the boreholes not seen or verified, that at least 50% were not working at the time of the Evaluations- which was approximately two years after handover to the communities.

## 5 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

### 5.1 Relevance

The SSRF Round 3 UN State Stabilizations programmes intended outputs and outcome were consistent with and a reflection of both national and local level priorities. Developed in 2009/2010 in the final years of the CPA interim period, the original design (July 2009 SC minutes) had two windows: (1) state focused recovery financing to States against their own plans, with a focus to stabilize and ‘transform conflict’ at the county level; (2) financing to assist the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to improve the delivery systems for vital services in four key areas: health, education, water and sanitation, and agriculture. The original financing target was \$120 million with \$90 million for the state –based window and \$30 Million for the GoSS basic services window. The second window was never activated.

In order to ensure relevance in programming to the local level, Jonglei State, piloted a state driven two-tiered (local, state) consultation and priority setting process in 2009 that built on the consultative methodology of the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme to select interventions that would improve security and further extend state authority at local level. This same methodology of local level consultations followed by a state level priority setting workshop, was followed in Warrap, Lakes, and Eastern Equatoria States during 2010. The targeting of priorities and the selection of key counties followed an analysis of conflict hot spots that resulted in the specific outputs of each state plan. The state plans had references to capacity building and endorsed labour –based approaches to promote employment of local residents, especially youth and women. Some states and donors, also advocated the employment of former combatants. The State plans were endorsed by the SSRF Steering Committee and the funding allocations were approved. State Stabilization Boards were put in place to monitor implementation, thereby providing a mechanism for continued inputs from state authorities.

In the field visits, interviews affirmed that the priorities and projects were considered relevant at the time and continue to be viewed as important priorities<sup>20</sup>. There was a strong sense that communities and counties had been consulted and agreed to the projects and as well as the specific siting, in most cases.

Capacity-building, especially in the emerging state governments, was a national priority in 2009. The original intent of the SSRF Round 3 was to operate through Grant Management Units embedded in the State Ministry of Finance, thereby building the capacity of state governments to plan and manage their own development plans. This was to be piloted in Jonglei, but after further examination of capacity, it was agreed that a management agent would be selected for the Jonglei SSRF Programme. The Joint State Stabilization Programme Document refers to State Management Support Units in the state Ministries of Finance to introduce a “phased capacity building solution” for the Ministry to plan, oversee and coordinate development projects. This appears to have depended upon a partnership with the UNDP Support to the States project that had TA embedded within key state ministries. The element was important for the relevance and impact of the project. The UNDP Support to the States Programme was being cut back, just as

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<sup>20</sup> Jonglei state was not visited during this evaluation. The two large projects in that state were terminated and not completed, due to the violence following the 15 December 2013 political crisis

the SSRF was moving into the full-scale implementation phase in 2012. There was no evidence of this unit when states were visited in 2015.

The intended outcome and outputs of the project were maintained until the political crisis of December 2013. However, the economic crisis of mid-2012, greatly reduced the capacity of national and state governments to assume their responsibilities for the recurring costs and maintenance of the infrastructure assets handed over to the state by the SSRF, as agreed in the Programme concept. Though the Lessons Learned Exercise flagged this as a problem, the SSRF Steering Committee did not develop any alternative options to guarantee the continued use and relevance of the assets (roads, county HQs, police posts, courts, prisons, haffirs, boreholes).

This situation was compounded by the political crisis of December 2013. The two projects in Jonglei suffered significant damage and loss and were terminated, due to external factors. The projects in other states that had been handed over to state government or communities before December 2013, encountered even greater difficulties after December 2013, as the state governments had even less financial capacity to assume their obligations, as the central government transferred even less funds to the states and counties, and retained a higher proportion of revenue collected at state level. The SSRF donors effectively withdrew from the SSRF in March 2014 and the SSRF SC stopped meeting, and there was no attempt to resolve this issue to guarantee SSRF investments that had not been affected directly by the political crisis, could be maintained and continue their 'relevance'.

To summarize, the Round 3 SSRF's stabilization model was considered very relevant by state and community level stakeholders and beneficiaries- both in its inception and after its completion; in the three states with realized outputs. SSRF donors changed their view on the 'relevance of the model'; diverging from end users and beneficiaries.

## **5.2 Effectiveness**

Overall the SSRF demonstrated development effectiveness in the delivery of its outputs and in making progress towards its outcomes, in Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Lakes State up until the time of handover of the each asset to the responsible state institution or community. The Jonglei UN State Stabilization programme did not achieve its intended results, though progress had been verified before the December 2013 crisis<sup>21</sup>. As a result of the political crisis and military attacks, there were significant losses and damage of assets, resulting in the suspension and subsequent closure of all Jonglei projects.

It is important to look at effectiveness in two time periods (1) before December 2013 (2) after December 2013. The 2013 Crisis impacted the 'effectiveness', as the state governments and communities ability to make the previously agreed upon in-kind or financial contributions to recurring costs and maintenance were significantly reduced as result of the crisis. Other factors that reduced effectiveness were linked to the lack of a SSRF resourced sustainability strategy, deficiencies in design and appropriateness of technology, poor durability of materials and quality of contractors.

Field visits, through SSRF monitoring, verified the completion of most projects before the 2013 crisis. In Warrap and Eastern Equatoria States all assets had been completed by December 2013,

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<sup>21</sup> Lessons Learned Exercise, 2012, Paragraphs 72 -79.

and rectification works and handover continued in 2014. All projects in Lakes were reported to have been completed by 2014.

In relation to public administration buildings, built by the SSRF, the evaluation team verified that the majority were being used for designated purposes, and that there had not been any change in use (or misuse) of the assets after the 2013 crisis (See Sections 4.3 and 4.4 above for Outcome and Output details).

Four County Headquarters were built. The evaluators visited 3 of the headquarters and interviewed state, county and communities (users) where it was verified that county officials moved to the counties with all departments being represented in the new buildings. The physical presence of the County Commissioner allowed for the county security committees to meet regularly, respond to security incidents more rapidly and increased the confidence of the local populations. The County HQ was seen as the 'front line' of visible state presence promoting stabilization but also enabling the state to deliver basic services to counties and payams. It also facilitated the work of other partners in the fields of health, education, water and sanitation and agriculture to work directly at county level and the County Commissioners could more easily coordinate and link with NGOs and other partners.

Interviews with communities, elders and payam or boma chiefs verified that they perceived that these outputs contributed to the overall outcome of increased security- i.e. felt more secure. "Evidence "on security is harder to find, as the data collected and used by the SSRF is questionable in terms of validity"<sup>22</sup>. There were no monitoring and evaluation staff posted at state level, and the staffing at Juba level, was also inadequate to carry out robust monitoring to the local level, despite intermittent joint monitoring missions with the various stakeholders.

Continuing insecurity and incidents of violence linked to inter-communal conflict, especially cattle theft, is reported by officials and communities. In Eastern Equatoria State it was noted that there is a perception that there has been a shift from cattle "raids" to cattle 'theft' of smaller number of cattle. The understanding is that this reflects a shift from inter-communal conflict to smaller 'criminal' groups that steal across ethnic lines, with smaller numbers of fatalities. These actions are often dealt with by security forces, and there are attempts to return the stolen cattle to their owners. The utilization of SSRF investments are seen as one of the inputs that has contributed to this shift in Eastern Equatoria State.

Other set of SSRF public infrastructure delivered included, courts, prisons and police posts. SSRF built the infrastructures, but again it was state responsibility to staff and manage the facilities. Police posts, in most cases, were occupied and staffed but often with less staff than had been anticipated. One police post visited in Warrap was being used as a prison. States complained that since 2013, they were not receiving new trained recruits from the National Government, so could not deploy according to the original plan. Newly constructed courts stood vacant for a period, and were not maintained. One court in Lakes visited in June 2015, only received its first judge in 2015, while the building had been completed in 2013. The assignment of judges, like police, is dependent, in part, upon a central Ministry decisions, indicating the need to plan and coordinate such local level infrastructure with all levels of government that impact its utilization. Prisons, suffered the same problem, after construction, as courts and police posts. There were often not sufficient trained prison officers, nor funds for operating costs or food for staff and prisoners. One common problem and critique of the original design, was the lack of

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<sup>22</sup> See section 4.3.2



accommodation for staff, as most facilities were built in remote locations. All of these factors reduced the development effectiveness of the SSRF investments.

The perceived impact of these investments to improve security varied. When a court or police post was functioning, or placed along a security road with increased activity and movement, it was perceived as contributing to security. If it was underutilized or not used at all, in fact it did not contribute, but potentially might in the future. For this reason, the effectiveness is to be viewed over time, with sustainability becoming the key factor.

All state stabilization plans included at least one 'security road'. The high costs and difficulties of road construction in South Sudan, resulted in delays and compromises in all the road projects, with multiple amendments to support additional costs. State government saw the 'security roads' as one of the key outputs of the SSRF in their states. They were selected on the basis of a security analysis to open up conflict areas to both security forces to quell insecurity as well as to state administration increased presence. In most cases, public administration infrastructure was built along the security road. Both the Lessons Learned Review, and the 2015 evaluation verified in field visits, that the roads did facilitate trade, encourage more settlements along the road, and build confidence among the population that things were 'more secure'. It was also seen as 'development' that brought hope that more investment would come. It was observed in Eastern Equatoria State, that the current economic crisis and devaluation of the South Sudanese currency, has reduced trade and increased the cost of basic commodities for the population along the SSRF road, which goes between Lobira and the Uganda border. Maintenance is a problem, as detailed in the sustainability section, which again reduces the effectiveness of the outputs over the long term.

Water sources, (boreholes and haffirs) were an important SSRF output as reduction of water based conflicts were strategically prioritized in the most state stabilization plans. A total of 12 haffirs were built and 28 boreholes installed. It was verified that 5 haffirs are for various reasons not operational and many boreholes were not functioning. The achievement of these outputs, had a close link to the reduction of conflict, as it was more directly linked to specific ethnic conflicts, than other outputs. Conversely, when the water source was not well- maintained and competition for water reappeared, so did the conflicts. For this reason, effectiveness must be closely linked to sustainability of the assets.

### **5.3 Efficiency**

Considering the operating conditions of South Sudan, the systems and processes utilized by the SSRF after the Steering Committee approval of the State projects can be considered to be efficient in fund and project management terms. It is clear that most projects were delivered within budget and on time, despite the various extensions and bar the intervening external factors such as the conflict of December 2013. If the financial delivery rate is used as a gauge for project management efficiency, then the SSRF efficiently utilized the funds on the planned projects as shown in the table below:

PUNO	Total Approved Budget	Total Cumulative Expenditure 2013	Total Cumulative Expenditure 2014	% Delivery by 2013	% Delivery by 2014	% in 2014
Coord Agency	5 604 153	3 565 461	4 367 876	64%	78%	14%
UNDP	15 146 127	9 301 152	12 263 994	61%	81%	20%
UNOPS	59 858 913	48 028 693	50 808 110	80%	85%	5%
WFP	22 220 000	17 670 824	19 598 307	80%	88%	8%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>102 829 193</b>	<b>78 566 130</b>	<b>87 038 288</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>12%</b>

The financial delivery up until end of 2013 (coinciding with the conflict of December) was 71%. An additional 12% was delivered in 2014 for a total financial delivery of 83%. Figures for 2015 are not yet available. The rate of financial delivery is influenced by the projects that were terminated and unfinished due to the conflict of December 2013 and the donors' decision to stop any further flow of funds. Total estimate of conflict related damage and loss to the SSRF stabilization programmes was reported in August 2014 to be USD 16,356,257 and non-conflict related damage and loss amounted to USD 283,245.

There were delays of approximately 21 months<sup>23</sup> between the approval of the Round 3 Allocation Proposal and final approval of all four State-level projects. The SSRF governance process allowed for multiple points of Steering Committee intervention, adding duplication into the system and causing delays. The allocation, project development and approval processes were based on multiple points of review and approval of individual projects, and of project components with each adding to transaction costs, inefficiencies and delays without adding value. While the partners agreed to a governing structure that put the Government in the lead, and had State level consultations and Boards to oversee implementation, there was still a tendency by the principle donors to review (unnecessarily) several times, many project management decisions.

The Lessons Learned Exercise review of the timelines found that the SSRF Secretariat, Coordinating Agencies and PUNOs generally responded in time to requests during the project development and approval, processes. However, Steering Committee requests tended to *"preference management and design over the strategic immediacy of addressing recovery and stabilization"*. Although the mandate of the Steering Committee is defined as *"providing strategic guidance, decision-making on global allocations, coordination and oversight"* it acted outside of its mandate and *"tended to function at the level of operational management"*. The SC did not require a mid-term evaluation to assess progress and realign in response to emerging challenges and new conditions, nor did they actively respond to other strategic issues, that impacted SSRF outputs or outcomes. Notably, there are no specific indicators on governance in the Results framework and Monitoring and Evaluation system that tracks the performance of the Steering Committee and the Secretariat.

The governance and management structures throughout the life of the Round 3 of SSRF, never established standard operational rules and procedures to provide clarity on the roles and mandates of each entity. Despite in the initial approval of the SSRF and later in the Lessons Learned Exercise, recommendations were made that an 'Operations Manual' was essential. There was, finally, an initiative in 2013 (4 years into the SSRF) to explore the possibility of

<sup>23</sup> For a full description, see *Lessons Learned Exercise 2012* paragraph 142 following which also includes the quotes extracted below

developing an Operations Manual, but nothing came to fruition. Without a clear mandate and role, the key governing and management entities could not demonstrate maximum efficiency.

UNDP, UNOPS and WFP were the PUNOs engaged in the SSRF and, as can be seen in the table above, their financial delivery rate was reasonably satisfactory in project completion— except for those projects where the conflict of December 2013 intervened. The Coordinating Agency was competent and efficient in managing the diverse nature of the SSRF portfolio which required a high level of oversight, monitoring and engagement with state and local authorities. It also managed to efficiently coordinate the multiple outputs of the different PUNOs and politically manage the SSRF relationships with state authorities.

Based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Administrative Agent and the PUNO, and also within the Joint Programme structure, each PUNO takes full programmatic and financial accountability and operates under its own financial regulations, rules and policies. However, there were some gaps in the monitoring and quality assurance of the detailed outputs of the PUNOs by the Coordinating Agency as evidenced by many residual PUNO related issues raised by state officials where inadequate follow up was been done, and the PUNOs claim they no longer have responsibility, as their contract has ended. .

Within the high risk conditions of South Sudan and despite international competitive tender processes, the availability of contractors willing and able to carry out construction operations was limited and PUNOs were often reduced to engaging lesser quality contractors. There were attempts by a few state officials to ‘open the bidding to local contractors’ that did not meet technical standards. The choice of contractors often hampered PUNO efficiency. The quality of two non- functioning haffirs in Eastern Equatoria is attributed to the contractor and design issues. In the case of WFP in Lakes State, it is alleged that there was possible collusion between the road design consultant and the contractor in the consultants’ supervision of the contractor. The design consultant also used an “off the shelf” design for the road and did not adequately do the survey. After the conflict of 2013 and the termination of the contract, the contractor attempted to claim an unrealistic amount for standing time. A lesser amount was settled for after legal action was threatened by WFP. UNDP engaged PACT to carry out its water projects, who in turn engaged contractors to build haffirs. In one instance, as a consequence of bad construction, the pump house collapsed (and remains so). There were other instances in all states, where evaluators were made aware of less than quality construction indicating that there was insufficient quality assurance undertaken. UNOPS was beset with internal management issues in the early stages of the implementation processes. In the evaluators’ visits, there were many residual issues raised relating to UNOPS implemented projects. In Warrap there was an issue of inappropriate road making machinery procured for road maintenance; haffirs not working in Lakes as well as the lack of adequate supervision and handover of a road construction camp.

Although there were challenges that varied from project to project, the programmes’ implementing partners possessed the capacity and did deliver the planned infrastructure; generally within the timeframes and budgets required. There were variations in the quality of the assets delivered by the implementing partners and this can largely be attributed to the contractors they engaged and the lack of adequate quality assurance. Although they may have had the capacity to build governments’ institutional capacity at local levels, this was not done—

according to UNOPS, as it was not initially planned for in their contracts<sup>24</sup>. The PUNOs may have developed the capacities of engineers in the projects. However overall institutional capacities of state authorities, responsible for these assets, was not planned or implemented despite capacity building being one of the original intentions of the SSRF<sup>25</sup>.

If Value for Money is defined as finding the right balance between economy, efficiency and effectiveness, then the evaluators would concur that the value for money provided by the United Nations implementation system appeared consistent with conditions in South Sudan. At the time of the Lessons Learned Exercise (mid 2012), a detailed analysis was done of costs to date. The analysis revealed that 80% of SSRF funds were allocated to Direct Programme costs, related to implementation of project works. 20% of the total cost accrued to the Coordinating Agency and the PUNO, related to administration fees and field management expenses. Of this, 13% went to total field management and 7% to administration. These proportions would appear to remain unchanged.

Costs were in line with market conditions in South Sudan, but were extremely high and increased significantly during the life of the project. Most important factors influencing costs were: costs of transport of equipment and materials to remote areas; cost of security required when working in conflict areas; fluctuating prices (usually increasing) for materials on the local market; cost of importing materials and equipment; and - roads in particular required that overburden be transported long distances from source; and the seasonal access to work sites requiring long times at work camps.

These factors impacted contractors' costs in the procurement process which was executed through competitive tendering in South Sudan and international markets. Because of these constraints and conditions tenderers had to factor in the additional costs. It can therefore be concluded that the costs were not unreasonable in the circumstances and it is doubtful if the same or equivalent inputs could have been procured for less money, unless quality of materials and work was compromised.

In terms of quality of the infrastructure put in place, the roads constructed are of standard quality. However, in some instances due to available funds, the roads were made narrower; less overburden applied; or final parts of the roads were left without overburden and merely cleared. In Warrap State, the intermediate road making equipment procured for road maintenance was based in cost and not sustainability of the roads<sup>26</sup>.

There are issues relating to the standard of materials and equipment used in the public administration buildings. Some construction components, (i.e. ceilings, roofing, windows, sanitary facilities) are not considered durable for public use and impact on the future maintenance costs. The same would apply to the furniture and fittings provided.

It was evident that insufficient funds were provided by the SSRF for significant capacity building (as mentioned in other sections of this report). It is the opinion of the evaluators that more value for money could have been achieved if the planned capacity building interventions had been implemented – albeit at additional cost to the programme.

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<sup>24</sup> See discussion on capacity building in the Sustainability section below

<sup>25</sup> See sustainability section below

<sup>26</sup> See sustainability below for a detailed discussion on the intermediate equipment procured

The SSRF Steering Committee structure reflected the principle that Government should be in the lead and that the SSRF should be consistent with and support national development priorities. However, in its functioning it was viewed as more of a donor dominated entity, especially in the post-independence period when confidence in government declined. Though state boards were set up to engage in the monitoring of implementation, there was never a link between these and SC.

After the 15 December 2013 crisis, there were no SC meetings throughout 2014. The donors did not want to engage with government, as this was interpreted to be a validation of government actions, so SSRF donors held meetings separately among themselves, often with the UN, and there are no minutes of these meetings that the evaluators had access to. Donors presented a letter to Government in March 2014, stating their position to withdraw all future funds from the SSRF and to close down operations.

Some donors stated that there was not clarity on the role of UNDP, as it assumed several roles within the SSRF – administrative agent of the fund through the MPTF Office in UN HQ in NY; administrative support to the Secretariat, Coordinating agency for SSRF, and a PUNO in EES (with PACT); Warrap State (with PACT), in Jonglei for the radio Project. The previously referred to lack of an operations manual fed this perception, as roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined. In addition, UNDP, with the support and endorsement of SSRF donors, moved to fill gaps, when other UN agencies would not assume the role of PUNO (case of Jonglei radio, and the water projects with PACT). However, given the context, UNDP's broader vision on the SSRF, and its ability to assume multiple roles, when others would not, ensured that the work could proceed in difficult circumstances.

## **5.4 Sustainability**

In its implicit theory of change, the SSRF recognized that conflict and insecurity result from the absence of the State and weak capacity to deliver core public goods and services. Because of the lack of a focused and resourced capacity building component, the SSRF contribution to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities to participate in design, implementation and support for the sustainability of the outputs/assets can only be considered to be cursory.

As noted in other sections, capacity-building, especially in the emerging state governments, was a national priority in 2009. The proposed State Management Support Units in the state Ministries of Finance to allow for the Ministry to plan, oversee and coordinate development projects, was not resourced by the SSRF<sup>27</sup>. A continuing lack of capacity (financial, technical and systems) at a state and local government level was noted by the evaluators. The SSRF did not sufficiently improve state capacity to sustain the service delivery mechanisms developed during the SSRF implementation or to ensure that the assets created would be sustained in the long term.

Although some individual capacity was strengthened (state engineers working on road projects), institutional capacity was not a programme component. Within the emerging state departments, ministers and officials are often moved. Accordingly, without the embedding of

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<sup>27</sup> See Relevance section above

systems and procedures in the state departments, the institutional capacity to plan, implement and monitor future projects as well to maintain existing projects does not adequately exist.

A primary factor impacting the ability of states to maintain the assets created is the lack of material, human and fiscal resources. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the fiscal crisis 2012 reduced the flow of financial resources to the states and counties and states could not cover their own budget commitments to basic service delivery, nor their obligations to the SSRF in respect of maintenance commitments.

In the implementation phase of the SSRF, the Coordinating Agent proposed that contributions be made in respect of recurrent costs, but this was not accepted by donors. Despite no external support for recurring costs, or post-completion training and technical support, handover processes included that states commit themselves to the on-going maintenance of the assets, based on previous agreements. States agreed to this, with the knowledge that they did not have the financial or capacity resources to do so. When asked, state officials in both Lakes State, Eastern Equatoria and Warrap also indicated that they did not have a formalized maintenance plan. The SSRF could have assisted in such preparation. Accordingly, these gaps by the SSRF, effectively reduced the future value of the investments made. In the field visits, evaluators noticed that many investments were already beginning to deteriorate – especially in the context of a harsh and challenging climate of South Sudan.

As stated, the PUNO approach to capacity building was limited to the inclusion of state engineers on the construction projects. Although there was a level of consultation with state officials or communities on the siting of projects, there was no evidence of state engineers' inclusion in the technical design phases. The design was done by external consultants engaged by the PUNOs, and no evidence was found that that state officials were involved in the supervision of design consultants though they were asked for final approval. Programme reports indicate that, during the construction processes, state engineers were included in joint monitoring missions. The extent of their participation and influence in these monitoring missions is not clear to the evaluators.

While state engineers were engaged by the PUNOs to develop their capacities, they appeared to be not fully included in the monitoring and supervision of the engaged contractors. Understandably the PUNOs were responsible for the outputs of the contractors, but an opportunity to build the capacity of the state engineers was lost in the process. In Eastern Equatoria, both the Governor and the State Ministry of Infrastructure, complained that the engineers were not part of a structured capacity development plan nor were they viewed as equal partners. In Lakes State, the evaluators interviewed an engineer who appeared to have been closely monitoring the construction of the water projects, police stations and courts. Although he had a good knowledge of the projects, he did not appear to have a capacity sufficient to adequately project manage multiple projects.

In Warrap, intermediate road making machinery was provided to the state to maintain roads. Although the state ministry approved the purchase of intermediate machinery, later they considered the machinery not to be appropriate for the maintenance of the roads. Opinion was sought by the evaluators on the appropriateness of the machinery and it would appear that it could be used effectively if properly used. However, it was apparent that insufficient training (and lack of on the job training) was provided in the use of the machinery. The machinery is standing idle in two locations and has never been used since the procurement thereof. In the one location, original tires have been replaced with worn ones, toolboxes have been emptied

and batteries have been removed. A road construction camp in Warrap that was transferred to the state for road maintenance was left in an unusable condition after the contractors vacated site. The PUNO, that is responsible for the supervision of the contractor, has not followed up on the issue. The state authorities do not have the resources to convert these the useable assets.

An important feature in the early discussion of the SSRF, was that the projects could provide temporary employment to local residents and that labour based methods could be utilized in some of the road works. Given the challenges of road construction in South Sudan, given the remoteness of many areas, the type of soil, and the seasonality of construction; labour – intensive methods were not adopted. However, there were unskilled labourers that were hired by the contracts for many of the task required in the road works. The SSRF contracting procedure did not have provisions for recruitment of local residents or provisions to hire target groups (i.e. women, youth.) The only PUNO to report on employment disaggregating data by gender, was WFP. This was a missed opportunity to provide employment and work experience to those benefiting from the projects and that would have also increased their sense of ownership.

At the project needs identification stage (see relevance section above), community voices were incorporated through the CSAC consultative processes. Despite recognizing this as important to the process, the SSRF did not include in its original design a resourced and staffed state based community engagement component throughout the life the project. When the projects were implemented, there was a modicum of consultation done by the PUNOs regarding the siting of the projects in coordination with the relevant state ministry and county officials. The location of the water projects required community input. Communities interviewed in Warrap, Eastern Equatoria and Lakes indicated that they had been consulted and that they were satisfied with the siting of the water projects. Problems arose in some cases when the desired location, did not meet the technical specification to build a haffir or borehole. Officials alike indicated that the siting of some buildings (courts, police posts, and prisons) was an issue – as the design did not provide accommodation for staff, in remote isolated areas. The location was determined on the basis of security needs, but the design did not incorporate the need for accommodation to be built - a necessity in remote locations. The water projects require more ongoing community engagement, through Water Management Committees. PUNOs and private contractors did not see community engagement or consultation as a priority, unless it was to directly affect their ability to build.

The extent of ownership of the SSRF assets among the different stakeholders at the different levels and implementation phases is varied. Ownership should be seen as understanding the responsibilities relating to the asset, having a plan to use and maintain the asset - and carrying it out. State authorities understand this clearly and all indicated that building and road assets created belong to the state. Due to the lack of adequate resources and capacities mentioned above, they cannot carry out their responsibilities. In the main, the assets are in use, or have been in use since their construction. Roads are evidently in continuous use by state security authorities and citizens. However, courts, police stations, prisons and county offices are only in use where the state has the resources to staff the facilities. Some facilities are being used more effectively than others. For example, the police station in Minkaman (Lakes) was impressively being used to its fullest capacity. Use, or the willingness to use the assets created by the SSRF is a prime indicator of ownership.

Communities generally feel ownership of boreholes and haffirs - if in use or usable. Water management committee and cost recovery schemes to maintain boreholes and haffirs, were not in place as designed. Community meetings indicated that they were very protective of their water resources and constantly monitored the use thereof. There were instances where it was reported that communities restricted the use of boreholes to the immediate population and did not allow neighbouring communities to use them. This form of ownership (and lack of sharing) could create potential sources of conflict.

Again, without a full-fledged community engagement component of the SSRF, the evaluators noted not enough efforts were made to sensitize communities on both maintenance and conflict sensitive management of their water resources. Where haffirs had been abandoned by the communities because they were not operational, they did not appear to demonstrate true ownership. Two haffirs viewed showed evidence of vandalism there was apparent informal use of non-functional haffirs evidenced by the tearing down of fences to allow cattle access to the water. The technology used in the haffirs in Lakes State and Equatoria was reported to be too complex to use and maintain. Spares are often not available in South Sudan, for much of the equipment installed. Due to insufficient funds no training of water committees was done in Lakes State., In Warrap, the communities interviewed revealed that the training may not have been intensive enough. In Eastern Equatoria, there was training, but no funds were allocated to the PUNO for continuing support to ensure operationality of the Water Management Committee or introduction of cost recovery measures. With the lack of adequate training and subsequent handholding period, coupled with the lack of spare parts and tools to maintain the water facilities, it is clear that true ownership cannot be reported.

The physical outputs created under the programme are likely to be utilised and maintained beyond the programme end date by the intended beneficiaries - provided that fiscal resources flow to state and county levels. Despite the lack of resources and capacities, state governments indicated that they are committed to maintaining the assets created. However it is evident, before the funds start to flow again to state governments, there is a need for additional resources to catch up on maintenance in the interim period.

State authorities are committed to maintaining security outcomes – but not exclusively as a result of the SSRF interventions. In Eastern Equatoria and Warrap States, in particular, state officials are currently holding down inter-communal violence as best possible taking into account limited resources and capacity in the context of the current political crisis. There is an overall commitment to maintain inter-communal peace – witnessed by the lack of availability of ministers in Warrap during evaluator’s visit, as they were deployed to quell a conflict between two communities. It was also evident that there are regular security meetings being held in all states at state and county levels. In Eastern Equatoria, the Catholic Diocese of Torit and the Eastern Equatoria Peace Commission, indicated they (together with state officials) are promoting peace dialogues to mitigate and resolve inter-communal conflicts so that violence does not occur. They viewed the SSRF outputs as an important contribution to improving security.

As the economic and political crises since 2012, had an impact on securing the outputs and outcomes of the SSRF, it would have been prudent for SSRF to intervene, by means of a period of subsidisation to secure sustainability until the fund flow from the central resources regularized. The Lessons Learned Exercise, in 2012 had flagged the issue and recommended the SSRF have a strategic response to secure their investments. This was not done and the response



to abruptly end the SSRF in all states, has placed both the physical assets and outcomes in jeopardy<sup>28</sup>.

While the SSRF framework placed Government and community ownership, as a driving principle of the stabilization programmes, the design of the programme, its staffing, and the resource allocation did not have sufficient investment nor did they adequately reflect these components. As stated above, there was robust consultation and engagement in the initial identifications of projects that depended upon processes that were financed outside the SSRF (i.e. CSAC). Much of the state –based capacity building, as in the programme document, was also to be carried out by other programmes, in partnership with the SSRF; in particular through the UNDP Support to the States Programme. The SSRF Coordinating Agency placed engineers at the state level to oversee the ‘works’, but did not have a monitoring and evaluation nor a community engagement component at state level during the life of the project. This compromised sustainability and ownership. As stated above, there was no overall strategic capacity strategy that was resourced. While it was understood that the State Ministries had little experience or capacity in planning, managing and overseeing such infrastructure projects, the SSRF did not invest in building these capacities in the context of the programme. There were attempts, during the implementation, to request that PUNOS take on small capacity building tasks (examples given above), but these had little follow up, and the PUNOs did not see this as their role.

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<sup>28</sup> SSRF Chairperson in interview (June 2015) reiterated the Government request to SSRF donors, that the programmes in Warrap, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria states should have been allowed to continue, while the Jonglei Programme could have closed due to the political crisis.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Conclusions

#### Relevance

1. The SSRF-Round 3 stabilization model (2009), recognizing the peace-building imperatives and security challenges of the CPA interim period, incorporated local and state priorities through robust state based consultation and prioritization processes.
2. Separate state-based Joint UN Stabilization Plans followed a common strategic framework in defining the category of stabilization outputs, but ensured local relevance through the selection and location of specific projects.
3. SSRF supported infrastructure (county headquarters, police posts, courts, prisons, roads, boreholes, haffirs, and radio station) only became relevant and could have desired impact and continued relevance through their utilization for intended purposes. Design of SSRF did not incorporate capacity building of the key implementing partner state ministries/communities nor support for maintenance of assets within the outputs, thus reducing the utility of the investments.
4. In the post-independence period (2012), when the fiscal crisis impacted greatly on the revenues and budgets of the states, the SSRF failed to review what actions may have been required to ensure the continued use and relevance of its assets.
5. In response to the political military crisis that erupted in December 2013, the donors of the SSRF (March 2014) stopped new or future support for SSRF as a political signal of disapproval of the actions of the State. Some SSRF assets had been attacked, looted and destroyed in Jonglei and Lakes States. The previously accepted SSRF Strategic Framework and Theory of Change, that placed state-building at the center, was no longer endorsed by the donor partners, thereby redefining the outputs as 'not relevant' to contribute to the outcome and even stating that "some activities and assets' may exacerbate rather than reduce tensions".<sup>29</sup>

#### Effectiveness

1. The SSRF was effective in terms of achieving its results in relation to outputs, and contributed positively to the desired outcome. However, during the life of the programme, the lack of monitoring and strategic assessment of changing conditions, reduced its effectiveness over time.
2. SSRF indicators were not designed to quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically determine the actual outcomes of the SSRF interventions where they were located - and there was no measure that could determine whether the real causes of the conflicts were being reduced. The use of UNOCHA data as the only means for measuring

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<sup>29</sup> Donor members of SSRF Steering Committee Letter to SSRF Steering Committee ,March 22, 2014

outcomes did not enable an accurate assessment of the achievement of the designed outcome indicators and SSRF did not investigate additional sources of information to correlate UNOCHA data.

3. While all intended outputs of public administration buildings and water resources in Lakes, Warrap and Eastern Equatoria were completed and handed over to the relevant state authorities or community Water Management Committees (exception Lakes), the development effectiveness over time and contribution to intended outcome of improvement of security is difficult to measure or attribute to the SSRF, using the indicators defined by the SSRF Results Matrix.
4. Visits and interviews carried out in the three SSRF states with completed outputs (Warrap, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria States), indicated a “perception’ that the SSRF assets contributed to improved security and a reduction in inter-communal conflict. This was strongly recognized in the case of County Headquarters (EES) and haffirs (when functioning) and less so for police posts and courts, as they were dependent upon staffing. There was no SSRF baseline, mid-term evaluation, robust monitoring at state levels of indicators, nor SSRF perception survey carried out to use as comparators.
5. SSRF UN Joint Jonglei State Stabilization Plan outputs (road, radio station, wildlife ranger outposts) did not achieve the intended results in terms of outputs or outcomes, as the road and radio station were attacked, damaged and looted during the political and military actions following the December 2013 crisis. The Jonglei Public Radio that had just started broadcasting in September 2013, was attacked and looted, in December 2015 therefore ceasing broadcasts. As a result of this looting, neither the Government nor the opposition forces could occupy a functioning radio station and use it to incite further violence. The remaining radio assets were removed from the building and are under UN control, underscoring the high risk nature of state linked media projects in volatile environments.
6. The SSRF supported ‘security roads’ that were completed in Lakes, Warrap and Eastern Equatoria States are in use, and are considered a contribution to improved circulation of security forces to quell inter-ethnic conflict, in particular cattle raiding. The road in Jonglei state, due to continuous security problems, was only partially completed at the time of the start of the December 2013 conflict, and suffered heavy losses and theft of equipment. The road construction in Jonglei was terminated so no outputs can be reported.
7. Despite a statement by SSRF donors in March 2014, that they would ‘support the consolidation of the existing benefits of Round 3’<sup>30</sup>, in conjunction with their termination of support for the SSRF; there was no evidence of a concerted effort nor a resourced plan to ensure that intended beneficiaries would continue to benefit from these SSRF investments. This was particularly evident in the case of haffirs and boreholes that required functioning water management committees to ensure their continued use and contribution to the reduction of conflict over water resources.

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<sup>30</sup> March 21, 2014 , Letter from SSRF Donors to SSRF Steering Committee

## Efficiency

1. Although the SSRF governance structure and Steering Committee (SC) reflected the principle that Government should be in the lead, its functioning, especially in the implementation phase, was donor dominated, and after the political crisis in Dec 2013, de facto governance of the SSRF was parallel process that excluded government in formal decision making.<sup>31</sup> In the absence of established standard operational rules and procedures there was no clarity on the roles and mandates of the various management structures. The multiple points of Steering Committee intervention added duplication into the system and caused operational delays.
2. The Coordinating Agency efficiently managed the diverse nature of the SSRF portfolio and provided an important function to reduce programme risks through regular engagement with State Stabilization Boards. There were gaps in the monitoring of the detailed outputs of the PUNOs resulting in remaining residual issues raised in the state programmes in June 2015.
3. The PUNOs possessed the capacity to deliver the SSRF assets generally within the timeframes and budgets required but their performance and efficiency was often hampered by the limited availability of quality contractors who could efficiently operate within the high risk conditions of South Sudan. In some instances this resulted in less than quality construction. PUNOs did not build governments' institutional capacity at local levels despite capacity building being one of the original intentions of the SSRF.
4. 'Value for Money' appeared consistent with conditions in South Sudan and costs were in line with market conditions. Costs were extremely high and increased significantly during the life of the project. Costs were largely influenced by transport, security, fluctuating material prices, far sources of road overburden and seasonal access to sites.
5. Contractors, in many cases, supplied lesser quality materials in terms of fittings, roofing, sanitary facilities, ceilings, office furniture that were not appropriate or durable for public use buildings in remote rural areas of South Sudan. PUNOs did not control this in their procurement and bidding processes

## Sustainability

1. Even though weak state and county capacities were identified as a significant risk in the design phase of the SSRF, there was no focused or resourced capacity building component of the SSRF for communities (water projects) or state ministries (public administration buildings, roads) so as to secure the sustainability of these critical investments.
2. While it was noted in the initial Joint Programme Documents, and in the Lessons Learned Exercise, that states, counties and communities were not assured of financial support for the implementation of their agreed upon activities and obligations after asset handover, the SSRF did not develop alternative plans or contingencies, even after

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<sup>31</sup> No SSRF SC were held during 204. A meeting was held in January 2015, with Government, UN and donors to agree to formally close the SSRF Round 3 on 30 June 2015.

the problem became more acute with the onset of the fiscal crisis in 2012 and the political crisis of December 2013.

3. A strong sense of ownership of a built asset is recognized as a critical element in contributing to its sustainability and continued benefit to the community. SSRF processes engaged communities and beneficiaries in the initial consultation to define stabilization priorities, but no continued community engagement (through state –based staff) was built into the implementation process, so as to consolidate that linkage. Neither the SSRF nor the PUNOs incorporated ‘social responsibilities’ within their contracting procedures, thus missing opportunities to cement stronger community ties to the assets.
4. While strategic and operational partnerships could greatly enhance the results of SSRF outputs, they do not substitute for essential elements (capacity building, community engagement, monitoring and evaluation) of the overall SSRF framework. During the life of the SSRF, programs that were deemed essential at one point (i.e. UNDP Support to the States Programme) were phased out at later phase, thus reducing the potential impact of the SSRF.
5. Sustainable capacity building in a complex context requires a long-term process that intervenes at both state and community levels and should include institutional, organizational and individual stakeholders and beneficiaries. This was not apparent in the SSRF implementation processes and there is no evidence that the SSRF adopted an approach that was flexible and responsive to emerging capacity challenges. The absence of a balance between the ‘hard’ infrastructure activities and the ‘soft’ capacity building, community engagement and active, local level monitoring and evaluation interventions means the possibility of long term sustainability and use of the assets created has been degraded.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

### **6.2.1 Recommendations for SSRF consideration**

1. In order to “consolidate the existing benefits of SSRF round 3”<sup>32</sup> in support of the intended outcome “to Increase security and reduce the levels of ethnic conflict”, SSRF could consider support for a community capacity building programme for maintenance and repair of boreholes and haffirs built through the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in Lakes, Eastern Equatoria and Warrap States. The form and modality of financing and implementation could be through a different entity, but it would ensure that the SSRF financed assets continued to contribute to the reduction of ethnic conflict linked to competition for water resources. As these assets were transferred to Community Level Water Management Committees (when they existed), it should be a continuing obligation of the SSRF to provide technical support and capacity development, recognizing that the state and county institutions have limited capacities in the current context. Such an initiative, could also include haffirs or boreholes constructed through other organizations.

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<sup>32</sup> Letter from SSRF donors to SSRF Steering Committee, March 21, 2014

2. SSRF supported road works in use in Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Lakes States, could be included in possible labour-based road maintenance programmes carried out by other organizations, so that the assets are not lost. SSRF resources could be used to support such initiatives and cover at least a three year period. An intervention such as this would improve general capacity to maintain roads other than those created under the SSRF.
3. SSRF donors and partners should continue the dialogue on how to move forward in future programmes in support of South Sudan's stabilization and recovery, as the needs are ever more pressing. Existing SSRF supported assets and investments must be preserved, where possible, while future initiatives are planned and developed.

## **6.2.2 General considerations for state and local level recovery programming**

### **Programme design and planning**

1. In programmes where interventions, as the strategic focus, are intended to reduce conflict and promote stabilization, the underlying causes of the conflict must be identified through participatory researched analysis utilizing consultative assessment and prioritization methodologies. The geographic area of programming, may be regional or area based, cutting across or combining formal governing administrative units. Where, for example, inter-communal conflicts are to be addressed through the interventions, then the assessments that identify the nature and locations of conflicts, should inform the localised indicators which will test the impact of the interventions implemented.
2. Indicators should be carefully designed to allow for the measure of the outcomes as well as detecting emergent problems in the implementation process so that the programme/project can be modified accordingly. To be effective, outcome indicators should be able to accurately determine attribution by using both quantitative and qualitative measures. Qualitative measures will provide contextual detail to the numerical findings. In the design stage, appropriate sources of data to measure the indicators should be identified. Rather than using a single data source, use should be made of a range of data from appropriate agencies as well as using focus groups, public and expert surveys.
3. The assumptions and risks in the planning frameworks must be strategic, forward looking and comprehensive enough, and be able to monitor a changing and often volatile political and physical implementation context.
4. Sustainability of development results should be an essential criteria in the planning, consultations, design and fund allocations of any recovery programme, especially when engaged in infrastructure or socio-economic interventions. Ensure that a post-project handover period, is sufficiently long to include the consolidation of capacity development and possible support for recurrent costs, with possible phasing of community or state assumption of responsibilities, depending on level of state formation. The dynamic nature of capacity building should be recognised and particular attention should be given to the design of specific indicators for assessing the success of

community/institutional capacity building. These indicators should be monitored periodically to suggest mid-course corrections and refinements.

### **Programme governance**

1. Multi Partner Trust Funds (MPTF) are valuable modalities for pooled support to agreed programmes. However, from the onset, any MPTF should have clear governing structures at all levels in the institutional arrangement designed for the programme. Rules and procedures must be transparent to all participants in the arrangement and this should, at the start, be clearly outlined in an agreed operations manual to ensure that each level operates within its given mandate and competency. The high level governance structure must maintain its focus on the strategic issues of the programme and avoid the micro-management of subsidiary governance and project management structures.
2. Partnerships and coordination are important elements to maximize the impact and linkages in recovery and stabilization programmes. However, to achieve maximum results they must be formalized, so that the attainment of results are not compromised if partners cannot assume responsibility for essential elements of the programme, thus compromising the attainment of results.

### **Implementation**

1. Particularly in complex programmes in challenging contexts with many variable political and developmental elements, efforts should be made to ensure that key staff should not only possess a project management orientation, but should also be able to understand the impact of project management decisions on the political and developmental imperatives of the interventions. Staffing of key decision-making positions in the implementation of project management structures should remain as constant as possible and prior important decisions taken that affect the political and developmental impacts of the programme should be adequately handed over.
2. A continued focus on the emerging situation should be maintained – both in terms of the macro situation and the outcomes and outputs being delivered in the implementation processes of the projects. Through robust monitoring and continuing conflict assessments and analysis carried out throughout the life of the programme, programme adjustments should be made as the circumstances change – whether positively or negatively. When responding to changing conditions, carefully assess the potential impacts of any changes being proposed. It should be ensured that all partners (including national, state and local authorities, beneficiary communities) are fully informed of any modifications and are included in decisions taken to respond to the changes. It should be anticipated in any programme/project in these volatile and changing environments that there will be high costs attributed to flexibility and alteration of programmes to achieve the intended outcome but they may be less costly than the losses linked to non- attainment.
3. The monitoring and evaluation efforts should be independently located (or ancillary to) the programme implementers (PUNOs for example) and be resourced with adequate staffing and funding. Programme beneficiaries must be included in the monitoring

activities and the reports of implementing partners should be independently verified to ensure that the progress towards outputs and outcomes is accurate. Reports should be followed up and remedial actions taken to ensure that there are no residual issues at the end of the implementation period that could affect quality and sustainability.

### **Sustainability of programme outcomes and results**

1. In the context of countries in continuing conflict, with weak or emerging state structures, embedding robust and realistic capacity building components within sub-national stabilization and recovery programmes is an effective means for developing long term institutional capacity to identify, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate and sustain development. A strategic approach would be to ensure that there is community or local (government) beneficiary leadership and ownership of the capacity building interventions and beneficiary inclusion not only in needs assessment processes, but throughout the life of the programme.
2. If building projects are anticipated, national construction contractor formation should be incorporated into the design. Contracts awarded to international contractors should ensure that protocols are included in the contracts that develop national contractor capacity. This could be done by enforcing joint venture arrangements and supported by ancillary contractor formation support through a contractor development programme that includes technical, financial and entrepreneurial support. Clear and cogent indicators should be designed to monitor contractor formation. Until national contractor capacity is built, costs will continue to be high.
3. In construction contracts awarded, protocols should be included that cover standard “social and economic impact” conditions. This could ensure, for example, employment benefits for local residents, attention is given to opportunities for youth and women, elements of vocational and technical training, small business opportunities to support the programmes (i.e. cafeterias, transport companies) appropriate to the asset being constructed. These protocols may increase the cost of the contracts, but will provide cash injections into local economies and leave some technical capacities in place that will facilitate asset maintenance and engagement in future community projects.
4. In project outputs, where community beneficiaries are expected to assume ownership of assets created, appropriate capacity building interventions should be designed that include a period of continuing organisational, individual and resource support after the creation of the assets.



## 7 ANNEXES

### 7.1 Annex 1: Terms of Reference

<b>Evaluation Title:</b>	<b><i>South Sudan Recovery Fund Round 3: UN Joint Stabilization Programmes Outcome Evaluation</i></b>
<b>Commissioned by:</b>	<b><i>SSRF Steering Committee</i></b>

#### 1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF), also referred to as the Sudan Recovery Fund prior to South Sudan's independence, is a UN Multi Donor Trust Fund that was established in 2008 to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance. The SSRF aimed to address the immense post-conflict recovery and reconstruction needs of South Sudan through delivery of catalytic, high impact projects for demonstrating peace dividends. Since its establishment, the SSRF has received financial support from four donors: Norway, Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA), The Netherlands and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). Since its inception, three rounds of funding allocations under the SSRF were delivered in South Sudan.

Round 3 of the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes was developed by UNDP in partnership with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as NGO implementing partners, PACT and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Approximately USD 102 million was allocated to deliver the intended results under Round 3: USD 23,449,683 under the Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme; USD 28,456,008 under the Jonglei Stabilization Programme; USD 31,277,662 under the Lakes State Stabilization Programme; and USD 19,645,840 under the Warrap Stabilization Programme.

Round 3 aimed to restore post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure, increase security and reduce the level of ethnic conflicts in four states of South Sudan: Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap through the delivery of the following outputs:

- a) Public administration buildings and rule of law infrastructure (county headquarters, county and payam-level police facilities and county courts) for supporting the extension of state authority to the underserved and conflict prone areas;
- b) Water facilities, including large reservoirs for watering cattle and boreholes for supplying water to local communities, with the aim of providing access to clean water and also to mitigate conflict over scarce water sources during the migration of cattle in the dry season;
- c) Access and security roads to and through insecure areas, for connecting communities as well as creating access to the most insecure and underserved areas;
- d) Public radio telecommunication infrastructure and services for promoting social cohesion through peace-building and educational broadcasts.

Initiatives for stabilizing conflict prone communities were identified and validated through county and state-level consultations and conflict mapping processes within each state's respective counties.

UNDP served as the '*Coordinating Agency*', providing oversight, coordination, monitoring and technical support on implementation of these programmes by participating UN organizations and NGO implementing partners.

## **2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION**

The independent evaluation aims to assess the overall contribution of Round 3: the Joint Stabilization Programmes towards improving community security and reducing the levels of ethnic conflicts while distilling lessons and best practices to feed into future programming. This evaluation will cover relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, partnership as well as impact and sustainability of the Un Joint Stabilization Programmes. The evaluation will assess the intended and unintended outputs, outcomes and (possible) impact of the Stabilization Programmes on the target communities and make recommendations to enhance operational and programmatic effectiveness of similar initiatives in comparable situations.

The evaluation findings will be disseminated to all stakeholders including the Government of South Sudan, the beneficiaries, donors, PUNOs and other implementing partners. This evaluation will provide SSRF stakeholders with a comprehensive assessment of the results, impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in meeting stabilization and recovery needs of the four conflict-affected target states—Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap. In addition, the evaluation will strengthen mutual accountability among all development partners/stakeholders.

## **3. EVALUATION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES**

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the validity of the SSRF Round 3 implicit Theory of Change in post-conflict and fragile state contexts, such as South Sudan. In light of this, the study will have to assess the Stabilization Programmes against a number of parameters set under evaluation questions in the sections below.

This evaluation will cover all UN Joint Stabilization Programmes target areas in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap states of South Sudan over the implementation period; January 2011 to June 2015 for Eastern Equatoria, Lakes State and Warrap Stabilization Programmes, and from November 2010 to June 2015 for Jonglei Stabilization Programme. The evaluation will cover programme conceptualisation (theory of change), design, implementation, internal monitoring and evaluation and output, outcome and impact. The UN Joint Stabilization Programmes inputs include: road, public administration, rule of law, public radio as well as water infrastructures. Target beneficiaries of the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes include state and local level government institutions as well as local communities in the project areas.

### **Specific objectives of the evaluation are:**

- a) To assess the relevance, ownership, effectiveness and efficiency of the Stabilization Programmes as well as understand the key factors that have contributed to achievement

- or non-achievement of the intended results;
- b) To determine the extent to which the Stabilization Programmes contributed to forging and strengthening of partnerships among key stakeholders including Government, donors, UN agencies and beneficiary communities;
- c) To assess the management arrangements and capacity in place by the Stabilization Programmes, Government and the beneficiary communities in sustaining the results achieved;
- d) To assess opportunity costs of engaging in infrastructure investments in South Sudan;
- e) To draw lessons learned and best practices and make recommendations for future programming of projects of similar nature.

#### **4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The evaluation questions include, but not limited to the following. Final decision on the evaluation questions will emerge from consultations among the UNDP programme unit, evaluators, and ERG.

##### **Relevance:**

- How clear was the distinction between post-conflict recovery and construction components of the programme?
- How relevant were the menu offered to the recovery and reconstruction needs of South Sudan?
- To what extent were community voices incorporated effectively into local decision-making processes and siting of interventions? How could the project have given stronger voices to the local beneficiary communities?
- How appropriate were the criteria for deciding choices of interventions menu for beneficiaries' security needs and socio-economic contexts?
- How appropriate and useful were the roles of state level governance boards in the selection and monitoring of interventions in targeted states?
- To what extent did the SSRF UN joint stabilization Programmes achieve the intended results and were there any unintended results?
- To what extent did the SSRF UN Joint stabilization Programmes address state and local community priorities?
- To what extent were the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes appropriate in terms of programme conceptualization and design?
- To what extent did the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programme design contribute toward the overall recovery objectives and priorities as perceived by the beneficiaries?
- To what extent did the SSRF UN Joint stabilization Programmes contribute to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities?
- To what extent did programme interventions contribute to mitigating local tensions and conflicts?

##### **Effectiveness**

- How effective and efficient were the strategic partnerships that were established under the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in programme monitoring, coordination and implementation?
- How did the Stabilization Programmes contribute to the realization of underlying programme objectives, as perceived by the beneficiaries?

- Have the Stabilization Programmes been able to achieve the stipulated results? Did they increase beneficiaries' security?
- What progress have been made towards the intended outcomes?
- What are the major factors that facilitated or impeded achievement or non-achievement of the intended results? How effective were the mitigation measures in addressing the challenges and identified risks?
- To what extent have the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programme outputs contributed to the intended outcomes?
- What is the quality and utility of the assets created under the programme?
- How did interventions explicitly address issues of exclusion of vulnerable groups, including women and girls, and what influence did programme interventions have on these groups?
- To what extent were the recommendations of the 2012 lessons learnt report implemented?

### **Efficiency**

- How efficient were PUNOs in the delivery of the Stabilization Programmes and did they respond effectively to emerging stabilization and recovery needs?
- To what extent did the coordination of activities and engagement among the SSRF stakeholders contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?
- Did the programme's implementing partners have the requisite skills/capacity to deliver infrastructure and develop governments' institutional capacity at local levels?
- To what extent were the SSRF stabilization programmes efficient in transforming inputs into outputs and did the outputs contribute to the envisaged outcomes?
- How efficiently was the fund flow managed at different levels? Were levels of subsequent fund disbursements comparable to the levels of physical progress made in the infrastructure across all the programmes? In other words, to what extent did the fund managers apply payment by milestones arrangement with implementing partners? Were there flow of funds tracking, disbursement triggers and monitoring of physical progress of infrastructure?
- To what extent did the SSRF Stabilization Joint Programmes contribute to the enhancement of sustainable natural resources planning and management?
- Did the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes provide value for money in terms of costs and benefits?
- To what extent was the programme complementing other interventions in target states?

### **Partnership/ownership/sustainability:**

- To what extent are the assets created under the programme likely to be utilised and maintained beyond the programme end date by the intended beneficiaries?
- How many target beneficiary communities' security needs have worsened since the outbreak of internal conflict in December 2013?
- What were the levels of participation of the different stakeholders at the different implementation phases?
- Has the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes partnership strategy been appropriate, effective and contributed to sustainable impact?

- What is the extent of ownership of the SSRF outputs among the different stakeholders at the different levels and implementation phases?
- How were risks owned and monitored throughout programme delivery?
- How strong is the level of ownership of the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes outputs by the government and beneficiary communities?
- What is the level of stated commitment by the government and beneficiary community in sustaining the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes outputs/outcomes and continue working for sustaining/enhancing the impact?
- Have some lessons learnt been transferred to partners, including local governments, in order to strengthen long-term sustainability?
- What lessons learnt need to inform future stabilization and/or post conflict recovery interventions?
- What was the impact of interventions in the different states on social cohesion or women's empowerment at local levels?
- Overall, was the Steering Committee's role inclusive enough to strategically guide programme relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and in leveraging partnerships among the stakeholders?
- Was SSRF balance right in relation to investments given to software as opposed to hardware?

## 5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation process will involve a wide range of methods. The evaluation is expected to adopt a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches including document review, stakeholder interviews, site inspections, system analysis, inventory and resource records and cost / benefit analysis. The evaluators will have access to all relevant documents and staff who have worked on SSRF Round 3 and will develop a rigorous methodology for the final evaluation and the sampling strategy as part of this assignment with guidance provided by the programme team. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG)—consisting of donor representatives, lead UN coordinating agency and the SSRF Secretariat—will be established and the ERG will evaluate the proposed methodologies as part of the selection process.

The evaluation process will include the following:

- Document review and analysis;
- Interviews with key beneficiaries (target population) and key stakeholders (both men and women) including SSRF Secretariat, donors, government officials, Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs);
- Field visits;
- Participatory observation and rapid appraisal and
- Incorporation of stakeholder feedback to the draft evaluation report.

Documents related to SSRF Round 3 will be provided as reference. Please see section 12 for the list of documents.

## 6. EVALUATION PRODUCTS (DELIVERABLES)

The main deliverables of the evaluation are:

- a) **Inception report:** The inception report should detail the evaluators understanding of the final evaluation questions and objectives; present a detailed methodology including sampling strategy, data collection and analysis plan (based on the guidance given by the ERG). The inception report should also include a refined work plan with clear timelines, detailing key deliverables and a comprehensive evaluation matrix with a detailed list of key questions, sub questions relating to the evaluation criteria; data sources; methods of data collection, indicators/success standards and methods of data analysis.
- b) **Draft evaluation report and a PowerPoint presentation:** The first draft of the report will be completed in-country. The first draft will contain summary of key findings, lessons learned, risk management and recommendations, which will be presented in Juba to the Steering Committee and to other key stakeholders. Feedback from the presentation and reviews by key stakeholders will be shared with the evaluator for finalisation of the report.
- c) **Final evaluation report:** After incorporating feedback received on the draft report, the evaluator will submit a final report as per the agreed timelines. The evaluator will attach the following annexes to the final report; data collection tools and guidelines, datasets, analysis plans, collation and aggregation tables, risk matrix, etc., if available. Guidance for the outline of the report is contained in Annex 1 below.  
The evaluator will make a presentation of the evaluation findings to all stakeholders including state government officials.

## 7. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIRED COMPETENCIES

### Skills and qualifications

The evaluator will be an international firm with extensive experience of conducting improvement-and-accountability evaluations in stabilization and post conflict recovery programmes. The evaluation provider is expected to demonstrate:

- **Excellent value for money:** including competitive consultancy rates, a detailed financial plan, and a clear methodology to ensure products will be delivered in line with agreed costs, a mitigation strategy for financial risk, and clear financial reporting processes.
- **An excellent understanding of evaluation principles and methodologies:** including capacity in a range of qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods; evidence of research or implementation expertise in stabilization and post conflict recovery; and an awareness of gender, social and conflict analysis in evaluation.
- **Expertise in communications, dissemination and advocacy around evaluation findings:** including a good understanding of the use of evidence-based approaches to influence stakeholders.
- **A high quality proposal for this assignment:** including a good understanding of these terms of reference; an evaluation methodology which meets international best practice; and a realistic and adequate work plan to deliver outputs.
- **A qualified and structured team:** including demonstrated capacity by the study leader in financial and human resource management, and in the production of timely, high-quality reports; a balance of appropriate skills and expertise within the team in evaluation

methodologies, sector expertise, and social analysis; and appropriate involvement of local partners to build evaluation capacity and provide value for money.

It would be up to the evaluator to propose the optimum team composition and clearly specify the role of each team member required to achieve the objectives of the evaluation. However, it is suggested that the evaluation team must be composed of experts who have proven knowledge and relevant work experience in the field of conflict and community security as well as sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation). The team needs to comprise local (South Sudanese) and international experts. Given the limited timeframe available, it is expected that (at least) two teams be deployed to cover the field work. Each team should have at least one South Sudanese team member.

The independent evaluator should have:

- At least ten years of experience in programme evaluations, of which at least five years should be in international settings – preferably in post-conflict or fragile state contexts;
- Experience in operating in difficult operational environment;
- Experience in South Sudan, post-conflict areas, and/or other East African countries will be an advantage;
- Experience in engaging with local community members, using participatory and consultative approaches;
- Experience in engaging with government institutions and handling sensitive information;
- Experience in monitoring/evaluating conflict prevention, peacebuilding, stabilization or community security-related programmes or projects will be an advantage; and
- The evaluation team should be sufficient and technically qualified to monitor and implement activities and deliver all required outputs. Moreover, the evaluation teams must have:
  - Demonstrated strong oral and written communications skills;
  - Good interpersonal skills and ability to work in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity;
  - Ability to work independently with minimal supervision and maintain flexibility in working hours.

## **8. EVALUATION ETHICS**

The evaluation should be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group Ethical Guideline, which is available at <http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/100>. Evaluator's methodology should ensure independence and impartiality of judgment in assessment findings and recommendations.

## **9. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

The selected independent evaluator is responsible for the overall evaluation activities and quality of the evaluation process as well as the products. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) composed of representatives of SSRF stakeholders and partners will be established. The independent evaluator reports to the ERG and the Evaluation Manager (SSRF Secretariat). The ERG reviews the deliverables and methodologies proposed by the evaluator and advises on any

improvements to ensure the validity and quality of the evaluation, if need be. Moreover, the UNDP SSRF stabilization team will:

- Provide the evaluator with appropriate support (in those situations that are beyond the evaluator's control) to ensure that the objective of the evaluation is achieved with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness;
- Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the evaluator during the evaluation process;
- Ensure that relevant documents are available to the consultants upon the commencement of their tasks;
- Coordinate and inform government counterparts, partners and other related stakeholders as needed;
- Support to identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the assessment;
- Help in liaising with partners; and
- Organize inception meetings between the selected evaluator, partners and stakeholders prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.

#### **10. TIMEFRAME FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS**

The evaluator should provide the detail list of activities and timeframe during the inception report. However, evaluation activities should be carried out and deliverables produced within 40 working days during the period mid-April to June 2015.

#### **11. PAYMENT MODALITY:**

The payment modality would be based on the following milestones:

- a) Up on signing of the agreement (20%).
- b) Completion of inception report (30%).
- c) Submission of Draft Evaluation Report and a PowerPoint presentation (30%).
- d) Submission of Final Evaluation Report (20%).

#### **12. DOCUMENT FOR STUDY BY THE CONSULTANTS**

- SSRF Terms of Reference
- Strategic Framework of the SSRF
- Republic of South Sudan Aid Strategy
- South Sudan Development Plan
- Memorandum of Understanding
- Standard Administrative Agreements
- UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds (7 January 2011)
- UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programming (2003)
- UNDG Generic SC TOR
- Consolidated Annual reports (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)
- SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)
- Quarterly Progress Reports
- Project Evaluation Reports
- Audit Reports
- Field visits reports



- Bi-lateral donor review report
- DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014
- OCHA South Sudan conflict related incidents reports and maps
- DFID 2014 SSRF Project Completion Review Report
- Approved programme documents and
- Other relevant documents.

Information on the SSRF and documents/reports can be found using the following link:

<http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/SRF00>

## ANNEX 1: SUGGESTED REPORT STRUCTURE

Indicative section	Description and comments
Title and opening pages	
Table of contents	
List of acronyms and abbreviations	
Executive summary	This should be an extremely short chapter, highlighting the evaluation mandate, approach, key findings, conclusions and recommendations. Often, readers will only look at the executive summary. It should be prepared <b>after</b> the main text has been reviewed and agreed, and should not be circulated with draft reports.
Chapter 1: Introduction (Background and approach/methodology)	Introduce the rationale for the evaluation, including mandate, purpose and objectives, outline the main evaluation issues including the expected contribution at the outcome level, address evaluability and describe the methodology to be used.
Chapter 2: The development context and challenges of South Sudan	In addition to providing a general overview of historical trends and development challenges, specifically address the evaluation theme. Explain how the theme is addressed by government, and how it is reflected in national policies and strategies. Also provide information on the activities of other development partners in the area.
Chapter 3: SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes response and challenges	Against the background of Chapter 2, explain what the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes have achieved in this area (purely descriptive, not analytical). Provide the overarching outcome model, specifying the results frameworks for the programmes, as well descriptions of some of the main SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes activities.
Chapter 4: Development results (Presentation of findings based on the evaluation criteria, questions and other cross-cutting issues).	Against the background of Chapters 2-3, analyse findings without repeating information already provided. Also, minimize the need to mention additional factual information regarding projects and programmes (these should be described in Chapter 3). Focus on providing and analysing <b>evidence</b> relating to the evaluation criteria. Preferably, structure the analysis on the basis of the main evaluation criteria: • <b>Relevance</b> • <b>Effectiveness</b> • <b>Efficiency</b> • <b>partnership</b> • <b>Sustainability</b> . In addressing the evaluation criteria, the narrative should respond to the corresponding evaluation questions identified and agreed on during the inception stage. It should also provide a summary analysis of the findings.

Chapter 5: Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations	Conclusions are judgments based on evidence provided in Chapter 4. They are pitched at a higher level and are informed by an overall, comparative understanding of all relevant issues, options and opportunities. Do not provide new evidence or repeat evidence contained in earlier chapters. Lessons learnt and recommendations should be derived from the evidence contained in Chapter 4. They may also, but need not necessarily, relate to conclusions.
Annexes	

**7.2 Annex 2: Inception report**

**South Sudan Recovery Fund Round 3  
UN Joint Stabilization Programmes**

**Outcome Evaluation**

**Draft Inception Report**

**26 May 2015**

**Submitted by:**

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## BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) Steering Committee decided at its Steering Committee Meeting of 27 January 2015, to undertake a final Outcome Evaluation of Round 3 of the SSRF. The SSRF Secretariat was tasked with managing the evaluation process. This large and complex program, operating over 6 years, supported state stabilization plans in four states, twenty counties and implemented 71 projects, totaling \$102 million.

After the events following the 15 December violence in Juba between opposing factions of the SPLM/SPLA and the spread of violence to many states, the donor members of the SSRF steering Committee in March 2014 reflected on the impact of the continuing conflict on the SSRF, the risks for current programme assets and objectives, and continuing support for the SSRF. An estimated 80% of the Round 3 SSRF activities had been completed by that time. A Damage and Loss assessment was carried out by UNDP, the Coordinating Agency for the SSRF that reported back that SSRF projects suffered conflict related losses of \$16,765,502. In January 2015, it was decided to close the current round of the SSRF by 30 June 2015. It was also decided by the donor members of the SSRF Steering Committee that under current conditions it was not appropriate to continue planning or discussion of round 4 of the SSRF.

The South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF), referred to as the Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) prior to South Sudan's independence, is a UN Multi Donor Trust Fund that was established in 2008 to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance. The SSRF aimed to address post-conflict recovery and reconstruction needs of South Sudan through delivery of catalytic, high impact projects for demonstrating peace dividends. Since its establishment, the SSRF has received financial support from four donors: Norway, Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA), The Netherlands and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). Since its inception, three rounds of funding allocations under the SSRF were delivered in South Sudan.

Round 3 of the SSRF was developed in consultation with the UN, Government and donors to respond to the emerging stabilization needs at state levels of a newly independent South Sudan. The initial framework was developed in 2009. The first state to develop a SSRF state stabilization plan was Jonglei, and the program started in 2010. The other states (Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap) developed their State Stabilization Plans in 2010 and those Programs started up in 2011. The SSRF worked in partnership with UNDP, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as NGO implementing partners, PACT and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).

Approximately USD 102 million was allocated to deliver the intended results under Round 3: USD 23,449,683 under the Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme; USD 28,456,008 under the Jonglei Stabilization Programme; USD 31,277,662 under the Lakes State Stabilization Programme; and USD 19,645,840 under the Warrap Stabilization Programme.

While the SSRF documentation has not explicitly state its theory of change, it can be formulated as follows. In Round 3, SSRF aimed to restore post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure, increase security and reduce the level of ethnic conflicts in four states of South Sudan: Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap through the delivery of 4 outputs:

- a. Public administration buildings and rule of law infrastructure (county headquarters, county and payam-level police facilities and county courts) to support the extension of state authority to underserved and conflict prone areas;
- b. Water facilities, including large reservoirs for watering cattle (haffirs) and boreholes for supplying water to local communities, to provide access to clean water and mitigate conflict over scarce water sources during the migration of cattle in the dry season;
- c. Access and security roads to and through insecure areas, for connecting communities as well as creating access to the most insecure and underserved areas;
- d. Public radio telecommunication infrastructure and services to promote social cohesion through peace-building, informational and educational broadcasts.

In turn, these outputs contribute to SSRF's stated outcome which is to increase security and reduced levels of ethnic conflict in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Warrap, and Lakes states. This outcome will contribute to UNDAF Outcome 1: Peace-Building.

In the formulation phase, initiatives for stabilizing conflict prone communities were identified and validated through county and state-level consultations and conflict mapping processes within each state's respective counties. Each state held a Stabilization Workshop to finalize their priorities, identify the counties and projects. State Stabilization Boards continued through the life of the project to support, coordinate and monitor progress working with the SSRF.

UNDP served as the 'Coordinating Agency', providing oversight, coordination, monitoring and technical support on implementation of these programmes by participating UN organizations and NGO implementing partners.

## **CONSULTANCY OVERVIEW**

### **Purpose of the Evaluation**

The independent evaluation aims to assess the overall contribution of Round 3: the Joint Stabilization Programmes towards improving community security and reducing the levels of ethnic conflicts while distilling lessons and best practices to feed into future programming. The evaluation will cover the Four State Programmes in twenty counties with 40 projects implemented over a five-year period.

This evaluation intends to cover relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, partnership, ownership and sustainability of the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes. The evaluation will assess the intended and negative/positive unintended output and outcomes of the Stabilization Programmes on the target communities and make recommendations to enhance operational and programmatic effectiveness of similar initiatives in comparable situations.

The evaluation findings will be disseminated to all stakeholders including the Government of South Sudan, the beneficiaries, donors, PUNOs and other implementing partners.

### **Evaluation scope and objectives**

Given the challenges and constraints of carrying out such an evaluation in South Sudan, it is important to define early on what is possible in terms of scope and objectives, given the availability of data, proposed interviews, field visits, and observation within the timeframe and logistical possibilities. An output evaluation, a necessary element of the outcome evaluation, can

be carried out with the existing information base. However, determining outcomes will be more challenging. While the methodology will gather and analyze both quantitative and qualitative information, it is important to recognize that the timeframe and conditions may not be sufficient for evidence based conclusions or attributions on outcomes, especially in relation to direct impact of the project as a predominant factor in the outcome.

The evaluation will be carried out over 46 working days<sup>33</sup>, starting on 9 May 2015, with all work completed by 31 July, 2015 and will cover the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Warrap states of South Sudan over the implementation period; January 2011 to June 2015 for Eastern Equatoria, Lakes State and Warrap Stabilization Programmes, and from November 2010 to June 2015 for Jonglei Stabilization Programme. The evaluation will cover programme conceptualization (theory of change), design, implementation, internal monitoring and evaluation, output and outcome. The UN Joint Stabilization Programmes outputs include: road, public administration, rule of law, public radio as well as water infrastructures. Target beneficiaries of the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes include state and local level government institutions as well as local communities in the project areas.

Specific objectives of the evaluation are:

- a. To assess the relevance, ownership, effectiveness and efficiency of the Stabilization Programmes as well as understand the key factors that have contributed to achievement or non-achievement of the intended results;
- b. To determine the extent to which the Stabilization Programmes contributed to forging and strengthening of partnerships among key stakeholders including Government, donors, UN agencies and beneficiary communities;
- c. To assess the management arrangements and capacity in place by the Stabilization Programmes, Government and the beneficiary communities in sustaining the results achieved;
- d. To assess opportunity costs of engaging in infrastructure investments in South Sudan;
- e. To draw lessons learned and best practices and make recommendations for future programming of projects of similar nature.

## **APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

### **Understanding of the purpose, scope and objectives of the evaluation**

The evaluation aims to assess the overall contribution of SSRF Round 3 SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programme towards improving community security and reducing the levels of ethnic conflicts. It will assess relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, partnership, ownership and sustainability of the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes. The evaluation will also track the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the SSRF State Stabilization Programmes on the target communities. Lessons and good practices will be identified that could benefit future programming. Recommendations will be made to enhance operational and programmatic effectiveness of similar initiatives in comparable situations.

The foundation of the evaluation will be the approved SSRF programme results framework as outlined in Annex 1.

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<sup>33</sup> See Annex 2 for the detailed schedule and workdays allocated to each consultant

The evaluators are cognizant of the fact that events of 15 December 2013 precipitated a continuing crisis and conflict that had major impacts on the SSRF. Accordingly, the evaluation methodology will track the SSRF in two distinct time periods:

1. SSRF Round 3 start up in 2009 to the eruption of armed violence on 15 December 2013; and
2. SSRF Round 3 post 15 December 2013 to June 2015.

The evaluation process will involve a wide range of methods, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

- Quantitative analysis of each State Stabilization Plan and its projects will be carried out. There is extensive documentation available provided by the SSRF coordinating agency, PUNOs, other partners, government (state level) including quarterly and annual reports on all four state plans. Quantitative information from external data sources (UNMISS, UNOCHA,) on outcome indicators will be gathered covering the 2010 to 2015 time period. Templates have been provided to UNOCHA in order to collect this information on each county in which the projects are located.
- Qualitative assessments will include stakeholder (government, partners, and communities) individual and group interviews (in Juba and in all states) and observation through site visits<sup>34</sup> in the four states. In discussions with the SSRF Secretariat and the Coordinating Agency, an initial sampling of projects was developed that includes a mix of projects covering the four output areas in the four states. Approximately 12 to 15 of the 40 counties will be visited. In addition, surveys and studies undertaken by PUNOs and other stakeholders will be reviewed.

Programme progress towards outputs and outcomes should be able to be substantiated through both quantitative and qualitative data. There is less quantitative data available to verify progress towards outcomes, as the project did not engage in systematic monitoring in this area. Data on incidents of violence in the targeted counties will be collected from UNOCHA, UNMISS and CSAC to track changes over time. Qualitative methods will therefore be an important source for the evaluation of outcomes. Qualitative information will be collected through interviews with individuals and groups at state, county and community level.

A Lessons Learned Study was carried out in 2012 that covers the initial period of the SSRF Round 3. The evaluation will also determine the extent to which the recommendations of the 2012 lessons learnt report were implemented. In addition the evaluation will attempt to assess whether some lessons learnt have been transferred to partners, including local governments, in order to strengthen long-term sustainability; and what good practices can inform future stabilization and/or post conflict recovery interventions.

The evaluation will use OECD DAC definitions for evaluation and take into account the UNEG Norms for Evaluation in the UN System.

### **Evaluation tools**

Within the current context of the Republic of South Sudan, group and individual interviews with a range of stakeholders (partners, government, donors, state and county officials, beneficiary

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<sup>34</sup> See Annex 4. Field Trips

communities) and document review are the most reliable tools for such a time bound evaluation exercise, carried out in conditions that limit access to many of the programme areas. The evaluation matrix can be found in Annex 4 below.

### ***Document review***

The SSRF has provided the consultants with extensive documentation that, inter alia, includes the list of documents suggested by the ToR for review. During the perusal of the documents already provided, missing relevant documentation has been requested from the secretariat. Where the consultants require additional information not contained in the provided documents, the secretariat will be requested to source such information. Reviews carried out by donors of the SSRF will also be reviewed.

In meetings with the PUNOs, they verified that their reporting was well reflected in the quarterly and annual reports. As these reports have been approved by the SSRF Steering Committee, they will be considered valid and acceptable documentation. Internal reports of PUNOS which do not duplicate the progress reports are being requested. The SSRF Secretariat was only able to organize meetings with PACT and UNOPS during the inception period. The others will be scheduled for early on in the next phase.

The consultants will also gather additional relevant documents during stakeholder and community visits and interviews during the field visits. This will include possible information from key state ministries and organizations working in the targeted counties. Information obtained from national sources on the outcomes, will be discussed at state and county levels as a means of verification. Some states have Peace Commissions that have been gathering information on conflict related incidents, though it does not consistently gather the same information over time.

The county will be the lowest level of data that will be collected for both outputs and outcomes.

### ***Interviews***

Interviews will be conducted with:

- SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee
- State Stabilization Board
- Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels
- Participating donors
- Participating United Nations Organizations
- Key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at national, state and community levels.

It was not possible to schedule a meeting with the Government Chairperson of the SSRF Steering Committee (Deputy Minister of Finance) during the Inception period. Juba level meetings will be scheduled with key sectors linked to the project: Water, Roads, Interior and Justice.

As there have been many changes in state government over the time of the project and since the Dec 2013 crisis, the team will try to locate some who were involved in the development of the state stabilization plans. Interviews will be requested with key state Ministries (Physical Infrastructure, Local Government, Finance, and Water) as well as the Governor's Office.



Community consultations and discussions will be held with groups of direct and indirect beneficiaries and/or stakeholders. It is being requested that women, youth, local leaders be included. After the preparatory visits to the states being undertaken by the SSRF coordinating agency, there should be more information available on the proposed visits.

A semi-structured interview format is being finalized for state, county and community interviews, to ensure consistency and comparability between interviewees. Final lists of interviewees for the field visits will be confirmed subsequent to the SRF team that will be going out to each state to prepare the field visits and identify interviewees and communities.

Interviews and related logistics will be arranged and facilitated by the SSRF secretariat.

Some initial interviews have been conducted by the evaluators in the inception period<sup>35</sup>

### ***Field visits***

The field visits will be carried out in all four states (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Jonglei). There are two teams composed of an international and national consultant, supported by the SSRF Stabilization Team that will visit two states each. The field visits will take place between June 16 and July 2, 2015<sup>36</sup>. There will be breaks in between the field visits in which meetings will be held with implementers to follow-up on field visits.

All field visits will be facilitated by the SSRF secretariat with the support of the Coordinating Agency. They are responsible for all travel and accommodation logistics, appointments with interviewees in the field and facilitation of site visits.

Projects to be visited in the field have been initially identified in consultation with the SSRF secretariat and the Coordinating Agency. Projects were selected on the coverage of all four output areas, security, accessibility, progress, and date of completion.

Prior to the evaluators' field visits, preparatory visits will be made to the states by the SSRF Team to verify the proposed programme and to arrange meetings and community level consultations. The list of projects will be finalized subject to access and availability of stakeholders and partners. Further review of available documents by the consultants may also alter the choice of field visits, in order to look at both good and bad practices.

The location and logistics of the field visits are described in the provisional table to be found in Annex 3 below. Note that the actual scheduling of the field visits and final project locations remain to be confirmed and will be dependent on availability of flights, road access and the current security situation in the intended locations identified.

### **Evaluation Questions**

The following definitions and related leading exploratory questions will be used when analyzing quantitative and qualitative documentation. They will be incorporated into the semi structured interview formats.

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<sup>35</sup> See Annex 5. Inception period interviews conducted

<sup>36</sup> See Annex 4. Field Trips

#### Relevance:

Relevance is “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.”

1. To what extent were the SSRF State UN Joint Stabilization Programmes intended outcomes and outputs a reflection of national and local priorities?
2. How appropriate and useful were the roles of SSRF Steering Committee and the state level governance boards in identification of priorities and selection of relevant interventions in SSRF targeted states?
3. What is the perception of the relevance to priority needs of the programmes’ conceptualization and design, of various stakeholders – beneficiaries, government, UN, Donors, and NGOs?
4. Did the intended outcomes and outputs change during the duration of the programme? What mechanisms existed to modify the programme response to changing circumstances?

#### Effectiveness.

Effectiveness is the “extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.”

1. To what extent did the SSRF State Stabilization Programmes achieve the intended outputs and outcomes? Were there any unintended results?
2. What are the major factors that facilitated or impeded achievement or non-achievement of the intended results? How effective were the mitigation measures in addressing the challenges and identified risks?
3. To what extent did programme interventions contribute to mitigating local tensions and conflicts and increase security in the target areas. ?
4. How did the various stakeholders perceive the State Stabilization Programmes realization of underlying programme objectives?
5. How effective and efficient were the strategic partnerships that were established under the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in programme monitoring, and implementation? How were risks owned and monitored throughout programme delivery?
6. What is the quality the assets created under the programme?
7. How did SSRF interventions explicitly and implicitly include and benefit vulnerable groups, women, youth and girls?
8. To what extent did the coordination of activities and engagement among the SSRF stakeholders contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?

#### Efficiency.

Efficiency is “the measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.”

1. Did the systems and processes of the SSRF ensure the efficient implementation of the programme, in the given conditions?
2. How efficient were PUNOs in the delivery of the Stabilization Programmes and did they respond effectively to emerging and changing stabilization and recovery conditions?

3. How efficient was role of the coordinating agency in oversight, monitoring and coordination?
4. Did the programmes' implementing partners have the requisite skills/capacity to deliver infrastructure and build governments' institutional capacity at local levels?
5. How efficiently was the fund flow managed at different levels? To what extent did the fund managers apply payment by milestones arrangement with implementing partners?
6. Did the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes provide value for money?
7. To what extent was the programme complementing, supporting or benefitting other interventions in target states?

Sustainability:

"Sustainability is the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed; the probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time." Important attributes of sustainability are partnership, ownership and coordination arrangements within the programme.

1. To what extent did the SSRF UN Joint stabilization Programmes contribute to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities to participate in design, implementation and support for the sustainability of outputs/assets?
2. To what extent were community voices incorporated effectively into local decision-making processes and siting of interventions? Could the project have given stronger voices to the local communities?
3. What is the extent of ownership of the SSRF outputs among the different stakeholders at the different levels and implementation phases?
4. What is the level of stated and actual commitment by the government and beneficiary community in sustaining the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes outputs/outcomes?
5. What was the effect of interventions on social cohesion, women's empowerment and youth engagement and how will this affect sustainability?
6. Was SSRF balance between infrastructure investments in software (i.e. capacity building, community engagement, monitoring and evaluation) correct in relationship to promoting sustainability and ownership?

***Information gathering on county security/displacement/incidents of violence***

In order to track the overall Outcome of the SSRF to improve security and reduce the levels of ethnic conflict in four states of South Sudan; Warrap, Lakes, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria, the Evaluation will draw on data collected by UNOCHA , UNMISS over the time period of the implementation of Round 3: November 2010 to June 2015. Other more qualitative information will be collected from local officials, communities visited, and organizations working in the area and special reports or studies undertaken in the time period.

The information will be collected for the twenty counties that were included in the project. Other data on contiguous areas that impacted security in those counties will also be reflected in the analysis.

Due to the widespread security impact of the events of 15 December 2013, the data will be broken into two sections (before and after the 15 December) so that trends can be examined before this critical event and after. It is suggested that data be collected for November 2011, November 2012, November 2013, and November 2014. The Coordinating agency has provided data for outcome level indicators through 2013 in the SSRF annual reports.

The national consultants will assist in the collection of this data based on a common template. Information collected will include; number of violent incidents, number of deaths by violent attacks, number of people displaced due to violent attacks, number of cattle raiding incidents and insecure access area as assessed by UNDSS. It is hoped that the data from UNMISS, UNDSS and UNOCHA can be collected and collated by 15 June, 2015. Then it will be reviewed and further through the state field visits, planned for period of 18 June to 3 July 2015.

The final assessment of progress towards outcome will be based on available quantitative and qualitative data. The quality and consistency of the data, must be reviewed and the information gathered from the field visits will be noted and reflect the perceptions of the stakeholders available at the time of the visits.

### ***National Consultants***

National consultants<sup>37</sup> have been identified and are in the process of being engaged by the UNDP procurement unit. Unfortunately, the most qualified consultant that was also familiar with the SSRF would not accept the terms of the UNDP contract, which reduced his 'real' salary by two-thirds given the currency devaluation of the SSP. Two less experienced consultants were recruited which will require more time and supervision by the international consultants. The evaluation team met with one of the consultants during the Inception phase to review the TOR (below) of their work.

Their primary tasks will be to:

- Review selected project related documentation to gain familiarity with the UN Joint Stabilization Programmes.
- Under the supervision of the evaluators, collect and collate information and assist in compiling an information pack for each project of the programme that will be used for analysis in the evaluation process. A template will be designed for this.
- Source and analyze third party information and documentation on counties where the projects have been implemented. (For example: inter alia the UNDP Rule of Law programme; CSAC, National Ministries; and reports of NGOs operating in the programme areas).
- Follow up with UNMISS and OCHA data collection, as needed.
- Support and participation in field visits, in particular the community level consultations with direct and indirect beneficiaries of the projects.
- Assist in the report writing period by sourcing additional information that may be required, and reviewing finished text.

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<sup>37</sup> See Annex 2 for the allocation of work days

## **Reporting**

The first draft of the findings will be presented to the SSRF Secretariat by 20 July 2015. It will be reviewed by the ERG and presented to the Steering Committee and other stakeholders on the 24<sup>th</sup> of July 2015. A power point presentation will be prepared as well. The evaluators will receive comments by 28 July and the final Draft will be presented by 31 July, 2015.

The presentation and initial draft will contain a summary of the key findings, lessons learned, risk management and recommendations. The structure and content of the final report will be based on what was provided in the Terms of Reference. During the process of writing the first draft report, any deviation on the provided report structure and timetable will be agreed to by the Evaluation Reference Group.

## **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

The consultants (two international and national) are responsible for the overall evaluation activities, and the quality of the process and products, within the context and constraints in South Sudan, and assuming that adequate and agreed upon support is provided.

An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) composed of representatives of SSRF stakeholders and partners has been established, composed of the SSRF Secretariat, DFID, the Netherlands and UNDP. The independent evaluation team reports to the Evaluation Manager (SSRF Secretariat) and the ERG. The ERG reviews the deliverables and methodologies proposed by the evaluation team and advises on any improvements to ensure the validity and quality of the evaluation. The Evaluation team can request support from the SSRF Secretariat and keep the SSRF Secretariat and the ERG apprised of progress, and make proposals for modifications, if required.

The UNDP SSRF Secretariat and the Coordinating Agency team will:

- Provide the evaluation team with appropriate support beyond the evaluator's to ensure that the objective of the evaluation is achieved with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness;
- Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the evaluator during the evaluation process;
- Ensure that relevant documents are available to the consultants upon the commencement of their tasks and to provide additionally requested documents/information in an expedient manner;
- Coordinate and inform government counterparts, partners and other related stakeholders as needed, and facilitate and set up the needed meetings and discussions.
- Support to identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the assessment;
- Help in liaising with partners to set up these meetings.
- Organize meetings between the selected evaluator, partners and stakeholders prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.
- Provide all logistical support needs to carry out the evaluation, including local land transport, air transport, hotel bookings and other support as needed.

## RISKS AND LIMITATIONS

Given the current security and logistical constraints within South Sudan, the proposed methodology may not be able to be fully implemented. While all attempts will be made to carry out the proposed methodology, if the Evaluation Team cannot have access to stakeholders, locations or communities important to the process, the evaluation team will prepare its report on the basis of available information.

A documentation of altered or changed, meetings, field visits, and interviews will be kept. The SSRF and the ERG will be advised on a weekly basis, of what meetings were able to be organized and carried out. If this has implications for the implementation of the methodology that will require changes, the SSRF may convene the ERG.

The key elements that will affect the ability to undertake the evaluation are:

- a. Weather and access to locations for field visits.
- b. The security situation in the areas where field visits are planned. Reports from UNDSS may affect permission to travel. This can only be assessed immediately prior to visits being conducted
- c. Availability of interviewees – Cooperation from key informants is vital to the success of the results. Many of those involved in the conceptualization and implementation of the SSRF up until 15 December 2013, are no longer in their governmental positions. There has also been high donor, UN and partner turnover. In addition, due to R and R and other factors, meetings may not be able to be set up by the SSRF Secretariat. Lack of availability of key informants could be a major risk factor.
- d. Given the ongoing political and military conflict within South Sudan coupled with the economic crisis, government officials have other priorities and may not view an evaluation of a closing program that has made it clear it will not allocate any funds for a future phase, as a priority when the SSRF is trying to schedule meetings. This could reduce the range of stakeholders the team can meet within the time frame.
- e. Qualitative information on perceptions of progress may be limited and not be sufficient to draw conclusions or attribute to the SSRF projects
- f. Flight scheduling is dependent on UNHAS and UNMISS.

## ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

SSRF Expected Outcomes and Outputs	Indicator	Indicator Definition	M&E Event/data collection methodology	Means of verification	Frequency of data collection	Responsibility	Baseline	Target (2014)	Risk and assumptions
SSRF Outcome: Increased security and reduced level of ethnic conflict in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Warrap, and Lakes states.	% change in the number of inter-communal conflicts	This measures the level of conflict in the four states. Count the # of ethnic conflict incidents in the reporting period and present it as percentage change compared to the baseline value.	Conduct outcome evaluations or assessments; joint field visits; desk review of reports and consultation with relevant institutions.	Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports; progress reports; monitoring reports; monthly UNOCHA incidents report.	Quarterly	UNDP will commission assessment and organize updates regularly; PUNOs, Government, donors and TS will provide the necessary support and participate as needed.	334 conflict incidents reported in 2011	TBD	Security threats
	% change in the number of deaths due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four States. Count the total # of deaths due to ethnic conflicts in the reporting period and present as percentage change compared to the baseline value.			Quarterly	UNDP will commission assessment and organize updates regularly; PUNOs, Government, donors and TS will provide the necessary support and participate as needed.	2,339 deaths reported in 2011	TBD	
	% change in the number of displacements due to inter-communal conflicts	This indicator measures severity of the conflicts in the four states. Count the total # of IDPs due to ethnic conflicts during the reporting period and present as			Quarterly	UNDP will commission assessment and organize updates regularly;	383,173 IDPs reported in 2011	TBD	

		percentage change compared to the baseline value.				PUNOs, Government, donors and TS will provide the necessary support and participate as needed.			
<b>Output 1:</b> Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State	Number of counties reached by the State managed radio station	The radio station is assumed to cover the whole state. Count the Counties that have access to the broadcast from the State managed radio station.	Conduct assessments; joint field visits; review meetings; desk review of technical and regular reports as well as consultation with relevant institutions, such as MoC.	Assessment, progress, training and monitoring reports; review meeting minutes.	Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	0	11	Limited access to project sites due to poor road conditions
	Extent of broadcast on security alerts, peace building and educational programs/messages in local languages.	Count the number of security alerts, peace building and educational programs/messages transmitted through the State managed radio station in the reporting period.	Conduct assessments; joint field visits; review meetings; desk review of progress and monitoring reports as well as consultation with relevant institutions.		Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	0	Twice in a day	Security threats



	Number of radio station staff received capacity building trainings on broadcasting and maintenance of equipment.	The total number of radio station staff received training through the SSRF stabilization programme, disaggregated by sex and type of training.	Conduct desk review of the periodic reports, training reports as well as monitoring reports; review meetings; joint monitoring visits.		Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	0	18 staff trained on audio recording/editing and studio operation as well as equipment maintenance	Security threats
<b>Output 2:</b> Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)	Kilometer of access roads constructed/rehabilitated	This indicator tracks the length of roads, in kilometer, constructed and/or rehabilitated by the SSRF stabilization programmes.	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct joint field visits.	Progress, training and monitoring reports; review meeting minutes.	Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	No access road	526km (140kms under EESP, 148kms under JSP, 168kms under LSSP and 70kms under WSP)	Security threats, delay due to rainy season
	Number of MoPI staff trained on road maintenance and machine operation	This indicator tracks the total number of MoPI staff trained by the SSRF stabilization programmes, disaggregated by sex and type of training.	Review progress, training and monitoring reports; consult PUNOs and MoPI; conduct joint field visits and review meetings.		Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will	0	-	

						be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.			
	Number and type of road maintenance machineries procured and handed over to the government	Count the number of machineries handed over to the government, disaggregated by the type of machineries.	Review progress and monitoring reports; consult PUNOs and MoPI; conduct joint field visits and review meetings.		Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	No road maintenance machineries (Jonglei and Warrap MPI)	-	
<b>Output 3:</b> Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	Number of county headquarters, police posts, prisons, court houses and ranger posts constructed	Count the number of local administration infrastructures constructed by the SSRF stabilization programmes. Disaggregate the data based on the purpose of the buildings.	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct monitoring visits and review meetings.	Progress and monitoring reports; progress review meeting minutes.	Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	Poor or no security and rule of law infrastructures in the target conflict prone areas.	4 County headquarters, 7 County courts, 11 police stations, 1 prison and 3 ranger posts	Security threats, delay due to rainy season

<b>Output 4:</b> Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)	Number of haffirs, boreholes and water filtrations constructed	Count the # of haffirs, boreholes and water filtration units constructed under the SSRF stabilization programmes.	Review progress reports from the PUNOs and monitoring reports; conduct monitoring visits and review meetings.	Progress and monitoring reports; progress review meeting minutes.	Quarterly	Joint field visits and review meetings will be organized by UNDP in collaboration with state governments and PUNOs; progress reports will be prepared by the PUNOs, UNDP and TS.	No water access points in the target conflict prone areas	10 haffirs, 26 boreholes and 1 water filtrations constructed	Security threats, delay due to rainy season
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## ANNEX 2. DETAILED WORK SCHEDULE

ID	Task Name	Start	Finish	June							July					A
				W1	W2	W3	W4	W5	W6	W7	W8	W9	W10	W11	W12	
1	INCEPTION PERIOD	Mon 15/05/11	Fri 15/05/22													
2	Interviews and coordination	Mon 15/05/11	Fri 15/05/15													
3	Inception report writing	Sat 15/05/16	Sun 15/05/17													
4	Deliver inception report	Mon 15/05/18	Mon 15/05/18													
5	SSAFE Training	Tue 15/05/19	Thu 15/05/21													
6	Interviews/amend inception report and submit	Fri 15/05/22	Fri 15/05/22													
7	DATA COLLECTION, COLLATION, FIELD VISIT PREPARATION PERIOD	Mon 15/05/25	Fri 15/06/12													
8	Collection and collation of information	Mon 15/05/25	Fri 15/06/12													
9	Pre-field visit preparatory trips by SSRF	Mon 15/05/25	Fri 15/06/12													
10	Document review, interviewee lists, formats for document collection and collation, national consultant coordination, supervision	Mon 15/05/25	Tue 15/05/26													
11	Document review, interview formats, national consultant coordination, supervision	Mon 15/06/01	Tue 15/06/02													
12	Document review, national consultant coordination, supervision	Thu 15/06/11	Fri 15/06/12													
13	FIELD VISITS PERIOD	Mon 15/06/15	Fri 15/07/03													
14	Finalization of arrangements	Mon 15/06/15	Mon 15/06/15													
15	Field visit EE	Tue 15/06/16	Wed 15/06/24													
16	Field visit WSP	Tue 15/06/16	Wed 15/06/24													
17	Field visit Lakes	Thu 15/06/25	Wed 15/07/01													
18	Interviews Juba	Thu 15/06/25	Fri 15/06/26													
19	Field visit JSP	Mon 15/06/29	Thu 15/07/02													
20	Interviews Juba	Fri 15/07/03	Fri 15/07/03													
21	INDEPENDENCE WEEK	Mon 15/07/06	Fri 15/07/10													
22	REPORTING PERIOD	Mon 15/07/06	Fri 15/07/31													
23	Draft report writing	Mon 15/07/06	Thu 15/07/16													
24	Deliver draft report to ERG	Fri 15/07/17	Fri 15/07/17													
25	Draft presentation to ERG	Wed 15/07/22	Wed 15/07/22													
26	Amendments	Thu 15/07/23	Fri 15/07/24													
27	Final report writing	Sat 15/07/25	Fri 15/07/31													
28	Deliver final report	Fri 15/07/31	Fri 15/07/31													

## Allocation of workdays

TASK	START	FINISH	International work days		National work days	
			SB	SC	N1	N2
<b>INCEPTION PERIOD</b>	<b>11-May-15</b>	<b>22-May-15</b>				
Interviews and coordination	11-May-15	15-May-15	5	5		
Inception report writing	16-May-15	17-May-15	2	2		
Deliver inception report	18-May-15	18-May-15	1	1		
SSAFE Training	19-May-15	21-May-15	3	3		
Interviews/amend inception report, meet national consultants and submit	22-May-15	22-May-15	1	1	1	1
<b>DATA COLLECTION, COLLATION, FIELD VISIT PREPARATION PERIOD</b>	<b>25-May-15</b>	<b>12-Jun-15</b>				
Collection and collation of information	25-May-15	12-Jun-15			12	12
Pre-field visit preparatory trips by SSRF	25-May-15	12-Jun-15				
Document review, interviewee lists, formats for document collection and collation, national consultant coordination, supervision	25-May-15	26-May-15	2	2		
Document review, interview formats, national consultant coordination, supervision	01-Jun-15	02-Jun-15		2		
Document review, national consultant coordination, supervision	11-Jun-15	12-Jun-15	2	2		
<b>FIELD VISITS PERIOD</b>	<b>15-Jun-15</b>	<b>03-Jul-15</b>				
Finalization of arrangements	15-Jun-15	15-Jun-15	1	1	1	1
Field visit EE	16-Jun-15	24-Jun-15	6		6	
Field visit WSP	16-Jun-15	24-Jun-15		6		6
Field visit Lakes	25-Jun-15	01-Jul-15		6		6
Interviews Juba	25-Jun-15	26-Jun-15	2		1	
Field visit JSP	29-Jun-15	02-Jul-15	3		3	
Interviews Juba	03-Jul-15	03-Jul-15	1			
<b>INDEPENDENCE WEEK</b>	<b>06-Jul-15</b>	<b>10-Jul-15</b>				
<b>REPORTING PERIOD</b>	<b>06-Jul-15</b>	<b>31-Jul-15</b>				
Draft report writing	06-Jul-15	16-Jul-15	8	8	4	4
Deliver draft report to ERG	17-Jul-15	17-Jul-15				
Draft presentation to ERG	22-Jul-15	22-Jul-15	1	1	1	1
Amendments	23-Jul-15	24-Jul-15	1	1	1	1
Presentation to Steering SSRF Steering Committee	24-Jul-15	24-Jul-15	1	1		
Final report writing	25-Jul-15	31-Jul-15	4	4	2	2
Deliver final report	31-Jul-15	31-Jul-15				
TOTAL WORK DAYS			44	46	32	34

### ANNEX 3. FIELD TRIPS

(Removed)

### ANNEX 5. EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
<b>Outcome</b> The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.	<b>Quantification of SSRF Results Framework outcome indicators</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % change in the number of inter-communal conflicts</li> <li>• % change in the number of deaths due to inter-communal conflicts</li> <li>• % change in the number of displacements due to inter-communal conflicts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNOCHA incidents reports</li> <li>• UNMISS incidents reports</li> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Monitoring reports; monthly UNOCHA.</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNOCHA</li> <li>• UNMISS</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at state and county levels</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is 'logic leap' in the of outputs to outcomes assumptions made in the framework</li> <li>• Data from project reports, UNOCHA, UNMISS may not correlate</li> <li>• Any % change cannot only be attributed to SSRF interventions</li> <li>• Perceptions at community and</li> </ul>

<sup>38</sup> The key evaluation questions are the questions that will guide the evaluators. Specific questions will be composed for specific interviewees prior to each interview – and the key questions will be used as a basis for that.

<sup>39</sup> Some of the comments, assumptions, risks and limitations have been described in the inception report. They are again listed here – as well as additional factors are noted

<sup>40</sup> These will be the primary documents to be consulted for each question. Additional documentation collected during the evaluation process will also be used

<sup>41</sup> Actual interviewees need to be identified with the assistance for the SSRF secretariat. The secretariat will arrange for interviews to be conducted as per the detailed project schedule. Due to the time constraints of the evaluation (with an inordinate amount of time allocated to field visits) it may not be possible to meet all interviewees.

<sup>42</sup> Actual beneficiaries will be interviewed during site inspections conducted during the field visits. These interviewees will be identified (and the consultation meeting organized) by the Coordinating agency and the secretariat.

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
		Review 2014 • Programme documents <sup>43</sup>			beneficiary level may be inconclusive
<b>Outputs</b> The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.	<b>Quantification of SSRF Results Framework output indicators</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output 1: Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State</li> <li>• Output 2: Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)</li> <li>• Output 3: Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)</li> <li>• Output 4: Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress and annual reports</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• Programme documents</li> <li>• PUNO and NGO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant government officials at state and county levels</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• State Stabilization Boards</li> </ul>	Verification of sampled projects visited	Can only be done via quantification using programme reports with limited verification during field visits

<sup>43</sup> Programme documents as listed in ToR

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
<b>Relevance:</b> Relevance is “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.”	1. To what extent were the SSRF State UN Joint Stabilization Programmes intended outcomes and outputs a reflection of national and local priorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF Terms of Reference</li> <li>Strategic Framework of the SSRF</li> <li>Republic of South Sudan Aid Strategy</li> <li>South Sudan Development Plan</li> <li>CSAC reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>CSAC</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily a desk study complemented with information obtained in interviews and field visits
	2. How appropriate and useful were the roles of SSRF Steering Committee and the state level governance boards in identification of priorities and selection of relevant interventions in SSRF targeted states?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF SC minutes</li> <li>State board minutes</li> <li>Concept notes</li> <li>Quarterly, annual reports</li> <li>CSAC reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs and members</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>CSAC</li> <li>Interviews with PUNOS</li> </ul>	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily obtained from interviews</li> <li>Turnover in membership through the life of the project may limit interviewees</li> </ul>
	3. What is the perception of the relevance to priority needs of the programmes’ conceptualization and design, of various stakeholders –	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reports , by donors</li> <li>SSRF SC and State Board Minutes</li> <li>Lessons Learned Exercise</li> <li>March 2014 Letter from SSRF Donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> </ul>	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>These perceptions may have changed during life of the project.</li> <li>Pre-crisis and post crisis needed.</li> </ul>



Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
	beneficiaries, government, UN, Donors, and NGOs?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> </ul>		
	4. Did the intended outcomes and outputs change during the duration of the programme? What mechanisms existed to modify the programme response to changing circumstances?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF SC minutes</li> <li>State board minutes</li> <li>Concept notes</li> <li>Quarterly, annual reports</li> <li>Implementing partner reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs and members</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> </ul>	n/a	Tracking of changes and mechanisms will be investigated through the various reports Supported by interview information Pre- crisis post crisis very important
<b>Effectiveness.</b> Effectiveness is the “extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.”	1. To what extent did the SSRF State Stabilization Programmes achieve the intended outputs and outcomes? Were there any unintended results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports<sup>44</sup></li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs and members</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily obtained through document review</li> <li>For intended results – the outcome/output indicators evaluation will be used, divided into pre-crisis and post crisis</li> <li>Unintended results will be obtained from documentation and</li> </ul>

<sup>44</sup> Progress reports would include all reports available including field reports

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
					from interviewees
	2. What are the major factors that facilitated or impeded achievement or non-achievement of the intended results? How effective were the mitigation measures in addressing the challenges and identified risks?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports ,</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs and members</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• PUNOs Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Community consultations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primarily obtained through document review</li> <li>• Verification through interviews</li> </ul>
	3. To what extent did programme interventions contribute to mitigating local tensions and conflicts and increase security in the target areas. ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• UNOCHA/UNMISS data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNOCHA</li> <li>• UNMISS</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at state and county levels</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered, looking at pre-crisis and post crisis periods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outcome/output indicators evaluation and Interviewee perceptions will be used to gauge this.</li> <li>• The may be variance linked to other factors, not the project itself</li> </ul>
	4. How did the various stakeholders perceive the State Stabilization Programmes realization of underlying programme objectives?	Scan of all available documentation for evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primarily obtained from interviewees</li> <li>• Scan of available documentation may reveal additional information</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
			national, state and county levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>		
	5. How effective and efficient were the strategic partnerships that were established under the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes in programme monitoring, and implementation? How were risks owned and monitored throughout programme delivery?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primarily obtained from interviewees</li> <li>• Scan of available documentation may reveal additional information</li> </ul>
	6. What is the quality the assets created under the programme?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Limited visual verification of sampled projects visited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not possible to fully evaluate quality through document review and interviews</li> <li>• Limited visual inspections of sampled projects will not fully</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
		Review 2014 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implementing partner reports</li> </ul>			assess quality. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality assessments can only be appropriate engineers</li> </ul>
	7. How did SSRF interventions explicitly and implicitly include and benefit vulnerable groups, women, youth and girls?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scan of documentation to find instances of benefit to vulnerable groups, women, youth and girls</li> <li>CSAC reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State SSRF level board chair and members</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> <li>Key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at, state and community levels</li> <li>CSAC</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not mentioned in project framework</li> <li>Information can potentially only be obtained from interviews and would largely be perceptual</li> </ul>
	8. To what extent did the coordination of activities and engagement among the SSRF stakeholders contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SC and State Board minutes</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Participating</li> </ul>	n/a	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
			donors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>		
<b>Efficiency.</b> Efficiency is “the measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.”	1. Did the systems and processes of the SSRF ensure the efficient implementation of the programme, in the given conditions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>	n/a	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews
	2. How efficient were PUNOs in the delivery of the Stabilization Programmes and did they respond effectively to emerging and changing stabilization and recovery conditions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>PUNO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Relevant</li> </ul>	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily obtained through document review and interviews.</li> <li>Pre and post crisis information is important</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
			government officials at national, state and county levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>		
	3. How efficient was role of the coordinating agency in oversight, monitoring and coordination?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• PUNO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	n/a	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews
	4. Did the programmes' implementing partners have the requisite skills/capacity to deliver infrastructure and build	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
	governments' institutional capacity at local levels?	Review 2014 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>PUNO reports</li> </ul>	the steering committee <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>	levels will be gathered	identified stakeholders at state and community levels This also linked to sustainability
	5. How efficiently was the fund flow managed at different levels? To what extent did the fund managers apply payment by milestones arrangement with implementing partners?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>PUNO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>	n/a	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews
	6. Did the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes provide value for money?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Coordinating</li> </ul>	n/a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily obtained through document review and interviews</li> <li>Results could be perceptual and change over time</li> </ul>

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PUNO reports</li> </ul>	agency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>		
	7. To what extent was the programme complementing, supporting or benefitting other interventions in target states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews
<b>Sustainability:</b> “Sustainability is the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been	1. To what extent did the SSRF UN Joint stabilization Programmes contribute to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Coordinating</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels



Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
completed; the probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.” Important attributes of sustainability are partnership, ownership and coordination arrangements within the programme	participate in design, implementation and support for the sustainability of outputs/assets?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PUNO reports</li> </ul>	agency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> <li>CSAC</li> </ul>		
	2. To what extent were community voices incorporated effectively into local decision-making processes and siting of interventions? Could the project have given stronger voices to the local communities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>CSAC reports</li> <li>State Board minutes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>Coordinating agency</li> <li>Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>Participating donors</li> <li>Implementing partners</li> <li>CSAC</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
	3. What is the extent of ownership of the SSRF outputs among the different stakeholders at the different levels and implementation phases?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• State Board minutes</li> <li>• PUNO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• SSRF Secretariat and members of the steering committee</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels
	4. What is the level of stated and actual commitment by the government and beneficiary community in sustaining the SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programmes outputs/outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• CSAC reports</li> <li>• State Board minutes</li> <li>• PUNO reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels

Evaluation criteria	Key evaluation questions <sup>38</sup>	Evaluation tool			Comments, assumptions, risks, limitations <sup>39</sup>
		Document review <sup>40</sup>	Interviews <sup>41</sup>	Field visits <sup>42</sup>	
	5. What was the effect of interventions on social cohesion, women's empowerment and youth engagement and how will this affect sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• CSAC reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSRF co-chairs</li> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> <li>• CSAC</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels
	6. Was SSRF balance between infrastructure investments in software (i.e. capacity building, community engagement, monitoring and evaluation) correct in relationship to promoting sustainability and ownership?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-term and final outcome assessment reports</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014</li> <li>• SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)</li> <li>• State Board minutes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State SSRF level board chair</li> <li>• Coordinating agency</li> <li>• Relevant government officials at national, state and county levels</li> <li>• Participating donors</li> <li>• Implementing partners</li> </ul>	Perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels will be gathered	Primarily obtained through document review and interviews as well as perceptions of key beneficiaries and other identified stakeholders at state and community levels

## ANNEX 5: INCEPTION PERIOD INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Kunal Dhar	Programme Coordinator-Stabilization Democratic Governance and Stabilization Unit (DGSU)	11-15 May, several consultations
Team meeting	UN Joint Stabilization Team, SSRF	11 May 2015
Pius Ojara	Conflict Adviser, DFID South Sudan.	12 May 2015
Felix Hoogveld	First Secretary. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands	12 May 2015
Toby Lanzer	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP in South Sudan	13 May 2015
Balazs Horvath	UNDP Country Director, S Sudan	13 May 2015
Tekle Meshesha	Monitoring and evaluation - Stabilization Unit (DGSU)	14 May 2015
Yomi Jacobs	PACT	15 May 2015
Alia Hassan	UNMISS, Head of Civil Affairs	15 May 2015
David Sossu	Program Engineer Stabilization Unit (DGSU)	Various consultations
Elizabeth Carriere Sonia Warner	Head of DFID Governance programme DFID	22 May 2015
Fayyaz Ahmad Catherine Kabuthia Sher Hussaini	UNOPS Programme Manager UNOPS Project Manager UNOPS Project Manager	22 May 2015
Arik Darmawathi	OCHA Information Management Officer	22 May 2015

### **7.3 Annex 3: Documentation consulted**

SSRF Terms of Reference  
Strategic Framework of the SSRF  
Republic of South Sudan Aid Strategy  
South Sudan Development Plan  
Memorandum of Understanding  
Standard Administrative Agreements  
UNDG Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds (7 January 2011)  
UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programming (2003)  
UNDG Generic SC TOR  
Consolidated Annual reports (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)  
SSRF Lessons Learned Exercise Report (2012)  
Quarterly Progress Reports  
Project Evaluation Reports  
Audit Reports  
Field visits reports  
Bi-lateral donor review report  
DFID SSRF Completion Review 2014  
OCHA South Sudan conflict related incidents reports and maps  
DFID 2014 SSRF Project Completion Review Report  
Approved programme documents and  
Other relevant documents.

## 7.4 Annex 4: Comments to the report from members of the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG)

After the completion of the report, members of the Evaluation Reference Group made a number of comments on the content of the report that are summarized in the table below.

Issue	Comment
Overall quality of the report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report notes that the quality of the database is low and that there are limitations of the interviews. Nevertheless it draws rather hard conclusions in spite of these apparent weaknesses. More cautious language would therefore have been appropriate.</li> <li>• At the same time, the report is unnecessarily vague in many place (excessive use of 'some', 'many', 'most', 'in general', 'a limited number').</li> <li>• Some of the possible difficulties to do a proper outcome evaluation of the SSRF programme were flagged in the inception phase of the evaluation. Nevertheless the consultants continued their study without adapting the methodology or adapting the expected results.</li> <li>• Some innovative ways of relating outputs to outcomes could have been used to further corroborate conclusions. There would be merit in using the results of current perception surveys to the extent feasible.</li> <li>• Two questions for the evaluation included in the ToR were not addressed in the report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ "to determine the extent to which the Stabilization Programmes contributed to forging and strengthening of partnerships among key stakeholders including Government, donors, UN agencies and beneficiary communities"</li> <li>○ "to assess opportunity costs of engaging in infrastructure investments in South Sudan".</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Conclusions on programme results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report leaves an overall negative picture of programme results, but conclusions are not strong: The SSRF apparently yielded outputs, which probably contributed to the desired outcome. Attribution is difficult and impact is not likely to be sustained. The report indicates the following factors as potential explanations for this: Poor design, low ownership, economic and political crisis in South Sudan, weak management of the fund, poor monitoring and confusing role by the steering committee apparently are to be blamed for the less than optimal results</li> <li>• The decision to stop funding of Round 4 was not only due to political issues or to show donor disapproval, but was because SSRF donors were concerned about the security of donor investments and further loss.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adhering to high professional evaluation standards as the report does makes it difficult to say much about programme outcome due the current uncertain and challenging South Sudanese context. As a result, the report leaves an impression that the programme has failed to achieve any significant results, and therefore that similar programmes should not be implemented. However, this would be a wrong inference, as the counterfactual is not known. There might have been significant evidence of peacebuilding impact, had the national context been more stable.</li> <li>• In relation to why the impact of the programme appears to be underrated: in certain circumstances, if something <b>does not happen</b>, that is an achievement. But it is never reported as such. For example, Warrap did not experience significant conflict, even though no one would have expected that State to hold up so well, being next to Unity. It is not without problems to relate this to the SSRF programme, but it may have well contributed.</li> <li>• Output 1 Jonglei radio communication is mentioned as an achievement. This strong statement is not justified, as the project clearly did not achieve its intended goals.</li> <li>• However, it can still be noted that the radio station was essentially completed when the conflict broke out, and it did begin broadcasting in several languages in Jonglei for three, then six hours a day. Staff were hired, trained, and began supplying broadcast material for these numbers of hours. The remaining (marginal) problems with the building (for the radio communication) within the product liability period were being fixed, preparing it for formal handover, when the crisis erupted and project implementation was disrupted.</li> </ul>
Conclusions on sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report concludes that there was a lack of sustainability of the water point projects which is a valid point. It seems like in the initial stages, communities were engaged, but somehow as implementation progressed there was less involvement, and this deterioration is not explained.</li> <li>• It was at the express insistence of the Steering Committee that working with State level government counterparts should be dropped — which was a centerpiece of the SSRF approach up until late 2013, and a prerequisite for engaging at the community level.</li> <li>• Lack of sustainability was not due to intrinsically poor design or weak management. Programming was based on a clear understanding that sustainability would be ensured by government being responsible for providing the funds to cover recurrent costs of running the facilities provided. At the time of designing the project, this was a sensible assumption, and this approach also reflects best practice in using donor</li> </ul>

	<p>funds. But the austerity policy stemming from the oil shutdown, followed by the crisis depleted State and community-level resources, making such contributions impossible. Indeed, there have been issues around the Secretariat, but decisions by the Steering Committee decisions have also played a significant role.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The point repeatedly made about insufficient maintenance and other aspects pointing to lack of sustainability is valid. However, the original plan to engage government resources for this purpose failed due to the conflict; it was not that the SSRF programme failed to anticipate the importance of these sustainability components.</li> </ul>
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## 7.5 Annex 5: List of interviewees

### Juba

11-15 May, several consultations	Kunal Dhar	Programme Coordinator-Stabilization Democratic Governance and Stabilization Unit (DGSU)
11 May 2015	Team meeting	UN Joint Stabilization Team, SSRF
12 May 2015	Pius Ojara Felix Hoogveld	Conflict Adviser, DFID South Sudan. First Secretary. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
13 May 2015	Toby Lanzer	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP in South Sudan
13 May 2015	Balazs Horvath	UNDP Country Director, S Sudan
15 May 2015	Yomi Jacobs	PACT
	Alia Hassan	UNMISS, Head of Civil Affairs
22 May 2015	Elizabeth Carriere	Head of DFID
	Sonia Warner	Governance programme DFID
	Fayyaz Ahmad	UNOPS Programme Manager
	Catherine Kabuthia	UNOPS Project Manager
	Sher Hussaini	UNOPS Project Manager
	Arik Darmawathi	OCHA Information Management Officer
15 June 2015	Hon. Mary Jervase Yak	Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
	Sayed Farooqui	World Food Programme Special Operation - Feeder Roads
16 June 2015	Sam Muhumore	UNDP, CSAC
	Martin Heide	Royal Norwegian Embassy
	Christinne Nykoro Kivy	Royal Norwegian Embassy
	Ali Hassan	Director UNMISS Civil Affairs
25 June 2015	Hon. Kwong Gatluak	Minister of Transport, Roads and Bridges
26 June, 2015	John Ajjugo	Wildlife Conservation Society
28 June, 2015	Balasz Horvath	UNDP Country Director
29 June 2015	Sue Lautze	UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
30 June, 2015	Mr. William Muchira	UNOPs JSP project Manager
	Mr. Sher Hussaini	UNOPs WSL Project Manager
2 July 2015	Sayed Farooqui and Christine M. Berger	World Food Programme Special Operation - Feeder Roads
Various dates	David Sossu	Program Engineer Stabilization Unit (DGSU)
	Tekle Meshesha	Monitoring and evaluation - Stabilization Unit (DGSU)

### Warrap State

18 June, 2015	Ms. Stella Abayomi	Chief, UNMISS Kuajok
	Ms. Kumbongali Monju	Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS, Warrap State
	Ms. Leda Hasila	UNMISS State Coordinator, Head of Office, Warrap State
	Limann,	
	Mr. Valentino Akot	Police Post Chief Mongol Apuk
	Majook	
	Mr. Simon Kuac	Police Post Clerk Mongol Apuk

19 June, 2015	Mayuen Community members Hon. William Wal Major Maika Lenkishon Mr. Angelo Akuei	Mongol Apuk Commissioner of Tonj South MLO Director for Administration & Finances, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Warrap State
	Mr. Joseph Gotkeer	Acting Director for Roads, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Warrap State
20 June, 2015	Hon. Marko Awuoc Kuot, Mr. Andrea Maluak Ajak Mr. Anguei Amer Mawien Local Community Members Mr. Majok Aliir Majok Mr. Deng Majak Yool Mr. Matong Luol Deng	Commissioner of Tonj North  Payam Administrator Akop  Akop Area Chief  Pakur Boma, Akop Payam  Paweng Area Chief Paweng Elder Community Judge/Chairman of Water Management Committtee Paweng Boma
	Local Community members Ms. Ayaak Poot, Mr. Abraham Abeer Piyap Mr. Maker Makuac Reng Mr. Lino Gim Wal Mr. Madhol Chol Thuc Hon. Mayar Deng Mayar Stephen Adhik Madiet	Prisons Services Wun Kot Payam Administrator  Deputy Director for Prisons  Prisons Services Commissioner of Tonj East County Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Warrap State  Director General Warrap State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure
<b>Lakes State</b>		
25 June, 2015	Mr. Samuel Mading Muorwal Dr. Charles Oyo Nyawello	Director General Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Lakes State President of the High Court Lakes State
26 June, 2015	Hon. Abraham Mayen Kuc Mr. Dut Riak	Minister for Physical Infrastructure Government of Lakes State Director General, Ministry for Finances, Lakes State
27 June, 2015	Mr. Mathiang Malou Beny Mr. Marial Gurwel Pawak Mr. Gordon Mayen Malou	Poloich Paramount Chief  Poloich Chief  Poloich Executive Chief

1 July, 2015	Mr. James Malual	Deputy Payam Administrator Poloich
	Manyuon	
	Community Members	Poloich
	Mr. Andrea Kech Dit	Minkaman Police Station Chief
	Ms. Mary Nyanchei	CID Officer, Minkaman Police Station
	Aluak	
	Mr. Garang Ajak Deng	Awerial County Judge, Minkaman

### East Equatoria State

18 June, 2015	Hon. Lokail Iko	Minister of Local Govt. EES
	Lucia Jovana	UNDP Rule of Law, EES
	Hiroko Hirahara	UNMISS State Coordinator
	Rinat Glimov	Information Officer, UNMISS, EES
	David Birege	Civil Affairs Officer, UNMISS
19 June, 2015	Annet	UNDP Rule of Law, EES
	Hillary Lukudu	Ex. Director Magwi County
	Odongo Johnny	Planning Officer, Magwi County
	Eng. James Orach	Engineer, Magwi County
	Community Members	Magwi County, EES
23 June	Nesike Allan	Member of Parliament, EES
	Col. Athony Kenyi	Director for Production Torit Prison
	Lt. Col. William Amori	Senior Administrator, Torit Prison
	Hon. Binginni Sebit	Director General, Min. of Housing & Physical Infrastructure
	Hon. Brig. Gen. Luis Labong	Governor, EES
22 June 2015	Hon. Saleman Gladio	Chairperson, Peace Commission, EES
	Hon. John Tabio	State Coordinator, National Peace Commission
	Hon. Abdula Hassen	DG. Local Government
	Hon. Alfred Kayumba	DG for Finance & Admin.
	Fr. John Opi	Peace & Justice, Catholic Torit Diocese
25 June, 2015	Mr. Leno Opiya	Community Leader, Shahari Village
	Philaman Petali	Women Leader, Shahari Village
	Community members	Shahari Community, Ikotos County
	John Moi	Wildlife Conservation Society(WCS), Juba Office
	Yousean Oh	UNMISS Kapoeta Base Head
30 June, 2015	UNMISS Team	Kapoeta
	Charles Meri	Chief, Lokages Village , Kapoeta North
	Community Members	Lokages Village/ community
	Charles Lokonoi	Commissioner, Kapoeta North
	Hon. Martin Lopir	Commissioner, Kapoeta South
1 July		

## 7.6 Annex 6: Interview questions

### Steering Committee Chair

1. Were you the chair from start of round 3?
2. What was the transition from the SRF to SSRF in terms of the governance structure? (There was an SRF coordination office)?
3. How well did SSRF round 3 link with SS Development Plan?
4. As the overall agreed outcome of the fund was to increase security and reduce the level of inter-communal conflict in the selected states. Did it made progress towards that outcome?
5. How important is investment in infrastructure in reducing levels of inter-communal conflict?
6. Are there other complementary initiatives necessary to achieve this outcome?
7. As Chair of SSRF – your view of the role and effectiveness of steering committee, and the coordinating agency?
8. How well did the SSRF secretariat service all partners?
9. How was the cooperation between governments, donors, implementing partners and other stakeholders?
10. As the SSRF was implemented as 4 state plans, how did the national governing structure provide oversight and interact with the state stabilisation boards?
11. Is the current governing structure and the processes of the SSRF appropriate for the management of any future multi-partner development funds?
12. Did the projects identified and implemented respond well to the needs of the beneficiaries?
13. Were there any unintended results – positive or negative?
14. What did you see as the main obstacles and challenges during the implementation period?
15. How could a steering committee deal with unforeseen events (fiscal/political/security crisis)? Is it possible to take measures to mitigate such losses as occurred in this programme?
16. What has been the impact of the continuing fiscal crisis in reducing allocations to the states that would support the sustainability of the assets created?
17. After the crisis – the donors sent the government a letter on 21 March 2014 on termination of support – how did you as chair respond. Appears no SC meeting held in 2014?
18. Was the SC in informal contact in 2014 and what was the role of the secretariat in facilitating that?

### State Officials- Finance, Local Government, Infrastructure, Water,

1. Were you engaged in the development of the State Development Plan?
2. The overall agreed outcome of the SSRF was to increase security and reduce the level of inter-communal conflict in the state. How successful were the state outputs identified in the plans in reducing conflict and inter-communal violence?
3. How well did SSRF programme in round 3 link with the State Development Plan?
4. How beneficiaries were consulted in the process and were their needs reflected in the plans?
5. Did well did the State Stabilisation Plan made progress towards the agreed outcome?
6. How well did the state stabilisation board work? How did it provide oversight and interact with the coordinating agency, PUNOs and implementing partners?
7. How was the cooperation between the state governments, PUNOs, implementing partners and other stakeholders? Can you comment on the state role in contracting and the oversight of contractors?
8. What is your view of the quality and efficiency of the PUNOs?
9. Comment on the quality and appropriateness of the assets produced:

- a. Roads,
  - b. Haffirs,
  - c. Water
  - d. Local infrastructure
10. Did the projects identified and implemented respond well to the needs of the beneficiaries?
  11. How did the project include and benefit vulnerable groups, women, youth and girls?
  12. Was the siting of assets created done well – did the siting have to be altered during the implementation process.
  13. Were there any unintended results – positive or negative?
  14. Was state capacity to plan, implement and sustain the assets developed increased in the programme implementation process? What were the capacity building interventions implemented
  15. What are the sustainability prospects of the assets created? Did the Water projects have Management Committee?
  16. What did you see as the main obstacles and challenges during the implementation period?
  17. Did changes in security and weather conditions affect the rate of implementation of the projects?
  18. What damage mitigation measures were put in place after the crisis?
  19. What other initiatives were implemented in the state that complemented the State Stabilisation Plans.
  20. What other complementary initiatives would be necessary to achieve the outcome of any future stabilisation plans?

#### **Local Community meetings**

1. How were you consulted in identifying this project?
2. Was this the main priority for the community?
3. Was the location of the project correct and is it being used today?
4. Has it produced made a change to your daily life? Is conflict reduced in your area?
5. Comment on the quality of the building or waterhole?
6. Did community members gain employment through the building process?
7. How did the project include and benefit vulnerable groups, women, youth and girls?
8. Was there training so you could manage and keep up the haffir or borehole?
9. Did the Water projects have Management Committee?
10. What did you see as the main obstacles and challenges during the implementation period?
11. Were there any unintended results – positive or negative?
12. What other initiatives were implemented in that complemented the asset produced.

#### **Conflict related Questions**

1. What was the nature and extent of the conflict in this area in 2009/10 when the project was conceived?
2. What were the most important issues/reasons for the conflicts at the time?
3. The State Stabilisation Plans identified infrastructure (list) that would reduce inter-communal conflict. Did this happen?
4. What were the changes in the security situation between 2010 and 2013?
5. After December 2013 has the situation stayed the same, deteriorated or improved? To what do you attribute this?
6. To maintain security within the state, what do you consider to be necessary priority projects?

## 7.7 Annex 7: Projects visited

**Note: No projects visited in Jonglei State**

### Warrap State

<i>County</i>	<i>Project name (ID)</i>
Warrap Town - Mashraar Road	Warrap – Akop- Pakur - Mashraar Road
Gogrial East	Police post or station
Tonj North	Police post or station
Wun Kot Police Outpost	Police post or station
Tonj East	Water – boreholes

### Lakes States

<i>County</i>	<i>Project name (ID)</i>
Awerial	Court
Rumbek Central	Court
Awerial	Police post or station
Rumbek Central	Police post or station
Rumbek Central	Water – haffirs
Rumbek Central	Karich-Amok Piny-Panyijar road

### Eastern Equatoria State

<i>County</i>	<i>Project name (ID)</i>
Kapoeta North	County Administration Buildings
Kapoeta South	County Administration Buildings
Magwi	County Administration Buildings
Kapoeta North	Water - haffirs/Lokoges Haffir/
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand pump
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand pump
Ikotos and Budi	Roads/ Security Road Project/


## 7.8 Annex 8: Additional outcome data

### SSRF programme level data

Programme level: all states including Jonglei

EQUATORIA	WARRAP	Number of Incidents														
		Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014
		18	20	12	19	16	15055	5593	-	1000	-	210	248	19	80	82
		23	60	36	49	80	21612	1575	816	964	16	118	230	42	127	454
JONGLEI	LAKES	18	12	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	42	16	1	16	39	
		116	209	145	159	19	48608	252663	123662	59298	-	284	1705	1020	294	113
		175	301	196	230	118	85 275	259 831	124 478	61 262	16	654	2 199	1 082	517	688

% Incidents year on year					% IDPs year on year					% Deaths year in year				
	2011	2012	2013	2014		2011	2012	2013	2014		2011	2012	2013	2014
%	72	12	31	-33	%	205	46	-28	-100	%	236	65	-21	5




Source: UNOCHA

Programme level: all states excluding Jonglei

Number of Incidents																Number of IDPs					Number of Deaths				
	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014	Base	2011	2012	2013	2014										
Warrap	18	20	12	19	16	15055	5593	-	1000	-	210	248	19	80	82										
Lakes	23	60	36	49	80	21612	1575	816	964	16	118	230	42	127	454										
E Equatoria	18	12	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	42	16	1	16	39										
TOTAL	59	92	51	71	99	36 667	7 168	816	1 964	16	370	494	62	223	575										

% Incidents year on year					% IDPs year on year					% Deaths year in year				
	2011	2012	2013	2014		2011	2012	2013	2014		2011	2012	2013	2014
%	56	-14	20	68	%	-80	-98	-95	-100	%	34	-83	-40	55



Source: UNOCHA

## County level data per state

### Warrap State

Counties	Incidents						IDPs						Death					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Gogrial East	-	3	4	-	1	-	-	800	3 187	-	-	-	-	100	136	-	23	-
Tonj East	1	6	9	6	4	2	7 500	2 000	1 655	-	1 000	-	180	11	80	13	37	21
Tonj North	-	5	1	2	2	6	-	9 975	-	-	-	-	-	75	20	1	11	38
Twic	1	4	6	4	12	8	-	-	751	-	-	-	7	24	12	5	9	23
<b>State Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>7 500</b>	<b>12 775</b>	<b>5 593</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1 000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>% Change</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-33</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-11</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>-71</b>	<b>-100</b>	<b>-95</b>	<b>-100</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-91</b>	<b>-62</b>	<b>-61</b>	

Source: UNOCHA

### Lakes State

Counties	Conflict Incidents						IDPs						Death					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Awerial	-	1	5	1	2	4	-	-	-	-	945	-	-	-	7	-	-	6
Cueibet	-	8	11	8	6	14	-	6 643	-	816	-	-	-	53	100	27	11	58
Rumbek Centre	-	-	18	13	14	25	-	-	-	-	19	16	-	-	45	4	63	91
Rumbek East	-	1	5	5	9	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	13	1	17	92
Rumbek North	1	4	10	7	11	8	4 527	-	575	-	-	-	5	5	51	5	30	197
Wulu	-	-	3	-	1	2	-	-	1 000	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	8
Yirol East	-	9	8	2	6	5	-	14 969	-	-	-	-	-	56	13	5	5	2
<b>State Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>4 527</b>	<b>21 612</b>	<b>1 575</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>964</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>454</b>
<b>% Change</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>248</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>-93</b>	<b>-96</b>	<b>-96</b>	<b>-100</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>-64</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>285</b>	

Source: UNOCHA

### Eastern Equatoria State

Counties	Conflict incidents						IDPs						Death					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Budi	-	9	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	3	-	-	-
Ikotos	-	2	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	13	1
Kapoeta East	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
Kapoeta North	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kapoeta South	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	3	-
Lapon	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
Lopa	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	1	-	2
Magwi	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
<b>State Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>% change</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>-33</b>	<b>-83</b>	<b>-83</b>	<b>-83</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>-62</b>	<b>-98</b>	<b>-62</b>	<b>-93</b>	

Source: UNOCHA

### Jonglei State

Counties	Conflict incidents						IDPs						Deaths					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Akobo	-	10	38	18	12	2	-	8 452	15 549	21 185	3 945	-	-	33	148	96	101	-
Ayod	-	1	7	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	-
Bor South	-	34	46	29	28	8	-	6 119	8 000	-	33 490	-	-	43	106	23	21	99
Canal	-	6	16	1	3	1	-	10 222	26 243	-	-	-	-	24	229	-	-	-
Canal (Khor Fulus)	1	-	-	-	-	-	1 000	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-
Duk	-	16	19	15	16	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	20	98	9	2
Fangak	-	1	4	3	3	-	-	15 000	15 000	-	-	-	-	72	206	4	3	-
Nyirori	-	4	8	8	8	-	-	-	-	21 000	-	-	-	8	11	37	16	-
Pibor	-	24	15	34	48	3	-	8 540	147 690	37 664	400	-	-	57	532	663	42	6
Pochalla	-	2	12	2	9	-	-	275	3 200	-	-	-	-	6	12	4	6	-
Twic East	-	12	12	13	8	4	-	-	9 331	23 700	21 463	-	-	22	39	10	80	6
Uror	-	6	32	22	22	-	-	-	27 650	20 113	-	-	-	5	389	85	16	-
<b>State total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1 000</b>	<b>48 608</b>	<b>252 663</b>	<b>123 662</b>	<b>59 298</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>1 705</b>	<b>1 020</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>% Change</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-84</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-100</b>		<b>Base</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-60</b>	

Source: UNOCHA



## 7.9 Annex 9: Detailed output data

### Output 1: Fully operational state managed radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State

- a) **Jonglei State Output 1:** *Fully operational, State managed, radio communication infrastructure and system established in Jonglei State, and improved capacity of the State Ministry of Information and Communication in developing media content, broadcasting and managing the station.*

*Note: No site visits/no interviews were conducted in Jonglei*

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
Bor	Radio Station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Radio Station built and radio equipment installed in 2013.</li> <li>Forty (40) staff trained in 2013 . Training and Management Needs Assessment carried out in November/December 2013.</li> <li>Radio broadcasting 3 hours a day between September and 15 December 2013</li> <li>Radio attacked and looted during conflicts between Government and opposition forces in December 2013 and ceased broadcasting.</li> <li>Damage and loss to radio and building estimated at USD 3,006,733 (building, equipment and contractual obligations for capacity-building (37.8% of total budget).</li> <li>Remaining equipment salvaged and relocated for safe storage in the UNMISS-Bor (SSRF UN Joint Stabilization Programme damage and Loss Assessment Report, August 2014.)</li> <li>Project terminated : outputs not realized.</li> </ul>

### Output 2: Security access roads constructed and rehabilitated (in Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, and Warrap States)

- a) **Jonglei State Output 2:** *Akobo-Pochalla road (170 km) constructed through an integrated, labour-based and mechanized approach, and improved capacity of the J-MoPI to manage and maintain road works in Jonglei State.*

*Note: No site visits/interviews were conducted in Jonglei*

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
Akobo-Pochalla	Akobo-Pochalla Road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental Impact Assessment carried out, Conservation component developed (2012)</li> <li>Only 15km 148 KM of road completed by December 2013 and bridge partially constructed (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> <li>The total cost of damage and associated loss is estimated at USD 7,594,069 USD 7,594,069 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> <li>As part of the capacity building support, road maintenance equipment and machineries, including tractors, grader, Dynapac rollers and load attachments, were procured and handed over by UNOPS to the Jonglei Ministry of Physical Infrastructure (J-MoPI) in Bor. During the December 2013 fighting in Bor, the machines were damaged. The cost of damage is estimated to be nearly USD 0 , nearly 60.5% of the original value. (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> <li>Project terminated: Output not realized.</li> </ul>

b) **Lakes State Output 1:** Construction of two roads, through a labour based and mechanised approach

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Rumbek Central	Karich-Amok Piny-Panyijar road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By December 2013 gravel work was completed for the 60.8km (68%) of road section from Karich to Panyijar (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The remaining 58km from Amok Piny to Panyijar was suspended and subsequently, terminated due to the limited prospect for completion within the anticipated time, as the result of the ongoing political instability and conflict in the area (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>WFP trained nine government staff on machine operation, costing, budgeting, construction and maintenance of roads (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Approximately 120 community members were also benefited from the employment opportunities during the labour based construction works (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The loss incurred related to incompleteness of the road section, GIZ force majeure claims, and closure expenditure is estimated at USD 4,590,831 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 60.8 km (68%) road section from Karich to Amok Piny is completed and used by all kinds of vehicles (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> <li>The 58 km road section from Amok Piny to Panyijar not completed because of lack of funds and insecure at the Unity-Lakes State border (Interviews)</li> <li>Only four people were 'seconded' to both road projects (Karich-Panyijar and Aluakluak-Kuac cok) to learn on the job (Interviews)</li> <li>No staff members were trained on machine operation, costing, budgeting, construction and maintenance of roads (Interviews)</li> <li>During the road construction, 54 people including 31 females were employed (Interviews)</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	AluakLuak-AkuocCok road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aluakluak-AkuocCok, 40.6km of 46 km road completed (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lake State Minister of Physical Infrastructure confirmed only 40.6km was completed (Interview, Hon. Abraham Mayen Kuc)</li> <li>About 6 km of the Aluakluak-AkuocCok road section not completed because of insecurity in the area coupled with lack of funds (Interview, Hon. Abraham Mayen Kuc)</li> </ul>

c) **Warrap State Output 1:** Construction/rehabilitation of roads to improve access to insecure areas

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Warrap - Mashraar Road	Roads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>70 km of 82 km Warrap-Akop-Pakur-Mashraar road completed. (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Clearing, grubbing, earthworks and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>70 km Warrap – Akop-Pakur is constructed (Site Visit)</li> <li>12 km road from Pakur –mashraar road does not look cleared and the road has become bushy. It could be</li> </ul>

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
		<p>drainage works completed from Akop to Mashraar river port (12km) (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The road improved access to security and rule of law services as well as schools, markets and health facilities (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The capacity building support provided to the government through the provision of road maintenance machineries and equipment, as well as on-job trainings strengthened the oversight and management capacity of state government and engineers, thereby creating an enabling environment for the government to sustain the outputs (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>12 W-MoPI staff members were trained on machine operation and road maintenance (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<p>because it has been not used for over two years ( Site Visit and Interviews)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minimal capacity building provided to the State Government (Interviews)</li> <li>The maintenance machineries and equipment are 'light' and not able to maintain road. Staff have not been trained on how to use or repair them (Interviews and Site Visits)</li> <li>Ministry confirmed two staff members were trained on-the job. and given two weeks course on how to use local materials .(Interviews)</li> <li>139 local community members were employed during the implementation of the road project (Tonj North Commissioner)</li> </ul>

d) **Eastern Equatoria State Output 1:** *Rehabilitation of roads, through a labour-based and mechanized approach, to improve security in and access to insecure areas*

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Ikotos and Budi	Roads/ Security Road Project/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completed 140 km road . (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>All packages, including construction of culvert at Kiman and a bridge over Kidepo River, fully completed o. ( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014 )</li> <li>Enabled government's access to the remote, underserved and conflict prone areas( Final Report: 2011-2014)</li> <li>State engineers integrated into road construction (MPTF Office Generic Final Report: 2011-2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Road is functioning well but lacks maintenance (Site visit, consultation at Shahari Village22, June 2015)</li> <li>Engineers not adequately trained nor integrated into the road construction project by contractor (Interview: Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities Director General and State Governor 23 June 2015).</li> <li>Few loca residents gained employment in the road construction works.No data on numbers of workers, nor gender disaggregation.</li> </ul>

**Output 3: Improved presence of state authorities in conflict prone areas (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)**

a) **Lakes States Output 3:** *Construction of security and rule of law infrastructure (seven police stations and seven courts)*

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
Awerial	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>County court at Minkaman, Awerial is 100 % completed and in use by the Government (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report &amp; Q3 2014-LSSP Status Report)</li> <li>Handed over to the state government on 12 February 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities improved extension of government authority in the underserved and conflict prone areas (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 15,190, loss of 43.21% of the original value (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minkaman Court is well-built (100 % completed) and is in use with a newly appointed judge in place (Site Visit)</li> <li>Not previously used by the Government until 1<sup>st</sup> July, 2015 reportedly due to lack of judges (Interview)</li> </ul>
Cueibet	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The county court was completed and handed over to the state government on 5 November 2012.</li> <li>Minimal loss of only 3.98% on the original value of furniture and equipment. Damaged of USD 275; (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Irregularly used by the Judiciary ( UNMISS Lakes State)</li> <li>Legal staff and one judge are present in the county (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>County Court at Rumbek town is 100 % constructed and used by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report and Q3 2014-LSSP Status Report).</li> <li>The county court was completed and handed over to the state government on 25 June 2012 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The construction is 100% completed (Site Visit)</li> <li>The court is operational/use by the Judiciary. Two office clerks and two judges were busy at work during the site visit</li> <li>Lack of maintenance is a cause for concern as some gutters are already coming off (site Visit)</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The county court was completed and handed over to the state government (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not being used as the court is constructed in less populated area coupled with lack of judges (Interview, President of lakes State High Court)</li> <li>Lakes State Minister for Physical Infrastructure confirmed this court has never worked.</li> <li>Court abandoned and was mainly used by operations police and army on duty (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The county court was completed and handed over to the state government on 12 February 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Used irregularly because of lack of judge (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> <li>Ceiling damaged and bats have infested it (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Yirol East	Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The county court was completed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Verified by UNMISS Lakes State to</li> </ul>

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
		and handed over to the state government on 16 August 2012 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>be in use by the community</li> <li>Few legal support staff and judge present (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Yirol East	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station was completed and handed over to the state government on 16 August 2012 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Up to 94.23% is loss on the original of value of furniture and equipment. Damaged of USD 33, 394; (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>About five police personnel present in the facility (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Awerial	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>100% completion of county police station in Awerial (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> <li>Handed over to the state government on 8 February 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities improved extension of government authority in the underserved and conflict prone areas (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No major construction defects/issues (Site Visit)</li> <li>The Police Station is working perfectly (Interviews)</li> <li>Operational issues including generator, water pump, and radio are not operational. Some are missing spare parts (Site Visit and interviews)</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station was completed and handed over to the state government on 11 March 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Up to 84.97% is loss on the original of value of furniture and equipment. Damaged of USD 30, 113; (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not being used as there are no police officers deployed there (Lakes State Minister for Physical Infrastructure)</li> <li>However, UNMISS Lakes State site visit confirmed the present of few police personnel</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station is completed and handed over to the state government on 7 September 2012 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Only 3.53 % is loss on the original of value of furniture and equipment. Damaged of USD 1,400; (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Abandoned because of insecurity (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> <li>Presently occupied by youth from Agar Pakam community (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> <li>Solar system ransacked, windows, and furniture destroyed during 2014 fight between Pakam and RUOP communities (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station was completed and handed over to the state government on 23 April 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ceiling damaged and bats have infested it (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> <li>Few police personnel using the facility (UNMISS Lakes State)</li> </ul>

Projects not viewed or verified by evaluators

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
Cueibet	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station was completed and handed over to the state government on 17 June 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Rumbek East	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police station was completed and handed over to the state government on 23 April 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>

b) **Warrap State Output 2: Construction of four police posts**

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Gogrial East	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police Post is constructed, equipped and handed over 31 January 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Installation of radio communication equipment, furniture and solar power were fully completed in 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities constructed under the WSP improved extension of government authority, thereby contributing towards improved community security and reduced level of ethnic conflicts in these areas (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 3,890, loss of 13.84% of the original value (Damage and Loss Assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mongol-Apuk Police Post constructed, equipped and in use by the Police (Site Visit)</li> <li>Furniture pieces are broken and littered the floor (Site Visit)</li> <li>Solar power, Radio and generator not working (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> <li>Radio operator not well trained to operate it. Generator has no fuel (Site Visit and interviews)</li> <li>The post is under-staffed with only six men who cannot control ethnic conflicts that usually involved hundreds of men (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> <li>If number of personnel is not increased, and management of the post is not addressed, Mongol-apuk Police Post may not achieve the intended purpose (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> </ul>
Tonj North	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police Post is constructed, equipped and handed over 11 April 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Installation of radio communication equipment, furniture and solar power were fully completed in 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities constructed under the WSP improved extension of government authority contributing towards improved community security and reduced level of ethnic conflicts in these areas. (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Pakur Police Post is constructed. However, the internal or external wall has major cracks (Site Visit)</li> <li>The Post is equipped with expensive communications equipment but they are not working (Site Visit)</li> <li>The police officers who were deployed to Pakur left because they did not have food. The presence of building and equipment without personnel does act as deterrent to would-be assailants. (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> </ul>
Aguka Police Outpost	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Police outpost with completed and handed over to the Government by November 20<sup>th</sup>, 213 (SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The post in use by the community and the Police (Third Party, Tonj South Commissioner)</li> <li>Generator and radio working (Third</li> </ul>

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Police outpost equipped with toilet, generator house, fencing, radio communications equipment and furniture (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>Was under defect liability period under 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2014 (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> </ul>	<p>Party, Tonj South Commissioner)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The building has cracks on the wall (Tonj South Commissioner)</li> <li>The communication equipment missing component, Motorola has no base (Tonj South Commissioner)</li> </ul>
Dirdi Police Outpost	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Police outpost with completed and handed over to the Government by November 20<sup>th</sup>, 213 (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>The Police outpost equipped with toilet, generator house, fencing, radio communications equipment and furniture (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>Was under defect liability period under 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2014 (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 821.44, loss of 5.55% of the original value (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct. 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Used by the police and local community member (Third Party, Tonj South Commissioner)</li> <li>31 police officers deployed at Dirdi Police Outpost (Third Party, Tonj South Commissioner)</li> </ul>
WunKot Police Outpost	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Police outpost with completed and handed over to the Government by November 21<sup>st</sup>, 213 (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>The Police outpost equipped with toilet, generator house, fencing, radio communications equipment and furniture (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>Was under defect liability period under 1<sup>st</sup> August, 2014 (<i>SSRF RSF Handover Mission Report</i>)</li> <li>According to the Oct.2014 Damage and Lost Report, 11.10% loss is incurred on the value of furniture and equipment. Damage of USD 1,642.88.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The police post is used as a prison instead of police station. This decision was taken by the Commissioner in collaboration with the community members (Site Visit and Interviews)</li> <li>Generators and Motorola removed from the Police Post (Interviews)</li> </ul>

Projects not viewed or verified by evaluators

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
Tonj East	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police Post is constructed, equipped and handed over 11 April 2013 (<i>2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report</i>).</li> <li>Installation of radio communication equipment, furniture and solar power were fully completed in 2013. (<i>2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report</i>).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities constructed under the WSP improved extension of government authority contributing towards improved community</li> </ul>



County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
		security and reduced level of ethnic conflicts in these areas (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).
Twic	Police post or station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police Post is constructed, equipped and handed over 31 January 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Installation of radio communication equipment, furniture and solar power were fully completed in 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The security and rule of law facilities constructed under the WSP improved extension of government authority in Twice thereby contributing towards improved community security and reduced level of ethnic conflicts in these areas. (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 1,991, loss of 8.11% of the original value (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct. 2014)</li> </ul>

c) **Eastern Equatoria State Output 2: Construction of four county headquarters and one prison in Kapoeta North**

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Lopa-Lafon	County Administration Buildings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project was completed on 31 March 2013 (Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme (EESP) Status Report as End of Q3 2014 (Handover Certificate provided</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 4,260 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>County Headquarters was completed and handed over to the state government on 30 October 2012 (Interview: DG Local Government)</li> <li>It is being use by local authorities (Interview: DG Local Government, 23 June 2015)</li> <li>Rectification works on the ceilings was carried out during the third quarter of 2013 (Interview: DG Local Government 23 June 2015)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	County Administration Buildings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project completion was on 31 March 2013 (completion certificate 2013, EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Is being use by the local government various departments. (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Local governments assess security situations and take appropriate measures (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Security enhanced and reduce levels of inter-communal conflicts (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Rectification works on the cracks and eaves (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>identified damages are due to a general lack of maintenance and misuse (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 6,202 (Damage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administration block was completed and handed over to the state government on October 2012 (Site visit, Interview Kapoeta North Commissioner 30 June 2015)</li> <li>Is being use by the local government various departments. (Site Visit, Interview with commissioner Kapoeta North 30 June 2015)</li> <li>Rectification works on the cracks and eaves (Site Visit, Interview with commissioner Kapoeta North 30 June 2015)</li> <li>identified damages are due to a general lack of maintenance and misuse (Site Visit, Interview with former commissioner Kapoeta North 18 June 2015)</li> </ul>



<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
		and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)	
Kapoeta North	Corrections/ Riwoto Prison/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prison complex 100% complete and ready for handover .( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Use with capacity to keep 200 inmates.(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Equipped with Furniture(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Defects on the windows have been rectified during the third quarter of 2014(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 3,317 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Prison complex completed and handed over 15 March 2014(Interview with Prison Administration 23 June 2015)</li> <li>Use with capacity to keep 200 inmates. Currently has 170 inmates (Interview with Prison Administration 23 June 2015)</li> <li>Equipped with Furniture(Interview with Prison Administration 23 June 2015)</li> <li>Defects on the windows have been rectified (Third party Interview with Prison Administration 23 June )</li> </ul>
Kapoeta South	County Administration Buildings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>100% complete and in use by the government Completion was on 31 March 2013(100% complete and in use by the government)</li> <li>Local governments assess security situations and take appropriate measures (Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme MPTF Office Generic Final Report: 2011-2014)</li> <li>Enhance community security and reduce levels of inter-communal conflicts(Eastern Equatoria Stabilization Programme MPTF Office Generic Final Report: 2011-2014)</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and equipment is USD 4,550 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completion was on 31 March 2013(Site visit, interview with commissioner of Kapoeta South 1 July 2015)</li> <li>Rectification works on the cracks on the wall which are visibly seen need fixing according to the commissioner although some repairs were done earlier during the third quarter of 2013.( Site visit, interview with commissioner of Kapoeta South 1 July 2015)</li> </ul>
Magwi	County Administration Buildings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project completion was on 31 March 2013 (( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014 )</li> <li>100% complete and in use by the government(( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014 )</li> <li>Cost of damage to furniture and Equipment is USD 3,000 (Damage and Loss Assessment Report, Oct.2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>County Headquarter Buildings was completed and handed over to the state government on 30 October 2012. (Site visit interview ,19 June 2015)</li> <li>The facility is being use by local authority.(Site visit interview,19 June 2015)</li> <li>identified damages and losses (site visit interview, 19 June 2015)</li> <li>Administration is situated outside the central town(site visit interview, 19 June 2015)</li> </ul>

## Output 4: Improved access to water sources (Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and Warrap States)

### a) Lakes States Output 2: Construction of 4 water reservoirs or haffirs and 16 boreholes

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.	Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)
Cueibet	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reservoir and intake of the haffir as well as rectification work on the pumping system has been completed (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The haffir is in use by the local community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Water management committees couldn't be established due to shortage of funds (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Abiriu Haffir has been vandalized by the community member (Lakes State Minister for Physical Infrastructure)</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nyankot Haffir and its two boreholes were fully completed by 2014 and in use by local communities (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>100% completed and in use by the community (Q3 2014-LSSP Status Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nyankot Haffir completed but not in used by the communities (Site Visit)</li> <li>Water pump broken and just floated on top of rain water (site Visit)</li> <li>One of the boreholes just next to Nyankot Haffir is working (Site Visit)</li> </ul>

Projects not viewed or verified by evaluators

County	Project name (ID)	Status described in SSRF reports.
Cueibet	4 Water – boreholes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction 100% completed and being used by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Rumbek Central	4 Water – boreholes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction 100% completed and being used by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	8 Water – boreholes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction 100% completed and being used by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reservoir and intake of the haffir have been completed. (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The haffir was vandalized during the violent conflict which erupted in mid-December 2013 (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Rectification works have been completed and the haffir is in use by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Water management committees couldn't be established due to shortage of funds (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report)</li> </ul>
Rumbek North	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reservoir and intake of the haffir have been completed (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The haffir was vandalized during the violent conflict which erupted in mid-December 2013. (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Rectification works have been completed and the haffir is in use by the community (2014-MPTF LSSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>

b) **Warrap State Output 3:** *Construction of two water reservoirs or haffirs and four boreholes*

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visits, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
Tonj East	Haffir and Water – borehole	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One haffir (30,000m) and 2 boreholes were constructed in Paweng (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The haffir and boreholes were fully completed and in use by communities since 2013(2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Haffir has reduced inter-communal conflicts that arise from competition over water sources (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One haffir and 2 boreholes have been found constructed in Paweng (Interviews)</li> <li>However, community consultation revealed that Haffir pump collapsed and has not been used for a long time (Interviews)</li> <li>Community uses the two boreholes to fetch water for cows more than for humans (Interviews)</li> <li>The boreholes have been used even at night to enable the cows to get water (Interviews)</li> <li>The overuse led to the pumps to break (Interviews)</li> <li>Although the village has pump mechanic trained under different project, the mechanic does not have spare parts and tools to fix the boreholes (Interviews)</li> <li>In Paweng Payam, only 11 members of the community were trained on water distribution and conflict resolutions (Interviews)</li> <li>No one found to have been trained in operations or maintenance of the water points (Interviews)</li> </ul>

Projects not viewed or verified by evaluators

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>
Tonj East	3 Water – boreholes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Boreholes completed and in use by communities (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Water Management Committee is formed and trained (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Tonj East	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One haffir of 30,000m<sup>3</sup> and boreholes was constructed in Makuac, Tonj East County. (2014-WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>The haffir and boreholes were fully completed and in use by communities since 2013 (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Six water management committees were established and 56 community members (35 males and 21 females) were trained on their roles and responsibilities as committee members and operation and maintenance of the water points (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>
Tonj East	Water – haffirs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water Haffirs completed and in use by communities (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> <li>Water Management Committee is formed and trained (2014-MPTF WSP Final Narrative Report).</li> </ul>

c) **Eastern Equatoria State Output 3:** *Construction of four water reservoirs or haffirs and eight boreholes*

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visit, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
Kapoeta East	Water - haffirs/Jie Hafir/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction, formulation of Water Management Committee (WMC) and training was completed in completed in 2013 (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>In use by the community (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>100% completion in 2013 (Interview: Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015).</li> <li>In use by the community (Interview: Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015).</li> </ul>
Kapoeta East	Water - haffirs/Na woyatom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The local authorities changed the location of the haffir from Loele to Naweiryatom (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>The construction and training of the water management committee was completed in 2013(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>In use by the community (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Concerns on construction quality and 2014 monitoring visit confirmed some components missing and rectification needed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Construction of haffir completed 2013 (formerly Loele(Interview:, Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015)</li> <li>The initial proposed site was changed with the advice of local authorities from Loele to Naweiryatom(Interview: Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015)</li> <li>Training of the water management committee was completed and the haffir is in use by the community ((Interview, Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015)</li> <li>Concerns on the quality of the construction works (Interview: Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015)</li> <li>Not in use.( Interview: DG Local Government)</li> <li>It is noted that routine maintenance and repairs works are required (Interview: Kapoeta East Commissioner 20 June 2015 )</li> </ul>
Kapoeta East	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water filtration was completed in 2012(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Are being used by the communities. (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Water Management Committee trained (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Water filtration completed (Interview: Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 20 June 2015 20 June 2015)</li> <li>Damage to the borehole due to a general lack of maintenance and misuse(Interview, Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)</li> <li>Use by the communities(Interview:, Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta East	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole with hand pump completed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Water management committees formed trained and commissioned for borehole maintenance (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Pumps are not functioning well (EESP Status Report as End of Q3</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Borehole completed(Interview: Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015 )</li> <li>Water management committees formed, trained (Interview , Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)</li> <li>Pumps not functioning well</li> </ul>

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visit, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2014).</li> </ul>	(Interview: Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)
Kapoeta East	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole with hand pump completed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Water management committees formed trained and commissioned for routine maintenance (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Pumps are not functioning (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Water management committee formed, trained (Interview: , Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015 )</li> <li>Pumps are not functioning (Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015 )</li> </ul>
Kapoeta East	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole with hand pump completed. (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Construction delayed due to poor performance of the contractor, Warsam Holdings (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Borehole completed.(Interview: , Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)</li> <li>Construction delayed due to poor performance of the contractor, Warsam Holdings(Interview: , Commissioner of Kapoeta East , 21 June 2015)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Water - haffirs/Lokoges Haffir/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Location was change from Lokuwa to Lokages, which is closer to the centre of the villages. ( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Completed in 2013 (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> <li>Is being used by the community (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Water management committee was formed and trained (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Location was changed from Lokuwa to Lokages, which is closer to the centre of the villages; this change was based on a decision made by the local communities.(Site visit interview)</li> <li>Completed in 2013(community chief, Charles Meri, site visit 30 June 2015).</li> <li>Is being used by the community(community elder, site visit 30 June 2015)</li> <li>Water management committee was formed and trained, but not working well. (community chief, Charles Meri, site visit 30 June 2015)</li> <li>Functioned for two dry season, but needs repair now before can function for next dry season.</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole with hand pump completed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014). )</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole visited and not functioning (community elder, site visit 30 June 2015)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole with hand pump point completed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Borehole completed (community elder, interview during site visit. Not verified. 30 June 2015)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Water - haffirs/Lok oal Haffir/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Haffir completed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Complaints on poor construction and follow that some component is destroyed (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> <li>Rectifications work required (EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No site visit</li> <li>Haffir completed (Interview: Former Commissioner 18 June 2015)</li> <li>Not functioning: Interview: County Commissioner , 30 June 2015)</li> <li>Poor Construction.</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human consumption water completed 2013 Haffir and Borehole</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No Site visit</li> <li>Borehole 2013(Third Party,</li> </ul>

<b>County</b>	<b>Project name (ID)</b>	<b>Status described in SSRF reports.</b>	<b>Verification by evaluators (site visit, interviews, 3rd party)</b>
	pump	Assessment Report 2013)	Commissioner, Kapoeta North30 June 2015)
Kapoeta North	Borehole with hand pump	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Borehole with hand pump completed 2013(EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No site visit</li> <li>▪ Borehole completed 2013 (Commissioner of Kapoeta North 30 June)</li> </ul>
Kapoeta North	Singata River Flood Mitigation Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Singata River Flood Mitigation Project was completed and is reported functioning very well( EESP Status Report as End of Q3 2014</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No site visit</li> <li>▪ Singata River Flood Mitigation is completed (Interview with Former Kapoeta North Commissioner, 18 June 2015)</li> </ul>