Project Document

SECURITY SECTOR REVIEW IN TIMOR-LESTE – CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FACILITY

December 2008

European Commission

United Nations Development Programme
Country: Timor-Leste
Project Document

Project Title	Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste - Capacity Development Facility
UNDAF Outcome(s):	By 2013, stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated.
Expected Outcome(s):	Basic foundations for post-crisis security, social cohesion, conflict analysis and resolution strengthened.
Expected Output(s):	By 2012, national capacity developed to promote the four dimensions of security sector reform (civilian oversight, operational management, financial accountability and policy debate)
Implementing Entity:	UNDP Timor-Leste
Responsible Parties:	UNMIT, Ministry of Defence and Security

Narrative

At the moment a major barrier to long term peace and security in Timor-Leste is the absence of a strong system of democratic civilian oversight of the security sector. Civilian control of the security sector is exercised through informal networks of relations dating back to the resistance movement against Indonesia. Democratic civilian control has not become institutionalised in Timor-Leste for a number of reasons. Partially this is because there is very little civilian capacity to exercise such a role and partly because there is not an environment for security policy to be debated. This project will directly address these needs through building oversight skill-sets among both civil servants and civil society; promoting accountability measures and increasing policy research capacity. It will also improve public building security, and assist in professionalizing the private security industry as well as providing a clear framework for coordinated emergency response

The proposed project is an integral part of the support provided by UNMIT/UNDP to the government-led security sector review and reform. It is an expansion of the Capacity Development Facility included in the project entitled "Support to the Timor-Leste Security Sector Review" endorsed by the Prime Minister on 13 June 2008. The project will support the development of national capacity to manage security sector governance in a sustainable and comprehensive manner to ensure long-term security and stability for the citizens of Timor-Leste through promoting the four dimensions of security sector reform, namely, civilian oversight, operational management, financial accountability and policy research capacity.

|	
Programme Period: **2009-2013** Key Result Area (Strategic Plan): **3.2. Strengthening post-crisis governance functions** Start date: **January 2009** End Date: **June 2010** PAC Meeting Date: **March 2008** Management Arrangements: **UNDP Implementation**	Total Budget USD 2,125,000 Allocated resources: • Government: • Regular (TRAC3) • Other: ○ Donor 1 (EU) USD 2,125,000 • In kind contributions: Unfunded budget:

For the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste:

_____   **Date** _____

Dr. Francisco Guterres
Secretary of State for Security

For the United Nations Development Programme:

_____   16.12.08

Mr. Finn Reske-Nielsen   **Date**

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
UNDP Resident Representative, Timor-Leste

Witnessed by:

_____   16.12.08

Mr. Juan Carlos Rey   **Date**

Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Timor-Leste

1. STRATEGY

Conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Not only is the human cost of conflict devastating but its impact on the political, social and economic development of a country is profound. The benefits of development assistance are all too often reversed by the outbreak of violent conflict. The cost of engaging in conflict prevention and peace-building, therefore, will ultimately be far lower than the financial burden of reacting to the outbreak of violence. This is a perspective shared by both the current Government and by the UN and enshrined in both the Government's Programme and the Millennium Development Goals. The rationale of this proposal is consistent with the principle that good governance and security are closely inter-linked and mutually dependent, and that they are both a pre-requisite for sustainable economic and human development. This principal has been recognised by the Government in its programme as underpinning the security sector reform process.

The aim of the project is to address the lack of institutionalized civilian control of the security sector within Timor-Leste. It will involve building individual skill sets in order to promote SSR and democracy. Current security expertise, such as it is, is dramatically over stretched. Therefore it is vital to provide a greater range of SSR expertise whether within the civil service or among a wider policy community. There is also a need to promote oversight capacity at every level. This project defines this clearly, namely by promoting academic, civil society and media capacity to address the security sector a policy community can be created that will provide the environment where reform and civilian control will become possible. As the project states the broad range of projects are designed to address existing SSR needs directly. The review is intended to assist the government develop an integrated security policy through a security development plan. The intention of this project which runs parallel to the review is to directly target needs which are already apparent. As with most other countries in the world the private security industry is an important, but often neglected part of the security sector. The inclusion of the private security industry is that at the moment it is largely unregulated and while not problematic at the moment experience in other countries has shown that it can become a challenge in the future.

This document sets out the approach and modalities for security sector capacity development which constitutes an integral part of the support provided by UNMIT/UNDP to the government-led security sector review and reform. The project aims to address the capacity needs for reform and future sustainable management of the security sector as they appear during the review process for the ultimate goal of long-term security and stability for the citizens of Timor-Leste. It outlines the planned expansion of the Capacity Development Facility included in the project entitled "Support to the Timor-Leste Security Sector Review" endorsed by the Prime Minister on 13 June 2008 (Appendix 1). The proposed approach adheres to the UNDP approach for capacity development in terms of fostering an enabling environment, and supporting institutional as well as individual development. It will thus assist the process of capacity development of security sector actors and thereby supporting the government to address the National Priority no. 1 (NP1) on *Public Safety and Security* and NP6 on *Clean and Effective Government*. Linkages with national priorities are outlined in the matrix contained in Appendix 2.

Relevant national authorities in collaboration with the project team will be able to submit proposals to the Project Board appointed by the Prime Minister (ref. Section 6) to release funds from the capacity building facility for specific activities identified during the review process. All projects will need to be compliant with the OECD-DAC definition of Official Development Assistance but otherwise can fill a range of activities including, for indicative

purposes, training (both in Timor-Leste and overseas), the provision of short term expertise to fill in immediate gaps, fact finding trips, discrete research activities (by NGOs, academics or the Government) as well as potentially the provision of non-military infrastructure. Examples of activities that this facility will not be able to support include direct military training or the purchase of weapons and military equipment or the support of officials carrying out line functions within the Office of the Secretary of State for Defence. The Project Board will be responsible for taking the final decision on the themes and scopes of activities to be funded under this facility as per Governments priorities as expressed in the Constitutional Government Programme endorsed by Parliament, subsidiary sectoral plans as well as the National Priorities Plan (NPP) and its future iterations. This assistance will help establish a political platform to facilitate the government led security sector review process. It will do so through the provision of technical advice, of opportunities for national actors (such as Government officials and Parliamentarians for example) to benefit from the experience, good practices and lessons learned from other countries. It will also seek to enhance national capacity and expertise in the area of SSR.

EC support to the security sector review process would further strengthen the Commission's intervention in Timor-Leste in the area of governance. It would also complement the assistance that some EU member states are already providing/ or planning to provide to the sector in the form of: (a) advisors seconded to national institutions of the sector (Portugal, on-going); (b) support to the development of the capacity of national actors to carry out reviews of the sector (Ireland – planned); and (c) support to the training of Government security guards (France – planned).

Most security sector development programmes cover four major areas of engagement. These are civilian oversight, institutional development, financial accountability and the social environment. Therefore the activities outlined in this document include all four major areas of intervention. In accordance with UNDP good practice capacity development focuses on three distinct areas namely: the overall structural environment; the institutions that need assistance; and finally the individuals who will benefit from any capacity development programme. Therefore the major activities outlined below are divided into these three areas.

I. Support to the Structural Environment: to enhance long-term security management and leadership. The themes and scope of such activities will be guided by the security sector review process and defined as per national priorities and OECD-DAC requirements.

1. **Quarterly lecture series** - Experts would be invited to address members of the security sector, oversight actors and civil society. A key part of security sector reform is the development of a wider security policy community comprising of among other groups academics, NGOs, legislators, civil servants and members of the security sector themselves. In order to facilitate the creation of such a community in Timor-Leste, it is proposed that lectures by high profile individuals be organized on a quarterly basis. It will be followed by an opportunity for participants to interact directly with the guest speakers and exchange information. Simultaneous translation facilities will ensure that the widest range of attendees can benefit from such initiatives. To ensure that these lectures generate the positive momentum expected of them, guest speakers will have to be of sufficiently high profile. In the margins of the lectures, they will be expected to undertake a number of high level meetings and to participate in seminars format discussions with relevant individuals during their two to three day visit. The selection of guest speakers will be undertaken in consultation with both the EC Delegation Office in Dili and the Government to ensure the relevancy of the individuals.

2. **Support for the development of a defence and security policy research institute**- A major medium term impediment to sustainable civilian oversight of the security sector in Timor-Leste is the lack of a significant base of knowledge on defence and security issues. There is therefore a need to stimulate independent academic policy work on security and defence issues. One way of stimulating such a debate would be the establishment of an academic research institute that has a small (3-5 people) staff of researchers to work on these issues. Ideally this should be embedded within a Timorese University. The institute would need support to develop a small library, access to internet resources and receive mentoring from a similar institution such as the Royal United Services Institute in the UK, the Instituto de Defesa Nacional in Portugal or other similar academic institutions within the EU. The research institute will also be encouraged to develop links with similar institutions in the region as well. The tasks that the institute could undertake for example would include publishing an annual evaluation of the defence budget and stimulating critical thought on the role of the defence force, policing or other similar issues. It is also hoped that the research institute will contribute to ensuring that relevant courses are taught at the host university where the institute is based. This research institute should be based on strong academic principals of impartiality and therefore should only conduct activities which are in the public domain and ideally be released into the public domain.

3. **Position papers on security sector issues:** A gap exists where relatively few Timorese NGOs or academics write about security sector issues. Therefore, to stimulate interest in developing a capacity for work on SSR among civil society organisations individual papers will be commissioned to undertake research in this area. The UNMIT SSSU has already, for example, been approached by women veterans seeking support to print a book outlining the role of women in Timor-Leste's struggle for independence. In addition, this fund could also be used to fund the translation and publication in Tetun of relevant books and papers. Clear and transparent criteria for commissioning articles or supporting publications will be developed by the Project Board.

4. **Support for a Consultation on a CAVR Successor Institution:** To assist Timor-Leste's security sector in learning from past experience and internalising democratic values, it is vital that the past history is documented and acknowledged therefore a successor organisation may be required to build on this legacy. Committee A of the Parliament has already called for the creation of a successor to the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (CAVR) for this purpose among others. Therefore, the overall objective of this activity will be to support the Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat facilitate the consultation with key stakeholders and the community in Timor-Leste on the form and structure of the proposed CAVR successor institution in order to benefit from their feedback, strengthen broad ownership of the project and enhance the quality of relevant legislation. In order to do this, the following activities will be undertaken: One video based on either the Parliamentary debate or interviews with individual MPs and other stakeholders plus replication on five DVDs; 13 meetings organized (one per district); a report produced on consultations; and amended draft legislation (See Appendix 4).

II. Institutional Assistance: to strengthen effective oversight, accountability, and operational management for peace and stability. Specific interventions will be identified during the review process and governed by national priorities and OECD-DAC requirements.

5. **Strengthening oversight capacity within the civil service:** The capacity of oversight actors to perform their role in an informed manner remains very limited in Timor-Leste. It is therefore vital that official oversight actors are well equipped and capacitated to fulfil their role. Accordingly, the project will address the training needs of national institutions with oversight responsibilities over the sector (Oversight Actors include civil

servants, parliamentarians, etc...) through courses in EU member states on security sector management. Seminars/training will also be organised in Timor-Leste. Examples of the sort of course offered might be a tailored course conducted by local facilitators in Tetun but based on a curriculum and guidance of a research institute in an EU member state.

Possible examples of institutes within the EU include the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden, the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands, l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques in France, Bradford University and Cranfield University in the United Kingdom and the Instituto de Defesa Nacional in Portugal. Other options will also be explored. The local EC delegation will be consulted on the final selection of the international service provider. This funding would also be used to send individuals abroad to take part in specific courses relevant to their oversight role- e.g. defence budget management and procurement. Ideally, this training will be organised through the Defence and Security Policy Institute outlined above.

6. **Support for the professionalization of Government security guards**- Working with the government of France following a pilot project between November and December 2008, the project will aim to train the Segurança Civil (Civil Guard) in accordance with its remit as defined by law and internationally recognised standards. The *Segurança Civil* provides security services and access management to public administration buildings and facilities. This agency, responsible to the Secretary of State for Security, operates under Organic Law 3/2004 encompassing its members (about 500 permanent staffs and 300 employed on a casual basis) as civil servants. In 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Government buildings were assaulted on a few occasions by angry crowd. Some equipment was stolen or destroyed; some premises were even burned to the ground; and staff harassed. This follow up to the pilot training mentioned above will include the development of a full training manual and also further work on training trainers to allow for the training to become institutionalised.

7. **Support for the Professionalization of the Private Security Industry:** The private security industry is one of the largest employers in Timor-Leste and is at present largely unregulated. The government have therefore identified the regulation of private security companies as a priority[1]. This project will therefore undertake commissioned research on the private security situation within Timor-Leste and support a series of round table meetings to discuss issues of the regulation and powers of private security guards as well as the development of minimum training standards for civilian security guards and the promotion of professional or trade organisations. Examples of potential outputs could be the adoption of ISO standards or the development of a Timorese Code of Conduct for the Security Industry. It is anticipated that there could be synergies built into this activity with the training of the *Segurança Civil* outlined above. This industry is likely to expand should the oil sector in Timor-Leste continue to develop or if Tourism was to increase significantly. In many other parts of the world, the private security industry has been subject to both politicisation and/or infiltration by gangs and organised crime. This research would be intended to assist the government and the industry to avoid this problem in Timor-Leste before it develops.

8. **Responding to Complex Emergencies:** An important aspect of ensuring that civilian political control of the security sector is maintained is the level of coordination between different government actors and a central point of control normally under the Prime Minister during a Complex Emergency. Complex Emergencies are crises which require the cooperation of a number of different agencies and government departments. The crisis could be in the form of a riot or a terrorist attack or could be a natural disaster such as a Bird Flue outbreak, a flood or an earthquake. A research project will be commissioned

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[1] Ref. Chapter 6 page 68 of the IV Constitutional Government's programme states that the government will: "*Support private security companies in terms of training of their personnel*".

which will examine existing coordination mechanisms such as the Integrated Centre for the Management of Crisis, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defence and Security. Issues to be examined will be inter-operability, inter-agency coordination mechanisms, communications systems, and clearly defined roles. This activity will result in a research paper and a series of recommendations which will be discussed at a roundtable of government experts.

III. Individual professional development: to develop necessary skill-sets identified during the security sector review process for a more transparent and efficient management of the security sector. Specific activities will be identified during the review process and governed by national priorities and OECD-DAC requirements.

9. **The development of specialised training courses to target specific identified needs.** A key element of capacity building for individuals is training. Therefore, a component of this project anticipates the need to provide individuals with training. This component could include training in a verity of areas. Examples of such training include training police or immigration officers on counter trafficking to ensure that Timor-Leste does not suffer from the problem of forced trafficking of individuals (usually young boys, girls or teenage women) for the sex trade else where in the region. There have recently been a number of examples where this has already happened in Timor-Leste and it could become a greater problem. Another example could be organising one day workshops on SSR for gender focal points within government departments or training members of the security sector on how to deal with the media. Another example could be training the media on how to cover security issues professionally. Relevant synergies and cross-linkages with the UNDP media project will be explored.

10. **Providing strategic advisors to fill immediate need for specific security oversight and governance expertise:** In Timor-Leste there is a severe capacity gap among national experts capable of providing technical advice in a number of areas. These areas include drafting laws or providing strategic advice on security oversight issues. However, while the provision of international experts can fill gaps, it does not constitute a sustainable solution unless it is accompanied with capacity building of civil servants. Therefore, this project will provide upon request short term experts who can provide advice while ensuring that a local counterpart is mentored to progressively assume the experts' responsibilities over an agreed time frame. Therefore, experts will be embedded in the hosting organisational structure alongside national staff who would accompany and work alongside these international experts to ensure transfer of knowledge and narrowing down capacity gaps, thus, reducing the long term reliance on international experts.

2. VISIBILITY

The objective of the visibility and communication plan will be to ensure that all the beneficiaries and external stakeholders are aware that the initiative is being undertaken with support from European Commission. All equipment will display both UNDP and the European logo in a prominent and easily identifiable manner (Stickers). They will be also featured on banners during major events (training workshops, consultation meetings, national workshop, etc.).

As part of the project activities, at least ten reference documents, training modules and reports will be produced for use by government, media and civil society. UNDP will take due care to feature the European Commission logo and any applicable disclaimers following consultation with the local EC Delegation. The European contribution will also be clearly acknowledged in press releases and other material disseminated by the project.

The action foresees a number of workshops and training sessions targeting a wide array of stakeholders including government, media and civil society representatives. The representation of the European Commission in these events will be discussed with the local EC delegation in due course. A press release will be circulated to launch the project and before each workshop and training sessions. All appropriate measures will be taken to publicise that the action has received funding from the European Commission. Information given to press, beneficiaries, and all publicity material, reports and publications will acknowledge this contribution through logos and disclaimers as applicable. The action will be included in the UNDP Timor-Leste website [http://www.undp.org.tl/] and will be linked to the corporate portal. Results will be shared with the UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok [http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/] and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery [http://www.undp.org/bcpr/] for dissemination and networking with regional partners. Publicity pertaining to this action will clearly refer to the contribution from the European Commission and refer to it both in Euros and USD.

3. PROJECT LOGFRAME

Title of the Action	Security Sector Capacity Development Facility
Principal Objective	Support the development of national capacity to manage security sector governance in a sustainable and comprehensive manner to ensure long-term security and stability for the citizens of Timor-Leste.

	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Risks and Assumptions
Specific Objective	Promote the four dimensions of security sector reform, namely, civilian oversight, operational management, financial accountability and policy research capacity to ensure peace and stability in Timor-Leste.	• Based on the results of the security sector review as a benchmark, greater public awareness and better public image of security and defence actors • Increase in efficiency and efficacy of operational management. • Number of vulnerable areas identified in internal control systems and managed by concerned government entities. • Number of research papers identified as relevant by decision-makers.	• Follow-up perception/ confidence survey to assess potential changes in behaviour and context undertaken by a non-governmental third party • Feedback questionnaires from a representative sample of stakeholders and beneficiaries before and after interventions, and 6 month thereafter. • Relevant published research papers.	• Volatile security situation • Lack of human resources and expertise • Limited civil society sector (NGOs, media and academia) involvement and knowledge of security sector issues • SSR is a national priority • Continued political commitment reflected in future national budgets for sustainability • Security sector survey (part of the Security sector review project) completed.
Results	1.1. Oversight skill-sets, accountability measures, and policy research capacity put in place	• At least 6 security sector management trainings overseas for national authorities with oversight responsibilities • At least 4 security sector seminars in TL • At least 3 organisations are supported through small grants for research and awareness raising on security issues • At least 4 quarterly lectures series on security sector development and international experience • Establishment of a Defence and Security Policy Research institute • At least 2 annual reports and 4 policy papers published by the Defence and Security Policy Research institute • At least 13 regional consultations conducted on the CAVR successor organisation • One video produced on CAVR related issues	• Capacity development implementation plan and progress reports • Media releases and published documentation • Defence and Security Policy Research institute linked to the national university • Records of meetings • Evaluation and feedback questionnaires filled by participants • Video and final report on CAVR successor institution.	• Lack of political support • Limited capacity and systems for oversight and accountability • Limited civil society sector (NGOs, media and academia) involvement and knowledge of security sector issues • Lack of human resources and relevant expertise • Delays in discussing and/ or approving recommendations and relevant legislation on CAVR successor institution

	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Risks and Assumptions
	1.2. Improved public building security, professionalized private security industry and clear framework for emergency response identified	• At least ¼ of Civil Security Guards trained as trainers • Training manual for Civil Guards • Report on private security situation published • At least 2 roundtables to discuss regulations, powers of civilian guards, trade/professional associations and code of conduct • At least 25 participants/ train-the-trainers from security companies in Dili and the Districts • Regulatory improvement for private security companies submitted • At least 2 specialised technical trainings to be identifies by the government for at least 25 participants each • Voluntary self-regulation such as ISO standards for private security companies developed to prevent any future misuse by organised crime • At least 4 experts deployed to support the short-term needs of security institutions and mentor local staff • Study on Government capacity to respond to complex emergencies addressing as a minimum coordination mechanisms, compatibility of communication systems, intra-operability, common training needs, along with proposals for improvement	• Capacity development implementation plan and progress • Training manual for Civil Guards • Evaluation and feedback questionnaires filled by participants • Records of meetings • Code of conduct and by-laws for private security company • Draft regulation on private security companies submitted • Evaluation report on Government capacity to respond to complex emergencies	• Lack of political support • Lack of basic human resources/ local counterparts • Lack of collaboration on behalf of private companies • Poor coordination and communication among different government organisations.
Activities	1.1.1. Facilitate security sector management trainings in European institutions for national authorities with oversight responsibilities over the security sector. 1.1.2. Organise locally in collaboration with European institutions seminars on leadership, accountability, management & service-orientation of security sector. 1.1.3. Manage small grants to support research and awareness raising on security sector issues for NGOs and academia. 1.1.4. Initiate a constructive debate on SSR among security actors, oversight institutions, academia and civil society in the neutral forum of high-profile quarterly lecture series and promote networking, transfer of knowledge and best practices. 1.1.5. Support the development of a Defence and Security Policy Research institute (a think-tank) as a base for knowledge and policy advice on defence and security issues, and sustainable civilian oversight. 1.1.6. Monitor the implementation of the consultation process of the CAVR successor institution initiative.	Pre-conditions • Continued Government commitment, leadership and commitment of actors in the security sector, Parliament, PNTL, FDTL, etc. • Expert critical mass created • Continued support of Committee A to the CAVR successor institution initiative	

	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Risks and Assumptions
Activities	1.2.1. Support the professionalization of unarmed Civil Security Guards '*Segurança civil*' to provide efficient security services, and manage access to public buildings and facilities. 1.2.2. Support the regulation and professionalization of the private security industry through research, regulatory development, establishment of potential professional or trade organisations and targeted training. 1.2.3. Identify or develop specialised training courses to target specific needs of public security actors as identified by the Government (ex. training police and migration officers on counter-trafficking, media relations, gender, etc.) 1.2.4. Direct support for institutional strengthening and capacity development through deployment of International experts to address the short-term needs of public security actors and mentor local counterparts. 1.2.5. Evaluate government capacity to respond to complex emergencies (ex. riots, natural disasters, disease outbreaks, etc.) where there is a need for inter-agency communication and coordination.	Pre-conditions • Continued Government commitment, leadership and commitment of actors in the security sector? Ie Parliament PNTL, FDTL, etc. • Availability and/ or recruitment of necessary human resources by the Government • Successful pilot project for Civil Security Guards capacity development		

4. PROJECT WORK PLAN

Activities	Months																	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Activities for Expected Result I Support to the Structural Security Environment:																		
1.1 Organising the quarterly lecture series (selection of speakers, logistics etc)			■			■			■			■			■			
1.2 Negotiations with partners, procurement, selection of staff for defence institute	■	■	■															
2.1. working with new defence institute director start process of acquiring equipment/books etc				■	■	■	■	■	■									
2.2. Production of Defence Institute publications and other related activities						■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
3.1. Launch tenders for the commissioning of SSR related publications				■									■					
3.2. Publish Research papers									■						■			
4.1 Commission post-CAVR Technical secretariat to undertake post-CAVR consultation (4 months date unclear)																		
Activities for Expected Result II. Institutional Assistance to strengthen democratic oversight of the security sector																		
5.1 Undertake an assessment of capacity needs of the civil service						■	■											
5.2 Undertake capacity building projects in partnership with civil service									■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
6. Undertake a project supporting the training of security guards	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■										
7. Commission research on private security companies and organise consultations based on result	■	■	■	■														
8.Commission research on Complex emergencies and organise consultations based on result	■	■	■	■														
Activities for Expected Result III. Individual professional development of security sector and oversight actors																		
9.1. Undertake consultations with key stakeholders on the need for specialist training & identification of training providers						■	■	■										
9.2 Develop and deliver training courses identified in 9.1									■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
10.1 Identification of needs and recruitment of key personnel needed to assist the government	■	■	■															
10.2 Employment of six international experts			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Prepare Final Evaluation Report																	■	■

5. PROJECT BUDGET

Description	Total Costs (in EUR)
1. Human Resources	
1.1 Salaries (local staff)	
1.1.1 Technical - National Project Manager	11,580
1.1.2 Administrative/ support staff	
1.1.2.1 Operations Assistant	9,660
1.1.2.2 Language Assistant	8,520
1.1.2.3 Driver	2,700
1.1.3 Defence and Security Policy Research Institute (DSPRI)	
1.1.3.1 Director	5,850
1.1.3.2 Researchers	16,200
1.1.3.3 Administrator	2,340
1.1.3.4 Secretary	1,980
1.2 Salaries (international staff)	
1.2.1 Technical	
1.2.1.1 International Project Manager	106,200
1.2.1.2 Project Officer	78,120
1.2.1.3 International Consultants	457,500
1.2.1.4 CPR Programme Analyst	51,000
1.2.2 Support staff - Monitoring Officer	26,100
1.3 Per diems for missions/travel	
1.3.1 Abroad	
1.3.1.1 Management training overseas	22,500
1.3.1.2 Defence & Security Policy Research institute	19,200
1.3.2 Local for project staff	1,860
1.3.3 Local for International consultants	28,325
1.3.4 Seminar/conference participants	4,360
Subtotal Human Resources	**853,995**
2. Travel	
2.1. International travel (from Europe to Timor-Leste)	90,000
2.2 International travel for Quarterly lecture series	25,000
Subtotal Travel	**115,000**
3. Equipment and supplies	
3.1 Furniture, computer equipment	32,250
3.2 Other (DSPRI Library stock)	30,000
Subtotal Equipment and supplies	**62,250**
4. Local office	
4.1 Vehicle costs	4,800
4.2 Office rehabilitation	25,000
4.3 Consumables - office supplies	3,000
4.4 Other services (tel/fax, electricity/heating, maintenance)	10,800
Subtotal Local office	**43,600**
5. Other costs, services	
5.1 Publications	31,200
5.1.1 DSPRI Publications costs	78,300
5.2 Studies, research (Final Public Perception Survey)	71,801
5.3 Management training overseas – Fees	19,290
5.4 Evaluation costs	10,815

5.5 Translation, interpreters	
5.5.1 Interpreters for conferences/seminars	12,160
5.5.2 Translation costs	10,800
5.6 Costs of conferences/seminars (Venue, equipment, ...)	
5.6.1 Venue & equipment	9,675
5.6.2 Catering	8,800
5.6.3 Institutional fees	60,000
5.7 Visibility actions (Leaflets, brochures, Commemorative plaques, Banners, ...)	15,000
Subtotal Other costs, services	**327,841**
6. Other	
6.1 Small Grant CAVR	22,000
6.2 Small Grant NGOs	75,000
6.3 Small Grant Media	30,000
6.4 Opening Ceremony - Defence and Security Policy Research Institute	3,500
Subtotal Other	**130,500**
7. Subtotal direct eligible costs of the Action (1-6)	**1,533,186**
8. Administrative costs (7% of 7, total direct eligible costs of the Action)	107,323
9. Total eligible costs (7+8)	**1,640,509**

6. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The project will be governed by the same arrangements as the Security Sector Review project (Ref. Appendix 1) and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) between the European Commission and the UN.

The overall strategy and direction along with major decisions will be made by the project board. This board is made up of three representatives appointed by the Prime Minister they are: the Secretary of State for Security who chairs the Board; an Opposition member of the Parliamentary Defence, Security and Foreign Affaires Committee; and the President's Security Sector Reform and Development Advisor (Ref. Appendix 3). From the UN side, the UNDP Deputy Country Director/ Programmes and the UNMIT Acting Chief of Staff represent their respective organisations on the board. In addition, the Assistant Country Director/ Head Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the Chief SSSU attend as observers.

7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring and evaluation activities will be undertaken in accordance with UNDP standard policies and procedures. Monitoring and evaluation are part of a continuous cycle that is intended to improve the impact(s) of the project. Hence, progress will be monitored and assessed regularly through participatory processes in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness. UNDP advocates strengthened collaboration and coordination in evaluation to improve effectiveness and reduce transaction costs for development cooperation. In this spirit and in accordance with UNDP's results-oriented monitoring and evaluation planning cycle, a final evaluation will be carried out as part of a joint evaluation work where possible. The TORs will be submitted to the local EC Delegation for clearance in due time.

The Project team is responsible for regular monitoring of the project results and progress achieved to date. A full time M&E and Outreach Officer (IUNV) will perform this function on a day to day basis. A monitoring log based on the identified indicators and potential risks will be developed. Additional data will be collected for each indicator to reflect the efficacy (use of time, budget and resources) and efficiency (i.e., gauging possible changes of behaviour). In addition, the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit will monitor project implementation. Monthly reports on capacity development/ mentoring activities will be submitted by the Project Manager; these will reflect progress and highlight potential obstacles and/ or unforeseen delays. The evaluation of workshops and training activities will be undertaken both by participants and the project team before and immediately after the intervention as well as 6 months thereafter, where possible, in order to assess change in behaviour, skill-sets and/ or mindsets. Progress will be reported periodically. The Interim Report will be submitted after twelve months from the start of the action and the Final Report three months after its end. Representatives of the local EC Delegation will be invited to participate in activities in order to assess progress, and meet the various participants and observers.

A Final evaluation will be undertaken during the last quarter of the project to capture results and distil lessons learned. It will include a small perception survey that will follow on the Review Survey undertaken by the UNMIT/ UNDP Security Sector Review project. The survey methodology will be designed to ensure that data is compatible and can be cross-correlated. This exercise will capture potential changes in the security environment and assess the impact of the ongoing security sector reform initiatives.

The following table summarises potential risks that would affect the project. They will be monitored as a minimum by the project team during implementation to ensure that mitigation measures are put in place as early as possible or to avoid altogether any possible impact(s) by re-orientating and/ or readjusting the strategy following approval by the Project Board.

Table 1: Activity/Deliverable Quality Criteria and Methods

Risk No.	Risk Description	Impact	Probability (L, M, H)	Degree of Impact (L, M, H)	Mitigation	Notes
1	Decrease in political support	Lack of national ownership	M-H	M-H	Early involvement in design and close collaboration with different concerned parties	
2	Conflicting interests and agendas among different stakeholders	Poor cooperation and delays in progress	M-H	H	Two forums have been foreseen for conflict mediation, namely PB and UNMIT regular coordination meeting with high level decision-makers	Political dynamics to be taken into account
3	Lack of participation of non-governmental actors	Skewed participatory and oversight processes	M-H	M-H	The project will focus on optimising outreach, scope and approach of the consultative process (roundtables, survey, etc.)	Identify potential champions/ supporters
4	Poor representation and inclusiveness of the process	Skewed participatory process and weak capacity development	M-H	M-H	Advocacy and preparatory dialogue with various political parties prior to public launching	Political dynamics to be balanced
5	Lack of adequate human resources to target	Delay in project implementation	M	M-H	A participatory capacity assessment exercise will inform the scope and beneficiaries of the capacity development strategy and/ or potential re-orientation of approaches.	
6	Volatile security situation	Failure to implement the project	L-M	H	Close monitoring and mitigation of potential disagreements	
8	Political intervention in project staff and implementation	Non-transparent decisions	M-H	H	The multi-stakeholder PB is the forum for consultation and decision making	Loss of motivation and confidence by other stakeholders

Note: **(L)** Low, **(M)** Medium, **(H)** High

List of Acronyms

CAVR	Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste
CPD	UNDP Country Programme Document
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
F-FDTL	Timorese Armed Forces
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
ISF	International Stabilization Forces
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoDS	Ministry of Defence and Security
MYFF	UNDP Multi-Year Funding Framework
NGO	Non-government Organization
NPP	National Priorities Plan
OECD - DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PB	Project Board
PNTL	National Police of Timor-Leste
RDTL	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSR-TL	Timor-Leste Security Sector Review
SSSU	Security Sector Support Unit, UNMIT
TL	Timor-Leste
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

APPENDIX 1

Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste

Endorsed Project Document

Project Document

SECURITY SECTOR REVIEW IN TIMOR-LESTE

June 2008

United Nations Development Programme
Country: Timor-Leste
Project Document

Project Title	Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste
UNDAF Outcome(s)/Indicator(s):	Transitional justice mechanisms and security sector reform processes implemented to support peace-building and to prepare for longer term institutional development of the justice and security sector[1]
Expected Outcome(s)/Indicator (s):	Improved institutional and human resources capacity (system and skills) to provide access to justice, uphold the rule of law and protect human rights[2]
Expected Output(s)/Annual Targets:	n/a[3]
Executing Entity:	UNDP Timor-Leste
Implementing agencies:	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

Narrative

This project proposal outlines the support of the United Nations to the comprehensive review of the security sector initiated by the Government of Timor-Leste. It will be governed by a Project Board chaired and driven by the representatives of the three tiered mechanism created by the State of Timor-Leste and implemented by its Coordination Committee assisted by UNMIT experts and UNDP consultants. It will do this by: Strengthening national institutions, through the employment of seconded Timorese civil servants or representatives nominated by the relevant ministries to ensure that the process is both nationally owned and nationally driven; Undertaking a detailed survey of public perceptions of security threats and of the security sector; Undertaking a capacity building function which will provide direct assistance to national authorities; Providing expert assistance on the issue of financial management in the security sector (such as Procurement and budgeting); and Providing support for the national authorities to conduct media outreach and consultation activities to support the review process and a socialisation strategy for security sector institutions.

In April and May 2006, long simmering grievances on the part of a group within the Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), leading to the dismissal of approximately 40% of the army, gave rise to public demonstrations and eventually open conflict between factions of the F-FDTL, the National Police (PNTL) and armed civilians. By the time order was restored, the national leadership of the PNTL had for all intents and purposes collapsed, and other State institutions were in disarray. Fighting between the army and the police resulted in a massive displacement of people, 38 deaths, and large-scale damage and destruction of houses, commercial properties and infrastructure. As a result of this crisis the government fell and the international community was requested to provide assistance. Another consequence has been a sharp economic downturn hampering the efforts of the government to spur investment and reduce unemployment.

UNMIT has been mandated by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1704 (2006), 1745 (2007) and 1802 (2008) to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector. This process already underway builds upon recent and current analytical and planning work. Additionally, the Millennium Declaration identifies conflict prevention as a key peace and security challenge. Decision 2001/1 on the role of UNDP in crisis and post crisis situations recognizes that *'crisis prevention and disaster mitigation are integral parts of sustainable human development strategies'*. This project document sets out the nature and modalities of UNMIT/UNDP assistance to RDTL as it conducts a comprehensive security sector review, which would ultimately define technical assistance and capacity development needs in the areas of security sector transformation, crisis management and recovery. It will also through out the period of the project work to build technical capacity within Timor-Leste to ensure the long term sustainability of the review process. Timor-Leste's President and Prime Minister endorsed the need for a comprehensive review process in a high-level ministerial seminar held in August 2007 and created, accordingly, the three tiered mechanism.

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[1] UNDAF and CPD 2003-2005 were formulated prior to the 2006 crisis, and therefore did not include an outcome related to Crisis prevention and recovery or Security Sector Reform. Given the context in TL, they were extended without major changes till 2008. However, during target setting for 2007, the Country Office introduced the above under Practice area 2 "Fostering democratic governance".

[2] Same as above.

[3] The 2007 annual target focuses on the justice sector. It does not account for the security sector.

Programme Period: n/a
Programme Component: Crisis Prevention &
Recovery
Project Title: Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste
Project ID:
Project Duration: 1 year
Management Arrangement: DEX

Total Budget	USD 1,223,226
Allocated resources:	
• Government:	
• Regular (TRAC3)	USD 200,000
• Other:	
○ Donor 1 (Norway)	USD 600,000
○ Donor 2 (Australia)	USD 200,000
• In kind contributions:	
Unfunded budget:	USD 223,226

For the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste:

H.E. Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão

Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Security of the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

For the United Nations Development Programme:

H.E. Mr. Finn Reske-Nielsen

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination

UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator

UNDP Resident Representative, Timor-Leste

Witnessed by:

H.E. Mr. Atul Khare

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste

1. SITUATION ANALYSIS

Following the end of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste in 1999 and the restoration of Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, the nation entered into the post-conflict stage. Post-conflict situations are well recognised to be periods when countries encounter significant challenges on the path to development. The security institutions of Timor-Leste were established by the UN during its previous missions but revealed their vulnerability when faced by the challenge of the events of 2006. The upheaval of April and May 2006 thrust Timor-Leste into a socio-political crisis with potentially catastrophic consequences for its future social and economic development. Long simmering grievances on the part of a group within the Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), leading to the dismissal of approximately 40% of the army, gave rise to public demonstrations and eventually open conflict between factions of the F-FDTL, the National Police (PNTL) and armed civilians. By the time order was restored, the national leadership of the PNTL had for all intents and purposes collapsed, and other State institutions were in disarray. The Prime Minister and a number of ministers also resigned. Fighting between the army and the police resulted in 38 casualties. An estimated 145,000 people were displaced with many taking refuge in IDP camps in Dili and throughout the country (70,000 in Dili, more than half of Dili's population), while an estimated 3,200 houses and buildings were damaged or destroyed in Dili.

The Government sought international assistance to help restore law and order in the country and requested that the UN should re-establish a peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste. This new mission, UNMIT, was established in August 2006 (SC Res.1704/06) as an integrated mission with a wide and far-reaching peacekeeping mandate.

The Government further requested the UN to establish an Independent Special Commission of Inquiry (CoI) under the auspices of the OHCHR with the mandate to determine the facts and circumstances pertaining to the outbreak of violence and to clarify the distribution of criminal responsibility for those events. The Prime-Minister established, on 3 May 2006, an *ad hoc* commission, the Commission of Notables to conduct an in depth enquiry on the grievances of the petitioners and to formulate recommendations for follow-up on the CoI findings. The Parliament approved a resolution declaring its confidence in the judicial system and its ability to implement the recommendations of the COI report.

The Security Council adopted new resolutions in February 2007 (Resolution 1745) and February 2008 (Resolution 1802) that extended the mandate of UNMIT until February 2009. Political tensions eased significantly in 2007. Peaceful Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in accordance with the constitutional timeframes. The polls were held with significant voter turn out and international election observers declared the vote to have been free and fair. The new President was sworn in on the 20 May 2007 and a new government took office in August. The inclusion of a police component in the UNMIT mandate was central in maintaining stability during the electoral period and its logistical support to the elections contributed to their success.

On 11 February 2008 there were two armed attacks against the President and Prime Minister by a small armed group which left the President badly wounded. In direct response to these attacks a Joint Command integrating contingents of F-FDTL and PNTL was created to capture the perpetrators. The joint operation carried out by the two forces has been effective in bringing suspect to justice. The joint operation served to build of confidence between the

two institutions and has demonstrated that they both can work together and coordinate activities.

One of the central elements of the mandate given to UNMIT is to assist the national authorities in developing and strengthening institutional capacity including in the security sector. To this end, a Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) has been established within UNMIT. Paragraph 4(e) of Resolution 1704 lays out its assigned tasks:

"To assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including the F-FDTL, the Ministry of Defence, the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior with a view to supporting the Government, through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening institutional capacity-building, as appropriate."

Security Council Resolution 1802 (2008) reaffirmed the international community's support for the SRSG in addressing critical security related issues through '*...inclusive and collaborative processes, including the High Level Coordination Committee and the Trilateral Coordination Forums*'. The resolution restated the importance of the review and the role of UNMIT to assist the Government in undertaking this process. The resolution also welcomed the three tiered mechanism that national authorities established, in August 2007, to address issues related to the security sector review.

The Security Sector Reform and Development (SSRD) team thus established was tasked to lead the process; to ensure information sharing between different RDTL institutions and the establishment of consensual positions as well as to establish a communication interface with the United Nations and elaborate proposals for the reform and development of the Security Sector.

The team comprises of three layers:

1. **High Level Committee** responsible for setting and approving policy direction and proposals to be submitted to the Council of Ministers and the National Parliament regarding Defence and Security policy and legislation.

2. **Steering Committee** responsible for reviewing and discussing the proposals prepared by the working groups, establishing guidelines for the Coordination Committee.

3. **Coordination Committee responsible for** managing the day to day activities of the review. Ensuring liaison between the Steering Committee and working groups, organising the agenda of the Steering Committee's meetings and ensuring the sharing of information between the members of the SSRD Team.

The President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste have endorsed the need for a comprehensive review process in a high-level ministerial seminar held in August 2007. Their political support is further reflected by the strong working relationships established between UNMIT/SSSU, the Coordination Committee and key partners in the national ministries of Defence and Security.

The project outlined in this proposal is designed to directly assist the national institutions in producing this review, having in mind the need for building national capacity regarding

security sector governance and analysis. Therefore, as well as assisting the review, this proposal is also intended to assist the development of national capacities.

2. STRATEGY

Conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Not only is the human cost of conflict devastating but its impact on the political, social and economic development of a country is profound. The benefits of development assistance are all too often reversed by the outbreak of violent conflict. The cost of engaging in conflict prevention and peace-building, therefore, will ultimately be far lower than the financial burden of reacting to the outbreak of violence. This is a perspective shared by both the current Government and by the UN and enshrined in both the Government's Programme and the Millennium Development Goals.

The overall goal of the project is to support the Government as it undertakes urgent reforms in the sector and develops a Security Sector Development Strategy that would become a road map for further reform and development of the sector. The Government has already taken a number of measures to refine and strengthen the legal framework delineating the roles and responsibilities of the different defence and security institutions. A National Security Policy framework is being prepared to guide the evolution of the sector in the short and medium term. Plans for the restructuring and/or development of the Defence and Security Forces are under preparation (PNTL) or initial implementation (F-FDTL).

This document identifies the method by which UNMIT and the UNDP will assist the national authorities in this on-going process. In keeping with the Government's decision to not limit its definition of the security sector to personnel in uniform, the project will follow an approach that goes beyond state institutions to encompass civil society, the private sector, non-state actors[4], as well as potential relevant informal mechanisms laying the ground for better efficiency, transparency and accountability.

The review will identify the main characteristics of the security sector as well as the concerns and needs of the Government and of the Timorese citizens. It will draw from available analysis and take into account current realities, extant capacities and resources of the current security sector institutions. It will also analyse future needs in terms of capacity building and interventions.

The project team will be placed within the Coordination Committee and it will include a national Deputy Programme Manager and five seconded experts or representatives from each relevant ministry (Office of the Prime-Minister, Secretary of State for Defence, Secretary of State for Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance). These experts will act as focal points for their respective Departments and the relevant Ministers within the Coordination Committee. The selection of these expects will have to be based both on political confidence and technical expertise. This will ensure that the government can deploy dedicated staff as part of the review process and guarantee long term sustainability.

A capacity building facility has been included in the project and is designed to ensure that reform activities can be mobilised rapidly by the project to address reform needs as they

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[4] Private security guards or non-state actors in TL outnumber police and military combined, and are a far more visible presence in cities and towns. Yet, despite their prevalence, little is known about this part of the security sector.

appear. It also aims to ensure that the different Government Departments and the National Parliament are able to fully play their role in policy formulation and fiscalization through training and other capacity development activities.

The project team will be able to submit proposals to the Project Management Board to release funds from the capacity building facility. These proposals can fill a range of activities including training (whether in Timor-Leste or outside), short term expertise, fact finding trips, discrete research activities (whether by the Government, NGOs or academics) as well as the provision of non-military infrastructure. Examples of activities that this facility will not be able to support include direct military training or the purchase of weapons and military equipment. The project management board will make its decisions on the use of this facility based on the National priorities as expressed in the Programme of the Government endorsed by Parliament, and by the three tiered mechanism created to lead the Security Sector Reform and Development.

PROJECT METHODOLOGY

The project methodology is consistent with the principle that good governance and security are closely inter-linked and mutually dependent, and that they are both a pre-requisite for sustainable economic and human development. This principle has been identified by the Government in its Programme as underpinning the security sector reform process.

In order to assist the development of an integrated approach to the security review a methodology that has proved useful in a number of other review processes is suggested. This methodology will be adapted to fit the national context and articulated through a clear work plan that systematically takes into account initiatives and analysis that has already been undertaken to date.

<u>Activities</u>

1. A **functional analysis** of (a) governance institutions and (b) security institutions which are 'core actors' or direct providers of security (ex. Crisis and emergency management actors, police, border control, etc.) as well as the correctional service, private security companies and non-state actors.

These institutions will be evaluated based on principles already identified by the national authorities such as the need to elaborate proposals ensuring a wide consensus, and keeping in mind the need to (a) ensure the efficient coordination between Security Forces; (b) rationalize the available resources and promote providing a better service to the population; (c) ensure a good financial base for the sector and outline an investment programme for facilities and equipment; (d) establish shared services and facilities where relevant; (e) promote respect for the Law and Human Rights; (f) establish the principle of democratic control of the security sector, through good governance mechanisms especially oversight, responsibility and transparency; (g) cement the separation between the political and the operational level in security sector governance.

2. A **gap analysis** to identify institutional and regulatory gaps which have a direct bearing on the security sector (Ex. legal framework including the supplemental agreement and its implementation, integration, oversight, coordination, management and leadership) with a view to supporting the government of Timor-Leste to refine implementation strategies. Similarly, projects that will follow the review should naturally flow from the gap analysis.

This gap analysis will take into account the already identified national SSR priorities, including recommendations on training for both the F-FDTL and PNTL, and existing bilateral initiatives.

3. A **threat analysis** which identifies generic and specific threats to internal and external security in Timor-Leste (for example, economic security/unemployment, rule of law, lack of judicial recourse and political instability, epidemics/disasters, external aggression, etc...). This threat assessment will include recommendations regarding established national SSR priorities including maritime security and border management.

4. A **strategic environment review** to canvass public opinion and promote a dialogue on security issues (for example perceived and/or common threats and freedom of movement) is also planned. An outreach and socialisation strategy will be launched to develop a comprehensive picture of the challenges currently faced by security sector. It will distinguish between different social structures, including groups such as IDPs, veterans, minorities, women and youth. Results will be gender disaggregated to capture the unique set of gender issues that permeate in the Timorese society. This is particularly important given the relatively high incidence of gender-based violence reported in Timor-Leste. The project team will ensure that relevant civil society organisations and other interested stakeholders are consulted in the preparation and undertaking of these activities.

Outputs

1. Drafting a work plan based on already identified priorities which will identify the areas where recommendations will be made:

   a. Integrated system of forces

   b. Institutions, including PNTL, F-FDTL, Ministry for Defence and Security, Civil Protection and private security

   c. Cooperation between institutions in order to ensure rationalization of resources

   d. Maritime security and border management

   e. Financial mechanisms

   f. Oversight mechanism

2. Incorporating identified issues and concerns into Timor-Leste's National Security Policy Framework to counteract identified threats and respond to national security needs and expectations.

3. Elaborating sectorial proposals, namely for the restructuring of the security institutions, *including the F-FDTL, the Ministry of Defence, the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior* to be incorporated in the Security Sector Development Strategy; examples of issues where recommendations will be made include greater coordination, including the justice sector; enhanced and where possible shared or pooled resource management. Vital areas of civil-military coordination will be in the area of maritime security, integrated border management, intelligence analysis and in responding to complex emergencies such as natural disasters. Other key aspects which will need to be integrated into the National Security Policy include civilian control, internal and external control and discipline mechanisms in compliance with international standards.

4. A costing and feasibility study to ensure that recommendations for the development of the security sector are strategically coherent, appropriate to the needs of the sector,

affordable and in line with overall national development priorities. This is specifically designed to allow the Government to make decisions based on both the cost of a proposal and its context.

5. Long term financial mechanisms for the sector will be studied and presented to the relevant authorities.

6. A security sector development strategy will be completed by the SSRD Team taking into account existing strategies, and identifying future interventions to transform the security sector and address identified threats along with a partnership framework for supporting implementation. The development plan will incorporate the proposed structure of the security sector articulating the vision towards a comprehensive force system, civil protection and the regulatory framework for the private security companies.

These activities will not be linear and to a large extent will run parallel to one another and mutually influence one another.

This review methodology is part of the elaboration of policy development and will contribute towards an integrated approach to policy coordination and cooperation across all parts of the security sector. It is also important that the Government's efforts to ensure that national capacity in intelligence gathering and analysis are enhanced and coordinated be supported.

In addition to the national experts who will be recruited to be part of the Coordination Committee, and will be supported by international experts, it is also vital to recognise the importance of accompanying the review with an ongoing process of capacity building as gaps appear. Therefore this project proposal includes the possibility of rapidly responding to any capacity needs or gaps as they are identified. This mechanism can then be developed as the project continues ensuring that capacity building activities in the security sector can be started quickly, reducing lead up time and building public trust in the review/transition process.

This national capacity building facility will also allow the review to address current SSR needs in Timor-Leste. Potential examples of support could include training and capacity building of members of the security sector or those institutions overseeing them or alternatively supporting specific technical assistance to the Government. Activities could also in certain circumstances include the provision of some equipment (not weapons). All activities funded through the Capacity Building Facility will need be approved by the Project Board and will comply with national priorities.

Possible examples of activities that the Project Board may wish to approve include:

- Development of national capacity in security sector governance
  1. Supporting the creation or development of national security related think tanks. This could include direct start up costs and/or the provision of research material or training for staff.
  2. Supporting study tours of countries with similar challenges in order to receive advice on the direction of security sector development activities.
  3. Facilitating the visit of international experts to give lectures on SSR related issues

4. Commissioning independent reports on issues related to security sector development

- Direct support to the government review process
    1. Training of civil servants or members of the security sector in issues directly related to supporting the review process (eg financial management, security policy etc)
    2. Provision of equipment necessary to undertake the review process (eg computers journals etc)
    3. Recruitment of short term consultants (whether from Timor-Leste or international)

- Direct support to ongoing SSR capacity gaps identified during the review
    1. Support to the training of government security guards
    2. Provision of management training to mid-level civil servants

It is anticipated that the production of the report will involve the creation of participatory and consultative mechanisms such as working groups involving the Government, the Parliament, project staff and other stakeholders which will not only be locally owned but also locally driven. The exact format of these working groups will be defined by the SSRD team.

3. PROJECT RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK

Intended Outcome as stated in the Country/ Regional/ Global Programme Results and Resource Framework: UNDAF and CPD 2003-2005 were formulated prior to the 2006 crisis, and therefore did not include an outcome related to Crisis prevention and recovery or Security Sector Reform. Given the context in TL, they were extended without major changes till 2008. However, during target setting for 2007, the Country Office introduced the following under Practice 2 "Fostering democratic governance: Transitional justice mechanisms and security sector reform processes implemented to support peace-building and to prepare for longer term institutional development of the justice and security sector".

Outcome indicators as stated in the Country/ Regional/ Global Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: n/a

Applicable MYFF Service Line: Conflict prevention and peace building

Partnership Strategy: The project will strengthen the partnership between the Government of Timor Leste, UNMIT and UNDP TL. It will reinforce the provision of coherent advice to the government and an efficient management support to UNMIT in its implementation of a key provision of Security Council Resolution 1704. Moreover, it will lay the foundation for future programming in the areas of SSR and recovery.

Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): Review of Security Sector in Timor-Leste

Intended Outputs	Indicative Activities	Responsible parties	Inputs[5]

1.1. Project mobilized and implementation procedures and mechanisms put in place	1.1.1. Develop TOR and recruit project staff
	1.1.2. Establish the multi-stakeholder Project Management Board (PMB) in close consultation with RDTL
	1.1.3. Provide detailed technical assistance to government in undertaking the review
	1.1.4. In consultation with national stakeholders launch the security sector review officially to reassert political support, purpose, scope and objectives of the project, as well as national counterpart(s)
	1.1.5. Conduct round table consultations to address community questions and concerns about the SSR process
	1.1.6. Conduct consultation meetings on technical issues with national
		• Coordination Committee, including UNMIT/SSSU focal point and UNDP TL project manager;
		• 1 National Communication Expert to work alongside the International communication expert in the design of the information campaign and consultative process
		• Local facilitators to assist with round tables and communication strategy
		• Contracted media and printing companies
			• Coordination Committee, UNMIT/SSSU and UNDP TL to conduct the activities in an integrated manner.
			• RDTL feedback on needs, challenges and priorities, regular follow-up and oversight
			• UNDP and UNMIT assistance (expertise, methodology)
			• UNMIT/SSSU staff time
			• Costs related with overall management (12 months):
			  - *Project Manager: USD 163,550*
			  - *National Project Officers (x4): USD 49,000*

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[5] Not withstanding management costs (F&A).

Intended Outputs	Indicative Activities	Responsible parties	Inputs[5]
	stakeholders throughout the process 1.1.7. Provide Technical advice to government on SSR related issues 1.1.8. Develop a public information and outreach campaign to raise awareness and encourage public participation 1.1.9. Form the multi-stakeholders consultative group to insure that the process is deeply rooted in local needs, realities and expectations		- *National Language Assistants (x2): USD 7,200* - *Equipment (Car & computers): USD 46,000* - *Supplies: USD 5,200* - *In-country travel: USD 15,000* - *Miscellaneous: USD 5,000* - *Final Evaluation: USD 15,000* - *Contractual services (ex. Meeting premises, sound system, etc.): USD 10,000* • Communication Expert (60 days): USD 20,000 • Total communication and consultation (incl. local senior and junior consultant teams for 30 days): USD 29,750 • Production and printing costs for media strategy USD47,750
1.2. A Strategic Environment Survey is undertaken by RDTL to identify public opinion and promote a dialogue on security issues	1.2.1. Design a survey to identify public perspective vis-à-vis security which is inclusive of youth, women, veterans, IDPs and disenfranchised groups. Implement the survey to assess public perceptions of security and security issues. 1.2.2. Translate and print the survey findings in four languages	• Same • Coordination Committee, including UNMIT/SSSU focal point and UNDP TL project manager working with an independent research and analysis institution/ organisation to develop and implement the survey	• Coordination Committee, UNMIT/SSSU and UNDP TL to conduct the activities in an integrated manner • RDTL feedback on questionnaire design, needs, challenges and priorities, regular follow-up and oversight • UNDP and UNMIT assistance (questionnaire design, methodology) • USD 300,000 for outsourcing survey • USD 20,000 for translation and printing

Intended Outputs	Indicative Activities	Responsible parties	Inputs[5]
1.3. The security sector is reviewed by RDTL	1.3.1. Undertake a comprehensive review of the security sector including legislative and institutional frameworks 1.3.2. Undertake a financial analysis to cost the different scenarios and identify potential sources of national funds in close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance 1.3.3. Assist RDTL in elaborating a Security Sector Strategy 1.3.4. Publish the final report in four languages	• Coordination Committee, including UNMIT/SSSU focal point and UNDP TL project manager; • Short term Financial Analyst • Short term strategic drafter • Contracted Printing Company	• RDTL on conducting the survey and overseeing the final document final document as well as regular follow-up and oversight • UNDP and UNMIT SSSU staff time • Financial Analyst (60 days): USD 44,500 • Strategic Drafter (40 days) USD 30,000 • Printing, design and translation costs (Tetum, Portuguese, English, Bahasa Indonesia): USD 112,450
	1.3.5. Organise a donor meeting to identify potential support for implementation	• Coordination Committee, including UNMIT/SSSU focal point and UNDP TL project manager; • Short term Financial Analyst	• RDTL design of SSS and regular follow-up and oversight • UNDP and UNMIT assistance (expertise, and coordination)
1.4. Immediate capacity gaps or needs as identified during the review process and addressed	1.4.1. Establish a facility which can be rapidly mobilised to address gaps and needs as identified during the review process 1.4.2. Undertake priority capacity building activities	• Coordination committee, including UNMIT/SSSU focal point and UNDP TL project manager; • Short-term consultants	• RDTL feedback and regular follow-up and oversight • UNDP and UNMIT assistance • Short term consultants or other implementing bodies

4. ANNUAL WORK PLAN BUDGET SHEET

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	TIMEFRAME				PLANNED BUDGET	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Budget Description	Amount
1. Project mobilized and implementation procedures and mechanisms put in place	X	X	X	X	International Project Manager	163,550
			X	X	National Operations Associate	9,600
	X				National driver	3,000
	X	X	X	X	International SSR Consultants	16,450
	X	X	X	X	Equipment and Furniture	6,000
	X	X	X	X	Seconded civil servants (x4)	49,000
	X	X	X	X	Supplies	4,000
	X				Miscellaneous	5,000
	X				Travel	15,000
	X	X			Contractual services/ Companies	10,000
		X			Equipment and Furniture (including car)	40,000
				X	Local Consultants	29,750
	X	X	X	X	International Media Consultant	20,000
					Printing costs	47,750
					Miscellaneous	2,000
					Sub-total 1	*421,100*
2. A Strategic Environment Survey is undertaken by RDTL to identify public opinion and promote a dialogue on security issues	X	X			Contractual services/ Companies	318,550
					Sub-total 2	*318,550*
3. The security sector is reviewed by RDTL			X	X	International financial analyst	44,500
				X	International strategic drafter	30,000
				X	Contractual services/ Companies	112,450
			X	X	Contractual services/ Companies	25,000
					Sub-total 3	*211,950*
4. Immediate capacity gaps or needs as identified during the review process and addressed	X	X	X	X	Contractual services/ Companies	186,000
					Sub-total 4	*186,000*
					Overhead costs	85,626
					Total	**1,223,226**

5. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNMIT/SSSU and UNDP will assist the government of RDTL team created to lead the Security Sector Reform and development in implementing the project activities in close consultation with the Government. The UNDP project team will be hosted at the Coordination Committee and will closely liaise with UNMIT/SSSU through the nomination of a focal point to ensure close follow up given the sensitivity of the project, and regular liaison with its in-house police, military and legal expertise (in-kind contribution to the project).

The selection of UNDP as executing agency and the direct execution modality is motivated by the proven experience and management capacity of UNDP and national context, as well as the project synergies and cross-linkages with on-going UNDP recovery, governance and development programs. UNDP will assume the responsibility for administrative services and document management, financial management (ATLAS), technical support, monitoring and reporting to local government and donors as needed (in coordination with the SSSU and the Government).

A Project Management Board (PMB) will be established to provide overall guidance and oversight on project implementation, including making management decisions upon request by the Project Manager. This includes the approval of project revisions. The PMB will meet at least four times during the life of the project, or as needed (TOR included in Annex 1). The management structure of the PMB is summarized in the following table. The Project Manager will be supervised on a daily basis by the Head of UNMIT SSSU and reports to UNDP through the Assistant Country Director/Crisis Prevention and Recovery. The Project Manager will also report directly to the Directive Committee and work very closely with his national deputy project manager.

Table 1: Management structure of the PMB (Financial Management)

Name of Role	Organization Responsible	Job title of the Person Fulfilling the Role
Project Board - Senior Beneficiary	State of Timor-Leste	3 Representatives of the 3 tier-National SSR Group, nominated by the Directive Committee
Project Board - Executive	UNDP	Resident Representative or his representative
Project Board - Senior Supplier	UNMIT	SRSG or his representative
Project Manager Deputy Project Manager	UNDP	UNDP Security Sector Reform Project Manager and Deputy Manager
Project Assurance	To be determined	To be determined
Project Support	UNDP	UNDP Operations Officer

The review process will be undertaken by the State of Timor-Leste for the people of Timor-Leste. As such the role of UNMIT and the UNDP is to assist in the review process. Therefore, the administrative structure in this project proposal is solely governing the financial administration of this project not the review itself. The overall strategy and direction along

with major decisions will be made or reviewed by the project board according to the public policy and priorities defined by the Three Tier Mechanism for Security Sector Reform and Development. This Board will be made up of three government representatives who will chair the Board and one representative each of the UNDP Timor-Leste and UNMIT. The Board will appoint an independent individual or organisation towards the end of the project to evaluate the project.

The Project Manager will answer to this board although on day to day issues he/she will coordinate their activities under the guidance of the Head of the SSSU and UNDP in liaison with the Government

The role of the Project Manager is to implement the strategy as defined by the project board and ensure that all activities are compliant with UNDP rules and regulations. The manager will also be responsible for the management oversight of all the staff recruited by the project. Similarly the Manager will ensure that donors and the Project Board are regularly briefed on activities related to this project, quarterly donor reports and will ensure that the SSR Capacity Building Facility is compliant with the decisions of the Project Board and donor requirements.

The following diagram further illustrates the structure as it pertains to the interaction between the project team and the government. The selection of these appointments one of whom will chair the board will be the decision of the Government. The diagram is designed to illustrate that the UNMIT and UNDP project mechanisms are intended to support a government driven process.

Figure 1. Project Management Structure in Relation to National SSR Architecture

High Level Committee

Steering Committee

Coordination Committee

(including UNDP/SSSU Project Team)

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring and evaluation activities will be undertaken in accordance with UNDP standard policies and procedures. Monitoring results will be shared with the PMB on a quarterly basis. The project manager will prepare and submit quarterly progress reports (both narrative and financial). A comprehensive final report (both narrative and financial) describing the process, approach, implementation results, recommendations and lessons learned will submitted upon completion of the project. A final evaluation will be carried out in accordance with UNDP's results-oriented monitoring and evaluation planning cycle.

Table 2 identifies the main potential risks to be monitored in order to mitigate and/ or counteract any resulting negative impacts should they materialize.

Table 2: Activity/Deliverable Quality Criteria and Methods

Risk No.	Risk Description	Impact	Probability (L, M, H)[*]	Degree of Impact (L, M, H)[*]	Mitigation	Notes
1	Decrease in political support	Lack of national ownership	M-H	M-H	Early involvement and close collaboration with different concerned parties	
2	Conflicting interests and agendas among different stakeholders	Poor cooperation and delays in progress	M-H	H	The process was designed in a highly participatory manner. In addition, 2 forums have been foreseen for conflict mediation (multi-stakeholder Consultative body and PMB) in addition to UNMIT regular coordination meeting with high level decision-makers	Political dynamics to be taken into account
3	Lack of participation of non-governmental actors (CSOs and non-state actors)	Skewed consultative process	M-H	M-H	A communication and outreach component is foreseen. It will build on international experience and knowledge of the local context. It will focus on optimising outreach, scope and approach of the consultative process (roundtables, survey, etc.)	Identify potential champions/ supporters
4	Poor representation and inclusiveness of the process	Skewed participatory process and weak capacity development	M-H	M-H	Advocacy and preparatory dialogue with various political parties prior to public launching	Political dynamics to be balanced
5	Donor support being used politically	The process it at risk of politicisation and decline in national ownership	L-M	H	Seek to widen the general donor base	
6	Volatile security situation	Failure to implement the project	L-M	H	Close monitoring and mitigation of potential disagreements	
7	Failure to include disenfranchised groups such as youth and women	Failure to achieve success factors	M	H	These aspects will be factored in communication strategy as well as survey design	
8	Political intervention in project staff and interventions	Non-transparent decisions	M-H	H	Make sure to observe a mix of representation (public, private and civic sectors) on the Consultative Group and PMB and maintain it as the best forum for consultation and decision making	Loss of motivation and confidence by other stakeholders

Risk No.	Risk Description	Impact	Probability (L, M, H)[*]	Degree of Impact (L, M, H)[*]	Mitigation	Notes
9	Different contexts in districts and sub-districts	No standard approach.	M	M	Undertake an initial needs assessment to inform the project strategy by cluster of districts/ sub-districts	
10	A solution to the grievances of the petitioners is not found	Volatile security situation would almost certainly mean that key stakeholders are temporarily not able to participate actively in the SSR process	H	H	N/A	

[*] *Note: (L) Low, (M) Medium, (H) High*

6. LEGAL CONTEXT

This document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA) between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the United Nations Development Programme, signed on 20 May 2002.

Consistent with the Article III of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement, the responsibility for the safety and security of the executing agency and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in the executing agency's custody, rests with the implementing partner.

The executing agency shall:

1. Put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;

2. Assume all risks and liabilities related to the executing agency's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of this agreement.

The executing agency agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

List of Acronyms

ALD	Appointment of Limited Duration
CB	Consultative Board
CDR	Combined Delivery Report
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DSRSG	Deputy of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
F&A	Facilities and Administration/ General management support cost
F-FDTL	Timorese Armed Forces
IDP	Internally Displaced People
ISF	International Stabilization Forces
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoDS	Ministry of Defence and Security
MYFF	Multi-Year Funding Framework
NGO	Non-government Organization
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PMB	Project Management Board
PNTL	National Police of Timor-Leste
RDTL	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
SSDS	Security Sector Development Strategy
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSRD	Security Sector Reform and Development
SSSU	Security Sector Support Unit, UNMIT
TL	Timor-Leste
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

APPENDIX 2

Linkages between the current proposal, the National Priorities no. 1 and 6, and the IV Government Programme

Activity	Brief Summary of Activities	Relationship to National Priorities	Relationship to IV Government programme
1.Quarterly lecture series	Experts would be invited to address members of the security sector, oversight actors and civil society	Direct impact on NP 1 with regards to both promoting professionalization in security sector through promoting international best practice and encouraging policy debate	This will assist the govt in Chap 7- sec 1 "*Define the National Defence Policy and its legislative and conceptual framework, by getting the State's competent bodies involved*"
2.Support for the development of a Defence and Security Policy Institute	Establishment of an academic research institute that has a small staff of researchers to work on SSR issues.	Relevant to NP 1 primarily as building on the policy capacity of Timorese in Defence strategy will feed into the ongoing development/implementation of F-FDTL Force 2020 Plan. It is also important to NP6 as the institute will promote greater informed discussion of defence and security issues and therefore assist in promoting civilian oversight	This will assist the govt in Chap 7- sec 1 "*Define the National Defence Policy and its legislative and conceptual framework, by getting the State's competent bodies involved*"
3. Position papers on SSR issues	Commissioning four policy papers/ reports on SSR issues	This will assist in implementing NP6 through promoting civilian oversight of the security sector	
4. Strengthening oversight capacity	Training of national institutions with oversight responsibilities over the sector (civil servants, parliamentarians etc...)	Direct impact on both NP 1 and NP6- as target is both greater professionalization and promoting accountable and effective government	Chap 7 states : "*The State shall make its best efforts, not only in the adoption of structural political decisions, regarding the legal framework and conceptual definitions, but also in the implementation of the technical and operating issues, of institutional character, in pursuing the overall goals of the Nation*"
5. Support for CAVR Successor	Support for a public consultation on a CAVR Successor institution		Chap 6 states "This Government wants the democratic process to be reinforced through the actions of the State and of society and improved through the people's participation. To achieve this, political parties should seriously engage in the political education of our people, so that there is political tolerance

Activity	Brief Summary of Activities	Relationship to National Priorities	Relationship to IV Government programme
6. Support for the professionalization of Government security guards	Development of training guidelines for government security guards and increased professionalism of the sector	Impacts directly on NP1 as the security of government buildings needs to be provided. Further relevant to NP 6 as professional security is vital to allow legitimate public access to government buildings.	
7. Support for professionalization of the Private Security Industry	Research and policy recommendations on regulation of the private security industry	This impacts on NP1 and 6 as a professional and regulated private security industry is a vital part of any countries security architecture	Chap 6 page 68 states that the government will: "Support private security companies in terms of training of their personnel"
8. Responding to Complex Emergencies	Research and policy recommendations on Timor-Leste coordinated response to Complex Emergencies	This is relevant to NP 1 as it relates to the capacity of the government to provide security to the general population during complex emergencies	Chap 6 page 68 states that the government will: "*Consider, under the scope of the emergency principle, that the following bodies exercise civil protection functions, in terms of warning, alert, immediate intervention, help and assistance: the F-FDTL, the PNTL, the maritime, port and airport authorities, fire-fighters, the services of hospital emergency and the Red Cross*
9. The development of specialised training courses to target specific identified needs.	Targeted training for members of the security sector and oversight bodies to respond to needs identified.	This is directly related to NP 1 as it is intended to assist in the professionalization of the security sector. Depending on who gets trained there is also a potential link to NP2	
10. Providing strategic advisors to fill immediate need for specific security oversight and governance expertise	Providing experts who address capacity shortfalls as advisors and mentors who can assist in training national colleagues	This will assist NP1 as it will address key gaps in the Ministry of Defence and Security while also addressing the cause of these gaps.	

APPENDIX 3

Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste

Project Board

Chair
Secretary of State for Security

Member National Parliament of Timor-Leste
Committee B

Security Sector Reform and Development Coordinator
Office of the President

Head of Political Affaires
UNMIT

Deputy Country Director (Programmes)
UNDP Timor-Leste

APPENDIX 4

CAVR SUCCESSOR INSTITUTION

Applicant: Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat
Representative: Rev Agostinho de Vasconselos, Executive Director
Title of project: National Consultation on CAVR Successor Institution
Duration of project: 4 months from time of receipt of funds
Date of submission: 18 September 2008
Project contact person: Pat Walsh, Senior Adviser
Contact details: Email padiwalsh@gmail.com Mobile (+670) 726 8423
Amount requested: Euro 22,000.00 (US$31,649.88 @ 18.9.08)

1. SUMMARY

Funding is requested to undertake nation-wide socialization and consultation regarding the terms of reference and other aspects of the new institution recommended by the Parliament's Committee A in its 5 June 08 resolution on the recommendations of the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (CAVR).

2. OBJECTIVES

2.1 Overall objective

The overall objective is to facilitate consultation with key stakeholders and the community in Timor-Leste on the proposed CAVR successor institution in order to benefit from their feedback, to strengthen broad ownership of the project and to enhance the quality of the relevant legislation.

2.2 Specific objectives

1. To assist Committee A and the Parliament generally with the development of the new institution proposed as a priority by Committee A.
2. To undertake specific consultations on the proposal with the following:
   - key government representatives, particularly the President, Prime Minister, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, Provedor for Human Rights, General Prosecutor, and security agencies;
   - key civil society organizations, particularly victims representatives, human rights NGOs, church and faith community leaders;
   - to discuss the proposal in the districts in a series of one-to-one and public meetings, as appropriate;
   - to discuss the proposal with representatives of the international community, particularly UNMIT, key governments and donors.
3. To utilise video and the media in this consultation process;
4. To build a broad, strong and informed support constituency for the proposal;
5. To enhance the quality of the legislation drafted for Parliament.

3. PROGRAM COMPONENTS

The proposed program will comprise the following components and steps:

3.1 Problem to be addressed

The need to develop a long-term strategy and mechanism that will integrate the findings and recommendations of two truth commissions and utilise these outcomes to facilitate Timor-Leste's transition from past and recent experiences of violence to a fully peaceful and stable society.

3.2 Steps to be taken

1.   Presentation of draft concept paper focussed on the purpose, functions and other aspects of the new institution proposed by Committee A of the Timor-Leste National Parliament. It is envisaged that the new institution will offer an independent, integrated approach to past violations with a strong emphasis on victims needs, research, dissemination and education, and will be mandated by Parliament and funded by Government to contribute to the national goals of peace and stability. This will be done primarily by utilizing and integrating the instruments, recommendations and lessons from history, developed by the CAVR and CVA, to promote a culture of human rights, non-violence, accountability and rule of law in Timor-Leste. The new institution may also have a community reconciliation function relating to 2006 but this will depend on negotiations with the President of the Republic and other stakeholders.

2.   Establishment of a Working Group comprising representatives of government, civil society, UNMIT, international organizations and the Post-CAVR Secretariat and tasked with reviewing and developing further the proposed terms of reference, structure, legal aspects, budget and location of the proposed new institution. As the lead agency in this process, the Post-CAVR Secretariat will require financial support for staffing and related costs.

3.   Production and replication of a short video on the new institution to facilitate community consultations on the new institution. The purpose of this video is to introduce the idea of the new institution to the public and to present the views of MPs and other stakeholders, including if possible the President and Prime Minister, so that members of the community, particularly outside Dili, will know their views. The video will include (a) reference to the CAVR and Committee A recommendations on a new institution and its purpose and (b) film of either the Parliament's plenary discussion on the CAVR recommendations, expected before the end of 2008, or, if that discussion is delayed until next year, film of interviews with individual MPs and other stakeholders.

4.   Program of consultations with government, civil society, church and other community representatives throughout Timor-Leste and with relevant donors, governments and other international organizations in Dili.

5.   Presentation of detailed, revised proposal to Committee A and Parliament.

3.3 Results and achievements
* Government and community supportive of initiative to establish new institution;
* Quality draft legislation submitted to Parliament;

- New institution established;
- Human rights, non-violence and peace advanced in Timor-Leste.

3.4 Beneficiaries

Parliament and Timor-Leste society.

3.5 Implementing agency

Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat (which is supporting Committee A in its work on the CAVR recommendations), in consultation with members of the Working Group.

3.6 Deliverables

- Staffing: one coordinator at the government international rate of Euro 1743 x 4 months (US$2500 x 4 months) or 5 staff @ Euro 349.00 x 4 months (US$500 x 5 x 4 months).
- One video based on either Parliamentary debate or interviews with individual MPs and other stakeholders, plus replication of 5 DVDs.
- 13 meetings (1 per district).
- Report on consultations.
- Amended draft legislation.

3.7 Timeline

Post-CAVR plans to carry out the consultations and related activities over 4 months in the first half of 2009, i.e. between January-June 2009. This is well within the 18 month period allocated to UNDP for the wider security sector project, of which this is part.

3.8 Assumptions

The implementation of the project and the stated timeline are based on two assumptions. These are (a) that the full Parliament will discuss Committee A's recommendation for a new institution over the next 6 months and (b) that the Parliament will agree to the concept in principle and request further work including the preparation of draft legislation. These are both unknowns, but Post-CAVR is confident the Parliament will proceed positively on both matters.

3.9 Amount requested: Euro 22,000.00 (US$31,649.88 @18.9.08)

Salaries	€ 7,000.00
Travel (fuel) and related costs (accommodation/per diems) in 13 districts	€ 4,030.36
Meeting costs (venue, transport for remote participants, food, equipment)	€ 2,687.05
Making of video	€ 1,566.75
Visits and related costs by international consultants	€ 6,715.84
Total	**€ 22,000**