



TERMINAL EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

*UNDP GEF Project, financed by the
Special Climate Change Fund – SCCF:*

*Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and
risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia*

UNDP PIMS ID 4697 | GEF ID 5105 | Atlas project code 00089624

This report has been prepared by an independent consultant reviewer. The findings and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or intentions of the UNDP.



DELIVERABLE 4) TERMINAL EVALUATION FINAL REPORT:

REPORT REVISED IN RESPONSE TO REVIEW COMMENTS ON DELIVERABLE 3 & 4 REPORTS AND THE PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS TO THE PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE (COFIL)

For client UNDP Tunisia
Terminal Evaluation of UNDP GEF SCCF Project

• *Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia* •

EBDGLO Project #0119 Tunisia TE Assignment

Report Number from Client Series:	#004
Period covered for this Report:	25-May-2021 through 07-December-2021
Region:	Africa
Country:	Tunisia
Focal Area:	Climate Change Adaptation
GEF Agency:	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Implementing Partner:	APAL - Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral
Other project partners:	Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment, APAL regional branches, Coastal Observatory, Municipalities of Houmet Essouk, Ajim and Midoun in Djerba, General Directorate for Land-Use Planning, Directorate General of Rural Engineering and Water Management, General Directorate for Water Resource Management, Municipalities of Ghar El Melh and Kalaat El Andalous in the northwest of the Gulf Tunis, Local NGOs/CSOs.

Version of
08 December 2021 (v. b, final)
by [Fabiana Issler](#), CEO



COLOPHON

Project:

“Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia”

UNDP GEF Project | PIMS ID: 4697

Atlas Award ID: 00079688 | Project ID: 00089624

Client:

For UNDP Tunisia

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Fabiana Issler, CEO EBDGLO, Contract Manager

Context:

The project has been indexed at EBD Global Optimum (EBDGLO) as “#0119 Tunisia TE Assignment” and has UNDP as the client. The contracting party is the UNDP Country Office (CO) Tunisia, in collaboration with the UNDP GEF Unit that supports the project at the regional level. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the assignment is appended to the PDF file with comments. The present report corresponds to the final DELIVERABLE from the client’s report series (DEL4).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Terminal Evaluation Consultant, Fabiana Issler, EBD Global Optimum’s CEO, acknowledges the support of all those who contributed to the evaluation process, including officials from the Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL), independent experts who lent their time to discuss their perspective on the project, several other national stakeholders, and in particular representatives from beneficiary NGOs, who provided insights into the difference made by the project in their activities. The Consultant thanks UNDP Officials in Tunisia, including Ms. Faiza Elleuch, Mr. Yousri Helal and the Resident Representative, Ms. Alissar Chaker, for their availability and patience. The Consultant thanks especially the Project Management Unit led by Project Coordinator, Mr. Fadhel Baccar, as well other team members, including Ms. Houwayda Foued, Ms. Bochra Jaouani and Mr. Ltaief Ben-Dermech, all of whom have been very helpful throughout the process. The consultant also thanks former colleague Ms. Keti Chachibaia, who is the Regional Technical Adviser responsible for the project at the UNDP, Nature, Climate and Energy Team.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APAL	Coastal Protection and Planning Agency
APR/PIR	Annual Project Reports / Project Implementation Reports
AWP	Annual Workplan
CO	Country Office
COP	Conference of the Parties
COFIL	Project Steering Committee (PSC) (after "Comité de Pilotage" in French)
CPD	Country Program Document
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DGRE	Water Resources Management Unit
DPM	Maritime Public Domain
DPM	Public Maritime Domain
ERC	Evaluation Resource Center
EWS	Early Warning System
ESSP	Environmental and Social Screening Procedure (of UNDP)
FSP	Full Size Project
GEF	Global Environment Facility
ICZM	Integrated Coastal Zone Management
iNDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NCE	Nature, Climate and Energy Team, within UNDP
NIM	National Implementation
OFP	Operational Focal Point
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIR	Project Implementation Reports
PRODOC	Project Document
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund, under the GEF
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound (concerning indicators)
SWAP EPI	UNDP's Evaluation performance Indicators for Gender Equality
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TOC	Theory of Change
TRAC	Resource assignments from core (UNDP Resources)
UNCT	UM Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

Project Title			
Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia			
Project Details		Project Milestones - See also TIMELINE on page 45	
Project's SHORT Title:	<i>"Resilience côtière"</i>	PIF Approval Date:	Oct 3, 2012
PIMS #:	4697	CEO Endorsement Date (FSP):	Jul 28, 2014
GEF Project ID:	5105	PRODOC Signature Date:	Dec 24, 2014
UNDP Atlas Business Unit Award ID, Project ID:	TUN10, 00079688 / 00089624	Date Project Manager hired:	Jul 03, 2015
Country/Countries:	Tunisia	"Inception Workshop Date", marking the end of the Inception Phase: ¹	Jul 6, 2016
Region:	Africa	Mid-Term Review Completion date:	Aug 2019
Project Type:	Full Size (FSP)	Terminal Evaluation Completion Date:	Oct 2021
Focal Area:	Climate Change Adaptation	Planned Operational Closure Date: ²	Dec 24, 2021
GEF Operational Program:	Objective 2: Increase adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change, including variability, at local, national, regional and global level. <i>[See further down for other 'Strategic Priorities / Objectives']</i>		
Trust Fund:	Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)		
Implementing Partner (GEFExecuting Entity):	Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL) Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral		

¹ In several UNDP GEF M&E documents, the milestone called "Inception Workshop Date" actually reflects a date after which the 'Inception Phase' is considered fully completed, meaning that and the project starts its 'effective implementation' period. It implies that all planning and preparations and key recruitments have been completed. Normally, this is marked by the conduct of an Inception Workshop, but some projects opt for a different way of launching For Tunisia's Coastal Resilience Project, this date was registered as "06-Jul-2016", which was the date when the Project Steering Committee met for the first time and approved the project's comprehensive planning. Evidence was included in the 2017 PIR, and in all PIRs since, as well as in the the Mid-Term Review's Report. At the same time, it should be noted that an 'Inception Workshop' had been held on 15-Sep-2015. However, it was mostly a political launch, given that very little technical content had been discussed.

² On 18 Aug 2021, the project received correspondence from the NCE announcing that the third request for project extension had been approved. The project's timeline in Figure 4 was adjusted accordingly, along with [timeline analysis](#).

Project Title													
Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia													
Cross-sectoral integration and NGOs/CBOs involvement:	Ministries responsible for Environment and Local Affairs, Land Use Planning, Rural Engineering and Water Resource Management, APAL's regional branches, Coastal Observatory, Ministry of Defense, Municipalities of Houmet Essouk, Ajim and Midoun in Djerba, Municipalities of Ghar El Melh and Kalaat El Andalous in the northwest region of the Gulf Tunis, Local NGOs/CSOs.												
Private sector involvement:	National Tourism Operators, Association and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Djerba, Banks, insurances companies, Farmers, fishermen												
Geospatial coordinates of project sites:	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Bizerte:</td> <td>37°16'10.35"N</td> <td>9°51'43.92"E</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ghar El Melh:</td> <td>37°10' 07" N</td> <td>10° 10' 18" E</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kalâat Landlouss:</td> <td>37° 03' 42" N</td> <td>10° 07' 11' 'E</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Djerba:</td> <td>33°48'57" N</td> <td>10° 50' 42" E</td> </tr> </table>	Bizerte:	37°16'10.35"N	9°51'43.92"E	Ghar El Melh:	37°10' 07" N	10° 10' 18" E	Kalâat Landlouss:	37° 03' 42" N	10° 07' 11' 'E	Djerba:	33°48'57" N	10° 50' 42" E
Bizerte:	37°16'10.35"N	9°51'43.92"E											
Ghar El Melh:	37°10' 07" N	10° 10' 18" E											
Kalâat Landlouss:	37° 03' 42" N	10° 07' 11' 'E											
Djerba:	33°48'57" N	10° 50' 42" E											

Box 1. Links to UNDP Strategic Frameworks

Strategic Programs
<p>UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021: Output #2.3.1 <i>Data and risk-informed development policies, plans, systems and financing incorporate integrated and gender-responsive solutions to reduce disaster risks, enable climate change adaptation and mitigation, and prevent risk of conflict³</i></p> <p>UNDAF/CPD Outcome #4: By 2020, regional actors will manage efficiently, optimally, sustainably and inclusively the use of regional resources.</p> <p>CPD output: 4.4. The frameworks and systems for improved disaster risk prevention and management are developed to enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems.</p> <p>CPAP output: output 4.4.1: Participatory governance, which promotes prevention, preparedness and response to disasters and to the effects of climate change, is promoted.</p>

³ See e.g. Integrated Results and Resources Framework of the UNDP (2029-2021): https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Climate%20and%20Disaster%20Resilience/Risk-informed%20development_WEB_final.pdf

Box 2. Project financial information and other key information from Open UNDP and d-Portal

Financials (US\$)		
PDF/PPG	at approval (US\$)	at PDF/PPG completion (US\$)
GEF PDF/PPG grants for project preparation	\$100,000	\$54,690
Co-financing for project preparation	\$118,000	<i>Not informed</i>
Project	at CEO Endorsement (US\$) ⁴	at TE (US\$)
[1] UNDP contribution:	\$100,000	\$114,319
[2] Government:	\$22,730,000	\$11,350,000
[3] Other multi-/bi-laterals:	\$0	\$146,070
[2] Government:	\$22,730,000	\$11,350,000
[3] Other multi-/bi-laterals:	\$0	\$146,070
[4] Private Sector:	\$33,100,000	\$45,100,000
[5] NGOs:	\$18,000,000	\$0
[6] Total co-financing [1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5]:	\$55,930,000	\$56,710,389
[7] Total GEF funding:	\$5,500,000	\$5,262,590
[8] Total Project Funding [6 + 7]	\$79,430,000	\$61,972,979

Notes on sources:

[1] This relates to TRAC contribution to the project (i.e. from UNDP's core funds). Source of information on expenditure: Source: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00079688>.

[2] At CEO Endorsement stage, this included \$30K that had been planned in the context of the Green Economy Initiative and \$22.7M through APAL. According to the project manager, by project end, the budget of \$22M assigned to APAL has not been used / spent.⁵

[3] At the TE stage, the amount disbursed refers to a contribution made the Government of Finland in 2020. Source of information: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00079688>, accessed in July/August 2021.

[4] National Coastal Protection Program, TA grants from KfW through the now defunct Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development / APAL. Reported that EUR 38 M was the amount disbursed for the project that started in 2013, equivalent to \$45.1 M.

[5] This refers to the Saudi Fund for Development through the former Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development / APAL. According to the project manager and his exchanges with APAL, there are indications that the amount from Saudi Fund has not realized.⁶


[7] From SCCF, last updated on Sept 2021 (sources: CDRs from UNDP Atlas). New data on disbursement, published in <https://open.undp.org/projects/00079688> (last accessed on 28 Nov 2021), indicates that the project's cumulative disbursement will reach 100%, or close to it, by year end. It is unlikely the project will send funds back to the GEF.

⁴ Refer to <https://www.thegef.org/project/addressing-climate-change-vulnerabilities-and-risks-vulnerable-coastal-areas-tunisia>.

⁵ According to email dated 29 Sep 2021: "Budget national 22 M\$ non consommé depuis 2015 à ce jour concernant les travaux de réhabilitation et protection".

⁶ According to email dated 13 October 2021: "Suite à des échanges avec l'APAL notamment la chargée du Budget, il s'avère que le budget du prêt relatif au projet Saoudien a été clôturé sans consommation."


Atlas Information through Open UNDP

ID	Output Title	Output Description	SDG ⁷
00089624	Addressing climate change vuln	<i>Le projet viendra appuyer la Tunisie à promouvoir des stratégies, des technologies et des options de financement innovantes pour répondre aux risques des changements climatiques</i>	 <p>"SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts".</p>

Donors	Year	Budget	Expense	Our Focus
United Nations Development Pro	2015	\$74,739	\$74,737	Eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions
Government Of Finland	2016	\$548,142	\$549,064	
Government Of Tunisia	2017	\$946,450	\$945,529	Signature Solutions Enhance national prevention and recovery capacities for resilient societies
Global Environment Fund Truste	2018	\$956,847	\$955,012	
	2019	\$1,197,649	\$1,194,884	
	2020	\$693,008	\$685,252	
	2021	\$1,313,847	\$1,131,059	

Policy Marker

Gender Equality : Significant objective



Source: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00079688> (last accessed on 28 Nov 2021)

Rio Policy Markers
4_7,3_7,2_7,1_7 Aid Targeting the Objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change - Adaptation

D-Portal Reference Identifier
XM-DAC-41114-PROJECT-00079688 https://d-portal.org/q.html?aid=XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00089624

⁷ According to UNDP Country Office, other relevant SDG targets are: TARGET_11.b, TARGET_13.1, TARGET_13.2.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION (BRIEF)

This report has been prepared in the context of the **Terminal Evaluation (TE)** of project “*Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia*” (or the “**Coastal Resilience Project**” in short). **The project objective** is to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options to address the risks of climate change and its impacts on the populations and the main socioeconomic sectors of the most vulnerable coastal zones in Tunisia. The achievement of the above objective is through three expected outcomes:

- *Outcome 1) Institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas is improved;*
- *Outcome 2) Climate change resilience of priority coastal areas enhanced through implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures covering 22 km of coast and 670 hectares of wetland and benefiting 150,000 inhabitants; and*
- *Outcome 3) Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures.*

The project is funded by the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)⁸, managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The project is nationally implemented by Tunisian authorities with the support from United Nations Development Program (UNDP) – more specifically by the Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL)⁹, which is institutionally linked to the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development¹⁰. It is hence a UNDP GEF-SCCF Project. GEF funds provided to the project are in the form of a SCCF grant (\$5.5 million, excluding GEF fees and PPG). The grant is complemented by co-financing from various sources (see Table 1), including from UNDP with core funds that are managed jointly with the SCCF grant through UNDP’s system, Atlas.

Tunisia’s coast is the backbone of its economy, and the confluence of competing resource uses including tourism, fishing and agriculture. Climate change and on-going anthropogenic exploitation of the coastal zone make coastal assets and people increasingly vulnerable. Expected impacts from climate change are especially pronounced in on agricultural activities and water quality. Erosion of sandy beaches, increased salinization of agricultural fields and the inundation of low lying wetland areas have been observed. These effects will be exacerbated by climate change, in particular due to sea level rise, projected to rise up to 1m during this century.

Before the project, future climate change scenarios were hardly considered in institutional policies and frameworks that guided coastal management in Tunisia. *With the project*, this reality changed -- as it will be presented in this report. APAL currently counts on several policy and regulatory frameworks for tackling climate change in the coastal zone. As an institution, APAL has been reinforced by the project through a suite of activities. *Also before the project*, coastal protection practices were generally reactive with a bias towards hard engineering works. This is because institutional knowledge on holistic, integrated climate change risk management was limited. In addition, the costs and benefits of coastal adaptation were poorly assessed and overlooked in most policy and investment decisions. Investments in coastal protection would normally not consider climate risks and adaptation needs.

In response to climatic challenges and identified barriers, the project proposed **the introduction of a risk-based approach to climate change adaptation** by enabling flexible adaptation pathways to be conceived. These pathways are expected to build resilience to climate change over time and to provide maximum co-benefits. As tourism is a dominant source of revenue in Tunisia, the project made efforts to develop a set of economic instruments that would both signal existing risks—including climate risks—and drive future hotel and private residence developments away from vulnerable areas. With such an approach, local development plans became more risk-based and climate change was more effectively mainstreamed into development practices. The project was also slated to design and implement initial coastal adaptation measures on the ground in the northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis and the Island of Djerba.

⁸ The SCCF has been designed to finance activities, programs and measures related to climate change adaptation and technology transfer to all eligible developing countries.

⁹ In French: *Agence de Protection et Aménagement du Littoral* (http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/index.html).

¹⁰ Previously, APAL was linked to the Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development.

EVALUATION RATINGS TABLE

Table 1. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard)

Criteria rated	Ratings	Ref. to Exec. Sum. paras
1. Monitoring and Evaluation		
M&E design at entry	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	29
M&E Plan Implementation	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	31
Overall quality of M&E	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	28
2. Implementing Agency (IA) Implementation & Executing Agency (EA) Execution		
Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)	24
Quality of Implementing Partner Execution	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	26
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	23
3. Assessment of Outcomes		
Relevance	Satisfactory (S)	12
Effectiveness	Satisfactory (S)	13
Efficiency	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	14
Overall Project Outcome Rating	Satisfactory (S)	2 through 5
4. Sustainability		
Financial sustainability	Moderately Unlikely (MU)	19, 20
Socio-political sustainability	Moderately Unlikely (MU)	19
Institutional framework and governance sustainability	Moderately Unlikely (MU)	19
Environmental sustainability	Moderately Likely (ML)	21
Overall Likelihood of Sustainability	Moderately Unlikely (MU)	18

JUSTIFICATION FOR MAIN RATINGS

- The purpose of the Terminal Evaluation (TE) and its methodology are informed by official guidance from both UNDP and the GEF on evaluation processes** – more specifically a recent publication of 2020 titled “*Guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects*”.¹¹ According to this guidance, and to the applicable TOR for the assignment¹², the following are the broad purposes of the evaluation: (i) to promote accountability and transparency; (ii) to help UNDP and partners synthesize lessons for improving the selection, design and implementation of initiatives; and (iii) synthesize lessons that can help to improve the selection, design and implementation of future UNDP-supported GEF-financed initiatives; and to improve the sustainability of benefits and aid in overall enhancement of UNDP programming. Additionally, and also in line with the UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs, the exercise equally sought: (iv) to assess and document project results, and the contribution of these results towards achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefits; and to (v) gauge project convergence towards other priorities within UNDP country programs, including *inter alia* the strengthening of resilience to climate change, disaster risk reduction and other cross-cutting issues such gender equality, empowering women, and poverty alleviation as applicable. In terms of **methodology**, the TE has been an evidence-based and consultative exercise, which resulted in documented findings, lessons and recommendations.¹³ The key evaluation criteria are those included in Table 1¹⁴, and for which a set of **evaluation questions** had been formulated (included in Annex V). The guided the consultation with stakeholders and the emphasis of the

¹¹ Referred to in this report as referred to in this report as the “UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs”. See: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/documents/GEF/TE_GuidanceforUNDP-supportedGEF-financedProjects.pdf.

¹² Included in this report in [Annex I](#).

¹³ For a summary of findings, refer to [Project Results Table](#). For lessons and recommendations, refer to Table 2.

¹⁴ As required by the TOR.

analysis. The methodology adopted also had a gender lens, which assessed the project’s impact on gender— including with respect to final beneficiaries. This was assessed by looking at the level of gender mainstreaming in design and implementation. For the main critical aspects of design and implementation, the TE proposed areas for improvement for future projects.

2. **The Overall Project Outcome** rating is **Satisfactory (S)** – with reference to **Criteria 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)** in Table 1. The S rating reflects an improvement vis-à-vis the rating provided by the MTR in 2019. The TE recognizes that there have been tangible improvements in project performance and measurable advances since the MTR in several aspects of the project’s progress towards results. Evidence on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency had been considered in building up the overall outcome rating for this TE. Delivery of results weighed the most. Much of the evidence underpinning the S rating was drawn from the Project Implementation Reports (PIRs) for 2020 and 2021, especially when compared with status in 2019, the year when the MTR was held.
3. To underpin overall project outcome rating, the TE highlights the achievement of an important target that constitutes an objective indicator: by project end, APAL managed to mobilize approx. \$10.32 M in coastal adaptation, according to progressive reporting through the PIR.¹⁵ In the draft 2021 PIR, the project reported 103% progress towards the target for this indicator. The project is slated to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options. Although the finance mobilized cannot be considered ‘innovative’, the achievement of this target is commendable in light of current challenges to investment mobilization faced by Tunisia these days.
4. Important project achievements in terms of planning and regulatory frameworks for adaptation spearheaded by the project are also commendable. We highlight the revision of the Public Maritime Domain (DPM), which now considers climatic hazards, and progress towards the ratification of Barcelona Convention on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Mediterranean, which also considers climate change.
5. There have been a few issues during project’s lifetime that end up being a shortcomings vis-à-vis the project’s performance and the successful production of results. One of them has been the approach to planning, which was chronically unrealistic¹⁶, certain M&E practices, which were not geared towards correctly informing against project indicators, and also issues with oversight. Evidence on the support provided by the implementing partner and UNDP is mixed. During the project’s inception, the very long delays in kick starting the project seem to have come from the interplay between UNDP and the national counterparts, but also from the overall post-Arab Spring context, which resulted in high turnover at the high echelons of government. Some of these problems were overcome and the project started delivering interesting results from its third year on. The TE focuses on the project’s entire lifetime and cannot ignore some of the problems that negatively affected the Coastal Resilience Project. Yet, **the project was mostly effective – and it delivered results**. There were quite a few delays – and very long delays in getting the project off the ground in its early days. This kind of delay must be avoided in future projects through more attention to critical processes during the inception phase. As a result of delays, the project needed more time added to its duration for compensating the time lost. However, by project end, most indicator targets were met, and the cumulative financial delivery was high. Even if the project may have to return funds to the GEF by December 2021, because of the definitive operational closure, this delivery will still be high (likely 98% of the SCCF funds).
6. No mission to the field was possible in connection with the TE exercise, due to covid-risk. Hence, some of the physical evidence with respect to results from the field evidence could not have been cross-verified, except indirectly, through remote stakeholder interviews (e.g. quality of ecosystem restoration actions

¹⁵ The amount of \$10.32 does not include the Coastal Resilience Project (of course). The Objective Indicator in question does indeed mention ‘disbursement of at least 10 m USD is accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation’, while the project reported on funds mobilization from various sources, including public finance, which was on focus in the indicator measurement. Yet, the progress is commendable.

¹⁶ See e.g. Figure 1 further down on the gap between amounts originally planned in AWP’s and amounts delivered by year end (2015-2020). On the quality of M&E, see TIMELINE, Table 4 with an analysis of the ‘SMART’ness’ of indicators in the Project Results Framework (following up on the MTR analysis) and others.

cannot be verified remotely). Besides the collection of Project Implementation Reports (PIRs), other evidence of outcome achievement was gathered from the content of various reports, including technical studies funded by the project, news articles, postings in social media and other sources, validated through stakeholder interviews.

7. The Satisfactory (S) rating for overall project outcome implies that the project performed well across most fronts (outputs and outcomes), with a few minor shortcomings. The project has a good number of tangible adaptation results to show, and performance had gradually improved on several fronts since the MTR, which had rated overall project outcome as Marginally Satisfactory (MS). A positive trend for delivery of results was indeed maintained in 2020 and 2021, in spite of challenges linked to the Covid-19 pandemic and increased political risk. This positive trend is also reflected in the gradual improvements in PIR ratings for progress towards project objective, as assessed by multiple stakeholders.
8. At the same time, and as shown by other TE ratings in Table 1, there are important **risks to the project's sustainability (Criterion 4)**. There are **shortcomings in the project's quality of M&E implementation (under Criterion 1)**. There are also **weaknesses in UNDP's oversight (under Criterion 2)**. These other aspects eventually **impacted the project's general achievement of results (under Criterion 3)**. The evidence that underpins the assessment of these aspects is provided in the report and summarized herein.
9. In the future, **more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments**. This is a core **RECOMMENDATION** from this TE, including because some of the shortcomings observed seem to affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Evidence shows e.g. that the need for adjusting project milestones is quite common across the UNDP GEF portfolio.¹⁷ The TE's view is that it is important to address the cause behind these requests for adjustments, rather than imposing rules for avoiding them. The main cause are the weaknesses in planning and scoping, which result a large gap between 'expectations' (the plans, the ambitions, the scoping of capacity) and the reality of implementation (actual delivery, actual capacity).
10. In particular, the issue of **project duration** was object of much discussion during the TE exercise, involving the project, UNDP CO and UNDP's Nature, Climate and Energy Team (NCE)¹⁸. In the case of the Coastal Resilience Project in Tunisia, there were three requests for milestone adjustments / project extensions during the project's lifetime, the last one was in mid-2021 and it was initially denied by the NCE Team. On this, one of the TE's important **FINDINGS** is that **it is quite important to pay attention to what is behind requests for project duration extension**: namely various aspects of project implementation and management, including limitations to approaches, standards and practices that apply to key processes. Those include starting-up a project, conducting planning and monitoring it. The TE noted that the approach to project inception, annual workplanning, and scoping of activities were at times unrealistic, to the extent that overly ambitious targets were set. Risk management was generally adequate but did not capture the complex reasons behind project delays. All of these elements affected the project and made it require more time to achieve its goals, than what had been originally planned. It is though true that some of these project management practices are undergoing change within UNDP. But the practices that had previously prevailed had negatively affected the quality of planning and scoping (both the strategic, and the cyclical planning and scoping processes). These have, in turn, also reflected on the efficiency and effectiveness of project execution and implementation. Project oversight functions would serve to pinpoint and address these weaknesses, but there were also limitations to the oversight that had been provided during critical periods (inception in particular). Ultimately, an inadequate approach to planning and scoping, to the use of time and resources, will negatively affect implementation, and the project's ability to generate results. In spite of the mentioned challenges, Tunisia's Coastal Resilience Project did deliver results, but they took a long time to realize and are still being consolidated.

¹⁷ A recent audit of UNDP GEF projects analysed 765 ongoing projects and concluded that 35% percent of project have/had extended project durations. Of these (i.e. 271 projects), almost half of them obtained duration extensions between 12 and 18 months, while a smaller number of them (30 project) were extended for more than 18 months. See UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management>, accessed on 13/08/21.

¹⁸ Formerly, the UNDP-GEF Unit, now rebranded NCE Team.

11. Based on recent discussions on project oversight with NCE’s Regional Technical Advisor (RTA), there are signs of change at various levels. It starts with the third tier of NCE’s oversight (i.e. HQ), from where UNDP is introducing more rigorous standard operating procedures (SOPs), and promoting the training of CO staff and project managers. This is positive. Yet, it will take a while before such measures will be reflected in the prevalent style of project design and management across the UNDP GEF portfolio.
12. The project is rated as **Satisfactory (S)** in terms of **Relevance**. When it was conceived, it was considered very much needed, in terms of helping Tunisia gradually address adaptation priorities and needs. Today, it remains relevant. The S rating assumes that there are different types of climatic hazards that will impact different sectors and geographic regions in different ways. Remaining relevant implies therefore that a large number of people benefit from the interventions, preferably the most vulnerable and including women more specifically. It also implies that the interventions should target vulnerable economic assets and sectors. This is the case for Coastal Resilience Project. The TE’s interpretation of relevance also assumes that addressing adaptation needs in Tunisia’s coastal zone will require several sequential, parallel and/or combined interventions that will gradually incorporate climate change into policies, practices and investments. Concepts such as integrated coastal zone management, resilience and adaptation to climate change were not part of the usual vocabulary in APAL before the project. Now it is. Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience Project, which effectively started its implementation in 2016 – and after a long period of project mobilization¹⁹ -- functioned as a decisive ‘kick-start intervention’ towards addressing highly central adaptation needs within the national context. “The coastal zone is the backbone of Tunisia’s economy”. This is the first phrase in the project document, which also stresses relevance. Before the project, there were very few interventions geared towards adaptation in APAL. Today, APAL is implementing other Coastal Resilience Projects, equally large.²⁰ Tunisia managed to mobilize several adaptation projects, funded e.g. by the EU, Germany, Canada and others, and which focus on different adaptation sectors (water, agriculture, etc.).²¹ The relevance of the Coastal Resilience Project is further enhanced by the fact that it was **aimed at changing approaches to climate-induced problems**: from a reactive approach, with a bias towards hard engineering works, to a more flexible, holistic one (and hopefully also more gender-sensitive). The new approach is based on sound policies, strengthened institutions and local participation. Therefore, the project helped build a very important baseline of climate change adaptation for the country – even though ‘the gender aspect’ was not an important concern at project design stage. It became one during implementation, albeit with a rather incomplete approach to gender mainstreaming.
13. In terms of **Effectiveness**, performance is **Satisfactory (S)**. It should be stressed that the project achieved important results in several areas, especially with respect to: (i) the implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures on the ground, which greatly accelerated since the MTR; and (ii) improvements to the institutional capacity to plan for, and respond to, increasing climate change risks in coastal areas. These two aspects are respectively aligned with the subject matter of **Components 2 and 1** of the project. Aspects involving finance for adaptation and the engagement of the private sector, including initiatives that prime public-private collaboration, also made advances. Yet, those aspects had comparatively more shortcomings. Innovative and sustainable economic instruments for adaptation are namely the subject matter of **Component 3** of the project and had fewer effective results to show. The overall ratings of results per Outcome and the analysis of achievements are presented in more details in Table 5. It was S for Components/Outcomes 1 and 2 and MS for Component/Outcome 3.
14. **Efficiency** is an aspect where performance left to be desired for most of the project duration. The final rating ends up being **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**, in order to recognize the project team’s perseverance against a number of odds and pressures that could otherwise have resulted in greater inefficiencies and lower delivery. The Efficiency aspect focuses on *how* ‘resources’ and ‘inputs’ (i.e. funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results. A critical element for most of the project’s duration has been the **overly ambitious**

¹⁹ With reference to the Inception Workshop, which took place after a long period of ‘project mobilization’, considering that CEO Endorsement Request had been achieved in 2014.

²⁰ Refer e.g. to APAL’s website.

²¹ See e.g. a simple search to D-Portal filtering for Tunisia as beneficiary and tagging the Rio-marker for adaptation as the main objective: https://d-portal.org/ctrack.html?country_code=TN&policy_code=2_7#view=main, as of 13/08/21, yielding at least 20 projects since 2016, 9 of which are currently active.

planning left to be desired, especially when compared with effective execution. In other words, a more pondered and realistic approach to planning could have been beneficial to the implementation of the project. Planning is closely related to scoping and it would be meaningless without adequate risk management. Evidence from financial analysis showed that, since the project’s first Annual Workplan (AWP), which had been prepared in early 2015, and up until 2020, AWP’s have been overly optimistic with respect to how fast financial resources could be put to use through effective implementation of activities. The TE noted how unspent budgets would be chronically “re-phased” (or transferred) to subsequent years through end-of-year budget revisions. While this practice helps show adequate delivery by year end, it is a symptom of overly ambitious. planning and scoping.

15. The practice of rephasing funds applies primarily to GEF/SCCF funds. In turn, UNDP’s TRAC funds²² can hardly be re-phased. Differently from SCCF funds, which is a fixed grant, TRAC resources can be regarded as a ‘competitive grant’ to be shared annually among UNDP projects at the CO’s level -- and even among different UNDP COs. Programmed TRAC funds that are unspent by year end are lost to the project.
16. Procurement of goods and services has been widely used by the project for implementing planned activities (e.g. conducting studies through consultancies and purchasing equipment).²³ Many of the piecemeal processes involved in procurement depend on a number of operational procedures that are outside the control of the project team. The role of the UNDP CO in conducting these processes was central, to the point that the project can be considered ‘operationally embedded’ within UNDP, even though it is a NIM project in a middle-income country. In practice, the modality applied was ‘assisted NIM’, at times deemed necessary by UNDP (an/or government), but at the expense of national ownership of the project.
17. At the same time, evidence of **unrealistic planning and scoping** (as concluded from financial analysis) indicates that project team’s ability to ‘push forward’ several complex procurement processes at once was probably underestimated. This had been pointed out by the MTR and a recommendation on strengthening the team had been made by the MTR – a recommendation that the project indicated to have followed. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed by the TE pointed out to “bureaucracy” as the reason why different operational processes faced delays and impacted delivery.
18. Considering the **Sustainability Criteria (#4)**, the project’s *Overall Likelihood of Sustainability* was rated as **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**. Three out of four sustainability elements requiring ratings in Table 1 had a similar rating: Financial, Socio-Political, and Institutional Framework & Governance. Two recent events in 2021 and put sustainability at risk. The *first* event relates to the initial refusal of UNDP GEF to grant an additional extension of the project’s duration until end of 2021. The *second* one refers to ‘the July 2021 political event’²⁴ and the resulting political and institutional instability triggered by it.
19. The two events mentioned in the paragraph above happened during the course of the TE assignment and directly contributed to **downgrading the initial intention of Sustainability ratings** for *Financial, Socio-political, Institutional framework and governance, and Sustainability of Financial resources*: from Moderately Likely (ML) to **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**²⁵. These events cast a number of hard-earned project results into a situation of political, institutional and operational uncertainty, and by consequence, also financial uncertainty -- affecting e.g. investment prospects. The situation is aggravated by extant risk factors, such as the significant negative impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on Tunisia’s economy and its workforce, in particular, the tourism industry. Risks to the project’s sustainability are directly attributable to political, economic and financial uncertainties, coupled with institutional instability.

²² Co-financing from TRAC was initially foreseen at \$100K. See [co-financing table](#).

²³ Procurement processes published in the “Open UNDP” website sum approximately \$3.7M, corresponding to at least 85% of expenditure (likely more).

²⁴ Referred to by the project manager as “*Suspension de toutes les compétences de l’Assemblée des représentants du Peuple par décret présidentiel et limogeage du Chef du gouvernement.*” – from this point on referred to in the report as simply the “the July 2021 political events”.

²⁵ Two small caveats: The MTR classified ‘Financial risks’ as ‘Moderately Likely (ML)’, while the TE is asked to assess the sustainability of ‘Financial resources’, implying opposing measures of the same aspects. Technically, the MTR and TE ratings concerning financial risk and financial resources sustainability are the same. The MTR also looked at ‘Socioeconomic Risks’ and classified it as Likely (L). This is different from ‘Socio-political sustainability’, which the TE is called upon to assess.

20. The **Moderately Unlikely (MU) rating for Financial Sustainability** is also linked to the difficulty that the project is facing in funding its 2021 workplan in full, in light of a 'sooner-than-expected' project closure. In June, the project reported to the evaluator that it could face major difficulties in concluding a number of strategic activities aimed at the mobilization of finance for adaptation and which depended on studies that were in the 2021 procurement's pipeline. The project team believed that those difficulties could have been remediated, if they could delay the project's operational closure till, say, the end of 2021. Yet, some segments of UNDP's Nature, Climate and Energy Team (NCE), had a different view on the project's needs for duration extension, and the request for a no-cost extension, as filed in July 2021, was initially denied. Later the decision was reversed. On 18 Aug 2021, the project received correspondence from UNDP's NCE Team announcing that the request for project extension had been approved.
21. On a positive note, and concerning the **Environmental Sustainability** aspect, the rating did indeed improve since the MTR, through the attribution of a **Moderately Likely (ML)** rating by the TE. This rating considers that the project had effectively addressed issues pointed out by the MTR. Shortcomings had specifically related to: (i) the need to demonstrate the environmental benefits of the various interventions; (ii) the need to demonstrate how the SCCF project is helping support the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), beyond being a 'pilot' intervention; and (iii) the need to produce more strategic results, i.e. to focus less on the production of 'studies', and prime 'advocacy' interventions a little more.
22. Most of the adaptation measures implemented on the ground, whether by the project or by service providers (e.g. NGOs, CSOs and local companies) have a relatively good chance of environmental sustainability, because they applied well-studied methods for fighting beach erosion, promoting water conservation and practicing climate adaptive agriculture. There are risks, but they are low. In turn, soft adaptation measures linked to land use planning and infrastructure development patterns are, to a large extent, no-regret measures – and by default likely sustainable – but they will take time to show results. The project does not have a clear Sustainability Plan or Exit Strategy (although UNDP has follow-up plans in the form of new programs, which might not be the same) and continuation of benefits may be in jeopardy unless concrete follow-up strategies and replication are rectified. Quick studies targeted at the tail end of the project will not secure sustainability. Some of the important studies were completed too late in the project's lifetime to have any impact on expected results or on the host institution's performance.
23. The assessment of project's **Overall quality of Implementation / Execution** is considered **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**. This includes the performance of the '*Implementing Agency*' (IA), i.e. UNDP as the "GEF Agency", and the performance of the '*Executing Agency*' (EA), i.e. APAL.
24. **Quality of UNDP Implementation** was rated as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**. There are indeed positive elements in the support provided by UNDP, but also important shortcomings. The TE must look at the quality of UNDP implementation throughout the duration of the project. On the positive side, we highlight e.g. the fact that the UNDP Country Office counts on a M&E Specialist that dedicates time to assisting the project with M&E compliance. There is good alignment with UNDP's strategic priorities, such as UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021), in addition to UNDAF and CPD Outcomes, and other frameworks such as the SDGs (see e.g. the [Project Summary Table](#)). As for the shortcomings, the most important one relates to quality and timeliness of UNDP's support to the Implementing Partner (APAL), including the Project Team, during the project's early mobilization period. We note a relatively long time lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the PRODOC Signature Date (5 months), followed by a gap of 18 months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Report date. This is a visible shortcoming (see [Project Summary Table](#)). Apparently, much of the delays during the project's mobilization period related to the recruitment of the project team, managed by UNDP, but depending on the endorsement of APAL's director. During that period, there were several changes in directorship at APAL, affecting agency's decision-making concerning the project.
25. We also highlight the role of "the regional level" – i.e., the segment of the NCE Team that directly interacts with the CO and project team and provides advisory and project development services.. On the one hand, the project team and the CO received indeed a good level of attention from the RTA. For example, the quality of the feedback received through the PIRs counts in favor of the usefulness of the regional oversight and support structures. The TE noted that the RTA generally understands the stakes for the project and provides useful feedback (e.g. through the PIR), in spite of not mastering French. On the other hand, at least

some segments of the NCE Team appeared not to be very flexible towards the project’s needs. A critical point concerning UNDP NCE Team’s limited flexibility has been the recent request from the project to extend its duration on account of the pervasive impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on implementation. When the request for no-cost extension was filed by the project in June/July 2021, and it showed to be the third one, the initial reaction from NCE’s HQ was to turn it down “because it is the third request”, according to sources. Even though the decision by the NCE Team was later reverted, and a conditional duration the extension was eventually approved, it caused disturbance in the project’s operational routine for a good two months in 2021.


26. The **Quality of Execution**, i.e. relating to APAL’s role as the Implementing Partner in the country for the GEF SCCF grant (using UNDP’s terminology), it is considered **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**. There are positive elements and a few shortcomings. Today, there is a good level of national ownership towards the project from the part of APAL and other national institutions, even though this was not always so. APAL experienced a high level of turnover in its higher echelons (as confirmed by the MTR and by stakeholder interviews during the TE²⁶). There have also been at least two ministerial reforms affecting the relative functions and attributions of line ministries to which APAL is linked.²⁷ At the same time, APAL appointed a technical person to function as Project Director since the beginning, ensuring institutional memory and continuity of processes, in particular at the level of the Project Board. The constancy and dedication shown by APAL’s Project Director has helped in different ways, including in the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders in central government institutions and at the local level, even though the engagement of private sector stakeholders appeared limited.
27. Based on stakeholder interviews, it became clear that the project team works well together, and mostly in a diligent and coherent way to fulfil their role in implementing the project. It may be said that the project is ‘technically embedded’ within APAL (for all coastal zone matters) and ‘operationally’ embedded within UNDP (in light of the assisted NIM arrangement in place). The team makes use of standard methodologies recommended by UNDP for planning, prioritizing and budgeting, involving APAL through the Project Board and other day-to-day interactions. There is room for improvements in these, but the chances of impact are still tangible. The project seems to work well with its stakeholders, according to the opinion of members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and some beneficiaries interviewed by the TE. The project maintains a good network of contractors (including consultants and specialized companies), as well as with local NGO/CSO partners showing strong national ownership in the choice of partners. The good level of stakeholder engagement and the appreciation of efforts from the project team has been almost unanimously expressed by local government partners and NGOs/CSOs active in Ghar El Melh, Kalaât El Andalous communes, as well as in Djerba (including three communes).
28. Concerning **Criterion 1** on the project’s **Overall Quality of M&E**, the rating is **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**, with several aspects pondered.
29. Most project indicators (with exceptions) are SMART and well-chosen vis-à-vis outcomes and the objective. Yet, the PRODOC lacked a specific and separate monitoring or evaluation plan. The MTR pointed out that there was no evidence that such a plan has been prepared since start of project implementation and made a recommendation it. This made it difficult for the project to monitor progress in physical adaptation measures and adaptation finance, as well as the gender aspect. The formulation of Outcome 2 mentions e.g. “150,000 inhabitants” as beneficiaries. There is no narrative that explains how the figure was calculated. The number is not broken down by gender or site. There was also no attempt to determine the actual number of beneficiaries, except in the end-of-project Tracking Tool, but with caveats (see [Annexure](#) with the Tracking Tool duly reviewed). Overall, the lack of a systematic M&E plan made it difficult for the project to adequately complete the Tracking Tool, although this is now being addressed with the help of the TE consultant. The rating for **M&E design at entry** ended up being **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

²⁶ According to the project manager, up to six directors have presided APAL during the project’s lifetime.

²⁷ The attributions of ministries respectively responsible for themes such as environment, ‘local affairs’, sustainable development, infrastructure, water, agriculture, development, investment, etc. have changed at least a couple of times during the project’s lifetime.

30. The project team reports relatively well against indicators, with few shortcomings when it comes to e.g. providing details that underpin certain project achievements. Useful background calculations are missing in the PIRs – e.g. it is not clear how some of the percentages and financial figures in the reporting against targets for key indicator are calculated. Some of the descriptions in the reporting are also off mark, vis-à-vis the subject matter of certain indicators. Otherwise, the reporting is relatively rich in details.
31. Other evidence showed that the lack of a specific M&E plan must have been overcome by the project in different ways. It was noted that the project had developed other hands-on tools for ensuring an adequate M&E system or framework. There are though important shortcomings relating to an overly ambitious patterns of planning. This became obvious in the gap between planned and executed, which is significant until 2020 and was only closed in 2021, when the project is reaching its end (see Figure 1 and related analysis in the main report). There are visible shortcomings in terms of gender mainstreaming. In turn, the project team has been instinctively applying principles of adaptive management in the project’s day-to-day tasks. Overtime, there were tangible improvements in these practices, as implementation moved forward. For example, the project team and the PSC have been responsive to an important MTR recommendation concerning project staffing needs. Finally, management of risk is adequate and systematic, starting with risk considerations and safeguards in AWP, and followed through in the project’s thorough reporting. Yet, we noted some gaps relating the assessment of stakeholder capacity for implementation. The **M&E Plan Implementation** was therefore rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

Figure 1. Gap between amounts originally planned in AWP and amounts delivered by year end (2015-2021)



SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS

Timeline Analysis: We refer to Figure 4. Project Timeline: from project idea in 2012 to project final financial closure in end 2022. **Effective project implementation** – i.e. when all preparations are over and the project team is on-board to start implementing activities – will have lasted 5.7 years, when the project reaches operational closure. More specifically for Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience Project, the ‘effective implementation period’ started counting in August 2016, marked by the standard UNDP-GEF milestone titled “Inception Workshop Date”. The ‘effective implementation period’ is expected to last until the currently planned date for operational closure, which is end-December 2021 (as per the current decision on accepting the project’s third request for extension). The mentioned milestone (“Inception Workshop Date”) serves to mark the end of the Inception Phase, that is, when all planning and preparations actions, and when key recruitments have been completed. This would normally coincide with the conduct of the full-project’s inception workshop, although for the Coastal Resilience project, it coincided with the first meeting of the Project Steering Committee (July 2016). The TE gathered that another event tagged as “Inception Workshop” had happened in the previous year (more precisely in September

2014), but that event had more of a ‘quick project launch’ character²⁸. At that point in time—the TE gathered—some of the recruitments of key project team members were not yet in place, and substantive project planning processes had not yet started. Furthermore, in several key documents (e.g. in the MTRs and in all PIRs since 2017), the official milestone “Inception Workshop Date” that seems to be registered in UNDP GEF’s database is 06-July-2015.

The TE noted that project upstart (or the ‘project mobilization phase’ – a term used by the MTR) was severely delayed. It lasted 23 months from the GEF’s CEO Endorsement till the end of the Inception Phase. Of these, we count 18 months, from PRODOC signature until the official milestone “Inception Workshop Date”. This means that the nominal period of implementation was 7 years. From project idea stage to the likely date of financial closure, we count some 10 years. Considering the time elapsed ‘from cradle to grave’, this is a rather long duration, even for a GEF project – a period that was marked by several delays and the approval of three requests for project milestone extension. However, this is totally uncommon in the UNDP-GEF portfolio.

The third and final request for duration extension was posed in May 2021 and decision in favor of the extension was reached in August 2021, amidst one the worse moments of the covid-19 pandemic in Tunisia, and also shortly after a sudden political event that promises to severely impact the country’s prospects for democracy: the July 2021 political events.

Concerning project results (summarized in a table below with conclusions and ratings that are optional and complement those from Table 1), after 7 years of nominal project implementation (i.e. from project PRODOC signature till now), and of which at least 5.7 years can be considered ‘effective implementation’ (from the end of the inception phase until project closure), the justification for the main TE findings can be thus summarized:

CRITERION	CONCLUSION	RATING
Project Design and Formulation		
Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)	Intervention logic is coherent, but the time required to achieve results (general project scoping) has been underestimated.	Satisfactory (S)
Assumptions and Risks	Logical and robust, and helped to shape project activities and planned outputs, especially for certain types of risks that are very much outside the project’s control, although not all relevant extant risk types. E.g. the covid-19 pandemic and the July 2021 political events are extant events that could hardly be foreseen). An important gap in the risks and risk management strategy relates to operational risks. Several project activities depend on procurement of goods and services. The related delays have not been adequately foreseen in the risk management frameworks.	Satisfactory (S)
Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design	Collaboration with other projects and interventions were well articulated in the PRODOC, but not always followed up upon in the reporting, meaning that the directives in the PRODOC for incorporating lessons were somewhat unrealistic. Simple, “common sense lessons” at portfolio level, such as getting the project documents translated into French or Arabic, were not followed up upon. Lessons on a more flexible approach to the issue of project duration do not seem to have been learned by UNDP.	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)
Planned stakeholder participation	A logical and complete stakeholder engagement plan presented in the PRODOC (especially through PRODOC Annex 6: Stakeholder Involvement Plan), which lists all key stakeholders according to meaningful categories, consultation instances and planned engagement during implementation. Yet, from a gender mainstreaming perspective, there are many shortcomings in the strategy.	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)
Replication approach	The PRODOC foresaw that the coastal adaptation measures had been “developed to be easily scaled-up and modified to serve other coastal communities vulnerable to climate change”. In fact, several of the soft adaptation measures – but not all – can be considered replicable. Measures that prime a flexible, holistic and gender-sensitive approach to adaptation, based on sound policies, strengthened institutions and local participation can be replicated in Tunisia and elsewhere. General measures on water conservation are also easily replicable, but EBA measures are	Satisfactory (S)

²⁸ Based on stakeholder interview and analysis of the substantive content in the Inception Report dated 2014.

CRITERION	CONCLUSION	RATING
	highly contextual and would require significant monitoring to even understand the replication conditions. This was considered in project design. In turn, it can be said that the term ‘gender-sensitive approach’ was added to the methodologies during implementation. The ‘the gender aspect’ was not an important concern at project design stage. It became one during implementation, albeit with a rather incomplete approach to gender mainstreaming.	
UNDP comparative advantage	Aligned in aspects of capacity building and support for SDG-based planning, as well as experience in designing and implementing climate change adaptation and sustainable resource management projects. UNDP has a Country Office presence in Tunisia and works closely with the government on projects in various GEF focal areas, especially biodiversity, climate change and multi-focal area projects.	Satisfactory (S)
Management arrangements	The management arrangements foresee that the government agency with a mandate for managing the coastal zone (APAL) will function as the implementing partner for the project, with oversight and some project implementation services provided by the UNDP Country Office – noting that the project became Full Support to NIM – 2014 Note to file to explain why Tunisia is implementing under DIM Modalities. Some operational details of project management arrangements had not been sufficiently detailed in the PRODOC, while others were unrealistic (e.g. inputs from international team members). The MTR had picked up on those. By the TE, and in hindsight, the arrangements are considered sufficient with respect to the provisions for the Project Steering Committee (PSC), considering the prevalent institutional volatility in Tunisia at the outset of the project, which was derived, to a great extent, from the country’s political instability legacy. Other aspects left to be desired. No evidence of detailed capacity assessment of partners of UNDP CO were mentioned for underpinning the proposed management arrangements.	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)
Project Implementation		
Adaptive management	More attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project’s methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. The misalignment between project duration and expectations is a token of it. There were major delays in the kick-starting the project. The MTR had concluded that a major emphasis of the project’s budgets seemed misaligned with the wordings of the project’s objective, which points out to “innovative adaptation strategies, technologies and financing options”. At the same time, a significant portion of the project’s budget would be dedicated to pilot activities on the ground, as observed by the MTR.	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)
Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)	Project has conducted extensive consultation with key stakeholders during project development phase. Not all of the partnerships proposed were followed through (e.g. the Saudi Fund), but new ones leveraged (e.g. with the government of Finland). The Project Steering Committee (PSC) is an active forum for engaging with relevant stakeholders. The project’s outreach to the public through dissemination, communication and publishing / posting in the media is a strength.	Satisfactory (S)
Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management	The quarterly, annual report from the project team to the Project Steering Committee, as well as the Project Implementation Reports were used as the main instruments to evaluate project progress, identify issues encountered during project implementation to determine adaptive management measures required. As a result of the feedback from the M&E activities, adaptive measures were undertaken during project implementation. The mechanism missed the important function of feeding back on the quality of planning, which continued to be unrealistic throughout the project’s lifetime.	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)
Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation	PRODOC contained a standard “Monitoring and Evaluation Work Plan and Budget, simple, in table format. This M&E Workplan and Budget was expected to be executed in accordance with established UNDP and GEF policies and procedures. PRODOC lacked a specific a separate monitoring or evaluation plan, which should otherwise have been included as an Annex to it. During project implementation, both UNDP (GEF Agency), and APAL (Implementing Partner), as well as the Project Board / PSC were relatively effective in monitoring and evaluation of activities and budget allocations with a few shortfalls. The formulation of Outcome 2 mentions “150,000 inhabitants” as beneficiaries. There is no narrative that explains how the figure was calculated. The number is not broken down by gender.	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

CRITERION	CONCLUSION	RATING
	The project team reports relatively well against indicators, with few shortcomings when it comes to providing details that underpin certain project achievements – e.g. vis-à-vis the numeric aspects of these indicators in the PIRs. measuring progress on the ground, on both soft and hard physical adaptation measures, indicator achievement should be illustrated by maps and aerial pictures that would demonstrate the progress and document it – ensuring better chances of sustainability of physical achievements on the ground. This stresses the importance of a consistent and systematically updated M&E System. There were e.g. issues with the completion of the Tracking Tool during the TE’s assignment - later sorted to satisfaction.	
UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution (*) coordination, and operational issues	There are indeed positive elements in the support provided by UNDP, as the GEF Agency (or IA), and APAL, as the Implementing Partner (IP). There are also important shortcomings in the quality management of actions to ensure achievement of project outcomes and objectives in a timely manner. The assessment differs for UNDP and APAL but tended in general towards a MS-rating. Delays during the project mobilization and inception complicated implementation in a decisive way that could hardly be compensated. Both UNDP and APAL had their share of responsibility. Another critical point concerns UNDP’s limited responsiveness to the recent request from the project to extend its duration on account of the pervasive impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on implementation.	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)
Project Results		
Overall results (Attainment of Objective and Outcomes)	Project has tangible success in attainment of Objectives and Outcomes, with only minimal shortfalls in some Outcomes.	Satisfactory (S)
Relevance	The project design and objectives were relevant to Tunisia’s national context, advancements in the adaptation agenda and other development priorities.	Satisfactory (S)
Effectiveness and Efficiency	Most project outcomes under project themes have been successfully achieved, however there were shortfalls in completion of some project outputs, especially for outputs relating to the development of financing instruments.	Satisfactory (S) and Moderately Satisfactory (MS), respectively
Country ownership	The project design and objectives were relevant to the national priorities and needs. Various government institutions worked in partnership and collaboration in project implementation.	Satisfactory (S)
Sustainability	There are important risks to the project’s sustainability. Two events have been critical: The first event relates to the refusal of UNDP GEF to grant an additional extension of the project’s duration until end of 2021. Even though the decision was later reversed, it impacted the project by putting pressure on it at the tail, and by end limiting the full realization of the 2021 workplan. This happened at a critical moment for the project and for Tunisia. The second event refers to the July 2021 political events and the resulting political and institutional instability, bringing uncertainty. Environmental sustainability may have better chances of performance, but the TE lacks sufficient elements to fully evaluate this element.	Moderately Unlikely (MU)
Impact	The project has implemented the majority of its activities that contributed to the achievement of the objective. The project has achieved the majority of project outcomes and outputs as stipulated with some minor shortfalls. Whether project impact will be lasting will depend on conditions for sustainability.	Satisfactory (S)
OVERALL CONCLUSION AND PROJECT RATING		Satisfactory (S)

More specifically, the justification for the above ratings is based on what the project had proposed and what it has effectively achieved by mid-2021 – as follows:

- *The update of regulatory and legislative frameworks to reduce the impacts of climate change effects on the coastal development and make the existing infrastructure more resilient.* Particular attention would be paid to the creation of an environment conducive for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management which takes into account climate change risks. **By project end**, at least two pieces of highly important policy or legal frameworks were expected to be informed by coastal dynamic modelling and adopted to account for

climate risks affecting the coastal zone.²⁹ Among the frameworks governing coastal management and the integration of climate risk into them, we mention: (1) an updated regulation on the Maritime Public Domain (DPM)³⁰; (2) steps towards Tunisia’s ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol (under the Barcelona Convention³¹); and (3) the re-structuring of APAL to better fulfil its mandate. Improvements to other policies and legal frameworks, which also received project support.

- *The application of flexible and innovative measures to reduce risks linked to climate change – or to “support resilience” (as proposed by the MTR).* Such measures would include protective measures (for example, restoration of dunes and wet zones) and best practices for the management of the water (for example, the controlled extraction of groundwater reserves to prevent saltwater intrusion) in line with the Integrated Coastal Zone Management. **By project end**, risk-based spatial management plans were developed for project sites, in particular, the Spatial Development Plan of Djerba island (SDAZs of Djerba) was an important achievement and tagged as a ‘climate plan’ for Djerba, as it was the first Tunisian spatial planning study taking climate change into account risk. Other studies that assessed different adaptation techniques and their feasibility supported the rollout of implementation on the ground (e.g. the “Evaluation [or Assessment] of coastal climate risk and development of the emergency response plan”). By project end, the project reported that 6.08 Kilometers wooden or palm palisades (Ganivelles and Palmivelles) were installed on public beaches and wetlands, including in the Ramsar site Ras R'Mel on Djerba island.³² Concerning freshwater availability, the project’s most important achievement appears to be a 2018 study in collaboration with the Water Resources Management Unit (DGRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture, using numeric hydraulic modelling, in addition to some concrete measures on the ground conducted by NGOs for recuperating traditional water harvesting and storage tanks in Djerba.³³ There were otherwise a number of activities relating to water, agriculture and both combined, but it is difficult to connect those to the intended indicator targets, or to verify the precise nature and level of certain physical achievements, given the remote character of the TE assignment.³⁴
- *The provision of a better climate information for monitoring coastal hazards, early warning system (EWS) and planning climate-resilient development.* The project resulted in 2021 in e.g. in the establishment of an EWS for the agricultural use of treated wastewater in Aghir water treatment station in Djerba and in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture. Other achievements linked to the installation of tidal gauge, buoys, and the collection and management of oceanographic data will take time before they can constitute an EWS. The advances on planning climate-resilient development have otherwise been highlighted. In terms of actions on the ground, the following gender relevant actions can be highlighted, even though the number of female beneficiaries is still small (quoting from recent project reporting in the PIR 2021):
 - *“As part of the adaptation project carried out by the Ajim fisheries development group in Djerba, a group of 25 women have improved their income through the sale of cages for catching blue crabs and have been able to have prospects for new incomes for their families through the processing and sale of blue crab meat.*
 - *500 traps were made and distributed to 23 artisanal fishermen. In addition, the women of this NGO actively participated in raising the awareness of 500 citizens about the importance of blue crab and adaptation.*

²⁹ The TE notes that it is not in the project’s mandate to secure governmental approval/ratification of such framework, but rather to support the process through essential technical inputs.

³⁰ More information in: http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/Files/dpm.pdf.

³¹ More information in: <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/> and more specifically, <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/tunisia>.

³² The TE notes that reporting by the project on this in the PIR is not totally clear. It is difficult to fully verify the physical achievements. The findings here are based, not on evidence, but on oral confirmation by the project manager. Also on the indicator targets concerning physical adaptation measures, the MTR suggested reducing the level of target ambitions for certain indicators on soft adaptation measures.

³³ See e.g. <https://www.ajem.tn/fesguietna>, whose representatives were interviewed by the TE.

³⁴ Some residual pieces of evidence that cannot be verified by the TE consultant within the scope of an assignment with only 24-day nominal duration. E.g. the quality of ecosystem restoration actions would require specific technical studies and sufficient time allotted. Since, those are only one of the aspects of the project, the TE concludes that the lack of direct verification of such aspects had not undermined the TE’s conclusions. For the same reasons, the assessment of the environmental sustainability of ecosystem-based adaptation measures (EBA) would be constrained by the limitations of the TE assignment as commended.

- *The group of women is an important target group for the project. In order to empower them and promote gender equality, the project has involved them through training workshops and raising awareness /outreach activities.*
 - *The project ensures the representation of both women and men in the project activities by ensuring their access to the interventions under all project outcomes.”*
- *The mobilization of public and private funds for Coastal Resilience Projects in national and local level by making projects more bankable. The introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors to ensure resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas. In fact, both the public and private sectors were expected to serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring. **The project resulted in** the publication of a study titled ‘Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia’ in 2019. The project also reported a number of sub-projects executed by NGOs/CSOs funded by the SCCF project, while the relevant indicator pointed out to APAL continuing to fund them from own budget. The catalytic interplay between public and private sector was not very well explored by the project, adding some level of risk to the sustainability of results. Decisions on conceding some of the funds reported under the resource mobilization indicator are to a great extent driven by financiers. It is therefore difficult to say if the mobilization of funds by APAL was indeed a result of the project, or if it would have happened independently from the project.*

MAIN FINDING

*The TE generally concludes that: (i) the project had an **overall satisfactory performance, all criteria considered**, but (ii) the **sustainability of its results appear to be currently at risk, with a moderately unlikely chance of transforming some of the hard-earned achievements into lasting impacts.***

The TE has analyzed the follow-up to the MTR management response and brought forward some important conclusions. There are issues with some of the MTR’s management responses that would require corrections, clarifications and some additional follow-up – if feasible – and even though it was recently updated by the project / UNDP CO.

In connection with it, the TE makes here the so-called herein “**RECOMMENDATION ZERO**” for immediate action by the Project Team and/or UNDP CO whenever possible (and if viable, otherwise drop), implying the project and the CO to reopen some of the MTR recommendations and their management response. Two of them were picked up again by the TE and reincluded in a new list of recommendations (refer to Table 11 in the main report). A few others should be revisited, because they contain important lessons.

The TE makes **10 CORE RECOMMENDATIONS** and draws lessons from the evaluation exercise, in addition 6 other recommendations that are also important, but not core, plus the 2 MTR recommendations picked up from an incomplete MTR Management Response – hence 18 recommendations in total, in addition to “recommendation zero” mentioned in the previous paragraph. They can be summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Recommendations and Lessons derived from issues pointed out in the TE

ISSUES	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS	Addressed to:
<p>The mainstreaming of gender and women’s empowerment into project results would be insufficient, if only project design is considered, and also considering the gender tagging as “Significant Objective”. The strengthening gender-responsive strategies in crisis (conflict and disaster) prevention, preparedness and recovery has not been sufficiently incorporated into the project document. The mainstreaming of gender into project design has been mandated by UNDP at least since the launching of the Agency’s Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021. During implementation, there have been more tangible efforts towards gender mainstreaming, but to a limited extent (based on the reading of technical and implementation report from 2016 through to at least 2019). Most of the gender mainstreaming actions happened towards the end of the project. In terms of products prepared by the project we highlight the report “<i>Élaboration d’un diagnostic sur l’intégration de l’approche genre dans le projet – Ghar El Melh et Djerba</i>” from 2021. In terms of and results from actions funded by the project (e.g. through NGOs and benefitting local communities), there have been several actions on the ground mentioned quoted from the 2021 PIR further up. However, even the number of female beneficiaries is still small, and results are modest – especially if the gender policy marking of ‘significant objective’ is considered.³⁵</p>	[R1]	<p>IF THERE IS STILL TIME: Gender mainstreaming. For the purposes of gendered-learning, the project team should re-read with a gender-lens some of the reports, strategies and policies prepared through the project. If there is still time to ensure an improved gender mainstreaming into them, then the project should dedicate some time to it in the next few months. [This recommendation had been initially made in September 2021, when the project still had a few months of implementation left. A new reading of reports with a gender lens could possibly influence the end-of-project report and the formulation of new pipeline projects. The project does not think it is realistic to propose this recommendation, but the TE maintains it for the record.]</p>	Project team and UNDP CO, in particular the UNDP Officers tasked with gender mainstreaming into the Agency’s program
<p>The TE recognizes that it is not possible to ‘turn back time’ (of course), and that there is always a <i>raison d’être</i> for why things were as they were. Yet, four key actions from the MTR’s management response were completed too late in the project’s lifetime to have any impact on results or on APAL’s performance as the host institution. At the same time, they were strategic and would require more time to mature and show results. In particular, this recommendation related to the following types of results: (i) certain strategic studies; (ii) actions on the ground, especially those tagged as Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (EBA); and (iii) proposed changes to</p>	[R2]	<p>In the design of future adaptation projects in Tunisia, strategic actions that require time for maturing should be prioritized earlier in projects’ lifetime. Therefore, all new projects should conduct strategic planning during the Inception Phase. In future projects, it is advisable to consider an earlier and higher prioritization of the following types of direct and indirect adaptation actions: (i) certain strategic studies; (ii) actions on the ground, especially those tagged as Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (EBA); and (iii) proposed changes to legislative processes. This is because these types of activities take a long time to reach maturity and show impact. This is important because quite often projects rush through the inception phase without really</p>	UNDP NCE Team, UNDP CO

³⁵ See Box 2 > Atlas Information through Open UNDP,

ISSUES	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS	Addressed to:
legislative processes. Refer to Box 6 in the main report for the evidence.		<p>prioritizing the sequence of strategic actions, without revising the Theory of Change.</p> <p><i>[This recommendation is also linked to R7 on the sustainability of results]</i></p>	
Evidence shows that the need for adjusting project milestones is quite common across the UNDP GEF portfolio. The project had requested three duration extensions, the last one in 2021, which was initially denied by UNDP’s NCE Team, apparently in an effort to implement SOP and stricter rules around the repeated re-phasing of the GEF grant through end-of-year budget revisions, which is in reality a sign of poor project planning and scoping. This TE consultant also thinks that the expectations towards UNDP GEF project milestones and timelines, as expressed through project documents, are quite unrealistic.	[R3]	<p>Address the real reason behind requests for project Milestone Adjustments. In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project’s methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. Some of the shortcomings observed seem to affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Efforts should instead go towards addressing the causes of delays – and less towards mere compliance with SOPs. Efforts should equally go towards a realistic analysis of context and circumstances, improved planning and scoping of time and resources needed across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective mobilization of the project in its Inception and pre-Inception Phases.</p>	UNDP NCE Team
The Covid-19 pandemic is worsening in Tunisia. The country is embarking in what appears to be a stricter lock-down (again) in May/June 2021 – and beyond (besides the 2020 lockdown). A project duration extension request till end 2021 had been posed by the project to the NCE Team, on the grounds of covid-19 impacts on project implementation. The request was initially denied by the NCE Team. Now, only activities linked to procurement initiated before June 2021 will be allowed to be concluded by December 2021. Still, the period considered effective project implementation will have lasted anyway 6.5+ years. Such duration was considered excessively long by the RTA, but normal by the TE. With the impact of the worsening of the pandemic in 2021, this could not have been different. The TE finds that NCE Team may not have been sufficiently sensitive to project needs.	[R4]	<p>Consider the seriousness of extant factors in risk management and decision-making. As the pandemic extends its duration and grip in the world, either the project or UNDP should conduct a study to fully gauge the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on vulnerable populations, including those that are climatically vulnerable. The study could also assess if all measures of sanitary protection, including social distancing, and as enforceable through UNDP projects, are sufficient to avoid further spreading the virus. In terms of approaches to project implementation different types of adaptations may be needed, including allowing the project more time.</p>	Project Team and/or UNDP CO

ISSUES	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS	Addressed to:
A period of 23 months for mobilizing the project since GEF CEO Endorsement till the end of the Inception Phase is unnecessarily long. Yet, the Inception Report (dated Sep 2016) did not touch upon the issue of delays. The MTR mentioned it, but the strongest focus of discussions on delays pertained to the implementation period and less on the mobilization period. Long delays in project upstart affect project performance in many different ways and for a very long time during its lifetime. It is almost “a miracle” that Tunisia Coastal Resilience Project ends up being rated satisfactory.	[R5]	Consider the seriousness of delays in project mobilization (from CEO Endorsement to the end of the Inception Phase). A recommendation to UNDP is to more actively monitor project startup processes, ensuring that a project team can be more promptly engaged, after the project document has been signed. If English is not the official language in the programming country, the PRODOC should be translated. Recruitments can be accelerated in different ways, preferably without compromising country ownership.	UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government
Evidence shows that the need for adjusting project milestones is quite common across the UNDP GEF portfolio. The project had requested three duration extensions, the last one in 2021, which was initially denied by NCE, apparently in an effort to implement newly consolidated SOPs and stricter rules around the repeated re-phasing of the GEF grant through end-of-year budget revisions. The TE thinks that this is in reality a sign of poor project planning and scoping. And this is the issue that should be addressed in project design. The impact of the high turnover at management level within at APAL has been an issue and a risk. It could have been foreseen in project design, and project Support to NIM should have been reinforced. As a result, project planning was overly ambitious, vis-à-vis the actual implementation capacity.	[R6]	Improve project scoping and planning functions, both during design and regularly during implementation, and mainly when the management modalities are reviewed. In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project’s methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments -- including because some of the shortcomings observed seem to affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly.	UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government
The project does not have a clear Sustainability Plan or Exit Strategy (although UNDP has follow-up plans in the form of new programs, which might not be the same) and continuation of benefits may be in jeopardy unless concrete follow-up strategies and replication are rectified. Quick studies targeted at the tail end of the project will not secure sustainability. Some of the important studies were completed too late in the project’s lifetime to have any impact on expected results or on the host institution’s performance.	[R7]	Strengthen sustainability early, rather than too late in the project’s lifetime. It is recommended that projects should begin the design of a project exit strategy early and through consistent actions that take into consideration the achievement made by the project. Such strategy should focus on correcting the project shortfalls and seek specific stakeholders for taking over strategic action and sustaining results, including when needed completing any outstanding outputs.	Project Team (currently), and for future projects, UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government
There are issues with project indicators, including their baseline and targets. Some of them have been picked up by the MTR, others by TE. A thorough analysis is included in Section 2.4 (Baseline and Indicators Established).	[R8]	Put more thought into the ‘SMARTNESS’ of indicators and ensure that they are harmonized with the Tracking Tool. In the future, indicators that monitor both soft and hard adaptation measures should be harmonized with the Tracking Tool and make direct reference to it in the PRODOC’s Results Framework. For measuring progress on the ground, for both soft and hard	UNDP NCE Team

ISSUES	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS	Addressed to:
		physical adaptation measures, indicator achievement should be illustrated by maps and aerial pictures that would demonstrate the progress and document it – ensuring better chances of sustainability of physical achievements on the ground. This stresses the importance of a consistent and systematically updated M&E System.	
The project has generated a good amount of data, information and knowledge, some of which has been put out in publications, however, a lot is only found in electronic format in the project's archives and not readily accessible to the public. Main reports are not even found in Open UNDP.	[R9]	Improve information management and make useful and unclassified information and data generated by public funds available. It is recommended that considers the advantage of open data. GIS data, as a minimum should be made available by APAL to the public. Reports and studies as well. Sharing these data, information and knowledge for use in national sectoral and integrated planning is an important way of ensuring sustainability of results.	Project Team and the Government
The project has resulted in a lot of benefits, and it will rely on other projects to replicate and further upscale to a more significant level. A follow-up intervention is recommended to further secure the investment made by the GEF/SCCF, Government and UNDP.	[R10]	Follow-up intervention(s). It is commendable that Government proceeds with its plans to carry out a follow-up intervention. Such an intervention should first create a bridge between the Coastal Resilience Project and the next in the form of a sustainability plan (Exit Strategy) – even though this should have been done earlier. The on-going study should have more focus on sectors where achievements were partially accomplished and also to address emerging issues. The issue of private sector engagement is clear gap to be addressed.	UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government
Other RECOMMENDATIONS for future projects:			
[R11] Development of a comprehensive M&E systems for the project and usable risk register. Train project staff in the use of the systems. UNDP's systems are improving but they are not integrated. Also, it is not clear how sound risk management practices will be integrated with Implementing Partners' systems, as UNDP reinforces the full NIM modality. Regardless, UNDP projects must have adequate means for monitoring and reporting and help with this integration.			<i><u>Other recommendations for future projects:</u></i> addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government
[R12] Recruit project managers and project teams early, but make no compromise on the quality of HR. Also, robust capacity building programs in project management and accounting, especially during initial phase is needed.			
[R13] Clear standard operating procedures outlining core functions in project management would be useful to avoid the type of arrangement that the coastal resilience project (technically linked to the implementing partner, but operationally linked to UNDP.			

<p>[R14] Project implementation officially starts by signature of the PRODOC. However, the actual project implementation always starts effectively with a delay typically of several months. This inaugural period of several months should be reflected and taken into account in project design. To the extent possible, the period of project mobilization should be attempted shortened.</p> <p>[R15] Project indicators and targets must be SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant/realistic and Trackable/time-bound. If they are not, they create an administrative burden. Avoid vague indicators and indicators that are not measurable within the project implementation period and unrealistic targets.</p> <p>[R16] Continue to promote integrated approach in multi-sector projects, such as the Coastal Resilience one, even though it may be challenging.</p>	
<p>Based on a critical analysis of the MTR’s Management Response (as of Sep 2021), two MTR RECOMMENDATIONS are proposed reincluded for follow up:</p> <p>[MTR RECOMMENDATION #16]: A Sustainability Plan, Replication/Upscaling and Exist Strategy does not appear to have been developed. This is needed for sustaining products, outcomes and effects to be made explicit plus provide the guidance towards upscaling the results of the project as appropriate. <i>By PMU/APAL/UNDP.</i></p> <p>[MTR RECOMMENDATION #17]: The above Recommendations should be followed by strengthening the narrative of the project to highlight its role in the acceleration of the NDC implementation in Tunisia along with a clear gender-mainstreaming plan. As part of this exercise, work is recommended that (where possible) inter-weave gender focused developmental issues (e.g.: NDC/Agenda 2030/Paris Agreement etc.) as a priority in the products and outcomes that result and seek to result out of the Project. <i>By PMU/PSC/APAL.</i></p> <p>TE’s FINDINGS: Both recommendations remain actual. [*] if not viable to revisit and reconsider these recommendations, UNDP may decide to drop them.</p>	<p><i>If viable to still be implemented*, the TE suggests revisiting and reconsidering two important MTR recommendations, which had not received adequate follow-up in the management response.</i></p> <p>Addressed to the Project Team and/or UNDP CO and Government</p>

-//- End of the Executive Summary -//-

1) INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared in the context of the **Terminal Evaluation (TE)** of project “*Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia*” (or the “**Coastal Resilience Project**” in short). The project is funded by a grant from the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)³⁶, managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), has the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the “GEF Agency”. It is hence a UNDP GEF-SCCF Project.

The Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL)³⁷, which is institutionally linked to the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development³⁸, functions as UNDP’s “Implementing Partner” for the project. APAL and the project team works together with several other key national institutions responsible for meteorology, infrastructure, local affairs, finance, tourism and land use planning, in addition to other partners responsible for implementation on the ground or other aspects of service provision.

In June 2021, the new UNDP Evaluation guidelines replaced the previous UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, amidst several other reforms within the organization. The introduction of new guidelines document is meant to regularly address changes within the organization. The updated **UNDP Evaluation Guidelines**, which are not specific to GEF projects, highlights that evaluation within UNDP is:

- A means to **strengthen learning** within our organization and among stakeholders, to support better decision-making.
- Essential for **accountability and transparency**, strengthening the ability of stakeholders to hold UNDP accountable for its development contributions.
- Often **intended** to generate empirical knowledge about what has worked, what has not, and why. Through the generation of evidence and objective information, evaluations enable program managers and other stakeholders to **make informed management decisions** and plan strategically.

Previously known as the “UNDP-GEF unit”, a new UNDP cluster has been recently rebranded as Nature, Climate and Energy (NCE). The NCE Team continues to hold both HQ and regional presence. The NCE Team is responsible for providing advisory and project development services to UNDP Country Offices (COs), which represent the decentralized level with respect to UNDP GEF projects. The NCE Team is also responding to a recent performance audit conducted in 2020 and targeting GEF projects, which pointed out several topics requiring improvement in the management of these projects.³⁹

Altogether, the TE exercise has taken place during a period of change within UNDP with respect to evaluations and its institutional accountability as a GEF Agency.

According to the UNDP GEF project cycle in effect, two evaluative exercises are foreseen for all medium- and full-sized projects financed by the GEF: a Mid-term Evaluation/Review (MTE/MTR), which in the case of this project was conducted in 2019, and a TE (the present exercise). Separate UNDP GEF guidance for TEs and MTEs/MTRs are available by UNDP to orient these exercises, including by outlining procedures and approaches and general guidance on evaluation processes, roles and responsibilities, terms of reference templates, evaluation report outlines and sample evaluation criteria matrices. The guidance and policies have been consulted widely applied in the present process.

³⁶ The SCCF has been designed to finance activities, programs and measures related to climate change adaptation and technology transfer to all eligible developing countries.

³⁷ In French: *Agence de Protection et Aménagement du Littoral* (http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/index.html).

³⁸ Previously, APAL was linked to the Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development.

³⁹ UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management>, accessed on 13/08/21.

Conducted between May and August 2021, the present TE was conducted remotely (100% home based), in light of heightened Covid-19 risks not just in Tunisia, but also in Brazil where the evaluator resides, and also globally, curtailing travel and other activities on the ground.

Apart from the review of documents related to the project, including the Project Document (ProDoc), technical reports, project interim reports and meeting minutes, the Consultant also conducted detail interviews with project stakeholders. Stakeholder interviews happened during the first half of the TE period. Data triangulation, which counted on the assistance from the project team, the CO and UNDP’s NCE Team Regional Technical Adviser, permitted the TE process to ensure quality and reliable information gathering for the assessment. Project stakeholders included representatives from the various national institutions, local CSO service providers at site level and various exchanges with members of the project team.

The findings from the TE terminal evaluation were analyzed to assess the general performance of the project, with the results presented in the various sections of this report. Important recommendations based on the findings of the TE process are provided towards the end of the report for improvement of future similar programs, and especially to guide GEF and UNDP programming in Tunisia and elsewhere.

1.1) PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the Terminal Evaluation (TE) and its methodology are specifically informed by guidance from both UNDP and the GEF on evaluation processes. A key publication that guides the present evaluation is titled “*Guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects*” of 2020⁴⁰, referred to in this report as the “**UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs**”. According to this guidance (and the TOR for the assignment), the following are the complementary and broad purposes of the evaluation:

- To promote accountability and transparency;
- To synthesize lessons that can help to improve the selection, design and implementation of future UNDP-supported GEF-financed initiatives; and to improve the sustainability of benefits and aid in overall enhancement of UNDP programming;
- To assess and document project results, and the contribution of these results towards achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefits; and
- To gauge the extent of project convergence with other priorities within the UNDP country program, including poverty alleviation; strengthening resilience to the impacts of climate change, reducing disaster risk and vulnerability, as well as cross-cutting issues such gender equality, empowering women and supporting human rights.

Considering the contribution of project results to the achievement of GEF strategic objectives (the second purpose mentioned above), the **SCCF’s climate change adaptation objectives will be on focus**. This concerns, more specifically, the need to show the GEF’s adaptation additionality in interventions funded by the project with SCCF finance.

In addition, the TOR specifically mentions that “[t]he evaluation should also **have a gender lens** and assess whether the project has had a negative, positive or neutral impact in terms of implementation, results and effects, including on the final beneficiaries, and propose areas for improvement for future projects.”

The 2020 Guidance on TEs prescribes the following and recommends further reading: “A gender-responsive evaluation should be carried out even if the project being evaluated was not gender-responsive in its design. The *UNEG guidance document, ‘Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations’* provides examples of how to incorporate these elements in the definition of the evaluation’s purpose, objectives, context and scope

⁴⁰ See: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/documents/GEF/TE_GuidanceforUNDP-supportedGEF-financedProjects.pdf.

and to add a gender dimension to the standard evaluation criteria.” The gender aspect is an important aspect of the TE, including by taking into consideration UNDP’s current policies and practices.

Concerning the gender aspect, UNDP’s latest guidance can be found in recent UNDP Policies, in particular the *UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021*⁴¹. This is a rather recent piece of policy guidance at the level of the organization, vis-à-vis the project’s timeline.⁴²

It should be noted that the project had been conceived and designed almost 10 years ago (see [TIMELINE](#)). Back then, UNDP’s gender policies were not as well elaborated and comprehensive as they currently are. While the current UNDP policy provides indeed the actual “lenses” for looking at the gender aspect, it would not be completely “fair” to judge project design with the present lenses. The same level of stringency concerning gender mainstreaming into project indicators were not common practice 10 years ago, but gender marking was only beginning to be introduced.

Rather, the focus of the assessment with respect to the project’s role in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment will be mostly on the implementation. The TE’s entry point is to show the extent to which gender gradually became mainstreamed into key project’s processes such as planning, choice of activities and partners, etc. Gender mainstreaming is explicitly taken into account in the evaluation’s methodology and in the assessment of findings. See in particular see e.g. the following sub-sections:

- [Gendered Sub-sections within this report](#)
- [Gender Considerations concerning the assemblage of stakeholders](#)
- [Results disaggregated by Gender.](#)

1.2) SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

The UNDP GEF TE guidance prescribes the following in terms of the **approach and methodology**⁴³:

“[...] highlighting the conceptual models adopted with a description of data-collection methods, sources and analytical approaches to be employed, including the rationale for their selection (how they will inform the evaluation) and their limitations; data-collection tools, instruments and protocols; and discussion of reliability and validity for the evaluation and the sampling plan, including the rationale and limitations. Sample methodological approaches are described in the ‘Pre-evaluation Phase’ section of this guidance.”

In this section, the above-mentioned aspects are covered from a methodological point of view, without repeating what is already in the TE guidance, which serves as a basis for the present TE exercise.

SCOPE OF THE TE AND PRODUCTS FROM THE ASSIGNMENT

The TOR mandates the evaluator to review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual Project Reports / Project Implementation Reports (APR/PIR) – which are the project’s donor reports, project budget revisions, the MTR (for which the report that was finalized in mid-2019), progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, plus any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment.

The following criteria are **assessed through a rating scale**, as a minimum: **Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, execution, and finally overall project performance**. The TOR’s Annex D contains the specific scales to be adopted (Figure 2). All ratings have been duly justified through evidence-based analysis.

⁴¹ See e.g. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021.html>

⁴² Before this period, UNDP had other frameworks in place. UNDP gender strategy started in fact in 2008 and lasted up to 2018, and it required COs to: “...ensure that gender equality and the empowerment of women are integrated into every aspect ...”. However, enforcement of the strategy at the level of UNDP GEF projects was weak.


⁴³ UNDP (2020) guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects.

Figure 2. The rating scales applied in the TE

FROM TE's TOR: ANNEX D: RATING SCALES <i>Color coded</i>		
<p>Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings 4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) 3: Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings 2: Unsatisfactory (U): major problems 1: Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems <p><i>Additional ratings where relevant:</i> Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A)</p>	<p>Sustainability ratings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3. Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks 1. Unlikely (U): severe risks 	<p>Relevance ratings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Relevant (R) 1.. Not relevant (NR) <p>Impact Ratings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Significant (S) 2. Minimal (M) 1. Negligible (N)

Other aspects concerning the TE’s scope relate to: (i) the process (Figure 3)⁴⁴; (ii) the need for integrating gender equality and women’s empowerment perspectives in the TE (covered in specific **‘gendered sub-sections’** of this report); (iii) the package of documentation to be compiled and availed by the project team to the TE ([Annex IV](#)); and (iv) the reach out to project stakeholders and interview them, even though a remote evaluation, on account of the covid-19 pandemic, posed challenges to process (see [Annex III](#)).

Figure 3. Evaluation Timeframe from the 2020 official guidance on TE by UNDP



Source: UNDP (2020) guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects. Reproduction of Figure 1, on page 13.

With the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on international travel in connection with the TE assignment has not been feasible. The TE has been being conducted 100% remotely. This required some adaptations to the usual methodology for face-to-face processes of project visit and direct consultations with project stakeholders. All stakeholder consultation was conducted through video-conferencing. No site visit was possible.

⁴⁴ The issue of timing and duration have been object of discussions discussion during the TE exercise, involving the project, UNDP CO and UNDP’s NCE Team. The project team is pressed to conclude the TE asp because of the project for operationally closing the project asp. Ideally, the TE should have been commended earlier, but with the downside of have too short a period between the MTR and the TE.

With respect to scope, the TE report contains evidence-based findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations. The evidence and findings are presented herein in a way that makes the content accessible and coherently presented.

Project performance has been evaluated according to the following criteria, as required by the TOR (those marked with * require ratings):

- Relevance *
- Effectiveness *
- Efficiency *
- Sustainability *
- Gender and human rights
- Additional cross-cutting issues, as relevant⁴⁵
- Results Framework⁴⁶
- Progress to Impact
- Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Design and Implementation *
- UNDP oversight/implementation *
- Implementing Partner execution*
- GEF-SCCF [adaptation] additionality
- Adaptive Management
- Stakeholder Engagement
- Financing & materialization of co-financing -- *a table will be composed*
- Social and Environmental Standards (Safeguards)⁴⁷

All of the criteria (or topics) above are covered by the TE, either directly or indirectly, through working questions – i.e. the so called ‘**Evaluation Questions**’ in Annex V– and which have been formulated for guiding the TE, especially in stakeholder interviews, which were all semi-structured.

The items marked with an asterisk in the bullet-points’ list further up (*) received special attention in the TE, because a rating is a minimum requirement for the TE and a specific scale must be used. See: Table 1. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard)).

For certain criteria, a ‘**consultative and analytical approach**’ has applied (e.g. the issue of adaptive management and the project’s duration issue). This was a specific request from the Resident Representative, echoed during the first interview.

Consistent with the official 2020 TE Guidance for UNDP GEF projects, the scope of the evaluation covers the entire project duration. This includes the preparation phase, the step-wise approval stage, the ‘Inception Phase’ and the ‘effective project implementation period’⁴⁸, including the steps towards closure, which in the case of the present project are still ongoing⁴⁹. For the phases or stages before the so-called ‘effective project implementation period’, the emphasis is mostly on the speed and effectiveness of project pipelining, approval and upstart. This is because UNDP GEF projects: (i) tend to take a long time in preparation and may face delays in upstarting; (ii) often need to comply with comprehensive technical and bureaucratic requirements before approval by GEF, UNDP and Government; (iii) require at times milestone extensions for ensuring that delays are

⁴⁵ The TE 2020 Guidance suggests for example: persons with disabilities, vulnerable groups, poverty and environment nexus, disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation. In this report, the gender entry point is adequately covered. For the focus on vulnerable populations and resilience, the TE faced limitations.

⁴⁶ Project’s outputs were analysed in this evaluation primarily through the end-results of project implementation. The project’s entire logframe / results framework, and the achievement of results expected under the outcomes, especially as assessed through project indicators, have been thoroughly analysed. This includes: (i) indicator’s baseline, including their ‘SMART-ness’, following up on an analysis conducted by the MTR; (ii) the achievement of targets for these indicators; and last but not least (iii) an analysis of the status of end-of-project achievements, on the basis of project indicators and ratings per Outcome.

⁴⁷ The topic ‘Social and Environmental Standards (Safeguards)’ is part of the TOR for this evaluation. The assessment of Safeguards is addressed in the following sections: in 3.1, under ‘Assumptions, Risks and Environmental & Social Safeguards’; and in 3.2 under ‘Coordination, Safeguards and Operational Issues’.

⁴⁸ With reference to the [TIMELINE](#) figure and [related analysis](#) in the narrative (on page 21).

⁴⁹ The consultancy end date is referred to in the inner cover of this report (07-December-2021), when the last piece of evidence in connection this TE had been availed to the consultant.

compensated and that the use of the project grant can be maximized. Therefore, the TE has put some emphasis on the timeline analysis.

The table that contains the **Evaluation Questions in matrix format** in [Annex V](#) includes more details on the methodological approach and scope.

Four main products or contractual deliverables (DELs) are expected from the TE assignment:

DEL1) Inception Report (*Delivered*), which is this report and should contain the methodology.

DEL2) Presentation (*Delivered through a separate file*). The presentation covers the initial findings of the evaluation.

DEL3) Draft Final Report (*The present report*), which presents the findings of the evaluator justified by evidence, a draft that is submitted for commenting by the project and stakeholders; and

DEL4) Final Report (*To be delivered once national stakeholders and UNDP have reacted to the present report*). The fourth and final deliverable is in essence an updated version of the draft (final) report, in which the evaluator has taken into consideration the comments received. As per current guidance on TE, an 'Audit Trail' is expected to include responses and justification for each comment listed.

In addition, the 2020 TE Guidance recommends the conduct of a '**Stakeholder Workshop**' for closing the TE process. During the mentioned stakeholder event, content from the DEL2 (Presentation) mentioned above is expected to be shared with participants.

On 01 November 2021, the Project Team organized a meeting of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) aimed at presenting the initial findings using material from DEL2. Prior to the meeting with the PSC (or "COFIL" as it is known to the project, after the French term "*Comité de Pilotage*"), the TE consultant had a preparatory working session with the Project Team and the M&E Specialist in UNDP's COs. The two meetings are reflected in [Annex III](#).⁵⁰

This aspect still needs to be discussed with the project team and UNDP. For an overview of next steps, refer to [Annex 3](#).

EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The conceptual model

As per the UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs, the model or approach to evaluating UNDP GEF project must depart from evidence. In fact, this is common sense in evaluation work.

The present TE is therefore evidence-based, but it is equally pragmatic in the selection and prioritization of this evidence, all according to *purpose* and *utility* – in addition to other principles, such as those that guide stakeholder engagement e.g., or gender mainstreaming

Much of this evidence was found in various reports prepared by the Coastal Zone Adaptation Project, most of them thorough, including, the project document, technical reports, various postings in Facebook and other media, and not least also, the sequential series of annual workplans and PIR, whose quality improved over years – expressing herein the TE's **FINDINGS** on the increased quality of both workplans and PIRs, as the project progressed. This improvement in planning and reporting is an indication of improved project management capacity and experience by the team.

⁵⁰ The list of participants in the COFIL meeting had not been shared with the TE, neither has the recording from that meeting.

Yet, with such wealth of evidence and information contained in the different documents and articles, assimilating meaning and drawing analysis for concluding the TE requires a course filter. The official guidance from UNDP GEF does not provide any indication on how this filter should apply. Rather, the **2021 UNDP Evaluation guidelines** prescribed the following **guiding quality criteria for evaluations’ methodology and approach**:

- **Strategic**, where Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UNDP Strategic Plan and alignment with UNDAF feature high;
- **Relevant**, including topics such as national needs and priorities, gender equality, climate additionality, etc.;
- **Principled**, basically referring to the 'leave no one behind' motto, among other topics;
- **Management and monitoring**, where indicator smartness, Theory of Change, gender mainstreaming and the governance of programs and projects should be on focus;
- **Efficient & Effective**, concerning mostly the use of resources; and
- **Sustainability and national ownership**, as is

Beyond the project document (PRODOC), this evaluator proceeded to analyzing content and capturing the core findings and conclusions contained in the MTR report and in the various PIRs (2016 to 2021⁵¹). The Inception Report was also consulted in this sequence, for building an idea about where the project came from in its progress towards the objective and in implementation.

In an **evidence-based and pragmatic approach**, reporting against indicator takes prominence in the assessment of performance. The TOR’s framework concerning the TE’s ratings and their application followed the guidance from the UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs. The content needs not be repeated here.

The approach to gender, with respect to the conceptual framework accepts that gender *inequality* exists in Tunisia (i.e. that it is a reality and a rather pervasive one), and it assumes that gender *equality* is a goal being pursued by the project, even though this aspect may not have been as explicitly stated in project design, as it would be, was the project to be designed today. Also, ‘acceptance’ of fact that gender inequality is pervasive reality in Tunisia does not imply agreement with inherent practices by this evaluator, who happens to be female. Acceptance here is a mere pre-condition for proposing realistic change.

The approach to gender issues also assumes that the Coastal Zone Adaptation project can make an important contribution towards gender equality in its areas of intervention and through the issues that are addressed. Considering the size and population in Tunisia and the sites in which the project operated, its sphere of influence can be considerable and the groups of stakeholders that the project engages significant. Therefore, gender screening, awareness and mainstreaming is **RECOMMENDED** for the bulk of project activities, especially in the time remaining. For more information in the approach to gender, see the next section.

The same pragmatic and evidence-based approach that was mentioned further up also applying to TE findings, the distillation of conclusions drawn, and to lessons to be learned and the recommendations made. The following legend applies to highlights specific aspects:

FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS

LESSONS

Data collection: Written Materials Consulted and Notes

The TOR lists much of the material and project documentation that is considered essential in an evaluation in the TOR’s Annex B (see this report’s [Annex I](#)).⁵² An entire set of documents, including short films and other reports, have been received and explored. Towards the tail end of the TE exercise, there were delays in receiving:

⁵¹ The 2021 PIR, as received by the TE from the project team on 12/08/21, remained a draft, but was considered sufficient for the purposes of the TE.

⁵² There were initial delays in receiving such materials from the Coastal Zone Adaptation project. The issues connected with the lack of sync in filesharing between the project and the TE, later overcome.

(i) information on the co-financing; (ii) the complete set of Tracking Tools; (iii) the draft PIR; (iv) the MTR management response. However, this was later overcome.

It is noted that in several activity reports for the project, links to Facebook pages are included as evidence, along with short films posted. **FINDING** These are considered valid forms of sharing project results. The project is commended for its proactiveness in communicating results.

Some of consulted materials were read and annotation on importance added. The same can be said about the calls with the project and stakeholders (reviewed towards the tail-end of the TE exercise). For those handwritten notes were kept and, where needed, recordings, were consulted.

Approach to Stakeholder Engagement – and Limitations

The 2020 UNDP GEF TE guidance prescribes the formulation of a few evaluation questions for facilitating the approach to stakeholder engagement. Those questions are highly central to the TE (see [Annex V](#)). In this subsection, we focus on principles that guided the interactions with stakeholders, in addition to the gender mainstreaming approach, which is explained next:

Table 3. Stakeholder engagement principles

Principle	Stakeholder Participation will
Value adding	Be an essential means of adding value to the project
Inclusivity (or inclusion)	Include all relevant stakeholders
Accessibility and access	Be accessible and promote access to the process
Transparency	Be based on information transparency and fair access to it
Fairness	Ensure that all stakeholders are treated in a fair and unbiased way
Accountability	Be based on a commitment to accountability by all stakeholders
Constructiveness	Seek to manage potential conflicts and promote the public interest
Redressing	Seek to redress inequality and injustice
Capacitating	Seek to develop the capacity of all stakeholders
Needs-basing	Be based on the needs of all stakeholders
Flexibility	Be flexibly designed and implemented
Rationality and coordination	Be rationally coordinated and not be improvised
Excellence	Be subject to ongoing reflection and improvement

As it is, the initial list of stakeholders compiled by the project was quite extensive. Because the TE was accorded slightly less the minimum number of days that the guidance recommends for a TE, not all, but a relevant sample of stakeholders were interviewed (see [Annex III](#)). The project team proposed, upon the evaluator's request, to facilitate scheduling of meetings with the stakeholders, but excused the evaluator and interviewee(s) to speak freely and in private.

It should also be added that the conditions for stakeholder consultations have been constrained by the fact that the TE was conducted remotely. The mentioned constrains had weakened the application of certain principles listed in Table 3, such as fairness, inclusion and excellence. Still, to the extent possible -- and to the extent practical and pragmatic -- all principles were attempted applied.

One additional principle should be in the list in Table 3, in light of the remote nature of the TE: **patience**. There can be many constraints implied in remote meetings interviewing, in addition to frustration and time pressure. To the extent possible, there was an attempt to compensate the lack of a mission and of face-to-face interactions, while still applying all of the stakeholder engagement principles.

The main implications of conducting the TE remotely are otherwise discussed in [section 1.4](#).

Tools for assessing Evaluation Questions and other TE aspects

Herein, we list some of the specific methods and tools that were used in the TE to consolidate findings and compose the final TE report:

- **Dynamic context analysis**, including by considering the impact of covid-19 in the project and of recent political events in Tunisia.
- **Examining [and confirming] evidence for validating the findings**, which is a more general and broad methodology, concerning which we refer to further up under “The conceptual model” and elsewhere in the report.
- **Consult project reports and other documentation**, including, where applicable, review of similar evaluation question in the MTR.
- **Query stakeholders**, which had been proposed done through semi-structured interviews.⁵³
- **Analysis of timelines**, which had been included in the Inception Report and is reincluded herein with adjustments (see Figure 4).
- **Analysis of the use of funds**, although we miss to evidence from the project team to validate the project’s co-financing table.
- **Assess the causal relationships among elements that compose the TOC (Theory of Change)**, including the [adaptation] problem that addressed by the project, its causes, the long term solution, the barriers to the solution, core assumptions and the project’s logframe/LFA⁵⁴ elements – and noting that assumptions and risks are closely linked, hence risks would also be assessed.
- **Assessment of progress towards results**, which follows a specific methodology that is made explicit in PIRs and is well mastered by the evaluator.
- **Gendered analysis**, for which specific tools and analytical insight applies (see next section).
- **Stakeholder interview and analysis of responses**, kept within the limits of the time dedication scope of this evaluation.

GENDERED SUB-SECTIONS WITHIN THIS REPORT

Concerning the gender aspect / entry point, the most important methodological guidance can be found in recent UNDP Policies, in particular, **UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021**⁵⁵, in which four priority areas for UNDP’s interventions are presented, in addition to proposals for various entry points for programming.

In Atlas, the Coastal Resilience Project is tagged as having “gender equality” as a “significant objective” (see [KEY PROJECT DATA](#)). Therefore it appears adequate that the project is evaluated against their contribution to one or more of the four priority areas in UNDP’s gender policy:

- a. Removing structural barriers to women’s economic empowerment, including women’s disproportionate burden of unpaid care work;
- b. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence;
- c. Promoting women’s participation and leadership in all forms of decision-making;
- d. Strengthening gender-responsive strategies in crisis (conflict and disaster) prevention, preparedness and recovery.

Given the nature of the Coastal Zone Project, the most important priority areas in terms of entry points for programming are “a” and “c”. These aspects have some resonance with selected questions in Evaluation

⁵³ While it could have been useful to include how selected questions applied to different classes of interviews, it would make the present report excessive.

⁵⁴ Logical Framework Approach.

⁵⁵ See e.g. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021.html>

Questions Matrix ([Annex V](#)). More specifically, **four working questions** from the Matrix will be used to analyze the level of gender mainstreaming in the project:

- *To what extent has gender equality and women’s empowerment been taken into account and integrated from the design, taking into account the specificities of the country?*
- *To what extent was gender equality and women’s empowerment reflected in the products prepared by the project?*
- *To what extent mechanisms and policies in place have allowed results to be sustainable in terms of gender equality, women’s empowerment, fundamental rights and human development?*
- *Based on above questions and discussions with stakeholders and partners, how is the project’s impact on Gender be assessed?*

Besides the conclusions, answers to the above questions can be found in sections:

Gender Considerations concerning the assemblage of stakeholders, under Section 2.5; Section 1.3) Linkages to the SWAP EPI: Evaluation performance Indicators for Gender Equality

1.3) LINKAGES TO THE SWAP EPI: EVALUATION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR GENDER EQUALITY

During early exchanges with the UNDP CO, the M&E Specialist had suggested that UNDP’s Evaluation performance Indicators for Gender Equality (the SWAP EPI) should indicatively be used as indicators for assessing gender equality performance through the project. This was considered justified because the CO had adopted the following three indicators from the SWAP EPI in its programming, at the level of the UN Country Team (UNCT):

INDICATOR 3.1 | UNCT collaborates and engages with government on gender equality and the empowerment of women

INDICATOR 3.2 | UNCT collaborates and engages with women’s/gender equality CSO

INDICATOR 7.1 | UN Programs make a significant contribution to gender equality in the country

The two first indicators above were considered included in evaluation questions in Annex V in the form of “to-what-extent” questions concerning gender, although it is not obvious how the UN Country Team would be on focus. The latter aspect was considered outside the scope of the present TE.

The topic is addressed in [subsection ‘Results disaggregated by gender’](#) (under section 2.6).

1.4) LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

There are three important limitations linked to the present TE process:

1. Lack of mission to the field;
2. Delays in obtaining documentation and some level of miscommunication made the TE consultancy be stretched in time. Later, the initial hurdles in communication and data sharing were overcome
3. The budget accorded to the TE, which could e.g. have accommodated the engagement of an assisting consultant.

No mission to the field was possible in connection with the TE exercise due to covid-risk. Hence, some of the physical evidence with respect to results from the field evidence could not have been cross-verified, except

indirectly, through remote stakeholder interviews (e.g. quality of ecosystem restoration actions cannot be verified remotely).

Besides the collection of Project Implementation Reports (PIRs), other evidence of outcome achievement was gathered from the content of various reports, including technical studies funded by the project, news articles, postings in social media and other sources, validated through stakeholder interviews. Still, there are limits to how the TE can effectively validate some of the data. Articles and FB pages, photos and videos have been an important and useful source of visual information on the project. Map interpretation in the technical reports, as well, but with limitations due to the dynamic nature of coastal ecosystems. Yet, none of these sources can substitute a cohesive and up to date M&E System, which the project has clearly lack, for keeping track of physical realizations, their measurements and other highly relevant elements of an M&E system.

Furthermore, the TE had commented, in another passage, that the Project’s reporting against indicators in the PIRs was somewhat confuse. This made it difficult to discern the level of achievement for these rather relevant sub-indicators. This applies to both the present PIR (2021) and past ones.

The budget dedicated to this TE is a limitation. The nominal number of days accorded in the TE’s contract (23 days) is below the minimum recommended the UNDP GEF guidance for TEs, which appears to be 24 or 25. At the same time, this is the first evaluation performed by this TE consultant, who decided to take the challenge as a learning experience, rather than “clocking hours” dedicated to the project.

1.5) STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

The Evaluation Report has been structured as follows:

Executive summary- This chapter includes a comprehensive summary of the TE’s findings, the ratings and their justification, main findings including with additional ratings, and recommendations and conclusions, in particular for future interventions related to climate change adaptation in Tunisia and elsewhere.

Section 1) Introduction- The section includes a description of the purpose of the TE report, key sources, the methodology and the report’s structure. The evaluation methods are briefly described with cross-reference to the evaluation matrix that further details the main evaluative questions. Some methodological considerations are also referenced (e.g. the limitations of the TE and the approach to stakeholder engagement). Finally, chapter 1.4 highlights the problems of evaluation and the approach in improvement of similar work.

Section 2) Project description and development context. The second section in the report aims to provide the general framework for the Coastal Zone Adaptation project, by describing its context, the problems that it was meant to address, the immediate and development objectives, baseline indicators and the main stakeholders at the time of formulation, compared to now. Considerations on project scoping and duration are also included.

Section 3) Findings. This is the most important TE section, which and a key TOR requirement and included three main s subsections:

- In the first one (3.1) it covers how the evaluation reviewed project design, the Theory of Change (TOC) that underpinned this design. The subsection also provides information about project structures and stakeholders, a description of the main institutional stakeholders involved in implementing the project, including their role and responsibilities. More specifically, it covers the project’s results framework, including validity of indicators, assumptions and risks are analyzed and put into context as were the assumptions and risks. Linkages with other interventions and the participation of stakeholders were assessed. As the project has been implemented by UNDP, its comparative advantage was also checked.
- In the second subsection (3.2) project implementation is assessed, including the quality of management during implementation. The approach to adaptive management is on focus, including the issue of project duration, but also partnerships that were sought by the project through different arrangements for fulfilling project goals. The M&E systems is reviewed. The financial aspects of are touched upon. The management quality of both the implementing and executing agencies were assessed.

- The final subsection (3.3) covers project results and reviews the project through a set of evaluation criteria: overall results, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, country ownership, mainstreaming, sustainability and impact. These aspects and criteria were rated.

Section 4) Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons. The conclusions address the consistency between the results that were actually achieved by the project and the proposed project objective and outcomes. To assess performance and draw conclusions, the TE estimated the degree of achieving project objectives were achieved, primarily through indicators and by comparing them to the baseline. The TE also looked at other elements of performance, in particular those that require specific ratings: (1) Monitoring and Evaluation; (2) The performance of the Implementing Agency for GEF funds (UNDP) and of the Implementing Partner (APAL); (3) Assessment of Outcomes, including Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency; (4) Sustainability, including several sub criteria. The TE discussed factors that contributed to the success or failure of the intervention for the entire project taking into account the efforts put in place by the different in-country stakeholders to correct and improve the project implementation Recommendations are made. Finally, the lessons learned are mentioned as a way to move forward for future programming.

[Annexes](#) to this report and provide supplementary information.

2) PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

To seek to improve coastal resilience in Tunisia, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is supporting has been supporting the government since 2014 with the implementation of the project being herein evaluated, titled “*Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia*”. The project is funded by the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)⁵⁶, of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with a grant of US\$ 5,500,000. The Coastal Resilience Project, as it is called in short, was initially slated to be executed over the period 2015 to 2019, and with the closing date later extended to 2021. The UNDP GEF-SCCF project is complemented by co-financing from various sources (see Table 1), including co-financing from UNDP’s core funds directly programmed through the project’s regular workplans and managed through UNDP’s system, Atlas, under the same project ID as the SCCF grant.

The project proposed a risk-based approach to Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) by enabling flexible adaptation pathways, which would build resilience to climate change and provide maximum co-benefits. As tourism is a dominant source of revenue for the North African region, a set of economic instruments, land use planning tools and policy frameworks had been proposed to clearly identify the existing risks and drive future hotel and private residence development, including investments, away from vulnerable areas. With such an approach, local development plans would be made more risk-based and climate compatible.

The project objective is to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options to address the risks of climate change and its impacts on the populations and the main socioeconomic sectors of the most vulnerable coastal zones in Tunisia. The achievement of the above objective is through three expected outcomes:

- *Outcome 1) Institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas is improved;*
- *Outcome 2) Climate change resilience of priority coastal areas enhanced through implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures covering 22 km of coast and 670 hectares of wetland and benefiting 150,000 inhabitants; and*
- *Outcome 3) Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures.*

⁵⁶ The SCCF has been designed to finance activities, programs and measures related to climate change adaptation and technology transfer to all eligible developing countries.

The project is implemented by the Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL)⁵⁷, which is institutionally linked to the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. Previously, APAL was linked to the Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development. APAL has also at some point been linked to the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment. The changes observed are due to ministerial reforms that were enacted in Tunisia for the past 6+ years.

Tunisia’s coast is the backbone of its economy, and the confluence of competing resource uses including tourism, fishing and agriculture. Climate change and on-going anthropogenic exploitation of the coastal zone make coastal assets and people increasingly vulnerable. Expected impacts from climate change are especially pronounced in on agricultural activities and water quality. Erosion of sandy beaches, increased salinization of agricultural fields and the inundation of low lying wetland areas have been observed. These effects will be exacerbated by climate change, in particular due to sea level rise, projected to rise up to 1m during this century.

Before the project, future climate change scenarios were hardly considered in institutional policies and frameworks that guided coastal management in Tunisia. *With the project*, this reality changed. APAL currently counts on several policy and regulatory frameworks for tackling climate change in the coastal zone. As an institution, APAL has been reinforced by the project through a suite of activities. *Also before the project*, coastal protection practices were generally reactive with a bias towards hard engineering works. This is because institutional knowledge on holistic, integrated climate change risk management was limited. In addition, the costs and benefits of coastal adaptation were poorly assessed and overlooked in most policy and investment decisions. Investments in coastal protection would normally not consider climate risks and adaptation needs.

In response to climatic challenges and identified barriers, the project proposed **the introduction of a risk-based approach to climate change adaptation** by enabling flexible adaptation pathways to be conceived. These pathways are expected to build resilience to climate change over time and to provide maximum co-benefits. As tourism is a dominant source of revenue in Tunisia, the project made efforts to develop a set of economic instruments that would both signal existing risks—including climate risks—and drive future hotel and private residence developments away from vulnerable areas. With such an approach, local development plans became more risk-based and climate change was more effectively mainstreamed into development practices. The project was also slated to design and implement initial coastal adaptation measures on the ground in the northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis and the Island of Djerba.

2.1) PROJECT START AND DURATION - CONTEXTUALIZED


We refer to project’s milestones in the [Project Summary Table](#). We used the dates from it to analyze the project’s history graphically by depicting its **TIMELINE** in Figure 4. It served to show the different ways of looking into the project’s duration. This was important, in order to be fair to the project, when considering the pros-and-cons of adjusting milestones.

All in all, the project’s full duration lasted, nominally, **7 years**, while it had been designed to last **5-6 years**. However, in the end of the day, the project will have lasted **5.7 years** only, if we conder the **‘effective implementation period’**, which discounts the delays in mobilizing the project in the beginning.

The **effective project implementation** period started counting in August 2015, with the conduct of the Inception Workshop. Shortly after, the project manager (and team) had been engaged. Nevertheless, Figure 4 makes explicit a relatively long time lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the PRODOC Signature Date (5 months), followed by a gap of 18 months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Workshop. This is a visible shortcoming in the management of the project’s lifecycle. For much of this period, which the MTR called **‘the project’s mobilization period’**, there was no project manager appointed, so the responsibility for pushing the project to kick-start implementation rested with UNDP and the Implementing Partner, APAL.

⁵⁷ In French: *Agence de Protection et Aménagement du Littoral* (http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/index.html). APAL is, in UNDP’s terminology the ‘Implementing Partner’.

Figure 4. Project Timeline: from project idea in 2012 to project final financial closure in end 2022



According to the former-Program Officer, who was responsible for the project from its beginning to mid-2020, much of the delays during the project’s mobilization period related to the project team’ lengthy recruitment – a process that was managed by UNDP but depended on the endorsement of APAL’s director. During that period, there were several changes in directorship at APAL, affecting agency’s decision-making concerning the project.

Delays in kick-starting a project, or delays in implementation for whatever circumstance, create the need for adjusting the project’s closure date during implementation. Delays also generate costs that not evenly distributed. The project’s beneficiaries lose the most with delays. If the project’s duration scoping was also not adequate, this too should prompt the need for milestone adjustments. UNDP should be attentive to these caveats at portfolio level, and with respect to each project’s specific case and circumstances.

Furthermore, the process of scoping duration should not be arbitrary – although there is evidence that it may have been for several UNDP GEF projects.⁵⁸ The project’s duration should be attuned to its complexity and to the capacity of the executing agency to implement it, all plausible risks considered. It should also consider the risks of delays in mobilizing the project, from CEO Endorsement to PRODOC signature, and then on to the conclusion of the Inception Phase – which in the case of Coastal Resilience Project lasted 23 months. Figure 4 makes explicit the very lengthy processes required for getting a GEF project approved and started.

The TE sees some issues in these processes, in the case of the Coastal Resilience Project, and draws some **LESSONS** on the importance of extant circumstances affecting the project and its duration. Hopefully, the lessons can apply in future projects in Tunisia, and at the level of the UNDP GEF portfolio.

The Coastal Resilience Project needed to request up to three milestone extensions. Although this seems like much, it is not uncommon among UNDP GEF project. The last request for milestone extension was in 2021 and it was a complicated process, as witnessed by the TE.

In correctly scoping *the ideal duration* for the Coastal Resilience Project, it is important to understand conditions the project’s lifecycle in its entirety. One needs to understand the stakes during the key phases: **(i) at the beginning of the project** (i.e. during project preparation, approval and post-approval, including before and during the full project’s inception phase), **(ii) during peak implementation** (normally, 2-3 years from the end of Inception Phase), and **(iii) during the project’s terminal period**. For the Coastal Resilience Project, these three phases lasted a good 10 years for the entire duration of the project cycle, from cradle to grave.

To understand the stakes, we also need to consider the impact of **external circumstances** that affected the project. Two types of issues caused some disturbance to the project’s normal functioning, including as witnessed by TE consultant during the assignment:

- (i) political risks and other circumstances have deeply affected the project**, both during the project’s mobilization period and in its terminal phase. We highlight political circumstances linked to the aftermath of the Arab Spring and its implications for institutional stability in Tunisia. Institutional instability within APAL affected the effective kick-start of the project. It is possible that UNDP have could have done more to accelerate the process. In turn, in the project’s tail end we highlight the covid-19 pandemic and the July 2021 political events. Both events also affected the project in different ways.
- (ii) UNDP NCE’s Team inflexible approach to project duration adjustments.** This is considered an ‘external circumstance’ because neither the project team, nor the UNDP Country Office (CO) had any say on important decisions made at the by the NCE Team on the project’s duration. Even though the decision of denying the project a third extension was later reversed by the NCE Team, it caused quite a bit of disturbance to the project team’s normal functioning.

Based on the data in Figure 4 and other evidence, some important points concerning project milestones stand out:

- According to the PRODOC’s cover page, the total duration of the full project was slated to last approximately 6 years (or 5.9 years, as the calculated difference between “Sep-2014” and “Aug-2020”).

⁵⁸ With reference to a certain unspoken tradition in UNDP GEF which dictates that all GEF projects should last 5 years in average.

This information contrasts with the budget section of the same PRODOC, which includes only five columns with planned financial years.⁵⁹

- In spite of the nominal start and end dates on its cover, the PRODOC was signed some 4 months later, on 24 December 2014, which means, in practical terms, that the project’s “year 1” would be 2015.⁶⁰ Yet, there were more delays, beyond the 18-month delay already experienced between GEF CEO Endorsement and PRODOC signature.
- The project’s first disbursement happened approximately in September 2015. More importantly, the project manager and the team were only hired in November 2015 – i.e. almost a year after PRODOC signature. At that point, it can be assumed that the project must have had all the necessary conditions for starting implementation. The inception phase then starts counting and it formally ends with the Inception Workshop date.
- In theory, once the PPG phase is completed and the endorsement of the GEF’s CEO is attained, there is a race with a series of steps to ensure that a GEF project can effectively start. The TE considers that, for the Coastal Resilience Project, ‘effective project implementation’ starts counted only in July/August 2015, after Inception Phase activities were completed. From the UNDP’s perspective, the **nominal duration** of a project starts counting from PRODOC signature.
- Regardless, there was a relatively long hiatus, counting 5 months between the end of the PPG phase (marked by the milestone ‘CEO Endorsement Request’ on July 2014) and the PRODOC signature date (on 24th December 2014). This period was followed by an even longer gap of 18 months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Report date (July 2016). The Mid-term Review (MRT) called this a “*relatively lengthy mobilization period of the project*”.
- Figure 4 shows graphically that the time elapsed to get the project up and running, after accomplishing the necessary preparations, implied in a project mobilization phase of almost 2 years. Such delays would need to be compensated somehow, normally through the approval of milestone extensions.
- Figure 4 also shows that the official MRT took place between June and August 2019, after a first frustrated attempt to complete the exercise in October 2018. That too, can be considered an external circumstance (the risk of a consultant not delivering) -- and may have resulted in further delays.
- The project obtained twice the approval from the NCE Team (formerly UNDP GEF Unit) for extending project duration, first in 2018 and then in 2020. A third request for extension was approved in August 2021, but only after an initial rejection that caused quite a stir in the project’s routine. More specifically:
 - The first duration extension added 12 months to the project’s duration in 2019, on account of delays in getting the project off the ground and also in kick-starting the MTR.
 - A second duration extension was later approved in 2020, adding 6 months to the duration. The justification was based on the covid-19 impact on the project.
 - A third request for duration extension had been filed by the UNDP CO in 2021, on account of the devastating impacts of the covid pandemic in Tunisia, stressing that it was much more serious in 2021 than in the year before. Initially, the NCE Team did not grant this third request and imposed operational closure by June 2021.
 - If the 2021 milestone extension had not been granted, the project would run the risk of having to send back funds to the GEF of \$400-700K (as calculated by the project manager). Several crucial activities would not be completed, possibly including the TE assignment. The TE consultant considered the initial refusal unreasonable.

In June 2021, the TE consultant was called upon to help the project and the RTA justify the third request for extension for approval. After analyzing the project’s milestone data, the TE proposed, through its Inception Report, an operational closure date by end June 2022, and if not possible, then by end December 2021. The main justification is that the **previous milestone extensions had not really compensated for the time lost in the beginning of the project. Neither have these extensions actually compensated for the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic** on the project. All in all, the project still had a “deficit of time” on its books, large budgets to deliver upon, and several on-going processes of strategic nature, which needed **time** to be concluded.

⁵⁹ Refer e.g. to the black line in Figure 1 in the Executive Summary, representing the annual distribution of the project’s budget as of the PRODOC. Note how it contrasts with the annual planning conducted during implementation and with actual expenditure.

⁶⁰ In practical terms, no expenditure would have been allowed in 2014, because UNDP’s financial year had already closed on that date. The project’s first disbursement could only happen from Jan 2015 on, and after UNDP’s operational end-of-year recess.


Currently, operational closure is foreseen in December 2021, after the NCE Team’s decision of denying the extension request was reversed.

The **FINDING** of the TE on the realistic timing for project closure was based on the assessment of the 2021 AWP and the volume of complex activities still remaining to be implemented. Other reasons are the following:

1. Through the first and second milestone extensions, which together added up to 18 months, the project had not been adequately compensated for the delays in project start – noting that the project mobilization period lasted almost 2 years (or 23 months).
2. The second request milestone extension, which was justified by the impact of covid-19, was insufficient, especially when considering the serious aggravation of the covid-19 crisis in Tunisia around July 2021. These were coupled by the complications that were suddenly imposed by the July 2021 political events.
3. The reasons alleged by the NCE Team for initially denying the project’s third request for extension appeared categorical (“because it is the third request”).

FINDING Across the UNDP GEF portfolio, evaluators will likely find a variety of circumstances behind delays in project start. A 23-month delay experienced by the Coastal Resilience Project is not uncommon. Delays, which then create the need for milestone extensions, appear to be chronic in UNDP GEF projects. At the same time, the entire ‘controversy’ around the Coastal Resilience Project’s milestone extension request hides some deeper issues linked to poor project planning, scoping and operational risk management. These are the operational weaknesses that actually need to be addressed, so that the projects can effectively deliver. To underpin this finding, we refer to two quotes from the recent Performance Audit of UNDP GEF projects concerning, on the one hand, delays in project start and, on the other, requests for milestone extension. Figure 5 quotes from the mentioned Audit and indicate 35% of UNDP GEF projects requested milestone extension. It also mentions some of the challenges behind this pattern.

Figure 5. Quotes from the 2020 Performance Audit of UNDP GEF projects⁶¹




The RTA informed that, since the release of the Performance Audit of UNDP GEF projects in December 2020, the issues depicted in Figure 5 are being addressed at the portfolio level by UNDP, alongside other perhaps even more serious issues. We learned that UNDP is introducing more rigorous standard operating procedures (SOPs). Apparently, the initial denial of Coastal Resilience Project’s request for milestone extension was due to the strict enforcement of an existing procedure concerning milestone extensions. Still, there are caveats worth looking at.

⁶¹ UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management>, accessed on 13/08/21.

The current template for UNDP GEF PRODOCs does include specific text on project extension requests, making explicit the rules that must currently apply to any new UNDP GEF project. In turn, the PRODOC for Coastal Resilience Project did not mention the item “Project extensions”, or any specific rule that should be applied when extension requests are needed, or when delays faced. The TE questions if the new rules or SOPs should really apply retroactively, or if decisions on milestone extension should be the result of careful analysis of circumstances – especially when dealing with old projects, such as the Coastal Resilience Project, designed 10 years ago.

There are indeed some statements in the PRODOC for the Coastal Resilience concerning project start, quoted e.g. in Figure 6. It mentions that the Inception Workshop, for which a long list of technical expectations is included, “will be held within the first 2 months of project start”. The TE consultant, who was UNDP GEF RTA for more than 10 years, has never witnessed a project that would both meet the 2-month standard for holding an Inception Workshop, and upholding at the same time the high technical requirements of a meaningful inception phase, stated in the PRODOC (Figure 6). It is simply not practically possible to do both within the operational environment of UNDP GEF projects. To circumvent such impossible requirements concerning the Inception Phase, projects will opt for a quick “political launch” of the project, and thereafter work on several fronts with due calm for fulfilling the numerous technical requirements a meaningful inception phase. Above all, given the constraints of the mentioned ‘operational environment’, it is very difficult for both UNDP and Implementing Partners to recruit entire projects teams within two months counted from PRODOC signature -- let alone having the teams be ready with the necessary planning for a ‘technically meaningful inception’ within such short time. Statements such as those in Figure 6 completely lack realism, in addition to missing to differentiate an ‘Inception Workshop’ from an ‘Inception Phase’. The former is the culmination of the latter.

Figure 6. Quote from the PRODOC on timelines expected in the Project start phase



FINDING: This TE consultant thinks that the expectations towards UNDP GEF project milestones and timelines, as expressed through project documents, are quite unrealistic. The evidence and analysis that underpins this finding is included in Section 2.1) PROJECT START AND DURATION – CONTEXTUALIZED (including the [TIMELINE](#)

figure), in which the issues of project milestones is thoroughly discussed. Because the issue of project delays is chronic and affects the UNDP GEF portfolio more broadly⁶², efforts should go towards **addressing the causes of delays**, and also towards consolidating, at the portfolio level, a more realistic analysis of context and circumstances, alongside improved planning and time scoping practices across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective project mobilization and Inception Phase.

The TE analysis included herein has also shown that much of the debate on milestones depends on what constitutes the ‘project start date’. And this depends on when one starts counting. There are different approaches.

We note in Figure 4 that the **“nominal implementation period” counts 7 years** from PRODOC signature to the currently planned operational closure; while the PRODOC’s cover page seemed to have prescribed a total duration of 6 years. The same PRODOC also included unrealistically high annual budgets packed into 5 years and expected the inception phase to be over after 2 months. The project’s effective implementation period for the Coastal Resilience Project will have lasted 5.7 years, when the project closes next year. This is considered a rather good record of catching up with delays. This is one more reason why the TE consultant considered their third request for extension both needed and deserved.

The NCE Team refers to requests for milestone adjustments as **“no-cost extensions”**. This is because the GEF grant is ‘fixed’ and will not be increased, once the amounts had been approved by the GEF Council at PIF stage, and then later reconfirmed at the CEO Endorsement stage. According to the RTA, several projects end up treating the GEF grant as a given and “relax” in their implementation efforts, as long as they can transfer any unspent budgets to the following year. In UNDP, this process is called “budget rephasing”. The rephasing practice would invariably prolong project duration beyond what projects had been originally scoped to last in their project documents. The TE consultant agreed with the RTA that this also creates a negative incentive for project managers to deliver results in a timely manner. However, unless the nature of GEF grants changes, the issues linked to the mentioned negative incentive will not change.⁶³

Concerning the approach to milestone extensions, the TE notes that the problem for the NCE Team is of a different nature. Similar to the GEF grant, the GEF fee is also fixed and proportional to it. The NCE Team is mostly funded by the GEF fee.⁶⁴ Any changes to project’s milestones that extend project duration become a burden to the NCE Team, because the fee is allocated in time according to the project’s originally planned duration. The so-called “no-cost extensions” are therefore considered quite costly by the NCE Team, irrespective of whether requests for extension may come from a genuine and well justified project need.

Also here, the TE considers that it is important to address the root cause of the problem, which are poor project planning and scoping, plus other reasons cited in Figure 5. It is also important not to penalize the project with unrealistic timelines.

2.2) PROBLEMS THAT THE PROJECT SOUGHT TO ADDRESS

The following are the problems that the project was slated to address:

- The update of regulatory and legislative frameworks to reduce the impacts of climate change effects on the coastal development and make the existing infrastructure more resilient. Particular attention would be

⁶² See in particular this source: UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management>, accessed on 13/08/21.

⁶³ There are signs that this may change in GEF8 – from “given grants” to “competitive grants”. Yet, this will not affect the Coastal Resilience Project.

⁶⁴ A letter from the UNDP Resident Representative in Tunisia confirming budget availability for the oversight activities of UNDP's NCE made it possible for the milestone extension, as filed in June 2021, to be granted.

given to the creation of an environment conducive for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management which takes into account risks of climate change.

- The application of flexible and innovative measures to reduce risks linked to climate change such as protective measures (for example, restoration of dunes and wet zones) and best practices for the management of the water (for example, the controlled extraction of groundwater reserves to prevent saltwater intrusion) in line with the Integrated Coastal Zone Management.
- The provision of a better climate information for monitoring coastal hazards, early warning system and planning climate-resilient development.
- The mobilization of public and private funds for Coastal Resilience Projects in national and local level by making projects more bankable. In fact, both the public and private sectors were expected to serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring.
- The introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors to ensure resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas, which depends on the interplay between public and private sector

2.3) IMMEDIATE AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

The project objective is to promote innovative adaptation strategies, technologies and financing options to address the additional risks posed by climate change on populations and key socio-economic sectors in Tunisia's most vulnerable coastal areas.

The above is the immediate objective and the one that the project must achieve through the achievement of its outcomes. The project document does not make reference to a specific "development objective" distinct from the objective in the paragraph above. Yet, from a programmatic point of view, the project is linked to various frameworks that include high level objectives, outcomes and outputs.

Relevant UNDAF (2015-2019) outcomes for this project include the following and are linked to UNDAF's Axis 2: Inclusive, Sustainable and Resilient Economic and Social Models:

- **UNDAF / Country Program Outcome:** *By 2019, a new fair, inclusive, sustainable and resilient model of economic and social development implemented by the Government, generating wealth and jobs;*
 - **CPD output:** *4.4. The frameworks and systems for improved disaster risk prevention and management are developed to enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems.*
 - **CPAP output:** *output 4.4.1: Participatory governance, which promotes prevention, preparedness and response to disasters and to the effects of climate change, is promoted.*

In addition, **Output 2.3.1 of the Global Strategic Plan of UNDP (2018-2021)** sets out a global environmental benefit set for the project, namely: *"Data and risk-informed development policies, plans, systems and financing incorporate integrated and gender-responsive solutions to reduce disaster risks, enable climate change adaptation and mitigation, and prevent risk of conflict"*.

From the GEF's point of view, the following are the applicable high-level strategic frameworks to which the project is expected to contribute:

- **Applicable GEF Strategic Objective and Program, Objective 2:** *Increase adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change, including variability, at local, national, regional and global level*
 - **Applicable GEF Expected Outcomes:**
 - *Outcome 2.1: Mainstreamed adaptation in broader development frameworks at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas*
 - *Outcome 2.2: Increased adaptive capacity to climate change in development sectors*

- *Outcome 3.1: Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures*
- **Applicable GEF Outcome Indicators:**
 - *Number and type of development frameworks that include adaptation measures*
 - *Number and type of natural resource assets created, maintained or improved to withstand conditions from climate variability and change*
 - *Number and type of development frameworks and sectorial strategies that include specific budgets for adaptation actions*

The measurement of the contribution to the GEF's frameworks is ensured primarily through the completion of the project's Tracking Tool, which has been completed in 2015 (baseline), 2019 (mid-term) and by project end (2021). A analysis and validation of the tracking tool, as it had been initially delivered, is included in row 3 of Table 4. The numbers for baseline, targets and achievements by mid-term had several internal contradictions which had been addressed in the end-of-project tracking tool prepared in September 2021. An analysis of the 2021 Tracking Tool is appended to this report.

The specific contribution of the project to the UNDP and UN frameworks is normally reported through internal reporting systems of UNDP and the UN Resident Coordination services. The TE has not been made privy to the relevant information. It was therefore left outside the TE's scope.

2.4) BASELINE INDICATORS ESTABLISHED

The project design has a comprehensive presentation of baseline indicators for project objective and outcomes.

The MTR has already conducted a thorough analysis of how SMART project indicators were – i.e. Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound. (Refer to the MRT Report, *Table 3.1: "MTR SMART Analysis for Project Result Framework Indicators"*.)

The MTR analysis relating to the above pointed out that project indicators were generally considered SMART, with a few exceptions listed in the mentioned table. Also, there were concrete suggestions from the MTR for incorporating slight changes to the formulation of one or two indicators to add clarity. Yet, the TE notes that the proposed changes were not followed up on in the 2020 and 2021 PIRs.

In case the 2021 is still a draft, it could be a chance to make this correction, although of limited utility at this stage. We mention the following one, which are important, because two of them is an objective-level indicators, and also because the TE's findings here can have implications for on-going project reporting through the 2021 PIR and end of the project Tracking Tool.

The above topics on indicators are specifically discussed in Table 6, building further from the MTR analysis.

Table 4. SMART Analysis of Project Results Framework (following up on the MTR analysis)

#	Description of Indicator BASELINE End of project target level SMART Analysis by the MTR	Comments										
1	<p>Objective level, Indicator 1. Amount of public funds mobilized to support coastal adaptation</p> <p>BASELINE: Limited domestic financing mechanisms for coastal adaptation exist and no financing exists on regional and local levels. Furthermore, the issues of coastal erosion, submersion, salinization and flooding are exacerbated by a limited number of applied coastal adaptation responses which take into account the long-term implications of CC. Diversified, locally-sourced and environmentally-friendly coastal protection technologies are required.</p> <p>By the end of the project, a disbursement of at least 10 m USD is accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="324 678 678 758"> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>M</td> <td>A</td> <td>R</td> <td>T</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>?</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> </table>	S	M	A	R	T	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	<p>BY THE MTR: The MTR questions whether US\$10M is an achievable amount to accrue especially post Revolution and amidst economic consolidation within Tunisia.</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The TE highlights e.g. the achievement of an important target that constitutes an objective indicator. It proposed that, by project end, a disbursement of at least 10 m USD would have been accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation. In the draft 2021 PIR, the project reported 103% progress towards the target for this indicator. According to progressive reporting through the PIRs, we learned that, by project end, APAL managed to mobilize approx. \$10.32 M in coastal adaptation. Indeed, the project reported on ‘funds mobilization’ from various sources, including public finance, which was on focus in the indicator measurement. Although these are different concepts, the progress is commendable.</p> <p>The project is slated to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options. Although the finance mobilized cannot be considered ‘innovative’, the achievement of this target is commendable in light of current challenges to investment mobilization faced by Tunisia these days.</p> <p>Today, APAL is implementing other adaptation projects that equally focus on the coastal zone. Tunisia managed to mobilize several other adaptation projects funded e.g. by the EU, Germany, Canada and others, and which focus on other adaptation sectors (water, agriculture, etc.). The project’s relevance is further enhanced by the fact that it was aimed at changing approaches to a climate induced problem: from a reactive approach with a bias towards hard engineering works, to a more flexible, holistic and gender-sensitive one, based on sound policies, strengthened institutions and local participation. Therefore, the project helped build a very important baseline of climate change adaptation in the country.</p> <p>At the same time, the catalytic interplay between public and private sector was not very well explored by the project, adding some level of risk to the sustainability of project results. It is also difficult to say if the mobilization of funds by APAL was indeed a result of the project or if it would have happened independently from the project. Much of the funds reported under the resource mobilization indicator is to a great extent driven by financiers.</p>
S	M	A	R	T								
Y	Y	?	Y	Y								
2	<p>Objective level, Indicator 2. Djerba: Percentage of coastal hotels working in cooperation with local municipalities to implement locally-sourced, naturally available soft protection measures (e.g., sea grass and sand layering)</p> <p>BASELINE: Only four hotels are employing soft protection measures to support coastal erosion (ganivelles and geotubes⁶⁵). However, such soft interventions are being made ad-hoc without an idea of upstream hydrological, ecological and geomorphological processes.</p> <p>[By project end,] 50 coastal hotels in the targeted areas implementing soft protection measures in alignment with recommended adaptation</p>	<p>BY THE MTR: The MTR questions whether it is ever achievable for 50 separate hotels in Djerba to pro-actively implement soft intervention measures. It is recommended that this is reduced to no more than 25 hotels.</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The TE agrees with the MTR that the indicator target should have been amended. The TE also notes that the reporting in the 2021 seems not to add up when referring to 4 plus 3 hotels in Djerba (n=7) and a 50% achievement of target.</p> <p>It is true that with the COVID-19 crisis, targets that were considered hardly attainable by the MTR should be discounted. However, this topic also refers to the catalytic interplay between public and private sector was not very well explored by the project (as commented further up). It would have been strategic to seek more engagement with the private sector.</p> <p>See also below [*] a comment relating to the completion of the Tracking Tool relating to this indicator.</p>										

⁶⁵ Elsewhere in the PRODOC’s Results Framework, the following is stated “APAL’s experience with the installation of geotextile tubes in the El Mezraya zone indicated that materials are too fragile.”

#	Description of Indicator BASELINE End of project target level SMART Analysis by the MTR	Comments																																																								
	<p>options outlined in Djerba’s risk-based spatial management plan (Component 1)</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>M</td> <td>A</td> <td>R</td> <td>T</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>?</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> </table>	S	M	A	R	T	Y	Y	?	Y	Y																																															
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Y	Y	?	Y	Y																																																						
3	<p>Outcome 2, Indicator 1. Number of soft adaptation measures implemented which improve coastal conditions by increasing resilience to absorb change as measured by the following <i>[sub-indicators]</i>:</p> <p>BASELINE: Existing baseline actions and projects, such as under APAL’s National Coastal Erosion Protection Programme, the ICZM project, and the KFW project consist mainly of reactive, end-of-pipeline solutions such as artificial sand nourishment and ‘hard’ protection measures (e.g., shore embankment, breakwater construction). Although the MedWetCoast project offered encouraging sand dune rehabilitation results, rehabilitation solutions are not cost-effective because required materials must be imported. Similarly, APAL’s experience with the installation of geotextile tubes in the El Mezraya zone indicated that materials are too fragile. Presently, 5 soft coastal protection and water management measures have been implemented in Djerba Ganivelles, dune stabilization with native grasses, geotextile tubes, wind-breaking fences, water recycling and purification practices in some hotels)</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <th>#</th> <th>S</th> <th>M</th> <th>A</th> <th>R</th> <th>T</th> </tr> <tr> <td>1a</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>?</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1b</td> <td>Y</td> <td>?</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1c</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1d</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>?</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1e</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> <td>Y</td> </tr> </table>	#	S	M	A	R	T	1a	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	1b	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	1c	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	1d	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	1e	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	<p>COMMENT BY THE TE: There are five sub-indicators to this outcome-level indicator, and they all relate to the Tracking Tool Indicators as follows:</p> <p><i>GEF SCCF Outcome 1.1: Vulnerability of physical assets and natural systems reduced > Indicator 2: Type and extent of assets strengthened and/or better managed to withstand the effects of climate change:</i></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Unit of measurement</th> <th>Baseline at CEO Endorsement</th> <th>Target at CEO Endorsement</th> <th>Actual at mid-term</th> <th>Actual at completion</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>ha of land</td> <td>670.00 [NOT CORRECT]</td> <td>[NOT COMPLETED]</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>[NOT COMPLETED]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>km of coast</td> <td>22.00 [NOT CORRECT]</td> <td>[NOT COMPLETED]</td> <td>1.00</td> <td>[NOT COMPLETED]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>numbers of hotels *</td> <td>4</td> <td>50</td> <td>0</td> <td>[NOT COMPLETED]</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: There is a need for consistency. This can perhaps be introduced in the end of project Tracking Tool, retroactively. Mistakes in the Tracking Tool here appear to be simple typos, but with important consequences for the project’s own reporting and making the lack of a consistent M&E System glaring. The target for “ha of land” should have been “670 km” and the baseline “0ha”. The target for “km of coast” should be 670 km and the baseline “0ha”. For the number of hotels the baseline and target seem correct, except that this tracking tool indicator actually relates to Objective level, Indicator 2 (analyzed in the box above). For all Tracking Tool indicators relating to physical assets, the completion by project end is missing and the one at mid-term seems inconsistent with the PIR. It would have been important for the project to actually follow up on the MTR’s general recommendation on the maintenance of a consistent M&E System. This is an important project lesson.</p> <p>Finally, the baseline for this indicator in the Results Framework is descriptive and not useful for monitoring soft adaptation measures implemented. The linkage to the Tracking Tool should have been made.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION: In the future, indicators that monitor both soft and hard adaptation measures should make be harmonized with the Tracking Tool and make direct reference to it in the PRODOC’s Results Framework.</p> <p><i>[Detailed commenting per sub-indicators is shown below:]</i></p>	Unit of measurement	Baseline at CEO Endorsement	Target at CEO Endorsement	Actual at mid-term	Actual at completion	ha of land	670.00 [NOT CORRECT]	[NOT COMPLETED]	0.00	[NOT COMPLETED]	km of coast	22.00 [NOT CORRECT]	[NOT COMPLETED]	1.00	[NOT COMPLETED]	numbers of hotels *	4	50	0	[NOT COMPLETED]
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4	<p>1a• Length of coast preserving public open space and natural ecosystems</p> <p><i>[BASELINE: not established, except in the Tracking Tool but lacking clarity]</i></p> <p>[By project end]: Djerba: Length preserving 10 km of coast public open space and natural ecosystems [target was originally 20km]</p>	<p>BY THE MTR: The MTR [had questioned] whether 20km of dune fixation can be achieved. It is proposed that this figure is reduced to circa 10km.</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The project adopted the 10km mark, one of the few MTR suggestions to indicators that seemed adopted. The project reported in the 2021 PIR that “6,08 Kilometers out of 10 km of coast public beach preserved with the Setting up of Ganivelles (wooden palisades)” and referred to it as a 70% achievement of target – while 60% seems more appropriate. The indicator achievement should be illustrated by maps and aerial pictures that would demonstrate the progress and document it – ensuring better chances of sustainability of physical achievements on the ground.</p>																																																								

#	Description of Indicator BASELINE End of project target level SMART Analysis by the MTR	Comments
5	<p>1b • Area of wetlands with improved ecological conditions</p> <p><i>[BASELINE: not established, except in the Tracking Tool but lacking clarity]</i></p> <p>[By project end:] Both sites: 670 hectares of wetlands with improved ecological conditions</p>	<p>BY THE MTR: The MTR [questioned] how ecological conditions are actually being monitored in order to ensure that the 670ha of wetlands are improving ecosystem services. The phrase “seek to support enhancement” would be better.</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The TE agrees with the MTR comment. The recommendation remains actual and can still be addressed by the project in the current PIR. The same comment as above on the need to document progress through maps and aerial photos remain. These are relatively cheap today with the popularization of portable drones. In any case, in the 2020 PIR the project reported: “An area of 500 hectares of 670 hectares of wetlands in the Ras R’mel arrow of Djerba had its ecological conditions improved with the fixation of the sand dunes and 200 hectares of the Ramli cropping systems in the lagoons of Ghar El Melh are recognized as Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems”. The TE cannot verify the above, as this evaluation is remote.</p>
6	<p>1c • Length of coast with stable dune fixation</p> <p><i>[BASELINE: not established]</i></p> <p>[By project end:] • Ghar El Melh: 2 kilometres of living shorelines implemented</p>	<p>BY THE MTR: The MTR questions the use of the term “living shoreline”. This term was used in the Egypt Adaptation to Climate Change in the Nile Delta project and was rejected as a term in the Inception phase of that project. Whilst no change is recommended for the current project delivery, it is strongly recommended that clarity is provided between shoreline management and ICZM is presented and understood in any future follow on proposal (GCF etc).</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The TE agrees with the MTR comment. In 2020, the project reported in the PIR: “2Km out of 20km of dune fixation completed”. The same comment as in the two above boxes on the need to document progress through maps and aerial photos remain. The TE cannot verify the above, as this evaluation is remote.</p>
7	<p>1d • Number of kilometers of living shorelines implemented</p> <p><i>[BASELINE: not established]</i></p> <p>[By project end:] 5% increase in hotels and agricultural land which use recycled water</p>	<p>BY THE MTR: No analytical comment required.</p> <p>COMMENT BY THE TE: The TE notes that the baseline the PIR reporting seems to enter into a different terrain concerning the use of water in hotels and agricultural land. The project describes actions concerning the certification process for Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS). A target of 5% does not make sense, when the baseline is not set. In this case, it should have been on the use of recycled water. Absolute numbers should be measured e.g. in thousands of cubic meters of water and be constrained to specific perimeters that the project would then focus on and monitor. Else, this sub-indicator is meaningless and should be dropped. The project mentions otherwise in the 2021 PIR: “In a partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture the project has also established in 2021 an Early Warning System for the agricultural use of treated wastewater in Aghir water treatment station in Djerba. This will enable online analysis of water quality and will allow the use of treated water from the Aghir water treatment station in Djerba to supply the Irrigated agricultural area on the Djerba coast. This irrigated perimeter PPI Djerba Aghir covers an area of 50 hectares is being extended with the creation of a new area of 70 hectares. This PPI is mainly dedicated to the cultivation of olive trees and forage crops and consumes 140 000 cubic metres m3 of treated wastewater water.”</p>

2.5) MAIN STAKEHOLDERS

During the project design phase an in-depth stakeholder analysis took place. To the extent possible, the gender aspect was highlighted. The purpose of the analysis was to identify main potential stakeholders and to consider their potential roles and responsibilities in the implementation and guidance of the Project.

There have also been at least two ministerial reforms affecting the relative functions and attributions of line ministries in Tunisia since the project started.⁶⁶ Some of the institutional structures that were mentioned in the PRODOC in section 2.9 (*Stakeholder involvement*) no longer exist.

At the same time, APAL appointed a technical person to function as Project Director since the beginning. The constancy and dedication shown has helped the in different ways, including in the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders in central government institutions and at the local level, even though the engagement of private sector stakeholders appeared limited.

In [Section 3.1, Planned stakeholder participation](#) the topic is discussed in detail. Box 7 in Annex III provides a peek into what remote evaluations are like.

GENDER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE ASSEMBLAGE OF STAKEHOLDERS

In terms of project design and stakeholder engagement, the following Evaluation Question from the Matrix in [Annex V](#) is relevant:

To what extent mechanisms and policies in place have allowed results to be sustainable in terms of gender equality, women’s empowerment, fundamental rights and human development?

We also draw content from the PRODOC in Figure 7 and from stakeholder lists (reproduced in Table 8):

Figure 7. Comments specific statement concerning gender mainstreaming in the PRODOC

Categorical. Both men and women depend on natural resources for their livelihood. Yet, they may relate differently to these resources

There is limited evidence of this in the project documentation.

214. Furthermore, women have been considered in project development and will continue to be implicated in project implementation. Women are an important target group because they are more dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods. Climate change has a strong impact on the expected women beneficiaries who are living in rural regions and have limited mobility. In addition, women may be excluded from some activities due to cultural norms, or due to lack of capital and ownership arrangements that confer all rights to men in the family (Buhl 2005; Eriksen et al. 2007). This inequality is compounded by a lack of opportunities arising from limited access to education and information services which prohibit participation in decision-making. [...]

Identifying those female beneficiaries had not been done through project design. This was deferred to implementation when some sort of survey could be conducted by non-identified NGOs.

In the information era we are currently living, at least this barrier could have been addressed by the project with own means.

[...] Due to all of these reasons, this project is targeting women as potential beneficiaries of SDCF grants to support nursery development to produce locally-sourced, native vegetation which will be used in the extensive kilometers of coastline to be vegetated.

⁶⁶ The attributions of ministries respectively responsible for themes such as environment, ‘local affairs’, sustainable development, infrastructure, water, agriculture, development, investment, etc. have changed at least a couple of times during the project’s lifetime.

In the project’s approach to stakeholder engagement, and in the general list of project stakeholders and their role in the project, as of Table 8, there no explicit evidence of gender inclusion as an important concern.

The word “gender” appears only 7 times in the Project Document. There is a mention of the project’s linkage to Millennium Development Goal #3 (MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women), but there is no specific “gender marking” on the PRODOC’s cover page (except what may have been added post-factum – see Box 2 > Atlas Information through Open UNDP, which indicates that the project’s gender policy marker is “Gender Equality: Significant objective”).

PRODOC Section 2.9 (Stakeholder involvement) includes several statements in paragraph 214 concerning gender and the assemblage of stakeholders, which the TE cared to comment in Figure 7.

In PRODOC Annex 6 (Stakeholder Involvement Plan), the following is mentioned in in paragraph 239:

“239. The Stakeholders identified during project preparation will continue to be implicated in project implementation. A Stakeholder involvement plan has been created to provide a framework to guide interaction between implementing partners and the key stakeholders, particularly end-users to validate project progress. All Stakeholders involved in the baseline self-capacity assessment will be addressed again in order to track the efficacy of Stakeholder capacity building both operationally and technically. Also, gender-focused NGOs/CSOs will conduct a gender disaggregated survey indicating the receipt of alerts and adoption of financial services by women.”

We stress the last sentence in the above quote. Annex 6 of the PRODOC then describes the steps in the stakeholder engagement plan and further states in paragraph 245:

“245. Specifically, in Part 1, gender-focused NGOs/CSOs will continue to be implicated and consulted in order to ensure women are properly engaged/warned. They will also conduct the gender disaggregated survey.”

In the documentation shared by the project team with the TE, there is no specific evidence of such gender disaggregated survey, except in the 2016 PIR, when reporting against the project’ last project indicator (which reads as follows: “Outcome 3, Indicator 2. Percentage of APAL’s budget provided to community members (including NGOs/CSOs) so that they can finance community-based coastal adaptation measures”). The mentioned reporting in the 2016 PIR is as below:

“[Expert assessment] was conducted by the project regarding the socio-economic diagnosis and the integration of gender approach in the project components. This reference included quantitative and qualitative indicators on the current gender situation in both project sites. Within this framework, focus groups where [sic] conducted and an overview on the capacity of the community or NGOs/CSOs members to implement small adaptation projects was discussed.”

The formulation of Outcome 2 mentions “150,000 inhabitants” as beneficiaries. There is no narrative that explains how the figure was calculated. The number is not broken down by gender. The project may have helped build a very important baseline of climate change adaptation in the country. However, a gender-sensitive approach in the project was not an important concern in project design. It became one during implementation.

At the same time, during implementation, the mentioned indicator could have been broken down by gender. Yet, it was not.

The strengthening of gender-responsive strategies in crisis (conflict and disaster) prevention, preparedness and recovery has not been sufficiently incorporated into the project document. Hence, the mainstreaming of gender and women’s empowerment into project results would be insufficient, if only project design is considered – not least also in light of the project’s current gender tagging with “Gender Equality” as a “Significant Objective” (see Box 2).

From the limitations imposed by project design, as analyzed above, gender mainstreaming in the engagement of project stakeholders needs to be put into perspective vis-à-vis what the project achieved during implementation – and considering the UNDP gender mainstreaming frameworks in place requires gender equality to be a significant objective in the project. **This aspect is covered in a subsection of 2.6 further down.**

2.6) EXPECTED RESULTS

The Project Results Framework/Strategic Results Framework presents the logic and strategy of the project. Outcomes indicate change, since each one of the three project outcomes has, as the target, an altered future state.

The project reports against indicators at the objective level through two indicators that are not disaggregated by gender, and through eight indicators at the level of outcomes, including one indicator under Outcome 2 that is broken down in 5 sub-indicators in order to adequately quantify soft adaptation measures that are expected to be ‘physically implemented’ on the ground. Hence, it may be said that the project has **10 indicators in total** (2 + 8).

The MTR had assessed the key elements that compose the project’s Results Framework indicators and did not find any significant weaknesses that would impact upon final project delivery. A thorough analysis of these indicators had been included in the MTR (see MTR Report Table 3.1), and it even covered the extent to which each of the project’s indicators and sub-indicators were SMART⁶⁷. Most of them were indeed considered smart. Yet, the MTR made a few suggestions of adjustments to certain indicators, focusing primarily on Objective-level and Outcome 2 indicators.

The TE generally subscribes the analysis conducted by the MTR on project indicators, which had commented the following on certain indicators:

- **Concerning Objective-level indicator 1** (on the amount of public funds mobilized to support coastal adaptation), the MTR had questioned whether US\$10M was an achievable target, in light of post-Revolution economic context in Tunisia. In the 2021 PIR, the project reported full achievement of the target, although this could not be cross-verified due to the limitations of the TE (lack of a mission to the country).
- **Concerning Objective-level indicator 2** (on the percentage of coastal hotels in Djerba working in cooperation with local municipalities to implement locally-sourced, naturally available soft protection measures), the MTR had questioned whether a target of 50 separate hotels in Djerba would be an attainable target. In the 2021 PIR, the project reported 50% progress towards the indicator towards the target and preferred to refer to the involvement of hotels and representatives of the Regional Federation of Hoteliers (FRH) in the consolidation of new vision of sustainable and integrated development for Djerba island, in addition to reporting on training and other relevant activities.
- **Concerning Outcome 2, indicator 1** (on the number of soft adaptation measures implemented which improve coastal conditions by increasing resilience to absorb change), there were several proposals for adjusting the quantitative sub-indicators. Project reporting in the 2021 PIR is somewhat confusing, and it is difficult to discern the level of achievement for these rather relevant sub-indicators.

The TE analysis compared the changes suggested by the MTR in 2019 with the exact wording in PIRs for 2020 and 2021 (the latter is a draft) and concluded that **the suggestions made by the MTR on the indicators listed further up had not been taken into account.**

The Project Objectives has been Satisfactorily Achieved.

Justification based on project barriers follows:

⁶⁷ SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound.

The update of regulatory and legislative frameworks to reduce the impacts of climate change effects on the coastal development and make the existing infrastructure more resilient. Particular attention would be paid to the creation of an environment conducive for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management which takes into account climate change risks. **By project end**, at least two pieces of highly important policy or legal frameworks were expected to be informed by coastal dynamic modelling and adopted to account for climate risks affecting the coastal zone. Among the frameworks governing coastal management and the integration of climate risk into them, we mention: (1) an updated regulation on the Maritime Public Domain (DPM)⁶⁸; (2) steps towards Tunisia’s ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol (under the Barcelona Convention⁶⁹); and (3) the structuring of APAL to better fulfil its mandate. Improvements to other policies and legal frameworks, which also received project support.

On the above, the TE notes that it is not in the project’s mandate to secure governmental approval/ratification of such framework, but rather to support the process through essential technical inputs.

The application of flexible and innovative measures to reduce risks linked to climate change – or to “support resilience” (as proposed by the MTR). Such measures would include protective measures (for example, restoration of dunes and wet zones) and best practices for the management of the water (for example, the controlled extraction of groundwater reserves to prevent saltwater intrusion) in line with the Integrated Coastal Zone Management. **By project end**, risk-based spatial management plans were developed for project sites, in particular, the Spatial Development Plan of Djerba island (SDAZs of Djerba) was an important achievement and tagged as a ‘climate plan’ for Djerba, as it was the first Tunisian spatial planning study taking climate change into account risk. Other studies that assessed different adaptation techniques and their feasibility supported the rollout of implement on the ground (e.g. the “Evaluation [or Assessment] of coastal climate risk and development of the emergency response plan”). By project end, the project reported that 6.08 Kilometers wooden or palm palisades (Ganivelles and Palmivelles) were installed on public beaches and wetlands, including in the Ramsar site Ras R’Mel on Djerba island.

On the above, the TE notes that reporting by the project in the PIR is not totally clear, nor is it illustrated by maps or aerial pictures. Also, the Tracking Tool has not been adequately completed by project, including by project end. It is therefore difficult to fully verify the achievements. The findings here are based, not on evidence, but on oral confirmation by the project manager. Also on the indicator targets concerning physical adaptation measures, the MTR suggested reducing the level of target ambitions for certain indicators on soft adaptation measures.

Concerning freshwater availability, the project’s most important achievement appears to be a 2018 study in collaboration with the Water Resources Management Unit (DGRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture, using numeric hydraulic modelling, in addition to some concrete measures on the ground conducted by NGOs for recuperating traditional water harvesting and storage tanks in Djerba.⁷⁰

There were otherwise a number of activities relating to water, agriculture and both combined, but it is difficult to connect those to the intended indicator targets, or to verify achievements, given the remote character of the TE assignment, let alone their sustainability.

Further to the above, it is worth mentioning that the project also organized a number of events and trained a large number of people, although it is not clear how many of them were women. A large scale event was organized in Djerba on 30th of March 2021 and recorded the participation of the Minister of Equipment and Interim Minister of Local Affairs and Environment and the participation of the mayors of Djerba and the Governor of Médenine with representatives of central and regional ministerial departments as well as the private sector and businessmen, and civil society.

The provision of a better climate information for monitoring coastal hazards, early warning system (EWS) and planning climate-resilient development. The project resulted in 2021 in e.g. in the establishment of an EWS for the agricultural use of treated wastewater in Aghir water treatment station in Djerba and in partnership with

⁶⁸ More information in: http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/Files/dpm.pdf.

⁶⁹ More information in: <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/> and more specifically, <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/tunisia>.

⁷⁰ See e.g. <https://www.ajem.tn/fesguietna>, whose representatives were interviewed by the TE.

the Ministry of Agriculture. Other achievements linked to the installation of tidal gauge, buoys, and the collection and management of oceanographic data will take time before they can constitute an EWS. The advances on planning climate-resilient development have otherwise been highlighted.

The mobilization of public and private funds for Coastal Resilience Projects in national and local level by making projects more bankable. The introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors to ensure resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas. In fact, both the public and private sectors were expected to serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring. The project resulted in the publication of a study titled ‘Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia’ in 2019. The project also reported a number of sub-projects executed by NGOs/CSOs funded by the SCCF project, while the relevant indicator pointed out to APAL continuing to fund them from own budget. The catalytic interplay between public and private sector was not very well explored by the project, adding some level of risk to the sustainability of project results. Decisions on conceding some of the funds reported under the resource mobilization indicator are to a great extent driven by donors / financiers. It is therefore difficult to say if the mobilization of funds by APAL was indeed a result of the project, or if it would have happened independently from the project.

The summary and justification of achievements per Outcome are included in Table 5 further down.

Table 5. Status of end-of-project achievements on the basis of project indicators and ratings per Outcome

LFA elements / Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Verification by the TE	Relevant PIR quote and Notes
Objective: To promote innovative adaptation strategies, technologies and financing options to address the additional risks posed by climate change on populations and key socio-economic sectors in Tunisia's most vulnerable coastal areas			Satisfactory (S)	
1. Amount of public funds mobilized to support coastal adaptation	<p>Tunisia's 2008 SNC coastal study indicated that the economic impact of climate change related SLR on agriculture and tourism is expected to cost 0.63% of the GDP/year, or approximately US\$1 billion. The current national coastal protection budget is limited at 10.4 m USD. This budget is being used to support site-specific projects, using predominantly hard engineering interventions, to reduce coastal erosion. Current interventions do not consider the use of an integrated approach to adapt to climate change (e.g., holistic watershed thinking or a Whole of Systems approach).</p> <p>4. BASELINE: Limited domestic financing mechanisms for coastal adaptation exist and no financing exists on regional and local levels</p> <p>Furthermore, the issues of coastal erosion, submersion, salinization and flooding are exacerbated by a limited number of applied coastal adaptation responses which take into account the long-term implications of CC. Diversified, locally sourced and environmentally-friendly coastal protection technologies are required.</p>	1.TARGET: By the end of the project, a disbursement of at least 10 m USD is accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation	<p>\$10.3 or 103% of target</p> <p>Target surpassed</p>	<p>"The total cumulative budget allocated to coastal protection and innovative interventions from the beginning of the project till 2021 is around 10,32 Million \$. Indeed, till 2020, the cumulative budget was around 7,37 Million \$ and in 2021, APAL obtained 2,95 Million \$ from the national government's budget (8,3 Million Tunisian dinar) to the management of coastline and the protection of Rafrac, Chaffar, Slimane and Hergla beaches against coastal erosion. (According to finance law of 2021)."</p>
2.Djerba: Percentage of coastal hotels working in cooperation with local municipalities to implement locally sourced, naturally available soft protection measures (e.g., sea grass and sand layering)	2. BASELINE: Only four hotels are employing soft protection measures to support coastal erosion (ganivelles and geotubes). However, such soft interventions are being made ad-hoc without an idea of upstream hydrological, ecological and geomorphological processes.	<p>2. TARGET 25 [*] coastal hotels in the targeted areas implementing soft protection measures in alignment with recommended adaptation options outlined in Djerba's risk-based spatial management plan (Component 1)</p> <p><i>[* target reduced from 50 hotels to 25 – based MTR suggestion.]</i></p>	<p>4 + 3 hotels in Djerba, or < 30%</p> <p>Below target achievement</p> <p>Reporting in the 2021 PIR was somewhat off topic.</p>	<p>"Indeed, the large-scale information event organized on March 30th, 2021, in Djerba on the results of the SDAZS recorded the participation and commitment of 4 hotels, businessmen and potential investors in the tourism sector. Also, the exchanges conducted around the beaches occupation plans (POP) and discussions for a better management of the beaches in front of hotels allowed a mobilization of 3 hoteliers and several beach operators at the level of the island of Djerba [...] it should be noted that this sector is experiencing a significant slowdown following the impacts of the COVID-19 sanitary crisis. This has undoubtedly had a significant effect on the commitment and participation of this sector in the implementation of soft adaptation options at the beach level."</p>

LFA elements / Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Verification by the TE	Relevant PIR quote and Notes
Outcome 1: Institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas is improved			Satisfactory (S)	
1. Number and type of policy or legal frameworks informed by coastal dynamic modelling and adopted to account for coastal risks	1. BASELINE Currently, in Tunisia there have been no concrete steps taken to incorporate climate change (CC) risks into policy and legal frameworks governing coastal management. Spatial planning regulations, building codes and Environmental Impact Assessments do not consider anticipated impacts of CC and erosion and flooding risks on the built environment, especially in tourism districts. Current rules for setbacks for coastal development are not based on site-specific assessments and do not consider well-established risk (e.g., Sea Level Rise, SLR).	1. TARGET: at least three pieces of regulation governing coastal management (such as, the Maritime Public Domain (DPM), Environmental Impact Assessment (EIE), the Code of Planning and Urban Development (CATU) and the new Environment Code) updated to consider SLR, erosion and coastal flooding in their policies / legal frameworks	100% Target achieved	
2. Creation of a national ICZM inter-ministerial platform to facilitate the coastal adaptation	2. BASELINE Although Tunisia ratified the Barcelona Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) protocol, implementation of the ICZM in terms of actions has been slow. Currently, the regional MedPartnership programme is trying to integrate CC into national strategies to begin implementation of ICZM in Tunisia. However, there have been no on-the-ground implementations of ICZM. The Ministries are also not collaborating with the National Shore Protection and Planning Agency (APAL) when they are implementing coastal development activities. Tunisia therefore lacks a mechanism to coordinate projects, strategies and programmes involving the coastal zone on the national and regional levels. (Other regional level ICZM initiatives in the Mediterranean include the Global Water Partnership, PEGASO and UNESO-IHP.)	2. TARGET: Creation of a national ICZM inter-ministerial platform to coordinate projects, strategies and programmes involving the coastal zone on the national and regional levels and to facilitate decision-making on sustainable and climate resilient coastal development	100% Target achieved	<i>“Indeed, 3 legal documents governing coastal management have integrated the climate risk considerations, coastal risks and adaptation strategies: (1) The Maritime Public Domain (DPM) [...] (2) Advocacy and support to facilitate the ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol [under Barcelona’s Convention] [... and ...] (3) Code of Planning and Urban Development (CATU)”⁷¹</i>
3. Number of risk-based spatial management plans used by the Municipalities of Houmet Essouk in Djerba and Sidi Ali Mekki in the northwest of the Gulf of Tunis	3. BASELINE Through the local Agenda 21 approach already applied in Tunisia, community informed sustainable planning is possible. However, a renewed local Agenda 21 which considers up to date coastal risks (erosion, SLR, flooding) is lacking in both sites of the project. Stakeholders have not been consulted about the current potential coastal risks in their region because there is no available risk planning tool to facilitate the application of options for ICZM and to develop site specific design criteria for sustainable development including appropriate adaptation strategies and flexible pathways.	3. TARGET: 1 risk-based spatial management plan developed for the Municipalities of Houmet Essouk in Djerba and Sidi Ali Mekki in the northwest of the Gulf of Tunis detailing prioritized, cost-effective ICZM and adaptation strategies / flexible pathways, targeting the agricultural sector (northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis site) and the tourism sector (Djerba)	100% Target achieved	<i>“In 2021 A climate plan, a reference framework, has been developed for the island of Djerba. It states that the national, regional and local authorities in Djerba have decided to change their development model. In strategic areas, Djerba invites stakeholders to get involved in a process to make the island a climate change resilient territory with a sustainable economy.”</i>

⁷¹ Other activities relating to legal and policy frameworks are mentioned in the PIR. The TE thinks that is sufficient to mention the three most important ones.

LFA elements / Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Verification by the TE	Relevant PIR quote and Notes
Outcome 2: Climate change resilience of priority coastal areas enhanced through implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures covering 22 km of coast and 670 hectares of wetland and benefiting 150,000 inhabitants			ASSUMED Satisfactory (S) (but not possible to fully verify)	Note: Because this evaluation is remote, it is not possible to verify on the ground. The assessment and satisfaction assumes that the numbers are accurate. The TE recommends UNDP to do independent verification on the ground, if still viable.
5. Number of soft adaptation measures implemented which improve coastal conditions by increasing resilience to absorb change as measured by the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Length of coast preserving public open space and natural ecosystems • Area of wetlands with improved ecological conditions • Length of coast with stable dune fixation • Number of kilometers of living shorelines implemented • Percentage increase in hotels and agricultural land which use recycled water 	6. BASELINE: Existing baseline actions and projects, such as under APAL’s National Coastal Erosion Protection Programme, the ICZM project, and the KFW project consist mainly of reactive, end-of-pipeline solutions such as artificial sand nourishment and ‘hard’ protection measures (e.g., shore embankment, breakwater construction). Although the MedWetCoast project offered encouraging sand dune rehabilitation results, rehabilitation solutions are not cost-effective because required materials must be imported. Similarly, APAL’s experience with the installation of geotextile tubes in the El Mezraya zone indicated that materials are too fragile. [By project start], 5 soft coastal protection and water management measures have been implemented in Djerba Ganivelles, dune stabilization with native grasses, geotextile tubes, wind-breaking fences, water recycling and purification practices in some hotels)	7. TARGET: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1a) • Djerba: Length preserving 10 km of coast public open space and natural ecosystems 1b) • Both sites: 670 hectares of wetlands with improved ecological conditions 1c) • Both sites: 20 Km of successful dune fixation 1d) • Ghar El Melh: 2 kilometres of living shorelines implemented 1e) • 5% increase in hotels and agricultural land which use recycled water 	1a) 6.08 km or 60% 1a) Below target achievement 1b) not possible to physically verify 1c) not possible to physically verify 1d) not possible to physically verify 1e) not possible to measure or verify Refer to the review of Tracking Tool in annexed to the TE Report for additional information on achievements.	Note: Reporting the 2021 PIR on these achievements lacks clarity and systematization, although results from numerous activities are reported upon. Refer to Table 4 for details.
2. Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) database with qualitative and quantitative indicators of soft coastal adaptation measures which contributes to the central coastal databank (SIAD)	2. BASELINE: No M&E system exists for adaptive coastal management: In spite of 13 years’ experience with coastal preservation projects, the National Shore Protection and Planning Agency (APAL) lacks technical and operational capacity to measure adaptation in accordance with ICZM. Coastal developments have been evaluated based on photographs and not any quantifiable indicators that dictate long-term success. Also, APAL’s developments themselves have been along limited reaches of coast, not accounting for interactions with the surrounding watershed and ecosystems.	2. TARGET: Establishment of a M&E database with qualitative and quantitative indicators of soft coastal adaptation measures which contributes to the central coastal databank (SIAD)	100% Target ASSUMED achieved but not possible to verify	“[...] Considerable progress was made during the reporting period to finalize the [Solutions] Database.”
3. Number of tide gauges and buoys installed to support coastal risk monitoring	3. In response to direct and indirect impacts from extreme weather conditions, the government has put an early warning system high on its agenda. Along the coast, alerts are planned to be used for seismic disturbances (tsunamis), flooding, coastal	3. TARGET: Three (3) tide gauge and 1 buoy to be procured and installed.	100% Target ASSUMED achieved but not possible to verify	“[...] 3 tide gauges and 1 buoy installed to support coastal risk monitoring Target 100% achieved.”

LFA elements / Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Verification by the TE	Relevant PIR quote and Notes
	<p>surges, strong winds and marrobbios. As a first step towards improved observation and forecasting capacity, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment with support from the GIZ Climate Change Assistance Programme, developed a concept plan for a national climate change multi-hazard monitoring and early warning system. Some initiatives such as the Environment Energy Programme (PEE) and the Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) (described in Section A.7) have provided coastal monitoring equipment to support alert generation. In spite of some point locations for observation and monitoring, the alerts and products from the regional center are not downscaled to suit Tunisia and updated by Tunisia specific observations.</p> <p>3. BASELINE: 4 buoys and 2 tide gauges procured and installed through the AAP project. 4 buoys procured and installed through the PEE project.</p>			
Outcome 3: Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures			ASSUMED Moderately Satisfactory (S) (but not possible to fully verify)	
1. Publication of long-term financing strategies to guide APAL in how to mobilize funds for coastal adaptation	<p>Tunisia's 2008 SNC Coastal study indicated that the total cost of adapting to a 0.5-meter SLR is approximately US\$1 billion. The Government of Tunisia currently has no financial mechanisms to cover the costs of SLR and erosion. Moreover, due to the difficulty in demonstrating cost-effective climate compatible measures to reduce water stress and impacts on coastal settlements, the Government does not have the knowledge on how to properly attract public and private financial mechanisms to support long-term coastal needs.</p> <p>1. BASELINE: No strategies which provide guidance on how to mobilize funds for coastal adaptation</p>	1.TARGET Publication of at least 1 long-term financing strategy to guide APAL in how to mobilize funds for coastal adaptation	<p>60-80%</p> <p>Target partially achieved (but not possible to fully verify)</p> <p><i>Note:</i> Apparently only part of the report had been availed to the TE. File "Rapport_1_phase1.pdf" by "IHE and TEC for UNDP and APAL. The report covers only "PARTIE 1 : cadrage économique et institutionnel sur le littoral tunisien". It is not clear if there are other parts. The report also seems to be divided into phases.</p>	<p>The PIR makes reference to the study "Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia".</p> <p><i>"In June 2019, an analysis of the economic costs and benefits of coastal development was completed to provide the public decision-makers with the elements essential to the economic and institutional plans that can guide public policy choices towards greater consideration of the impacts and risks expected from climate change."</i></p>
2. Percentage of APAL's budget provided to community members (including NGOs/CSOs) so that they can finance community-based coastal adaptation measures	<p>2. BASELINE: Community-run Coastal Resilience Projects (with the support of local NGOs/CSOs) have had much success in Tunisia. During the Africa Adaptation Project (AAP) 7 NGOs developed Adaptation Action Plans with the goal of promoting climate change awareness. In spite of the solid collaboration between APAL and NGOs/CSOs, investment mechanisms to support community-based adaptation are limited in Tunisia.</p>	2. TARGET 2% of APAL's budget supports community members or members of NGOs/CSOs to implement small adaptation projects (e.g., nursery development, sand dune fixation, etc.)	<p>?</p> <p>not possible to assess</p> <p>[In the lack of certainty, the TE reports with a question mark and a couple of notes]</p> <p><i>Note:</i> There seems to be a mismatch between the indicator and what the</p>	<p>The project reports on the use of SCCF resources and not on APAL's budget:</p> <p><i>"100% of progress has been made to date : 185 K\$ has been allocated for the small adaptation projects implemented by NGOs in the project sites"</i></p>

LFA elements / Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Verification by the TE	Relevant PIR quote and Notes
	Consequently, there are no financial mechanisms to support sustainability of coastal adaptation activities in the long-term. NGO/CSO engagement in coastal rehabilitation is hindered by their lack of financial resources.		project reports upon, which outlines the progress in approving grants to a number of NGO/CSO sub-projects. If the indicator should have changed to mention not APAL's budget, but "SCCF" or "adaptation finance more broadly", then the achievement would have been 100%.	<u>Note:</u> The TE also wishes to highlight that evidence from co-financing from APAL showed disappointing results. In case the indicator target is interpreted literally, then the achievements would be close to zero. In case a more flexible interpretation is allowed (considering SCCF funds under APAL's management as the implementing partner), then results would be quite positive.

Box 3. Notes on data verification on the ground and the limitations of a remote TE

First, the TE notes that UNDP Independent Evaluation Office is adapting its evaluation approach to evaluations in covid-19 times. We watched a new video in this UNDP site on the matter: <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/>. Some of the new UNDP guidance proposes the following [with ref. to quote to the right]:

In this TE exercise, several of these tools have been used. And even though some of the physical achievements (but not all) could not be directly verified by the TE due to the remote nature of the evaluation, this has not undermined the TE's ability to reach meaningful conclusions on the realization of key outcomes. Neither has it hindered the TE from formulating valid findings that actually document the project's results in a satisfactory manner.

Second, the analysis of the Tracking Tool and the finalization of the 2021 UNDP GEF Project Implementation Report (PIR) provided the TE with the necessary triangulation for some of the data on physical achievements, especially where 'X hectares of land' and 'X kilometers of coast' etc. had been reported upon by the project. The TE gathered that such reports undergo so much scrutiny by several stakeholders, that evidence of achievements can be considered indirectly validated, including by the project board (the "Comité de Pilotage" or COPIL, which played an active role in overseeing the project's achievements on the ground). In fact, there should have been less emphasis on this in the final version of the report (e.g. in Table 5 or in Table 10), now that the triangulation was possible in dialogue with the project, and through the Tracking Tool and related reports and pieces of evidence.

Thirdly, there will always be some residual pieces of evidence that cannot be verified within the scope of an evaluation assignment due to the nature of the data, including by noting the assignment's nominal duration of only 24-days. This relates in particular to topics such as the quality of ecosystem restoration actions and their sustainability. In order to validate the project's achievement in those domains, not just verification on the ground would be needed, but specific technical studies and sufficient time allotted to the task would be required. Since, those are only one of the aspects of the project, the TE concludes that the lack of direct verification had not undermined the TE's conclusions.

"In the absence of field visits and lack of local evaluation team members data could be collected remotely. Skype interviews, mobile questionnaires, online surveys, collaboration platforms (slack or yammer) and satellite imagery could be used to gather data. [...]"

RESULTS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER

In terms of policy alignment, the following Evaluation Question from the Matrix in [Annex V](#) is relevant:

To what extent mechanisms and policies in place have allowed results to be sustainable in terms of gender equality, women’s empowerment, fundamental rights and human development?

The answer to it is: **“to a rather limited extent”**, as per analysis that follows.

In the project document, none of the UN strategic frameworks listed on the PRODOC’s cover, and which are meant to ensure the project’s fit into higher level UN and UNDP goals, had explicitly included gender. They referred to UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and to Tunisia’s UNDAF 2015-2019. Both are currently outdated.

During implementation, the UN and UNDP strategic frameworks changed and evolved. Reporting against relevant UN/UNDP frameworks has also changed.

Currently, there is good alignment between the project’s theme and UNDP’s strategic priorities, such as UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021), in addition to UNDAF and CPD Outcomes, and other frameworks such as the SDGs (see e.g. the [Project Summary Table](#)), even though the gender angle in project design is weak, as it has been discussed in [Section 2.5, under subsection ‘Gender Consideration concerning the assemblage of stakeholders’](#).

Still, it is worth highlighting that the mainstreaming of gender equality principles and goals into project design has been mandated by UNDP at least since the launching of the Agency’s Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021, and—*theoretically*--even before that, that is, in the programming before that (which was the 2008-2018 Gender Strategy⁷²).

Also, UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021 is seamless aligned with UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021). The expected global environmental / adaptation benefit from the project relates to Output 2.3.1 of the Global Strategic Plan of UNDP (2018-2021), which reads as follows: *“Data and risk-informed development policies, plans, systems and financing incorporate integrated and **gender-responsive solutions** to reduce disaster risks, enable climate change adaptation and mitigation, and prevent risk of conflict”*.

Against the above background, it may be said that, at the highest strategic level, the project had effectively integrated a gender-sensitive approach by adopting updated UN and UNDP strategic frameworks. At a more basic level, the project had not really accomplished this – as we will see further down.

In order to evaluate the project through results expected under selected UNCT indicators listed in section 1.3 (as per UNDP’s request), which refers to UNDP’s Evaluation performance Indicators for Gender Equality (or the SWAP EPI), we need to test the project against its contribution to three of the four priority areas in UNDP’s gender policy (Table 6). We additionally ask the relevant the questions in [Annex V](#) (Evaluation Question Matrix).

Table 6. Assessing gender mainstreaming in project results and through UN / UNDP strategic frameworks

Priority areas or entry points for gender mainstreaming	Key TE Question: To what extent has gender equality and women’s empowerment been taken into account and integrated from the design [to implementation and to results], taking into account the specificities of the country?	Rating
With respect to: UNDP’s gender policy (as of UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021)		
a. Removing structural barriers to women’s economic empowerment,	None of the 10 project indicators (with reference to Table 5) are immediately amenable to be disaggregated by gender. Yet, the last indicator, which pertains to finance, could have been modified by the	Unsatisfactory (U)

⁷² See e.g. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021.html>. Prior to 2018, UNDP had other frameworks in place concerning gender equality and mainstreaming. UNDP gender strategy started in fact in 2008 and lasted up to 2018, and it required COs to: “...ensure that gender equality and the empowerment of women are integrated into every aspect ...”. However, enforcement of the strategy at the level of UNDP GEF projects was weak.

Priority areas or entry points for gender mainstreaming	Key TE Question: To what extent has gender equality and women's empowerment been taken into account and integrated from the design [to implementation and to results], taking into account the specificities of the country?	Rating
including women's disproportionate burden of unpaid care work	project at inception or mid-ways for capturing important project's efforts towards promoting equality and women's empowerment.	
c. Strengthening gender-responsive strategies in crisis (conflict and disaster) prevention, preparedness and recovery.	<p>In Box 4, the TE sampled an important reports produced by the project. The results leave to be desired. We highlight here a highly central report, whose author is a women: The 2019 study "Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia". The TE noted that there is no gender specific section. The word gender is absent in the report. On page 21, the report mentions the economic activities such as fishing and aquaculture in project sites with some 5,500 people involved in it, 90% female (while the PRODOC assumed it was 20%). It is astonishing that the report did not even mention the need for gender mainstreaming. For three other studies in Box 4, the level of gender mainstreaming also has similar gaps.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION: For the purposes of gendered-learning, the project team should re-read with a gender-lens some of the reports, strategies and policies prepared through the project. If there is still time to ensure an improved gender mainstreaming into them, then the project should dedicate some time to it in the next few months. If viable, it also be important to assess the gender entry points in key results such as the following ones influenced by the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) The Maritime Public Domain (DPM); (2) Tunisia's dossier for the ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol [under Barcelona's Convention], as prepared by the project; and (3) the Code of Planning and Urban Development (CATU). 	Unsatisfactory (U)
With respect to: UNDP's Evaluation performance Indicators for Gender Equality (the SWAP EPI)		
Does the project [INDICATOR 3.1 UNCT] collaborate and engage with government on gender equality and the empowerment of women; and [INDICATOR 3.2 UNCT] collaborates and engages with women's/gender equality CSO	<p>Evidence from PIR and other reports on the project's engagement with government on gender equality is scant. There e.g. is no compilation of statistics broken down by gender on participation in project events benefitting government.</p> <p>There is though evidence of strong participation of women in government in Tunisia, with women retaining some 47% of seats in municipal councils after the 2018 local elections.⁷³</p> <p>When it comes to CSOs, there is some project reporting that mentions some project benefits broken down by gender – e.g. in the 2021 – although with just a sample of a couple of phrases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “• 25 women have been trained in the manufacturing of blue crab ponds and in the techniques of processing and storing blue crab meat” (NGO Ajim Djerba fisheries development group) “• 24 young people from the governorate of Bizerte (12 girls and 12 boys) have benefited from a training session on theoretical and practical diving in the sea and in the swimming pool.” (Bizerte Diving Activities Club) <p>While the above is interesting as background, it is a more peripheral angle vis-à-vis the project.</p>	Not relevant / Not applicable

⁷³ OECD source: <https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/la-place-des-femmes-dans-la-vie-politique-locale-tunisie.pdf>.

Further to the topic of expected project results disaggregated by gender, we bring forward a two more questions from the Evaluation Questions Matrix in [Annex V](#):

- *To what extent was gender equality and women’s empowerment reflected in the products prepared by the project?*
- *Based on above question(s) and discussions with stakeholders and partners, how is the project’s impact on Gender be assessed?*

The TE will analyze and draw a summarized conclusion further down based on evidence.

During implementation, there have been more tangible efforts towards gender mainstreaming. There are two important source of information with respect to the level of gender mainstreaming during project implementation through the engagement of stakeholders. **One is the PIR**, since the project is expected to report specifically report on concrete gender mainstreaming actions and results every year. Results from the last PIR in this regard are summarized in Box 4. **The other source is content distilled from stakeholder interviews**. Nuanced views on gender mainstreaming were obtained from stakeholders, by directly querying them on perceptions based on the Evaluation Questions. Some of the stakeholder were not very impressed with the project’s “concrete efforts towards gender mainstreaming, and with the project’s expected positive impact on gender equality.

Box 4. About gender results during implementation

Based on the TE’s reading of technical reports (from 2016 through to at least 2019) and of implementation reports for the project’s duration, the main conclusion from the analysis that follows is that gender equality and women’s empowerment were not well reflected in the products prepared by the project.

Most of the gender mainstreaming actions happened towards the end of the project. In terms of products prepared by the project we highlight the report “*Élaboration d’un diagnostic sur l’intégration de l’approche genre dans le projet – Ghar El Melh et Djerba*” from 2021, which is a specific report focusing on gender, and aimed at ensuring the mainstreaming of gender equality into the project. However, there are several other reports, and their level of mainstreaming is disappointing. The TE has specifically screened a relevant sample of such technical reports. Here are the findings with reference to their ‘shorthand titles’ and year of production:

- *Water: Socio-economic impacts of sea level rise (2018): gender is mentioned only twice*, in the background section and the analysis is superficial;
- *Urgent Intervention Plans for Sites (2019): gender is mentioned in the background part, but not in the actions*
- *Viability Assessment of Soft Adaptation Measures (2018): gender is absent;*
- *Schema Directeur, Djerba (2021) - gender is not just absent, but the use of language in certain passages is outright gender-discriminatory*, e.g. here: “*L’état actuel des infrastructures et des services de transports n’est pas en mesure d’assurer une mobilité satisfaisante des hommes et des marchandises.*”

On the latter sample and quote, ‘mobility’ should obviously be a priority benefit for both men and women. The mentioned report should not have been accepted with the kind of language sampled here – and it was just a sample.

In terms of and ‘**concrete results**’ from actions and investments funded by the project, which were primarily delivered through subcontracted NGOs and benefitting local communities, there have been **several actions on the ground mentioned in the PIRs**. The 2021 reflects the consolidation of gendered benefits. Herein are relevant quotes from the 2021 PIR:

- “*As part of the adaptation project carried out by the Ajim fisheries development group in Djerba, a group of 25 women have improved their income through the sale of cages for catching blue crabs and have been able to have prospects for new incomes for their families through the processing and sale of blue crab meat.*
- *500 traps were made and distributed to 23 artisanal fishermen. In addition, the women of this NGO actively participated in raising the awareness of 500 citizens about the importance of blue crab and adaptation.*
- *The group of women is an important target group for the project. In order to empower them and promote gender equality, the project has involved them through training workshops and raising awareness /outreach activities.*
- *The project ensures the representation of both women and men in the project activities by ensuring their access to the interventions under all project outcomes.”*

General Conclusion: The level of gender mainstreaming in the project is deemed as generally Unsatisfactory (U)

- **In terms of actions on the ground**, the number of female beneficiaries with improved income (n=25) is quite small. Different stakeholders interviewed, both men and women, confirmed that they were not very impressed with project's results from a gender equality perspective. The project has not tracked beneficiaries according to a structured database.
- **Concerning the technical reports screened and their level of gender mainstreaming**, the TE found that:
 - (i) mainstreaming is weak; and
 - (ii) there was little point in conducting a specific gender study in 2021, in case its agenda was to showcase some level of gender mainstreaming in the project's last year, when there were glaring gender gaps in previous technical studies that had not been properly screened with an adequate gender lens.
- The mentioned 'gender study' should have been conducted earlier, preferably in the project's year 2.

3) FINDINGS

In line with the methodology, the Evaluation findings are based on documented evidence, supplemented by interviews with stakeholders ([Annex III](#)). The following document types proved of most use to the TE with the full listing provided in [Annex IV](#):

- Documents relating to the Project's design and approval
- Reports produced by the PMU for the implementing and responsible partners and UNDP.
- Documents produced in the course of the Project (e.g. workshop reports, Steering Committee reports; reports commissioned under the Project, PIRs)
- Web references by APAL and other institutions of the Tunisian State.

3.1) PROJECT DESIGN / FORMULATION

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FRAMEWORK (PROJECT LOGIC /STRATEGY; INDICATORS)


CRITERION	RATING
Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)	Satisfactory (S)

With respect to Results Framework for the Coastal Zone Adaptation project, the general analysis points out the intervention being logic, coherent and adequate, including the main elements in the Logic Framework Analysis (LFA), among them the project Objective, the three Outcomes, which are considered relevant and central to the project strategy and the problem that the project seeks to address, in addition to Outputs and Indicators.

The PRODOC is used as the main reference for the analysis in this section. The analysis of the quality of the project's logical framework and/or results framework is based on a rather simple Theory of Change (ToC) that had been included in the PRODOC and is reproduced in Figure 8.

Since the project was conceived in GEF5, there was no strict requirements for projects to include a thoroughly explained TOC in the project document, as it is the case in the GEF7 cycle e.g. Ideally, the TOC should also link up different LFA elements the problems that the project seeks to address, the solution proposed (which would be explicitly included) and the Barriers to the proposed solution. The project's TOC lacks these elements and leave important concept implicit.

Figure 8. Theory of Change (TOC) as included in the PRODOC



According to the TOC, the project Objective would be achieved by building national, regional and local capacities to update existing coastal planning mechanisms and regulatory frameworks to deliberately consider climate change. Updates to these frameworks would be based on dynamic modelling, coastal risk monitoring and targeted vulnerability assessments. Planning will be used to facilitate informed adaptation decisions and action using a “Whole of Systems approach”, although this concept is not well defined in the PRODOC.

Monitoring and evaluation of coastal adaptation measures would be slated to support transfer and up-scaling of successful interventions. SCCF financing will also be used to support national and local authorities to implement economic risk sharing and reduction incentives which can minimize exposure of assets to climate change. Simultaneously, financing would be mobilized to support implementation of prioritized coastal adaptation measures in the long-term.

Even through the TOC figure included a very brief narrative that explained it, it clearly highlighted the problem to be addressed by the Coastal Zone project, as well as the desired outcomes and approaches to be undertaken for proper implementation.

Assumptions were included in the Results Framework in the PRODOC, but not in the TOC. There is a certain disconnect between Risks and Assumptions (more on this further down).

To achieve the objective, the project focused on three components, with specific and well formulated Outcomes behind them:

Component 1: Enabling policy and institutional frameworks	Outcome 1: Institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas is improved
Component 2: Replicable adaptation measures in the target coastal sites	Outcome 2: Climate change resilience of priority coastal areas enhanced through implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures

	covering 22 km of coast and 670 hectares of wetland and benefiting 150,000 inhabitants
Component 3: Economic incentives for coastal adaptation	Outcome 3: Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures

The PRODOC has very detailed descriptions of the project’s baseline finance – i.e. the development interventions that would underpin adaptation measures to be financed by the SCCF. Calculating the project’s baseline finance and additionality can be challenging but useful (and more recently required by the GEF). The project had sufficient information to complete the additionality calculus at design stage but did not perform it. Still, the level of detail in the description of baseline and additionality made the additional cost reasoning sufficiently sound to meet requirements at design stage.

PRODOC Table 5 (Summary of Outcomes and Outputs) provides costs broken down by Outputs, even though this is not required by the GEF.

There are a few useful economic and financial arguments that make PRODOC design strong. These include:

- PRODOC Section 2.6: Cost-effectiveness
- PRODOC Annex 2a: Adaptation Options Analysis
- PRODOC Annex 2b: Net Present Value Analysis

Apart from being clear, relevant and coherent, the project’s Results Framework still had shortcomings in a few areas. The TE confirmed one of the findings from the MTR process on the ‘smartness’ of project indicators. See Section 2.4 in this report, and more specifically the following content:

Table 4. SMART Analysis of Project Results Framework (following up on the MTR analysis)

There are a few important shortcomings relating to indicators and which are described in the above-cited table. Yet, these were not enough to downgrade rating, which remains Satisfactory (S) for the ‘Analysis of Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)’.

Another strong point to note is the mention of innovative adaptation strategies in the project objective, as well as the term ‘flexible’ in other passages, to distinguish what the project actually proposes from the mainstream hard-engineered and costly adaptation solutions that had otherwise been applied in Tunisia prior to the project. These strategies imply a combination of processes (physical, social, economic, governance, administrative, policy related etc.) – all of which are slated to enhance the local communities’ and business’ capacity to respond to, withstand, and recover from climate-related shocks.

ASSUMPTIONS, RISKS AND ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS

CRITERION	RATING
Assumptions and Risks	Satisfactory (S)

Within a broader approach to the management of risks at project level, assumptions and risks are an integral part a project’s Theory of Change (TOC). Risks are in fact linked to the possibility that a core assumption will not realize.⁷⁴ As for environmental & social safeguards, they relate to a specific category of project risks, which focus on the possibility that a project can unintentionally cause social and/or environmental damage. Good practices in project design and management require that safeguards are then formulated and monitored namely to avoid, mitigate or remediate environmental and/or social risks. In this section, both ‘assumptions & risks’, and the

⁷⁴ For example, if a core project assumption is that ‘institutional engagement and coordination’ is in place for successful the implementation of the project, then the corresponding risk is that those elements will be ‘insufficient’ (with reference e.g. to risk #1 in Table 7).

‘Environmental & Social Safeguards’ that applied to the project are covered. Only the first elements (Assumptions and Risks) require ratings, which for the case of Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience project was considered Satisfactory (S), as it is presented below.

Risks and Assumptions

There are five Risks and five Assumptions listed in the Results Framework table. Of the Risks, three are included in the Risk Analysis table in PRODOC Annex 1, which counts 7 Risks; while the other two Risks are not. Good practices on logical TOCs would recommend that assumptions are tested through proposed risks, and that all risks are integrated in the project’s risk assessment. There are a slight misalignments. However, GEF project were not as serious about TOC stringency at design stage as they are today.

Overall, project assumptions and risks are logical and robust, and helped to shape project activities and planned outputs, especially for certain types of risks that are very much outside the project’s control, although not all risks can be reasonably foreseen. E.g. the covid-19 pandemic on and its impacts are extant risks that could hardly be predicted in project design.

Still, the comprehensiveness of the project’s Risk Analysis at entry made it easier for it to prepare for expected risks and issues. Risk #1 revolves about institutions and capacity, and it predicts that not addressing the risk could compromise project delivery and success. With the major delays faced by the project in the long mobilization period, the risk should have been heightened. At least, the risk had been foreseen; it was expected, even though the management response, if ever applied, was probably not sufficient to avoid delays in kick-starting the project. The mentioned risk reads as follows: *“Insufficient institutional engagement and coordination may prevent successful project delivery especially in the current transitional context, in Tunisia.”*

An important gap in the risks and risk management strategy relates to operational risks. Several project activities depend on procurement of goods and services. The delays in such processes in the Assisted NIM modality became actual during implementation. Yet, they have not been adequately foreseen in the risk management frameworks.

The TE highlights in other passages the current risks to the overall implementation of the Coastal Resilience Project in Tunisia linked to extant factors and the implications of these to the project’s sustainability (covid-19, the July 2021 political events and delays in approving the project extension). These risks could not have been foreseen at design stage. Therefore, risk management at project entry was adequate. The project design had focused on a comprehensive and relevant list of possible project risks, which helped determine activities and planned outputs. The only general critique of Table 7’s content is the fact that some risk types are ambiguous. It would have been more practical to stick to a single risk type for each for each risk.

Table 7. Major risks at project design stage and feedback on them from the Terminal Evaluation (TE)

Type	Description of Risk	TE’s Feedback with hindsight
<i>Organizational, Strategic</i>	1) Insufficient institutional engagement and coordination may prevent successful project delivery especially in the current transitional context, in Tunisia	The risk was relevant and actually materialized through the long period of project mobilization shown in the project’s TIMELINE . LESSON Management responses pertaining to delays in the project mobilization must be strengthened across the UNDP portfolio. It seems to be a chronic issue affecting several projects. To underpin this point we refer to the recent Performance Audit of UNDP GEF. ⁷⁵
<i>Operational, Financial, Organizational</i>	2) Resistance among key socio-economic stakeholders (i.e. tourism operators, property owners, etc.) to participating in new economic instruments for adaptation	There was probably less resistance than expected private sector players to participate in training events, workshops, etc. However, little was done for actually involving them in the

⁷⁵ UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management>, accessed on 13/08/21.

Type	Description of Risk	TE's Feedback with hindsight
		conceptualization of economic – and financial – instruments for adaptation. Some of the key studies that would help fight the mentioned resistance from socio-economic stakeholders arrived late in the project's lifetime. The risk was relevant, but mitigation measures in the PRODOC were not actually applied. Its persistence represents a risk to the project's sustainability.
<i>Operational, Strategic</i>	3) Lack of continued Monitoring and Evaluation to document lessons learned from soft protection measure applications	The so called Solutions Database has been conceived by the project as one of its knowledge management products. The completion and delivery of the Database will likely advance, albeit late in the project's lifetime. Hence, the risk is still actual.
<i>Operational, Strategic</i>	4) Data sharing is hindered by lack of coordination / willingness of agencies to share data	The TE limited evidence on the status of this risk. If Tunisia was an LDCs, this risk would be applicable by default. Yet, Tunisia is middle-income country. The Ministry of Environment advertises through its website that it embraced Open Data policies. In any case, the project should set the example and share its GIS data for APAL to make public and allow users to download and use – more georeferenced data on coastal vulnerability and climate change produced by the project.
<i>Environmental</i>	5) Water and coastal management strategies are made ineffective by an unanticipated increase in the frequency of flood events, coastal surges which jeopardizes coastal protection and water conservation measures and damages coastal monitoring infrastructure	It was useful to include this risk, but it is difficult to monitor it, unless relating to specific sites and ensuring the long-term monitoring of conditions on the ground, including beyond the project's lifetime. Currently, there is uncertainty about this. The TE has not had access to the project's exit strategy.
<i>Operational, Strategic</i>	6) Emphasis on shared coastal management and coordination between private hotels and NGOs and/or the municipality is hindered because of self-interests and contrasting agendas	This risk appears to be more like a barrier and something that the project should have addressed. Risks included in Risk Analysis table should be 'residual' risks from the TOC, and hence those that would negate project assumptions. However, a more sophisticated approach to TOC would have been required. GEF project were not as serious about TOC stringency at design stage as they are today.
<i>Operational, Organizational</i>	7) NGOs/CSOs do not have sufficient financial literacy to manage funds for small-scale Coastal Resilience Projects	In hindsight, it seems like project designers have underestimated the capacity of local NGOs and CSOs in Tunisia.

Environmental and Social Standards (Safeguards)

According to the TE's methodology, not just 'assumptions' and 'risks', but also 'Social and Environmental Standards' (and 'safeguards') are an important criterion in the assessment of project performance. This had been mentioned in [section 1.2 on scope and methodology](#). The TE analyzed how these standards and safeguards applied to the project.

First, we give some background: Back in 2012, UNDP has adopted a mandatory project-level Environmental and Social Screening Procedure (UNDP's ESSP). The screening procedure became since a vital component of UNDP's project-level quality assurance process with the aim of minimizing, mitigating or, where needed offsetting potentially adverse environmental and/or social impacts of UNDP's development work. Until 2014/2015, the

methodologies and requirements for Social and Environmental Safeguards within UNDP were relatively simple. These methodologies and frameworks had gradually evolved, as the Agency accumulated experience with safeguards application and the policy frameworks evolved. Currently, a comprehensive frameworks for social and environmental risk management is in place within UNDP. An assessment of project’s application of social and environmental safeguards needs to consider this gradually evolving context and up against current standards on the matter, which are much more demanding.

The 2013 to 2015 period coincided with the project’s CEO Endorsement milestone and also with a time with the requirements for project-level social and environmental safeguards were still simple. The TE verified that, in the PRODOC, the project’s ESSP had been classified as “Category 3a”

A Category-3a project means that impacts and risks were considered “limited in scale and [could] be identified with a reasonable degree of certainty”. A Category 3a classification also assumed that environmental and social risks could be handled through application of standard best practice, but requiring some level of review and assessment for identifying and evaluating whether a full environmental and social assessment would be needed or not. Should the risk level increase, the project would move to Category 3b, which would require additional assessments, measures in terms of safeguards, for being considered adequate. The required ‘review and assessment’ was set out in the PIRs – and indeed it was, but only in 2018, in the case of the Tunisia Coastal Resilience project.

Normally, the ESSP should be included in PRODOC Annex 8 as an attachment. Yet, as applied in 2014 in connection with PRODOC approval, the ESSP could not, upon request, be availed to the TE by the Project Team. It could probably not be located in the project’s archives. On 06-December-2021, the Project Team pointed out instead to content in the PRODOC’s paragraphs 224 through 225, which covered some notes on the project’s environmental and social safeguards. The content (reproduced in Box 5) was analyzed.

Box 5. Environmental and Social Safeguards in the PRODOC

<p>Environmental safeguards: 224</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing vehicle access pathways which clearly designate routes to ensure no ad hoc degradation of dune areas occurs. • Building the capacity of APAL to understand concepts of ecological sustainability and to better integrate social and community values and aspirations into engineering decisions, thereby adhering to Integrated Coastal Zone Management. • Ensuring either the property owner(s) or government officials monitor the soft measures effectiveness in preventing erosion. This will help determine if the current strategy is working to control erosion or if the strategy needs to be adjusted to address changes in conditions. The ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the living shorelines strategies will ensure that if die-out occurs, the problem will be assessed and quickly mitigated with re-vegetation. • Implementing demonstration projects in the target areas that are visible, with accompanying community awareness raising and education campaigns which will help raise understanding of the soft approaches and how they can be as effective (or more) as structural stabilization techniques and more sustainable and cost-effective in the long-term. 	<p>Social safeguards: 225</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consulting villages to determine “real” coastal risks which will be fed into the risk-based spatial management plans • Facilitating feedback from marginalized populations on the appropriateness of ICZM interventions by involving community stakeholders from inception in planning to protect and restore the natural shoreline • Educating property owners and other stakeholders on how to maintain living shorelines and monitor the progress of adaptation measures • Knowledge sharing with international tourism operators on cost-effective best practices for coastal adaptation and coastal erosion risk management • Financial management and literacy training for NGOs and community members who partake in coastal adaptation project implementation
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Considering the applicable standards for ESSP at that time (2024/15), the response in the form of safeguards was considered adequate, but noting that the gender aspect was absent, a piece of evidence that reconfirms the TE’s assessment of weak mainstreaming of gender concerns in the project—in this case, with respect to project design. In other words, it is not enough to mention that the project would be “[f]acilitating feedback from marginalized populations on the appropriateness of ICZM interventions [...]”. As a minimum, gender should have been mentioned.

If the current UNDP framework and for managing environmental and social risks had applied, the response would hardly be considered adequate. More specific, the safeguards’ statements are generic and are not appropriately linked to project activities and budgets, nor to the risks referred to in Table 7.

In Section 3.2, the assessment of applicable safeguards during implementation is assessed.

LESSONS FROM OTHER RELEVANT PROJECTS INCORPORATED INTO PROJECT DESIGN

CRITERION	RATING
Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)

Collaboration with other projects and interventions were well articulated in the PRODOC. This includes with a few exceptions the co-financing initiatives. However, this collaboration was not always followed up upon in the reporting, meaning that the directives in the PRODOC for incorporating lessons could have been somewhat unrealistic.

For example, section 2.3.2 in the PRODOC, titled “Relevant national and regional related initiatives” lists at least 14 relevant projects and programs that were on-going at the time when the project was designed. Much information is included on the financial baseline, but none on the collaboration or lessons that the project would learn.

In another section of the PRODOC, it is indicated that the project would incorporate, under Component 1, lessons learned on the development of an integrated management plan for another coastal pilot site. This would be based on the data sharing experience and training on specific coastal software DIVA that had been used in the *MedPartnership* initiative. Lessons would also be learned from climate change related coastal monitoring from the IASON project when procuring and placing new data collection equipment. There are no explicit indications of the mentioned lessons learning in project reporting, now on how the project actually was built on other relevant projects such as the Tunisian-Bavarian Cooperation or the Arab Climate Resilience Initiative (ACRI).

Under the description of the project’s component 2, there are several passages that also make reference to other initiatives that have success in implementing coastal adaptation measures on the ground in similar context and that the project should learn from those, e.g. on the management of aquifers, or the techniques to fight beach erosion. It is possible that those lessons were already embedded in APAL and it should be easy for the project to help APAL incorporate the lessons in their planning. Yet, the TE lacks evidence on whether this is happening, or if a specific ‘handover mechanism’ should be established for knowledge products, databases and similar assets. A handover protocol and data sharing mechanism must in any case be enforced before the project reaches its last operational days.

Another lesson pertains to the benefits of translation. Once the project was approved by the GEF, it would have been getting the **project documents translated into French** or Arabic, could have facilitated the engagement of stakeholders. Yet, this was not followed up upon. This would be a simple, “common sense” type of lesson to be learned at portfolio level and applicable to all non-English speaking countries, noting the English is the only official language of the GEF. The assumption here is that, if a quality translation of the project documentation had been commended by UNDP back in 2014, and right after the project’s GEF CEO Endorsement, and if this translation had been made available to e.g. APAL and others, maybe the long time wasted before the project start could have been shortened. This is a hypothesis, but based on experience from other non-English speaking countries, the availability of quality content concerning the project in the national language is a clear facilitator.

Lessons on **project duration, extension requests** and delays in kick starting the project (which had been discussed in section 2.1 as part of the same complex of problems) should be a very dear lesson to the Tunisia Coastal Resilience project. Any GEF project in the future must avoid at all costs to have delays as long as those experienced by Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience project, which reached some 23 months of dwell time between GEF CEO Endorsement and the end of the project’s inception phase, when implementation have effectively started. Delays of this nature have very high translation costs. However, these ‘costs’, which are mostly opportunity costs, are not borne in the same way by different stakeholders. Ultimately, everyone loses when a project approved by the funder is facing difficulties in kick-starting. Yet, by default, the beneficiaries are those who lose the most – and in this case, we are talking about vulnerable coastal communities in Tunisia, who live on the brink and really need to be able to access adaptation finance, directly or indirectly. There are indications that the lesson of avoiding delays in kick-starting projects through whatever viable means necessary is being learned by UNDP’s NCE. The RTA communicated to the TE that there are several changes to procedures and practices for

ensuring that risks and national capacity are more realistically assessed. Poor planning, poor risk assessment and capacity limitations, including within UNDP, seem to be recurrent reasons behind the delays experienced.

The main point made by the TE (i.e. a key **FINDING**) is that **it is quite important to pay attention to what is behind requests for project duration extension**: Poor project management and oversight practices, which includes the methodologies and standards applied in planning processes, scoping, negotiations, risk and capacity assessments, and not least the definition of roles and responsibilities in the interplay between UNDP and national counterparts in their common quest to mobilize a GEF national project. Improving the quality of project management and oversight should be a top priority for both UNDP and national implementing partner.

All of these affect the quality of project planning (both strategic and cyclical), which in turn also reflect on the efficiency and effectiveness of project execution and implementation. The project oversight functions would serve to pinpoint and address these weaknesses, but there too there were problems. Ultimately an inadequate approach to planning and scoping time and resources needed for implementation affect the project’s ability to generate results. In spite of the challenges, the Coastal Resilience Project delivered results, but they took a long time and are still being consolidated.

PLANNED STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

CRITERION	RATING
Planned stakeholder participation	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

A logical and complete stakeholder engagement plan presented in the PRODOC (especially through PRODOC Annex 6: Stakeholder Involvement Plan), which lists all key stakeholders according to meaningful categories, consultation instances and planned engagement during implementation.

Yet, from a gender mainstreaming perspective, there are many shortcomings in the strategy.

The MTR updated the stakeholders’ matrix, while the TE has further updated it, although with uncertainties about what is currently on-going in Tunisia at the level of institution, in light of the July 2021 political events.

Based on the MTR’s matrix, the main stakeholders for the project and their expected roles and responsibilities is listed in Table 8 with comments.

Table 8. Commented stakeholder Matrix updated by the TE

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project (as stated in the MTR)	Comment by the TE
Project Management Unit (PMU)	Day-to-day management and implementation of the project	A small unit, balanced in gender, led by the project manager. Normally housed at APAL, but currently working remotely due to Covid-19 risk (at least in part).
UNDP Tunisia	Project management and supervision	<p>The part that refers to project management relates to the operational implementation role assumed by UNDP (procurement, finance, payments)⁷⁶. The PRODOC mentioned the following in paragraph 227:</p> <p><i>“The UNDP CO will provide specific support services for proper project implementation, as required, through its Administrative, Program and Finance Units and through support from the UNDP Regional Centre.”</i></p> <p>The UNDP function described by the mentioned PRODOC passage refers to implementation support, which is separate and distinct from project oversight, including to the extent that the functions are exerted by different units within UNDP (e.g. Program and Operations).</p> <p>Part of project oversight function of UNDP is exerted by a Program Officer. A M&E Specialist that oversees the CO’s portfolio more broadly also dedicates time to the project – but more specifically for M&E function compliance.</p>

⁷⁶ It is notable, e.g. that all project team members use email addresses with the @UNDP.org domain. This is probably so to facilitate operational processes, such as inclusion of purchase orders, payments, etc. Yet, this contributes to blurring the lines that must separate project implementation from project oversight. It also weakens national ownership.

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project (as stated in the MTR)	Comment by the TE
Project Steering Committee (PSC) Members	Project strategic direction and supervision (two NGO Networks (RANDET and TUNWET) are represented in the PSC.	There is no evidence of the presence of NCGs/CSOs in the mentioned Committee at entry. The PSC's composition in 2021 is apparently different now, but the TE did not have access to more up-to-date PSC documentation. Based on the latest documentation in file concerning the PSC (meeting of December 2020), there were 18 members. Members of the PMU identify themselves as "UNDP". There is evidence of the presence of UNDP, APAL and others (listed below). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Djerba Commune – Office National de la Protection Civile – Centre national de cartographie et de télédétection, Ministère de la Défense (CNCT / MND) – Institut National Agronomique de Tunisie (INAT) – Direction Générale de Forêts (DGFôrets)
Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral (APAL)	The project's "implementing partner" (slightly correcting the terminology used by the MTR). As per its institutional mandate APAL played important role in day to day implementation of the project.	Titled ' <i>Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral</i> ' in French. Previously, APAL was linked to the ministry also responsible for Local Affairs. Currently, its institutional linkage is with the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (<i>Ministère de L'Environnement et du Développement Durable</i>). See APAL's web presence in: http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/index.html
Line ministry to which APAL is linked	Formally, the national 'Executing Agency' for UNDP would be the line ministry to which APAL is linked. This ministry is the one responsible for the project execution as per UNDP's national implementation modality (NIM).	In the PRODOC's cover, the executing agency was indicated to be the "Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development". In the Management Arrangements sections, it appears to be APAL. This is confusing. During the MTR the Executing Agency was indicated to be the "Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment". Both are now defunct institutions that have seen their mandates, attributions and structure changed by ministerial reforms. Currently, the line ministry to which APAL is linked is the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. The Ministry houses the focal point for the UNFCCC, Ramsar Convention and quite importantly, Barcelona Convention (though this latter role appears to have been delegated to APAL). The Ministry is expected to play an oversight role in the project, side-by-side with UNDP, in addition to enabling the work of ICZM through APAL and through the enacting of relevant policies and legislation. See web presence: http://www.environnement.gov.tn Linked institutions to the Ministry (besides APAL) that are important to the project include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Agence Nationale de Protection de l'Environnement – Agence Nationale de Gestion des Déchets – Centre International des Technologies de l'Environnement de Tunis
Other line ministries responsible for Local Affairs, Infrastructure, Land Use Planning, agriculture, national defense	All actively contribute to the regulatory development process as well as providing technical and logistical support to adaptation/ICZM planning and EbA activities.	Due to the several ministerial reforms since project start, there is not a lot of clarity on which directorates currently collaborate more intensely with the project. From the 2021 PIR, there is evidence of joint work with the Ministry of Agriculture (concerning water, agriculture and EBA), Ministry of Equipment (i.e. infra-structure and concerning Land Use and Spatial Planning) and the Ministry of Defense (concerning the LiDAR initiative). RECOMMENDATION: It is important that APAL gives continuity to these joint initiatives. Other line ministries worth mentioning (based on MTR) include: The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, investment and international cooperation and other relevant line ministries. Their role has been to engage with the project in the development of the desired adaptation financing instruments and preparation and monitoring of the annual financial plans. There is limited evidence on
National Meteorological Institute (INM) and National Institute of Marine Science and Technology (INSTM)	Contribute to the regulatory development process under Component 1 and will provide technical and logistical support to adaptation/ICZM planning and demonstration activities under Component.	INM is currently linked to the Ministry of Transport. There is no mention of on-going collaboration in the 2021 PIR. There is though evidence of collaboration in the 2018 and 2019 PIRs, which read as follows: " <i>The PMU has reached out the Tunisian Office of Cartography, the Navy's Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, the National Meteorological Institute and the National Institute for Marine Science and Technology as partners for the implementation of all of the activities of Outcome 2.</i> " See web presence: https://www.meteo.tn/
Other donors, baseline initiatives	Coordination	There is a mention on funding from the Government of Finland as having been provided to the project directly through Atlas (data from d-Portal), but there is no other evidence of what this collaboration entailed.

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project (as stated in the MTR)	Comment by the TE
		Source: http://d-portal.org/q.html?aid=XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00089624
University of Tunis	“Implementing partner” (thus mentioned by the MTR)	The University of Tunis is certainly not the “Implementing Partner” for the project (as per UNDP’s terminology). There is little evidence that any collaboration has taken place. In the 2017 Project Report “Étude de réalisation d’un mapping institutionnel au niveau de deux sites du projet : Ghar El Melh et Ile de Djerba” there is a single mention to the University of Tunis.
Civil Society Organizations (CSO) & Communities	CSO have been partners in the implementation of some of the field activities and important partner for advocacy. Key partner for local community information and awareness rising about climate change impacts and adaptation solutions. Communities are the end beneficiaries (Training, awareness raising beneficiaries, EbA implementation, livelihood opportunities).	Communities, as such, seem to be represented through local CSOs. We mention a few CSOs that were interviewed by the TE – The TE also mentions in addition the following NGOs/CSOs that were interviewed: – Association Tunisienne pour le Leadership, l’Auto-développement et la solidarité (ATLAS) – Réseau Enfants de la Terre (RET) – Groupement de développement de la pêche Ajim Djerba (GDPA Djerba) – Association Jlij pour l’Environnement Marin The latter holds an interesting web presence that depicts their sub-project on local water harvesting and storage in Djerba: https://www.ajem.tn/ . There is ample reporting by the project on training events targeting NGOs and CSOs. Also, as of the 2021 PIR, the following was specifically reported: “Five NGOs have been financed by the SCCF project and benefitted from the accompaniment and support of the SCCF project in setting up Climate Change adaptation activities which aimed at reducing pressure on the coast, creating other income-generating activities and enhancing the value of the sectors: agriculture, fisheries, tourism.”
Local Municipalities (Communes)	Involved across all components and in relation to the measures that will take place in their corresponding municipalities. They will be close partner for project’s field-based measures and coastal adaptation planning and policy formulation	Due to the limitations of the TE, it was not possible to hold calls with representatives from local governments. However, project technical reports offer very rich documentation and evidence of their involvement, primarily as beneficiaries. There is though lack of clarity from the TE on whether the strongest involvement is at the level of communes, delegations (or yet governorate). The TE’s stakeholder list makes reference to “communes”, as follows, which appears to be the same as “municipalities”: – Commune de Ghar El Melh (Bizerte Governorate) – Commune de Kalaât El Andalous (Ariana Governorate) – On Djerba Island: Commune de Djerba Ajim; Commune de Djerba Houmet Souk; Commune de Djerba Midoun
Consultants and [other project] partners	“Implementing partner” (thus mentioned by the MTR) – although the terminology is not accurate.	Neither consultants, nor other partners, as mentioned by the MTR. Consultant and partners should not have been classified as the “Implementing Partner” for the project (as per UNDP’s terminology). The TE had anyway the chance to interview a couple of senior national consultants who rendered services to the project. Both seemed very well prepared within their fields of expertise. They have also been work developed by the together within international consulting firms, but none of them appeared to result in a longer term technical collaboration, which could have possibly been beneficial to the project and APAL.
National Tourism Operators Association and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Djerba	Engaged in the project in order to stimulate investments into “soft” shoreline protection systems, facilitate adherence to new EIA standards and spatial regulations and develop innovative adaptation finance schemes.	According to the MTR, these stakeholders were expected to collaborate closely with local actors (Municipalities, SC) and with key Ministries. There is ample mention in the PIR 2021 of training instances that had involved private sector stakeholders.
Insurance Association Federation, the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts, in collaboration with the Caisse de dépôts et consignation (CDC)	Critical to stimulate investments into “soft” shoreline protection systems, facilitate adherence to new EIA standards and spatial regulations and develop innovative adaptation finance schemes.	In the 2021 PIR, the project reported: “On the 13th of November 2020, a remotely workshop was organized gathering representatives of public institutions, banks, insurance companies and their professional organizations, as well as micro-financial institutions financial. This event summarized the main conclusions of the mission. on the preparation of the Tunisian financial sector for financing mechanisms for adaptation of the national coastline to climate change.” In the FINDING of the TE The engagement of insurance and real estate industry, as well as other private sector federations / associations, and in particular of financiers, would have been quite important within the project strategy. Yet, much of this involvement came relatively late in the project’s lifetime.

REPLICATION APPROACH

CRITERION	RATING
Replication approach	Satisfactory (S)

The PRODOC foresaw that the coastal adaptation measures had been “developed to be easily scaled-up and modified to serve other coastal communities vulnerable to climate change”.

In fact, several of the soft adaptation measures – but not all – can be considered replicable. Measures that prime a flexible, holistic and gender-sensitive approach to adaptation, based on sound policies, strengthened institutions and local participation can be replicated in Tunisia and elsewhere. They include: *inter alia* small rainwater harvest and water storage facilities, restoration of wetlands, stabilization of sand dunes, plus other forms of beach nourishment, agricultural practices that can be classified as ‘conservation agriculture’, adaptive land use planning for coastal protection management of artisanal fisheries for sustainable fish stock, value addition of local produce, etc. – just to name a few.

General measures on water conservation are easily replicable, but ecosystem based adaptation (EBA) measures are highly contextual and would require significant monitoring of ecosystem condition for the scientist to measure adaptation outcomes and, if positive, propose methods for replicating such conditions. This was already pondered and considered in project design, as verified by the TE.

The so called **Solutions Database** has been conceived by the project for recording the flexible adaptation solutions and measures that the project has put in place, whether directly or through partners. It is not clear, if it will be turned into a ‘Marketplace’ type of platform. Else, the TE learned indirectly that the consolidation of the Solutions Database is yet to be achieved. The initiative will likely advance in the next few months, albeit late in the project’s lifetime, and hence curtailing the project’s greater chances for sustainability.

The TE wishes to add that ecosystem monitoring activities are known to have high costs. They would need to have been carefully planned during implementation, in addition to requiring quite a bit of observation time before meaningful results begin to show (especially in drylands). The costs of undertaking comprehensive ecosystem monitoring studies would need to be weight against potential benefits, the main one being to be able to consolidate protocols and cost coefficient for successful EBA measures that can then be replicated elsewhere in a coastal zone setting. Having looked at the pilot nature of such activities in Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience, the TE finds that what the project could have been done with respect to those adaptation measure has effectively been done. The replication criteria is deemed Satisfactory.

The above conclusion is reached on the basis of indirect accounts and reporting from the project on the success of such measures, including most notably the introduction of palm palisades (locally known as ‘Ganivelles’ and ‘Palmivelles’) as a coastal adaptation measure aimed at slowing down beach erosion, possibly also promoting beach nourishment. It should be noted that the TE cannot fully assert the success (or failure) of such measures or their actual physical achievements (in terms of kilometers, hectares, etc.). This is not only because their ‘EBA character’ (i.e. they take long to show results and require systematic observations), but also because of the limitations of a remote TE assignment with rather limited number of days for evidence discovery and analysis. The inclusion of these measures in the Solutions Database is otherwise considered adequate.

UNDP’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

UNDP’s comparative advantage

CRITERION	RATING
UNDP comparative advantage	Satisfactory (S)

Aligned in aspects of capacity building and support for SDG-based planning, as well as experience in designing and implementing climate change adaptation and sustainable resource management projects. UNDP has a

Country Office presence in Tunisia and works closely with the government on projects in various GEF focal areas, especially biodiversity, climate change and multi-focal area projects.

By the time the project was designed, UNDP was becoming a dominant GEF Agency in the Adaptation Focal Area. Its comparative advantage would have been unquestionable. A rating of Satisfactory (S) is though enough to express the agency’s ‘fitness’ for developing the project.

LINKAGES BETWEEN PROJECT AND OTHER INTERVENTIONS WITHIN THE SECTOR

This aspect is covered in a thorough manner under section [‘Lessons from Other Relevant Projects Incorporated into Project Design’](#).

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

CRITERION	RATING
Management arrangements	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)

In the PRODOC, the management arrangements foresaw that the government agency with a mandate for managing the coastal zone (APAL) would function as the ‘implementing partner’ for the project – using UNDP’s terminology (or the ‘executing agency’ – using the GEF’s terminology), while oversight and some project implementation services would be provided by the UNDP Country Office. The latter aspect is relevant within the Tunisian context because all UNDP projects in the country are either under the DIM modality (Direct Implementation) or ‘Full support to NIM’ (National Implementation), with national counterpart agreements signed through letters that clearly define roles and responsibilities.

From the perspective of UNDP as the GEF Agency for the project, the Agency has an inherent role and obligations vis-à-vis the GEF, which relate to oversight. In addition, according to the Management Arrangements in the PRODOC, UNDP also plays a key role in quality assurance through the Project Board.

Playing both an oversight role, and a role in the support to implementation in the same project is possible, but not always desirable. The arrangement is functional, as long as these two roles can be kept very well separated – e.g. played by different units within UNDP and never accumulating tasks that represent “judge” and “party” at the same time. The reality is that these two different roles can easily constitute a conflict of interests, if they are not sufficiently articulated in the PRODOC, and in practice.

Some operational details of project management arrangements had not been sufficiently detailed in the PRODOC, while others were unrealistic (e.g. inputs from international team members). The MTR had picked up on those.

By the TE, and in hindsight, the arrangements are considered sufficient with respect to the provisions for the Project Steering Committee (PSC), considering the prevalent institutional volatility in Tunisia on the project’s onset, which was back then a legacy from the country’s political instability linked to the aftermath of the Arabic Spring.

Other aspects of the project’s de facto management arrangement left to be desired. Ideally, UNDP should strive to make the national counterparts gradually responsible for its projects, while the Agency retreats more and more into an oversight role. A pre-condition is sufficient national capacity to run the project. The TE found no evidence of detailed capacity assessment of partners, or even of the UNDP CO, which could underpin the choice of management arrangements.

The PRODOC did propose in some passages “capacity self-assessment” for NGOs/CSOs that would be candidate responsible parties. There is though limited clarity to the TE on how this played out in practice. Much of these aspects ended up being overshadowed by a more serious problem, which was the very long period of project mobilization (23 months from CEO Endorsement to the end of the Inception Phase – see [TIMELINE](#)).

3.2) PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

CRITERION	RATING
Adaptive management	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)

More attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project’s methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. The misalignment between project duration and expectations is just a token of it.

There were major delays in the kick-starting the project – more specifically, with reference to the very long period of project mobilization, which lasted no less than 23 months between CEO Endorsement and the end of the Inception Phase – [see TIMELINE](#).

The MTR had concluded that a major emphasis of the **project’s budgets seemed misaligned with the wordings of the project’s objective**, which points out to ‘innovative adaptation strategies, technologies and financing options’. At the same time, a significant portion of the project’s budget would be dedicated to pilot activities on the ground, as observed by the MTR. The availability of a faithful translation of the project document turned out to be a limitation, rather than an adaptation management attitude. Such translation would have facilitated many aspects of implementation.

Adaptive management could have applied to **project indicators**. In Section 2.4, the TE points out to a few missed opportunities for adjusting project indicators. This is best done through a well-managed inception process. However, it is likely that the Inception Phase ended up having to be rushed due to the mentioned delays in mobilizing the project.

Adaptive management could have applied to **gender mainstreaming**, for doing justice to certain flaws in design that ended up ignoring important gender aspects. Yet, there is evidence discussed in gender relevant sections that this was not the case. See in particular:

- [Figure 7. Comments specific statement concerning gender mainstreaming in the PRODOC](#)
- [Table 6. Assessing gender mainstreaming in project results and through UN / UNDP strategic frameworks](#)

Finally, adaptive management did apply to **needed adjustments on project milestones**. Since early 2020, the project has been facing the pervasive impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on implementation, aggravated by an unexpected worsening of infections and mortality rates in Tunisia towards July. The project requested an additional duration extension. Initially UNDP’s HQ unit responsible for GEF project projects denied it, but later reverted their decision. On 18 Aug 2021, the project received correspondence from the NCE announcing that the third request for project extension had been approved. The current extension was necessary for the project to achieve its goals in an adaptive fashion.

PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

CRITERION	RATING
Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)	Satisfactory (S)

This aspect applies to partnerships with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region.

Project has conducted extensive consultation with key stakeholders during project development phase, in spite of shortcomings with respect to the mainstreaming of gender aspects.

Not all of the partnerships proposed in the project document were, however, followed through in implementation (e.g. the Saudi Fund). At the same time, there is evidence that new ones leveraged (e.g. with the government of Finland).⁷⁷

The PSC is an active forum for engaging with relevant stakeholders. The project’s outreach to the public through dissemination, communication and publishing / posting in the media is a strength. The MTR had made a recommendation on Project study findings and interventions needs to be better communicated to all stakeholders. Evidence from the MTR’s Management Response indicates that the “Communication plan” had been prepared with the UNDP Country Office’s own expertise – rather than by recruiting a communications officer or a specialized service provider. In the TE’s **FINDING**, the design and execution of communication plans and strategies should preferably be outsourcing to professionals. A project with \$5.5 million budget from the SCCF would have deserved it.

FEEDBACK FROM M&E ACTIVITIES USED FOR ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

CRITERION	RATING
Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

The quarterly, annual report from the project team to the Project Steering Committee, as well as the Project Implementation Reports were used as the main instruments to evaluate project progress, identify issues encountered during project implementation to determine adaptive management measures required.


As a result of the feedback from the M&E activities, adaptive measures were undertaken during project implementation. This is, in certain instances, reflected in the PIR. A positive trend for delivery of results was indeed maintained in 2020 and 2021, in spite of challenges linked to the Covid-19 pandemic, lower than expected execution rates and increased political risk.

This positive trend is also reflected in the gradual improvements in PIR ratings for progress towards project objective, as assessed by multiple stakeholders as depicted in Figure 9. It is a token of how feedback from M&E activities can be used for adaptive management and improved project performance.

**Figure 9. Gradually improved ratings for progress towards development objective: from PIRs 2016-2021⁷⁸
...for progress towards development objective: from PIRs 2016-2021**

⁷⁷ The TE lacks however more information on this specific co-financing.

⁷⁸ The 2021 PIR is still a draft.



The mechanisms missed the important function of feeding back on the **quality of planning**, which continued to be unrealistic throughout the project's lifetime. This is discussed in more detail in section: Effectiveness – Rated "S".

Another miss relates to project indicators, especially those under Outcome 2 that relate to physical interventions on the ground. Those indicators should also have been linked to Tracking Tool indicators.

The project has generally incorporated recommendations from the MTR into implementation. Yet, there are a few shortcomings.

The following two tables discuss the two latter topics in depth:

- [*Table 11. MTR Recommendations tagged 'completed' that should be revisited*](#)
- [*Table 5. Status of end-of-project achievements on the basis of project indicators*](#)

PROJECT FINANCE

A summary on the use of funds by the project can be summarize by a graph in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Overview of the use of all funds combined (source: d-Portal)



Source: <https://d-portal.org/q.html?aid=XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00089624>

The TE lacks the budget data in Excel to include 2021 in financial delivery the analysis Else see: the box with [“Atlas Information through Open UNDP”](#) in this report’s initial pages.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION: DESIGN AT ENTRY AND IMPLEMENTATION - RATED “S”

CRITERION	RATING
Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation	Moderately Satisfactory (S)

Concerning **Criterion 1** on the project’s **Overall Quality of M&E**, the rating is **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**, with several aspects pondered. There are **two facets** to the overall rating: ‘M&E design at entry’ and the ‘M&E Plan Implementation’ – as discussed herein.

The PRODOC contained a standard “Monitoring and Evaluation Work Plan and Budget”, simple, in table format. (PRODOC Table 9). This M&E Workplan and Budget was expected to be executed in accordance with established UNDP and GEF policies and procedures – in particular, those that applied 10 years ago. According to the MTE the PRODOC lacked “a specific a separate monitoring or evaluation plan”, which – should otherwise have been included as an Annex to it⁷⁹. The TE goes one step further and states that the Coastal Resilience Project actually lacked a **M&E System** proper.

Concerning ‘**M&E design at entry**’, the TE notes that it is not even clear of the amounts mentioned in PRODOC Table 9 were aligned with the project’s budget. Amounts assigned to the MTR and TE in PRODOC Table 9 are e.g. not earmarked in the PRODOC’s budget. Neither is the amount reserved for audits in the same table. There is other evidence that the TE can assert, and which indicates that such design flaws have already been addressed in by UNDP in the current requirements in the UNDP GEF PRODOC template.

During project implementation, both UNDP (the GEF Agency), and APAL (the Implementing Partner vis-à-vis UNDP), as well as the Project Board / PSC were relatively effective in monitoring and evaluation of activities and budget allocations, with a few shortfalls. The formulation of Outcome 2 mentions “150,000 inhabitants” as beneficiaries, but there is e.g. no narrative in the PRODOC that explains how the figure was calculated. In addition, the number is not broken down by gender.

The project team reports relatively well against indicators, with few shortcomings when it comes to providing details that underpin certain project achievements. We stress an important shortcoming with respect to the numeric aspects of certain indicators in the PIRs and in the Tracking Tool, which should be harmonized with relevant indicators. For measuring progress on the ground, for both soft and hard physical adaptation measures,

⁷⁹ Section 6 in the PRODOC (titled ‘Monitoring Framework & Evaluation’) is just a generic description of M&E activities. It is not specific to the project. It does not touch upon the monitoring needs of the project which had a few complex indicators.

indicator achievement should be illustrated by maps and aerial pictures that would demonstrate the progress and document it. The TE believes that this will also ensure better chances of sustainability for physical achievements on the ground. Documenting physical progress on the ground, and also with other aspects such as legislation and adaptation finance, simply stress the importance of a consistent and systematically updated M&E System.

Another symptom of the lack of a M&E System is e.g. in the Tracking Tool, which was not adequately completed, neither at CEO Endorsement stage, nor at mid-term. The reporting is incomplete, incorrect and not aligned with project indicators.

Having said all this, it is also important to stress that most project indicators are SMART and well-chosen vis-à-vis outcomes and objective. There are though exceptions and also gaps in indicator smartness (see e.g. Table 9)⁸⁰. These gaps and exceptions apply in particular to respect to physical adaptation measures.

The lack of systematic M&E plan made it difficult for the project to monitor progress in physical adaptation measures and adaptation finance, as well as the gender aspect. Ideally, if the PRODOC lacks a detailed M&E plan as an Annex, the project team should have prepared one such plan during the Inception Phase. The MTR had pointed out that there was no evidence that such a plan has been prepared since start of project implementation and made a recommendation it. It is not clear if the recommendation was followed. What is clear to the TE consultant is that, during implementation, some of project indicators were interpreted to suite a reporting style that focused to a large extent on activities. We refer specifically to the collection of PIRs. **FINDING:** By this, the TE means that some of the descriptions in the PIR reporting are at times confusing and off-mark, vis-à-vis the subject matter of certain indicators (in particular in the PIRs – refer to Table 5 for the detailed analysis). Otherwise, the reporting is relatively rich in details.

Other evidence – in particular from the MTR -- showed that the lack of a specific M&E plan / system must have been overcome by the project in different ways. Yet, the TE thinks that the project could have done better since the thorough analysis of indicators provided by the MTR. It was noted that the project may have developed other hands-on tools for ensuring an adequate M&E. Yet, the lack of a systematic M&E plan (or, better still, a ‘system’) made it difficult for the project to adequately complete the Tracking Tool, although this is now being addressed with the help of the TE consultant.

There are in addition, important shortcomings relating to an overly ambitious patterns of planning – which becomes obvious when the gap between planned and executed is generally large (as it will be seen in more detail further down). In turn, the project team has been instinctively applying principles of adaptive management in the project’s day-to-day tasks. For example, the project team and the PSC have been responsive to an important MTR recommendation concerning project staffing needs. Finally, management of risk is adequate and systematic, starting with risk considerations and safeguards in AWP. This was followed through in project reporting, though with some gaps relating the assessment of stakeholder capacity for implementation.

Therefore, the **M&E Plan Implementation** was rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

UNDP AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNER IMPLEMENTATION / EXECUTION – RATED “MS”

CRITERION	RATING
UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution (*) coordination, and operational issues	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

This criterion is sub-divided into two criteria, both of which require ratings as of the TOR. The ratings are included in Table 1. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard) and reproduced herein. The sub-criteria are on the one hand the **“Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight”**, referring to **UNDP’s role** as the Implementing Agency (IA) for GEF funds (or **“GEF Agency”**, as per the more recent terminology) and, on the other, the **“Quality of**

⁸⁰ A complete analysis of indicator “smartness” was included in the MTR.

Implementing Partner Execution”, referring to **the role of APAL**, as UNDP’s appointed “Implementing Partner” (or IP, using UNDP’s terminology). Below, we present the analysis that underpins the piecemeal ratings.

Quality of UNDP Implementation and Oversight

CRITERION	RATING
Quality of UNDP Implementation / Oversight	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)

The **Quality of UNDP Implementation and Oversight** was rated as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**.

There are indeed positive elements in the support provided by UNDP, but also important shortcomings. The TE must look at the quality of UNDP implementation throughout the duration of the project. There are obviously periods in a project’s cycle when UNDP’s support is more important than in others periods. There is also an yearly cycle divided into quarters. UNDP’s support is also more important in Q1 and Q4 and in mid-year. UNDP’s support also includes support provided to the Project Team (once it had been formed), and the relationships with implementing partners, responsible parties, service providers and, last but not least, project stakeholders.

On the positive side, we highlight e.g. the fact that the UNDP Country Office (CO) counts on a M&E Specialist that dedicates time to assisting the project with M&E compliance. There is also good alignment with UNDP’s strategic priorities, such as UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021), in addition to UNDAF and CPD Outcomes, and other frameworks such as the SDGs (See e.g. the [Project Summary Table](#)). The Coastal Resilience Project is the most important environmental project of UNDP Tunisia, even though the topic environment represents only 13% of the CO’s portfolio, resource-wise⁸¹. In terms of the soft assistance provided by UNDP to the government, it is possible that topics related to Governance would take precedence.

As for the shortcomings, two issues are highlighted. The most important one relates to quality and timeliness of UNDP CO’s support to the Implementing Partner (i.e. APAL) during the project’s early mobilization period. The second concerns the role of “the regional level” – i.e. the segment of the NCE Team that directly interacts with the CO and project team and provides advisory and project development services.

We noted some level of confusion from the part of the UNDP Country Office (CO) on the distinction between “the GEF”, i.e. the funding facility that provides the finance to the project, and the “UNDP-GEF unit”, which is part of UNDP and is now rebranded “NCE Team”. (The core mandate of the later is to provide advisory and project development services to UNDP COs – hence, their clients.) Although this is a minor issue, the confusion became apparent during the dialogues between the TE, the project team and the CO concerning the request for project duration extension posed by the project in May / June 2021.

As for the first important shortcoming concerning the quality of UNDP Implementation, we note in particular a long time lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the PRODOC Signature Date (5 months), followed by a gap of 18 months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Report date. This is a visible shortcoming depicted in the project’s [TIMELINE](#). Normally, in non-English speaking countries the need for translating the PRODOC would delay signature, but this was not the case for the Coastal Zone Adaptation project. The TE learned that the project team only counted on an ‘informal automated translation’ into French of the project document. This was as their main working document throughout implementation. For a full size GEF project with a budget of \$5.7M (direct co-financing included), a professionally translated project document could have been a better choice. That is, the project could have afforded a higher quality translation of the project document into French. This translation could have been commanded during the long dwell-time between CEO Endorsement and PRODOC signature. As for the delay in kick-starting the project after PRODOC signature, the following explanation was provided in the 2016 PIR by the Implementing Partner:

“A significant delay has been registered in the startup of the project. Indeed, the joint signature of the project by the Minister of Environment and UNDP was made on December 29th, 2014, and the start-up workshop was held September 11th, 2015. A considerable institutional change occurred in August 2015 by the change of national Director of the Implementing Agency of the project APAL. It has destabilized for a while the

⁸¹ Based on data from D-portal, covering 2016 till today. See e.g. https://d-portal.org/ctrack.html?country_code=TN&reporting_ref=XM-DAC-41114&year_min=2016#view=main, retrieved on 13/08/21.

process due to the slowness of the management of files by the new DNP [National Project Director] which inevitably extended the deadlines for the various administrative procedures. The designation of the project national coordinator was made in July 2015. The project management Unit (PMU) and the technical committee members were appointed in October 2015.”

In the same 2016 PIR, the UNDP CO mentioned “*delay in the project management unit recruitment*” as the main reason for the 18-month time lag between months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Report date.

Since the project team has been recruited by UNDP, a clear **RECOMMENDATION** from the TE is for the UNDP CO to be more responsive to project needs, especially during inception and pre-inception, and to prioritize early recruitment of project teams. Project Inception and Project Closure are some of the most critical periods for a project, when the needs for UNDP support are highest.

The second important shortcoming, relates the limitations of regional and global oversight functions exercised by the NCE Team. The project team, and the CO, receive indeed some attention from the RTA at the regional level. The RTA generally understands the stakes for the project and provides useful feedback (e.g. through the PIR), in spite of not mastering French.

At the same time, some segments of the NCE Team appeared to be not very flexible towards the project’s needs, and considering that the project and the UNDP CO are ultimately their clients. A critical point observed by the TE during the assignment concerned UNDP’s limited flexibility to project needs in connection with the recent request from extending the project duration in 2021. A more flexible approach to service provision, and more client-orientation from the NCE Team, would have been warranted, especially with respect to negotiations relating to the project’s duration. On this matter, the TE offered several lessons to be learned in other sections of this report.

LESSON: According to the Regional Technical Advisor (RTA), UNDP’s NCE Team’s stricter approach to milestone extensions in force now—and which resulted in the 2021 request being initially denied—was justified because the NCE Team is paid by the GEF fee. The TE sees it differently. Obviously, delays in project mobilization resulted in costs, including multiple manifestations of opportunity costs. However, the requests for milestone extension are rooted in delays and heightened project risks. Maybe some of the delays would have been avoidable, others maybe not. The problem is how the costs of delays are actually distributed. The TE thinks that the highest costs of delays are paid by beneficiaries – it is a massive opportunity cost. On the one hand delays were caused by the ineffective interplay between UNDP and government in the phase after GEF approval and before effective project start. On the other, because UNDP has a prime role in ensuring the necessary clearances to see the project started, ultimately, UNDP has the prime responsibility for the mentioned delays. The government also bears responsibilities, to the extent that own the project, or should own it more. Regardless, more ‘flexibility’ and ‘service-orientation’ by UNDP would have been warranted and is warranted with respect to new projects.

The case of Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience project in connection with the 2021 milestone extension request was very specific. It related to the pervasive impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on implementation, which were aggravated by an unexpected worsening of infections and mortality rates in Tunisia around June/July 2021. Initially UNDP’s HQ unit responsible for GEF project projects showed little understanding of the specific situation of the project and of Tunisia. They denied the project extension request that had been posed in June 2021 on the account that “it was the third request”.

Luckily, on 18 Aug 2021, the project received correspondence from the NCE announcing that the third request for project extension had been approved. Still, the lesson remains valid.

A **RECOMMENDATION** to UNDP’s NCE Team is to consider that the UNDP COs and the project teams are “clients” with respect to services that are provided by this group, in particular project development and advisory services. The lack of flexibility displayed by some segments of the NCE Team, when a well-justified request for duration

extension was posed, could be interpreted as ‘limited service-orientation’ by the NCE Team⁸². When the request for no-cost extension was filed by the project in June/July 2021, and it showed to be the third one, the initial reaction from NCE’s HQ was to turn it down “because it is the third request”, according to sources. At the same time, based on the analysis of timeline and the project’s context, implementation and delivery patterns, the TE concluded that the request for extending project duration relates to a deeper issue at the portfolio level. It is linked to poor scoping and planning at design stage, during which a standard 5-year project duration was imposed, regardless of context or national circumstance. In reality each project will have its own needs, its own ideal duration, and its own conditions of implementation. Protocols and procedures that limit a service by UNDP, when it is needed by one of its projects, are not helpful. The NCE Team could have shown more service-orientation towards its “clients” – i.e. the project and UNDP CO Tunisia.

Even though the decision by the NCE Team was reverted, and a conditional approval of the extension was eventually approved, it caused disturbance in the project’s operational routine for a good two months in 2021 – as witnessed by the TE consultant.

Quality of Implementing Partner Execution

CRITERION	RATING
Quality of Quality of Implementing Partner Execution	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

The **Quality of Execution**, i.e. relating to APAL’s role as the Implementing Partner in the country for the GEF SCCF grant (using UNDP’s terminology), it is considered **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**. There are positive elements and a few shortcomings. Also, there are indications that performance was not uniform throughout project implementation. The PIRs’ ratings by different stakeholder are a token of that (Figure 9). Performance improves over the years.

Today, there is a good level of national ownership towards the Coastal Resilience Project from the part of APAL and other national institutions, even though this has not always been so. APAL experienced a high level of turnover in its higher echelons (as confirmed by the MTR and by stakeholder interviews during the TE).

There have also been at least two ministerial reforms affecting the relative functions and attributions of line ministries.⁸³ At the same time, APAL appointed a technical person to function as Project Director since the beginning. The constancy and dedication shown by the Project Director has helped the project in different ways, including in the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders in central government institutions and at the local level, even though the engagement of private sector stakeholders appeared limited. The latter conclusion is based on the TE reading of different reports, including technical reports and the sequence of PIRs.

COORDINATION, SAFEGUARDS AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Based on stakeholder interviews, it became clear that the project team works well together, and mostly in a diligent and coherent way to fulfil their role in implementing the project within APAL. The team makes use of standard methodologies recommended by UNDP for planning, prioritizing and budgeting. There is room for improvements in these, especially in the processes involving planning, scoping and time management.

Most importantly, the project works well with its stakeholders. This is based on e.g. the opinion of members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC). It is also stronger than several other GEF projects known to this evaluation in terms of communicating project results, not least also through social media and other means of dissemination and outreach.

The project maintains a good network of contractors (including consultants and specialized companies), as well as with local NGO/CSO partners showing strong national ownership in the choice of partners. The good level of

⁸² During the first interview with the RTA, held in July 2021, she clearly indicated that she it would be “in [her] interest to maximize the results of the project, and I would definitely not oppose the extension”, and that she would “argue hard at HQ and with supervisor, provided that the team would [give her] a very strong justification, and mostly linked to the covid situation.”

⁸³ The attributions of ministries respectively responsible for themes such as environment, ‘local affairs’, sustainable development, infrastructure, water, agriculture, development, investment, etc. have changed at least a couple of times during the project’s lifetime.

stakeholder engagement and the appreciation of efforts from the project team has been almost unanimously expressed by local government partners and NGOs/CSOs active in Ghar El Melh, Kalaât El Andalous communes, as well as in Djerba (including three communes).

It is notable, e.g. that all project team members use email addresses with the @UNDP.org domain. This is probably for facilitating operational processes, such as inclusion of purchase orders, payments, etc. Yet, this contributes to blurring the lines that must separate project implementation from project oversight. It also weakens national ownership.

At the same time, it can be assumed that this ownership is best, when the project team identifies more with the implementing partner than with UNDP. Emails sent out to stakeholders from a specific domain send out a powerful message of institutional belonging. Stakeholder within APAL identified the project as being “UNDP’s” and rendering services to APAL in areas where they had weaknesses in capacity.

It is also possible that newer projects, under a ‘full NIM’ implementation modality already foresee arrangements for not just lodging project teams at the implementing partners’ premises, but also using emails with their domain, and for exercising stakeholder outreach in a manner to strengthens national ownership, rather than signaling UNDP’s presence.

A **RECOMMENDATION** to UNDP stays in the sense of: (i) considering the pros and cons of having project teams use UNDP domains, and (ii) prioritizing national ownership and full NIM implementing partner responsibilities in the management arrangements of new projects.

As for the applicable environmental and social safeguards during implementation, the TE noted that it was only monitored by the project in 2018 PIR and through the inclusion of a link to a file.⁸⁴ As compared to safeguards in the design stage, there is a bit more detail during project implementation with respect to the assessments of potential adverse environmental and social risks. There is stronger linkage to project activities, but not budgets.

Considerations in those mid-ways implementation perior are however superficial and, similar to safeguards during design stage, gender continues to be absent. For example, the reference to ecosystem restoration activities in a RAMSAR site does not discuss potential negative implications of this work in an ecologically sensitive area (a wetland of international importance):

“Some of the activities are being proposed in RAMSAR, internationally recognized protected wetlands but they will be used to restore ecosystem function in these regions. In fact, the soft measures, such as Living Shorelines will improve natural habitats by providing ecosystem services. This includes, planting native vegetation that will also serve as a natural filter to absorb nutrients (e.g., upland nitrogen and phosphorous).”

According to today’s standards (and to standards applicable in 2018), review and assessments of such proposals would be warranted for identifying and evaluating whether a full environmental and social assessment would be needed. Rather, content from the PRODOC is repeated. In the 2019 PIR, the exact same file as in 2018 was included, but in the body of the 2019 PIR, there is mention of a study on “the job of agro-fisherman” (without mentioning the importance of fisherwomen). The study was being conducted by an expert within the framework of the project in Ghar El Melh, Kalaât El Andalous and Djerba. There are a few important considerations on the social and environmental aspects, which are followed up upon in 2020 with direct reference to the so-called ‘ramli’ crops and the potential for the recognition of certain sites as Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS). Considerations are implicitly remitted to the study on GIAHS in projects that would be conducted. Also in 2020, the section of environmental and social safeguards mentions Covid-19 and the initial impacts of the pandemic on the project and in Tunisia.

Finally, in 2021, the topic of the covid-19 pandemic dominated that aspect of the PIR. The same file that had been included in the 2018 PIR on Environmental and Social Safeguards was again included in the PIR, even

⁸⁴ The filename was “SUBMISSION_4697_Tunisia_ESSP Checklist and Summary Tunisia.docx”. In the 2017 PIR, the topic ‘environmental and social safeguards’ was otherwise not part in the structure of PIR sections.

though UNDP’s framework is quite different in 2021 than when the ESSP framework had been approved, and even though the new and evolving policies on social and environmental standards of UNDP are mentioned in the 2021 PIR forms. In other words, there have been limited effort from the project for updating project the content relating to social and environmental safeguards, which may also explain the project’s difficulties in mainstreaming gender equality and women’s empowerment.

3.3) PROJECT RESULTS

OVERALL RESULTS (ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES) - RATED “S”

CRITERION	RATING
Overall results (Attainment of Objective and Outcomes)	Satisfactory (S)

In terms of Overall Results, the project has had tangible success in the attainment of Objectives and Outcomes, with only minimal shortfalls in some Outcomes.

The Overall Project Outcome rating is **Satisfactory (S)** – with reference to **Criteria 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)**. This is the criteria that weighed the most in the final **S** rating by the TE.

In other words... There can be many issues in the lifetime of a project that end up being ‘shortcomings’ in the eyes of an evaluator – from unrealistic and inefficient approaches to planning and poor M&E practices, in addition to poor oversight and limited support by the implementing partners and/or UNDP. And indeed there were all of these problems affecting the Coastal Resilience Project. Yet, **the project was mostly effective and it delivered results**. There were quite a few delays – in particular very long delays in getting the project off the ground in its early days. There were delays in processing procurement processes, which accumulated. Some of these delays can and must be avoided in future projects through dedication and investment in professional support and oversight. Operational delays must be addressed corporately by UNDP, so that the organization can better serve its client countries. There were also extant causes of delays (e.g. covid-19 pandemic and political events, and their implications). As a result of the sum of all of these types of delays, the project needed more time added to its duration for compensating the time lost. Still, the TE pointed and showed through evidence in the [TIMELINE](#) that the total duration of ‘effective project implementation’ was 5.7 years (more or less as it had been planned in the PRODOC) – and noting that effective project implementation counts from the moment that project has put the preparatory and inception phases behind and can start with fully fledged and fully staffed implementation. For the Tunisia Coastal Resilience project, this moment in time was in the second semester of 2015, between September and November of that year. Above all, by project end, most indicator targets were met, and the cumulative financial delivery is now high. Even if the project may have to return funds to the GEF by December 2021, because of the definitive operational closure, this delivery will still be high by end 2021 (it will likely reach 98% of the SCCF funds).

Also the S rating for Results reflects an improvement vis-à-vis the rating provided by the MTR in 2019. The TE recognizes that there have been tangible improvements in project performance and measurable advances since the MTR in several aspects of the project’s progress towards results. Evidence on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency had been considered in building up the overall outcome rating for this TE. Much of this evidence was drawn from the Project Implementation Reports (PIRs) for 2020 and 2021, especially when compared with status in 2019, the year when the MTR was held.

To underpin overall project outcome rating, the TE highlights e.g. the achievement of an important target that constitutes an objective indicator. It proposed that, by project end, a disbursement of at least 10 m USD would have been accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation. In the draft 2021 PIR, the project reported 103% progress towards the mentioned indicator target. The project is slated to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options. Although the finance mobilized cannot be considered ‘innovative’, the achievement of this target is commendable in light of current challenges to investment mobilization faced by Tunisia these days.

Important achievements in terms of planning and regulatory frameworks for adaptation spearheaded by the project are also commendable. At least two pieces of highly important policy or legal frameworks will be informed by coastal dynamic modelling and adopted helping the country address coastal risks linked to climate change. It is not in the project's mandate to secure governmental approval/ratification of such framework, but rather to support the process through essential technical inputs. From this perspective, it is clear that the project fulfilled its role, even if the framework is not yet approved, as this aspect is on the State's remit, not the project's. Among the frameworks governing coastal management, and the integration of climate risk into them, we mention: (1) an updated regulation on the Public Maritime Domain (DPM)⁸⁵; (2) steps towards Tunisia's ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol (under the Barcelona Convention⁸⁶); and (3) the (re-)structuring of APAL to better fulfil its mandate. Improvements to other policies and legal frameworks, also received project support, but the three mentioned herein are the most noteworthy.

Risk-based spatial management plans were developed for project sites, in particular, the Spatial Development Plan of Djerba island (SDAZs of Djerba) was an important achievement, tagged as a 'climate plan' for Djerba, as it was the first Tunisian spatial planning study that explicitly took climate change risk into account. Other studies that assessed different adaptation techniques and their feasibility supported the rollout of implement on the ground (e.g. the "Evaluation [or Assessment] of coastal climate risk and development of the emergency response plan"). By project end, the project reported that 6.08 Kilometers wooden or palm palisades (locally known as 'Ganivelles' and 'Palmivelles' according to the materials they are made of) were installed on public beaches and wetlands, including in the Ramsar site Ras R'Mel on Djerba island.

It should be noted that the reporting on the above physical measures is taken as face value from project reports such as the PIR. However the TE cannot fully verify the measurements, including in the lack of clear illustrations of physical measures in certified maps or aerial pictures. Also, the Tracking Tool was only completed by project in September 2021. This made is more difficult to verify the achievements, but the tracking tool did help.

The MTR had suggested reducing the level of ambition expressed through targets for specific project indicators on soft and hard adaptation measures. Concerning freshwater availability, the project's most important achievement appears to have been a 2018 study in collaboration with the Water Resources Management Unit (DGRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture, using numeric hydraulic modelling, in addition to some concrete measures on the ground conducted by NGOs/CSOs for recuperating traditional water harvesting and storage tanks in Djerba.⁸⁷

There were otherwise a number of activities relating to water, agriculture and both combined, but it is difficult to connect those to the intended indicator targets, or to verify achievements, given the remote character of the TE assignment. It is equally difficult to assess the sustainability of these physical measures on the account of the remote character of the TE assignment.

The project resulted in 2021 in e.g. in the establishment of an Early Warning System for the agricultural use of treated wastewater in Aghir water treatment station in Djerba and in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture. Other achievements linked to the installation of tidal gauges, buoys, and the collection and management of oceanographic data, will take time before they can constitute an EWS. The advances on planning climate-resilient development have otherwise been highlighted. Responsibility for, and the sustainability of these achievements must rest with APAL.

Additionally, the introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors have been tried, with the aim of ensuring resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas. In fact, both the public and private sectors were expected to serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring. The project resulted in the publication of a study titled 'Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia' in 2019, but fell short on taking ownership of transformative processes in the climate finance domain for adaptation. Publishing a study is an interesting achievement, but it is not transformative.

⁸⁵ More information in: http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/Files/dpm.pdf.

⁸⁶ More information in: <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/> and more specifically, <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/tunisia>.

⁸⁷ See e.g. <https://www.ajem.tn/fesguietna>, whose representatives were interviewed by the TE.

The project also reported on the support provided to a number of sub-projects executed by NGOs/CSOs funded by the SCCF project, while the relevant indicator pointed out to APAL continuing to fund such initiatives with its own budget. With the current financial outlook, and noting the low realization of co-financing from APAL, the scenario of continuation with national budgetary allocations seems unlikely.

The catalytic interplay between public and private sector was not very well explored by the project, adding some level of risk to the general sustainability of project results. It is also difficult to say if the mobilization of funds by APAL was indeed a result of the project, or if it would have happened independently from the project. Much of the funds reported under the resource mobilization indicator is to a great extent driven by financiers.

A commented assessment of project reporting against indicators is include in:

- [Table 5. Status of end-of-project achievements on the basis of project indicators.](#)

RELEVANCE - RATED “S”

CRITERION	RATING
Relevance	Satisfactory (S)

Overall, project design and objectives were relevant to Tunisia’s national context, advancements in the adaptation agenda and other development priorities.

The Tunisia Coastal Resilience Project remains relevant. The MTR also considered it relevant. When it was conceived, the project was considered very much needed, in terms of helping Tunisia gradually address adaptation priorities and needs. The project is therefore rated as **Satisfactory (S) in terms of Relevance**.

The above rating assumes that there are different types of climatic hazards that will impact different sectors and geographic regions in different ways. Remaining relevant implies therefore that a large number of people benefit from the interventions, preferably the most vulnerable, and including women, more specifically. It also implies that the interventions should target vulnerable economic assets and sectors. This is the case for Coastal Resilience Project.

The TE’s interpretation of the Relevance criterion also assumes that addressing adaptation needs in Tunisia’s coastal zone will require several sequential, parallel and/or combined interventions, which will gradually incorporate climate change into policies, practices and investments.

Concepts such as integrated coastal zone management, resilience and adaptation to climate change were not part of the usual vocabulary in APAL before the project. Now it is, as confirmed by the Project Director during the stakeholder interview. Tunisia’s Coastal Resilience Project, which effectively started its implementation in 2016 – and after a long period of project mobilization⁸⁸ -- functioned as a decisive ‘kick-start intervention’ towards addressing highly central adaptation needs within the national context. “The coastal zone is the backbone of Tunisia’s economy”, as stated in the PRODOC in its very first phrase. All these elements stress the project’s relevance.

Before the project, there were very few interventions geared towards adaptation in APAL. Today, APAL is implementing other Coastal Resilience Projects, equally large. Tunisia managed to mobilize several adaptation projects, funded e.g. by the EU, Germany, Canada and others. These other project focus on different adaptation sectors (water, agriculture, etc.)⁸⁹ and agglutinate with the adaptation achievements of the Coastal Resilience project.

⁸⁸ With reference to the Inception Workshop, which took place after a long period of ‘project mobilization’, considering that CEO Endorsement Request had been achieved in 2014.

⁸⁹ See e.g. a simple search to D-Portal filtering for Tunisia as beneficiary and tagging the Rio-marker for adaptation as the main objective: https://d-portal.org/ctrack.html?country_code=TN&policy_code=2_7#view=main, as of 13/08/21, yielding at least 20 projects since 2016, 9 of which are currently active.

The proposed outcomes of the SCCF project are prominently featured in all relevant national strategies in Tunisia, such as the National Development Plan (2016-2020) and National Sustainable Development Strategy (2014-2020) – both of which identify coastal protection and improved urban and special planning specifically as key priorities for sustainable development in the country. Of relevance, adaptation needs in the coastal zone feature high in Tunisia’s **2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (iNDC)**⁹⁰, as follows:

- The physical vulnerability of the Tunisian coastline to rising sea levels is expressly mentioned (and other impacts, e.g., linked to water and coastal aquifers), including to rough estimates of loss in productive capital caused by climate change;
- Coastal tourism and the implications of beach erosion are considered;
- Coastal zone adaptation projects (in the plural) are referred to in
- The conservation of the ecological functions of low-lying coastal areas is a stated priority among the measures; and
- Investments in the order of \$556 million are mentioned as needed for the “coastline” for the period 2015-2030, including physical investments, and other types of investments called “mostly intangible”, which aim at supporting and popularizing new practices (institutional support, capacity building, research and development, etc.).

The present project is—and has been—and important contribution to the so-called ‘intangible’ investments mentioned in the latter point.

The relevance of the Coastal Resilience Project is further enhanced by the fact that it was **aimed at changing approaches to climate-induced problems**: from a reactive approach, with a bias towards hard engineering works, to a more flexible, holistic one (and hopefully also more gender-sensitive). The new approach is based on sound policies, strengthened institutions and local participation. Therefore, the project helped build a very important baseline of climate change adaptation for the country – even though ‘the gender aspect’ was not an important concern at project design stage. It became one during implementation, albeit with a rather incomplete (and insufficient) approach to gender mainstreaming.

EFFECTIVENESS – RATED “S”

CRITERION	RATING
Effectiveness	Satisfactory (S)

Most project outcomes under project themes have been successfully achieved, however there were shortfalls in the completion of some project outputs, especially for outputs relating to the development of financing instruments.

In terms of **Effectiveness**, performance is **Satisfactory (S)**. It should be stressed that the project achieved important results in several areas, especially with respect to: (i) the implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures on the ground, which greatly accelerated since the MRT; and (ii) improvements to the institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas. These two aspects are respectively aligned with the subject matter of **Components 2 and 1** of the project. Aspects involving finance for adaptation and the engagement of the private sector, including initiatives that prime public-private collaboration, also made advances. Yet, those aspects had comparatively more shortcomings. Innovative and sustainable economic instruments for adaptation are namely the subject matter of **Component 3** of the project and had fewer effective results to show.

The ratings per outcome and their justifications are presented in more details in:

- [Table 5. Status of end-of-project achievements on the basis of project indicators.](#)

⁹⁰ The updated NDC is in the final stages of preparation in preparation for the UNFCCC COP26 in November 2021. The draft NDC was not made available to the TE.

EFFICIENCY – RATED “MS”

CRITERION	RATING
Efficiency	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

Efficiency is an aspect where performance left to be desired for most of the project duration. The final rating ends up being **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**, in order to recognize the project team’s perseverance against a number of odds and pressures that could otherwise have resulted in greater inefficiencies and lower delivery. The Efficiency aspect focuses on *how* ‘resources’ and ‘inputs’ (i.e. funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.

A critical element for most of the project’s duration has been the **low quality of planning**, especially when compared with effective execution. Planning is closely related to scoping and it would be meaningless without adequate risk management.

Evidence from Table 9 showed that, since the project’s first Annual Workplan (AWP), which had been prepared in early 2015, and up until 2020, AWP’s have been overly optimistic with respect to how fast financial resources could be put to use through the effective implementation of planned activities.

Table 9. Gap between planned resource use and actual execution

AWP FY	A Planned (\$K) SCCF as of approved AWP	B Planned (\$K) TRAC as of approved AWP	C [A + B] Planned (\$K) Total as of approved AWP	D Executed total by year end (\$K)	E End-of-year revised budget (\$K)	D / E End-of-year "delivery" based on revised budgets (%)	D / C End-of-year execution in relation the original AWP (%) *	C / D Gap between planned and executed (factor)**
2015	533	20	553	75	75	100.0%	14%	7.1
2016	1,316	0	1,316	549	548	100.2%	42%	2.4
2017	1,538	30	1,568	946	946	99.9%	61%	1.6
2018	1,400	22	1,422	955	957	99.8%	68%	1.5
2019	3,069	6	3,076	1,195	1,196	99.9%	39%	2.6
2020	1,893	0	1,893	685	693	98.9%	36%	2.8
TOTAL ***	9,750	78	9,828	4,404	4,415	-	-	-

* In end-of-year project reports, delivery is normally calculated in relation to *revised* annual budgets (E). Here, we show what delivery would look like, if budget amounts in original AWP’s were used in the calculation (column “D/C”). ‘End-of-year execution in relation the original AWP’ is a measure of quality of planning, and an indirect measure of the efficiency of implementation. Performance was worse in 2015, followed by 2020 and 2019. It was better in 2017 and 2018, but still with much room for improvement. ** The last column shows the size of the gap between planned and executed as a factor (“C/D”). In 2018 and 2017 e.g., the planned budget was respectively 1.5 and 1.6 times larger than the execution. In 2015, it was more than 7 times larger than what had been originally planned. *** The total amounts (sum of 2015 to 2020) point out to the project delivering by end 2020 some 79% of the SCCF + TRAC budget made available to it through Atlas for programming (\$4,404/\$5,578). Only \$78K could be mobilized by the project from TRAC resources between 2015 and 2020, of which \$71K were apparently spent (see [co-financing table](#)).

For financial data concerning 2021, refer to the Executive Summary and to Figure 1. Gap between amounts originally planned in AWP’s and amounts delivered by year end (2015-2021).

Because SCCF resources are a fixed grant for the duration of the project, unspent amounts can be re-programmed the following years by conducting one or more budget revisions during the financial year (FY). With this artifice, expenditure amount will come closer to budgets availed, and annual delivery will be high by year end. Amounts shown in [Atlas the Information table through Open UNDP](#) (below Project Summary Table) display this high delivery relationship, which masks a reality of poor scoping and unrealistic planning.

Table 9 clearly shows how unspent budgets (the difference between columns C and D) had been chronically “re-phased” (or transferred) to subsequent years through end-of-year budget revisions (column E). While this practice helps show adequate delivery by year end (the similarity between columns D and E), it is a symptom of poor planning and scoping.

The practice of rephasing funds applies primarily to GEF/SCCF funds. In turn, UNDP’s TRAC funds⁹¹ can hardly be re-phased. Differently from SCCF funds, which is a fixed grant, TRAC resources can be regarded as a ‘competitive

⁹¹ Co-financing from TRAC was initially foreseen at \$100K, delivered by 114%, but only when consolidated in 2021. See [co-financing table](#).

grant’ to be shared annually among UNDP projects at the CO’s level -- and even among different UNDP COs. Programmed TRAC funds that are unspent by year end are lost to the project.

FINDING: The low risk to the availability of the GEF/SCCF’s grant creates overtime a negative incentive for the project to apply good financial planning practices in GEF projects.


Procurement of goods and services has been widely used by the project for implementing planned activities (e.g. conducting studies through consultancies and purchasing equipment).⁹² Many of the piecemeal processes involved in procurement depend on a number of operational procedures that are outside the control of the project team.

The role of the UNDP CO in conducting these processes was central, to the point that the project can be considered ‘operationally embedded’ within UNDP, even though it is a NIM project in a middle-income country. In practice, the modality applied was ‘assisted NIM’, at times deemed necessary by UNDP (an/or government), but at the expense of national ownership of the project.

By holding email accounts within the UNDP.org domain, project staff was able to play an active part in conducting procurement processes within UNDP systems, benefitting from the global outreach of UNDP procurement’s advertisement and the apparent ‘security’ that contracting by UNDP contracts represent in the eyes service providers (as opposed to government contracts e.g.) The approval of larger procurement processes was reserved to UNDP staff [to be confirmed].

According to a key informant interviewed, this arrangement was the result of an explicit request from government to UNDP – and not necessarily because an institution such as a APAL was deemed to lack the capacity to conduct complex procurement. Rather, it appeared convenient to APAL to have the UNDP CO assume this role in operational implementation, in light of e.g. the need to accelerate project delivery, especially in the inception and post-inception period. According to the same informant, this aspect did not weaken national ownership.

Figure 11. Cumulative amounts in Atlas: originally planned in AWP’s vs. delivered by year end (2015-2020)⁹³



⁹² Procurement processes published in the “Open UNDP” website sum approximately \$3.7M, corresponding to at least 85% of expenditure (likely more).

⁹³ This figure is a variant of Figure 1 in the Executive Summary.

At the same time, evidence of **unrealistic planning and scoping**, such as the one presented in Table 9 – and also in Figure 11 – indicates that project team’s ability to ‘push forward’ several complex procurement processes at once was probably underestimated. This had been pointed out by the MTR and a recommendation on strengthening the team had been made by the MTR – a recommendation that the project indicated to have followed.

At the same time, some of the beneficiaries interviewed by the TE pointed out to “bureaucracy” as the reason why different operational processes faced delays and impacted delivery on the ground.

We have already covered why re-phasing budgets and invariably extending the project duration are a tangible problem for the NCE Team (refer to Section 2.1). In fact, they can become a problem for the project as well to the extent that they create no incentive for improved planning. This is an important **LESSON** for the project and for other similar ones.

Project teams should have strong skills in planning, executing, managing risk and reporting on both progress and results. If the skills are not in place, the focus of project Inception should be on strengthening their capacity.

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

CRITERION	RATING
Country ownership	Satisfactory (S)

The project design and objectives were relevant to the national priorities and needs. Various government institutions worked in partnership and collaboration in project implementation.

Important, but yet pending MTR recommendations pertained to the integration of the project in frameworks such as the Nationally Determined contribution.

Highly important progress in the theme of legislation and policies are perhaps the aspects that most enhance the project’s ownership. We mention again: (1) an updated regulation on the Maritime Public Domain (DPM)⁹⁴; (2) steps towards Tunisia’s ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol (under the Barcelona Convention⁹⁵); and (3) the structuring of APAL to better fulfil its mandate. Improvements to other policies and legal frameworks, which also received project support.

SUSTAINABILITY - RATED “MU”

CRITERION	RATING
Sustainability	Moderately Unlikely (MU)

There are important risks to the project’s sustainability and some recent events have been critical: The first relates to the initial refusal of UNDP’s NCE Team to grant an additional duration extension to the project. The second is the July 2021 political events, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty for the project’s prospects, and threatening sustainability. Environmental sustainability shows better performance though.

Considering the **Sustainability Criteria (#4)**, the project’s *Overall Likelihood of Sustainability* was rated as **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**.

Three out of four sustainability elements requiring ratings in the Executive Summary (Table 1) had a similar MU rating: Financial, Socio-Political, and Institutional Framework & Governance. We wish to comment on around July 2021, two contributed to putting sustainability at risk, just as the project was trying to counteract the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on the pace of implementation in 2020. The *first* was the initial refusal of UNDP GEF to grant an additional extension of the project’s duration until end of 2021. The *second* was the July

⁹⁴ More information in: http://www.apal.nat.tn/site_web/Files/dpm.pdf.

⁹⁵ More information in: <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/> and more specifically, <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/tunisia>.

2021 political events, which brought institutional uncertainty. These two events happened during the course of the TE assignment and directly contributed to **downgrading the initial intention of Sustainability ratings for Financial, Socio-political, Institutional framework and governance, and Sustainability of Financial resources:** from Moderately Likely (ML) to **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**⁹⁶.

As it is, the TE considered that, given the timing, these events managed to cast a number of hard-earned project results into a situation of political, institutional and operational uncertainty, and by consequence, also financial uncertainty -- affecting e.g. investment prospects.

The situation is aggravated by extant risk factors, in particular the negative impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on Tunisia's economy and its workforce, which are significant. The sudden drop in tourism activities since the beginning of 2020 also resulted in a slowdown in investments in hotel and real estate sectors, and therefore also in their willingness to invest in resilience. According to specialists, there are prospects for economic recovery in Tunisia in 2022 and beyond.⁹⁷ Yet, the recovery process will take a while to be consolidated and it depend strongly on trends in Europe.

Overall, the project's general prospects for sustainability have been pushed down, considering the situation today. Risks to the project's sustainability are directly attributable to political, economic and financial uncertainties, coupled with institutional instability.

In fact, functional and strong institutions and good governance are a pre-condition for sustainability. Although important, the project has no influence on the macro-framework for governance in the country and a limited contribution to institutional strengthening of its host institution—it is one among a few other projects that support APAL and propose to strengthen the institution. The **Sustainability of Institutional framework and governance** must therefore be analyzed within these limitations.

The project does not have a clear Sustainability Plan or Exit Strategy (although UNDP has follow-up plans in the form of new programs, which might not be the same) and continuation of benefits may be in jeopardy unless concrete follow-up strategies and replication are rectified. Quick studies targeted at the tail end of the project will not secure sustainability. As discussed in previous sections, some of the important studies prepared by the project, as well as other important activities, were completed too late in the project's lifetime to have any impact on expected results, or on the host institution's performance. This is discussed in Box 6 below.

Box 6. Considerations on the timing of strategic actions

With reference to three different types of results that have been pursued by the project would have desirable earlier:

(i) certain strategic studies:

For e.g. the gender mainstreaming study should have been prepared in the project's early period, and not at the tail end. The project's Exit Strategy should have been under preparation since after the MTR.

(ii) actions on the ground, especially those tagged as Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (EBA):

EBA measures should start early in the project's lifetime and be followed up upon in a systematic manner. EBA measures are highly contextual and require significant monitoring of ecosystem condition for the scientist to measure adaptation outcomes and, if positive, propose methods for replicating

(iii) proposed changes to legislative processes:

The TE notes that much effort from the project had been invested in preparing the conditions for the Tunisian State to ratify the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Protocol under the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (The Barcelona Convention). Although the Protocol's ratification would be a desirable outcome from the project, a critical activity to achieve the result (the actual

⁹⁶ Two small caveats: The MTR classified 'Financial risks' as 'Moderately Likely (ML)', while the TE is asked to assess the sustainability of 'Financial resources', implying opposing measures of the same aspects. Technically, the MTR and TE ratings concerning financial risk and financial resources sustainability are the same. The MTR also looked at 'Socioeconomic Risks' and classified it as Likely (L). This is different from 'Socio-political sustainability', which the TE is called upon to assess.

⁹⁷ Refer e.g. to the African Development Bank's current page on 'Tunisia Economic Outlook': <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-north-africa-tunisia/tunisia-economic-outlook>, accessed on 10/08/21.

ratification) does not depend on the project, but on Tunisian Legislators, and it is yet to be accomplished.⁹⁸ Because changes in legislation take time, project support to such processes should start early.

The **Moderately Unlikely (MU) rating for Financial Sustainability** is also linked to the difficulty that the project faced in terms funding its 2021 workplan in full, in light of a 'sooner-than-expected' project closure. Currently, the threat of early closure is no longer there. However, Financial Sustainability is also linked with an analysis of what will happen to investments once the project reaches its end.

Concerning the first point mentioned: In June, the project reported to the evaluator that it could face major difficulties in concluding a number of strategic activities aimed at the mobilization of finance for adaptation and which depended on studies that were in the 2021 procurement's pipeline. The project team believed that those difficulties could have been remediated, if they could delay the project's operational closure till, say, the end of 2021. Yet, UNDP's Nature Climate and Energy Team (NCE)⁹⁹, had a different view on the project's needs for duration extension and the project's request for extension was initially denied. Later the decision was reversed. On 18 Aug 2021, the project received correspondence from the NCE announcing that the third request for project extension had been approved.

Concerning the sustainability of project's financial investment, the TE assesses that several of the NGOs and CSOs which implemented grants funded by the project would face difficulties in finding other sources of funds. APAL cannot fund with own resources the replication of vulnerability studies in other areas of the coastal zone (as confirmed from two different stakeholder interviews). Finally, progress under the project's Component 3 on financial mechanisms for adaptation was modest (see e.g. Table 5 for evidence).

On a positive note, and concerning the **Environmental Sustainability** aspect, the rating did indeed improve since the MTR, through the attribution of a **Moderately Likely (ML)** rating by the TE. This rating considers that the project had effectively addressed issues pointed out by the MTR on ecosystem management and the need for more attention to social-environmental safeguards.

Shortcomings had specifically related to: (i) the need to demonstrate the environmental benefits of the various interventions; (ii) the need to demonstrate how the SCCF project is helping support the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), beyond being a 'pilot' intervention; and (iii) the need to produce more strategic results, i.e. to focus less on the production of 'studies', and prime 'advocacy' interventions a little more.

Concerning the latter point: There are indications that key MTR lessons have been learned by the project, although this is subjective and contextual. The studies slated for conclusion in the 2020 and 2021 AWP have a more strategic character, one of the TE's **FINDINGS** is than those conducted in the previous years. Yet, their results are produced late in the projects entire lifetime, which sums 6.5 to 7 years.

Most of the adaptation measures implemented on the ground, whether by the project or by service providers (e.g. NGOs, CSOs and local companies) have a relatively good chance of environmental sustainability, because they applied well-studied methods for fighting beach erosion, promoting water conservation and practicing climate adaptive agriculture. There are risks, but they are low.

In turn, soft adaptation measures linked to land use planning and infrastructure development patterns are, to a large extent, no-regret measures – and by default likely sustainable – but they will take time to show results. In reality, only time will tell how environmentally sustainable or strategic these studies or measures on the ground really were. Assessing their actual sustainability of physical adaptation measures would require a one or more ex-post evaluation studies.

⁹⁸ See <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/iczm-protocol>, as accessed on 03-Dec-2021, showing that Tunisia signed, but has not ratified Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Mediterranean, which had been adopted by Parties to the Barcelona Convention on 21 January 2008, in Madrid, Spain.

⁹⁹ Formerly, the UNDP-GEF Unit, now rebranded NCE Team.

IMPACT

CRITERION	RATING
Impact	Satisfactory (S)

The project has implemented the majority of its activities that contributed to the achievement of the objective. Also, the project has achieved the majority of project outcomes and outputs as stipulated with some minor shortfalls.

Based on stakeholder interviews, it became clear that the project team works well together, and mostly in a diligent and coherent way to fulfil their role in implementing the project. It may be said that the project is ‘technically embedded’ within APAL (for all coastal zone matters) and ‘operationally’ embedded within UNDP (in light of the assisted NIM arrangement in place). The team makes use of standard methodologies recommended by UNDP for planning, prioritizing and budgeting, involving APAL through the Project Board and other day-to-day interactions. There is room for improvements in these, but the chances of impact are still tangible.

The project seems to work well with its stakeholders, according to the opinion of members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and some beneficiaries interviewed by the TE. The final evaluation highlights the work carried out by the Project Steering Committee (PSC), which is well summarized in the TOR that constituted it back in late 2014 (known as the “COFIL Charter”), and which had been signed by all members, and ever since the very first meeting of the Committee, which took place in July 2016. As part of a response to TE review in November 2021, a member of the PSC commented the following in writing:

“The PSC members conducted missions and carried out their functions, listed in the PSC’s Charter Article 4, with a lot of responsibility and rigor. Lessons can be derived from such an exemplary engagement.”¹⁰⁰

The TE agrees that the PSC had indeed provided rather useful guidance to the project during implementation and that the Committee created incentives for the project to seek improved levels of performance and delivery from the onset. The PSC was within their right mandate to demand this from the project (as per the Charter). **LESSONS** of perseverance can indeed be learned from the level of commitment displayed by the PSC, and as the TE could verify by reading through the sequence of minutes of meeting of the Committee.

The same member of the PSC mentioned further up, had also commented to the TE that Committee members could have benefited from training on the GEF modality in connection with the project to strengthen their functions, and that suggested, in addition that *“the COFIL could have their mandate extended for following up with the project team on the accomplishment of actions highlighted [by the TE].”¹⁰¹* The TE agrees with the PSC member. It could be useful in terms of the project’s general sustainability and for addressing TE Recommendations. Yet, the TE wonders if the proposition is viable, given its timing (November 2021) and the pressures on the project’s team in connection with project closure by end 2021.

The project team is also stronger than several other GEF projects known to this evaluation in terms of communicating project results, not least also through social media and other means of dissemination and outreach, although not all stakeholders interviewed would agree to that.

The project maintains a good network of contractors (including consultants and specialized companies), as well as with local NGO/CSO partners showing strong national ownership in the choice of partners. The good level of stakeholder engagement and the appreciation of efforts from the project team has been almost unanimously expressed by local government partners and NGOs/CSOs active in Ghar El Melh, Kalaât El Andalous communes, as well as in Djerba (including three communes).

All of these elements are conducive to impact. Also, the fact that the approach is replicable have contributed positively to the evaluation of Impact.

¹⁰⁰ Refer to the Audit Trail appended to this report for additional context.

¹⁰¹ Source: *Ibid.*

Actual impact needs to be measured up against the problems that the project sought to address (with reference to section 2.2). These and the project achievements are summarized in the matrix below:

Table 10. Assessing project impact

Problems that the project sought to address	How the project addressed them
<p>The update of regulatory and legislative frameworks to reduce the impacts of climate change effects on the coastal development and make the existing infrastructure more resilient. Particular attention would be given to the creation of an environment conducive for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management which takes into account risks of climate change.</p>	<p>Important achievements in terms of planning and regulatory frameworks for adaptation spearheaded by the project are also commendable and likely to have a lasting impact in Tunisia's management of its coastal zone. We highlight the revision of the Public Maritime Domain (DPM), which now considers climatic hazards, and progress towards the ratification of Barcelona Convention on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the Mediterranean, which also considers climate change.</p>
<p>The application of flexible and innovative measures to reduce risks linked to climate change such as protective measures (for example, restoration of dunes and wet zones) and best practices for the management of the water (for example, the controlled extraction of groundwater reserves to prevent saltwater intrusion) in line with the Integrated Coastal Zone Management.</p>	<p>Supporting evidence for physical realizations has cannot be fully verified, but if the TE assumes that what the project reports is accurate, results in terms of physical measures, as assessed against indicators, show mixed results. More specifically, the 2021 PIR mentions the following, and with data that is now consistent with the tracking tool:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Beneficiary count broken down per gender: consolidated data not available</i>¹⁰² • <i>ha of land (Area of wetlands with improved ecological conditions) – against a target of 670 ha</i> • <i>50 + 70 (?) ha of land (agricultural land which use recycled water) – against a target of 5% increase over the baseline</i> • <i>6.06 km of coast (Length of coast with stable dune fixation public open space and natural ecosystems in Djerba) – against a target of 10 km (plus another 10km in Ghar El Melh?)</i> • <i>2 km of coast (Number of kilometers of living shorelines implemented in Ghar El Melh)</i> • <i>X numbers of hotels (possibly also the percentage over baseline of hotels, which use recycled water) – against a target of 5% increase over the baseline</i> <p style="text-align: center;">=====</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Although the data above has been to a great extent 'triangulated' with data from the PIR, it is not possible to fully and/or physically verify some of the evidence for the indicators above (though not all). Here is an example of the kind of evidence that could not—and cannot—be obtained when conducting a remote evaluation. The second indicator on 'improved ecological conditions' require specific studies that cannot be conducted remotely. Also such studies require time and scope, which are completely outside those of the evaluation. Verification of physical evidence on a map does not yield the same type of results as, e.g. ground-level validation of data.</p>

¹⁰² The analysis of the tracking tool by 2021 (as conducted on 30 November 2021) revealed that the project did not maintain a consistent gender disaggregated dataset on beneficiaries.

Problems that the project sought to address	How the project addressed them
<p>The provision of a better climate information for monitoring coastal hazards, early warning system and planning climate-resilient development.</p>	<p>Various crucial studies providing climate information have been conducted by the project and plans prepared with its assistance. We mention the following in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Emergency response plan to prevent and mitigate the impacts of flooding (2018)</i> - <i>Addressing Climate Change Vulnerabilities and Risks in Vulnerable Coastal Areas of Tunisia, 2019</i> - <i>Étude d'évaluation des risques climatiques et élaboration d'un plan d'intervention d'urgence dans la frange littorale de Ghar el Melh - Kalâat el Andlouss et de l'île de Djerba, in 4 phases, concluded in 2019</i> - <i>Plan d'intervention d'urgence, Ile de Djerba (2020)</i> - <i>Early Warning System for the agricultural use of treated wastewater in Aghir water treatment station in Djerba, in partnership with Ministry of Agriculture (2021)</i> <p>The project also purchased a certain number of buoy and tide gauges. These are expected to contribute to an improved management of coastal hazards, including climate-driven ones, provided that APAL and other partners have the adequate training, skills and back-office support.</p> <p>The project conducted various trainings. However, it should be pointed out that consolidated and gender-disaggregated data on the outreach of training events had not been maintained by the project.</p>
<p>The mobilization of public and private funds for Coastal Resilience Projects in national and local level by making projects more bankable.</p>	<p>The project reported the mobilization of \$10M in new projects by APAL. The amount of national public funds is not reported. Additionally, consolidated and gender-disaggregated data on the mobilization of private funds has not been maintained by the project.</p> <p>Both the public and private sectors were expected to serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring. The co-financing amount at project end exceeded the expectations at CEO Endorsement, primarily thanks to the mobilization of KfW funds.</p>
<p>The introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors to ensure resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas, which depends on the interplay between public and private sector</p>	<p>If we consider the concept of 'risk transfer' broadly, there would be many achievements to report.</p> <p>The project reported by 2021 to have allocated \$185K to small adaptation projects implemented by NGOs in project sites.</p> <p>Many of them pursue women's empowerment approaches, but data on the breakdown of benefits per gender not available.</p> <p>It is worth noting that the project conducted various trainings. consolidated data not available, and also not gender-disaggregated.</p>

Concerning sustainability, and the considerations on institutional and governance framework vis-à-vis the project, it is difficult to make predictions. The political situation is fluid. Also the remote nature of the evaluation posed some limitations in this regard, along with limitations in terms of number of consulting days. The institutional and governance framework vis-à-vis the project and its impacts and sustainability is one among several other criteria to be evaluated through the TE.

More importantly, the TE noted that, before the project, ICZM was not a common concept in APAL and climate change was rarely considered in decision making concerning the coastal zone. The project managed to put climate change on the agenda for coastal zone management, with various stakeholders at play: public and private sectors, as well as Civil Society. While this represents the core impact of the project, whether it will be lasting will depend on conditions for sustainability. If e.g. major institutional changes will affect APAL in the near future, the longevity of these soft policy impacts may be at risk. Tunisia’s ratification of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol (under the Barcelona Convention¹⁰³) is something to be watched in this regard.

4) CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The TE’s main conclusion and FINDINGS can be thus summarized: The TE generally concludes that: the project had an **Overall Satisfactory Performance (S)**, all criteria considered, and considering that delivering results is the most important evaluation criterion.

There were several problems affecting the Coastal Resilience Project: from unrealistic and inefficient approaches to planning and poor M&E practices, and poor oversight and limited support by the implementing partners and/or UNDP. There were also delays, which meant that the project had to request three project duration extensions. Yet, **the project was mostly effective -- and it delivered results.**

The sustainability of project results appears to be currently at risk, with a moderately unlikely chance of transforming some of the hard-earned achievements into lasting impacts. The project should attempt to mitigate these risks, however possible, within the implementation time left.

Most of the project’s co-financing realized and it leveraged other funds that were not foreseen through design. Even if the project may have to return funds to the GEF SCCF by December 2021, because of the definitive operational closure, the project’s cumulative delivery on SCCF will still be high (likely 95-98% of the SCCF funds).

By today’s standards, more efforts would be needed to ensure the mainstreaming of gender equality and women’s empowerment through the project. Yet, it was designed 10 years ago and responded to different standards. At the same time, there were positive surprises concerning female leadership and participation as discovered through stakeholder interview. Gender equality, and the differential project benefits by gender were however poorly monitored – in fact not recorded.

There are **10 CORE RECOMMENDATIONS** made by the TE (described with caveats in sections 4.1 through 4.4), in addition to the following ‘special’ recommendations:

- **“Recommendation Zero” for immediate action by the project / UNDP CO** and pertaining to corrections to be made to the MTR Management Response;
- **6 other recommendations** that are also important, but are non-core and are therefore listed separately (numbered until recommendation #16); plus
- **2 MTR recommendations picked up from an incomplete Management Response to the MTR exercise.**

In the next sections they are presented according to a specific classification given by the headings: Corrective actions for the design, implementation and M&E ([section 4.1](#)), actions to reinforce the project’s benefits ([section 4.2](#)), proposals for future directions, moving forward (or beyond) from the project’s objective ([section 4.4](#)).

For the complete list of 18 TE RECOMMENDATIONS refer to:

Table 2. Recommendations and Lessons derived from issues pointed out in the TE

¹⁰³ More information in: <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/> and more specifically, <https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/contracting-parties/tunisia>.

4.0) CONCERNING THE MTR RECOMMENDATIONS (A SMALL PARENTHESIS)

Of the **17 MTR recommendations**, **15 of them were included in the MTR’s Management Response** and have been adequately followed up on.

From 15 recommendations, the project outlined **32 time bound and targeted actions** (or “**key actions**”), with varying degree of difficulty, starting in mid-2019 and running into the first semester of 2021, when the project was expected to reach its end.

Of the 32 key actions proposed in the MTR Management Response, 5 were tagged as “No longer applicable” by July 2021 and 27 actions were tagged as “Completed”.

In terms of who would be responsible for implementing the actions: 3 targeted at UNDP to implement and another 3 targeted APAL. Other actions (some 24 of them) targeted combinations or responsible bodies to implement, including 10 targeting the Project Manager and Project Steering Committee and other targeting the Project Management Unit. A total of 13 actions were completed in 2021 and had the data updated in UNDP’s system in July 2021.

The TE has analyzed anyway the follow-up to the MTR management response and brings forward some important conclusions in Table 11. In the TE’s considers that, there are issues with some of the MTR’s management responses that will require corrections, clarifications and some additional follow-up, even though it was recently updated by the project / UNDP CO.

With respect to the content in Table 11, the TE makes herein “**RECOMMENDATION ZERO**” for immediate action by the project / UNDP CO whenever possible:

[RO]	<p>IMMEDIATE BUT SIMPLE ACTION REQUIRED: Reopen the MTR’s management response and address pending issues in the TE’s Table 11 [MTR Recommendations tagged ‘completed’ that should be revisited].</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Addressed to the Project Team and/or UNDP CO -- and if viable, otherwise drop it.</p>
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Table 11. MTR Recommendations tagged ‘completed’ that should be revisited

Reference	Description
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTR Recommendation 3, Key Action 2 • MTR Recommendation 5, Key Actions 1, 2 and 3 <p><i>These four key actions, all of which were tagged as ‘corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project’, were completed too late in the project’s lifetime to have any impact on results or on APAL’s performance as the host institution.</i></p> <p><i>[Added: 2020/02/07] [Last Updated: May and July 2021]</i></p>	<p>One of the TE’s main FINDINGS is that, for the four key actions listed to the left, there should have been followed upon earlier in the project’s lifetime. They would have had more impact and would have been more strategic.</p> <p>They include e.g. the implementation of a Capacity Building Program in the Climate Finance Field. We also mention the conduct of a studies on the potential of ‘Palmivelles Green Employment’, or on the ‘Economic and institutional assessment of coastal adaptation to climate change in Tunisia’, and yet still on the ‘identification of the financing mechanisms for coastal adaptation to climate change Institutional and opportunities for Tunisia’.</p> <p>The inclusion of the above key actions in the MTR recommendations is accurate, and we note that the actions are tagged as ‘Complete’. Still, there is an important lesson to be learned here. They were completed too late in the project’s lifetime. It would have more strategic to conclude these studies earlier.</p> <p>The TE also recognizes that it is not possible to ‘turn back time’ (of course), and that there is always a <i>raison d’être</i> for why things were as they were. RECOMMENDATION / LESSON: In future projects, it should be possible to consider an earlier commencement of strategic studies and prioritizing them higher in the overall workplan. This encompasses: (i) certain strategic studies; (ii) actions on the ground, especially those tagged as Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (EBA); and (iii) proposed changes to legislative</p>

Reference	Description
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTR Recommendation 8, Key Actions 4, 5 • MTR Recommendation 11, Key Action 1 <p>The tree key actions listed above are not very well formulated</p> <p>[Added: 2020/02/07] [Last Updated: May and July 2021]</p>	<p>processes. This is because these types of activities take a long time to reach maturity and show impact.</p> <p>The TE does not understand what the following actions really mean, not even in context, and suggests UNDP CO to provide clarifications / ensure improved editorial when reopening the applicable management responses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>“Improving mechanisms of delivery feedback times for the remainder of the project under the leadership of the Project Director (DG of APAL).”</i> – to be implemented by PM/APAL. <u>Our comment:</u> The term ‘delivery feedback times’ is not clear. - <i>“Integrating programmatic objectives into the project monitoring and evaluation systems as set out in the 2019 AWP.”</i> – to be implemented by the PM/PSC. <u>Our comment:</u> It is not clear if this refers to UNDP’s or APAL’s programmatic objectives. - <i>“Conducting an upscaling expertise of the project results”</i> – to be implanted by PM/UNDP/APAL. <u>Our comment:</u> Results do not usually have expertise.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTR Recommendation 10, Key Action 2 • MTR Recommendation 11, Key Action <p>These key actions should have targeted APAL.</p> <p>[Added: 2020/02/07] [Last Updated: July 2021]</p>	<p>There seems to be a misunderstanding of target and purpose with one of the key actions that says: <i>“Meteo-oceanographic data collection used to feed vulnerability and protection studies of Tunisian coastal zones”</i> – to be implemented by the PM/SC.</p> <p>One of the TE’s FINDINGS is that this should be considered a rolling institutional function of APAL, and not a key action to be followed up on from the MTR.</p> <p>Also, the recommendation should have been addressed to APAL, i.e. for them to continue data collection and analysis. The MTR had in fact mentioned in its recommendation that the <i>“activities of the project that can be embedded within the larger development initiatives e.g.: aspects of the specific Coastal Management Plans, Master Plans or Beach Occupation Plans for Djerba and Ghar el Melh.”</i></p> <p>Another key action pertains to GIS data. It mentions: <i>“Development of an SGBD and a GIS web for the management of the date produced within the project implementation”</i>.</p> <p>The MTR Management Response has tagged the above action as ‘Complete’. However, it is not clear whether this is done. The description seems to refer to a presentation of a study to partners.</p> <p>The TE RECOMMENDS that GIS data generated by the project is currently considered open data and made available to the public -- as it sometimes is in some countries, for the wider benefit.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MTR Recommendation 10, Key Action 2 • MTR Recommendation 11, Key Action <p>These key actions should have targeted APAL.</p> <p>[Added: 2020/02/07] [Last Updated: July 2021]</p>	<p>One key action concerning the Tracking Tool should not have been tagged as ‘Complete’, while there is still a task for the project to be completed.</p> <p>It reads <i>“Reviewing the baseline GEF IW tracking tool (2015) and carry out an additional midterm assessment version (2019 onwards). Where possible this should demonstrate progress links to SDG13 and 14.”</i></p> <p>In reality, the end of project Tracking Tool is not completed. Based on the reporting the PIR, where some of the quantification of actions on the ground seems unclear, this will require some action. The project could have benefited from a more systematic tracking of progress in an M&E System, especially for quantitative indicators.</p>

IMPORTANT: There are, in addition, **three MTR recommendations (numbered 15 through 17) that were not listed in the MTR Management Response.** MRT Recommendation #15 pertains to the preparation of a GCF project with remaining LDCF funds. The TE does not think that this is the project's responsibility, but UNDP's. The other two MRT Recommendations (#16 and #17) have been reincluded in the TE for adequate follow up.

4.1) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT

There are a couple of **IMMEDIATE ACTIONS** required by the project and that should be effected, while the project is still under implementation, and if there is time:

[RECOMMENDATION 0], addressed to Project Team and/or UNDP CO – if viable, otherwise drop: Reopen the MTR’s management response and address pending issues in the TE’s Table 11 *[MTR Recommendations tagged ‘completed’ that should be revisited]*. This is because there are issues with the MTR management response, as recently updated by the project / UNDP CO. These require corrections and clarifications, including of three MTR recommendations that were left out of the Management Response, numbered 15, 16 and 17. Of these, the TE thinks that the latter two are important and should be picked up again through the TE’s Management Response. They were reincluded further down. As for MTR Recommendation 15, concerning the preparation of a GCF project with remaining LDCF funds, the TE does not think that this is the project’s responsibility, but UNDP’s.

[RECOMMENDATION 1], addressed to Project team and UNDP CO, in particular the UNDP Officers tasked with gender mainstreaming into the Agency’s program: Concerning gender mainstreaming: For the purposes of gendered-learning, the project team should re-read with a gender-lens some of the reports, strategies and policies prepared through the project. If there is still time to ensure an improved gender mainstreaming into them, then the project should dedicate some time to it in the next few months. *[This recommendation had been formulated in September 2021¹⁰⁴]*

Concerning the MTR **RECOMMENDATIONS** that were reincluded, also for **IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP**, here they are (TE’s **FINDING**: Both recommendations remain actual):

[MTR RECOMMENDATION #16], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government: A Sustainability Plan, Replication/Upscaling and Exist Strategy does not appear to have been developed. This is needed for sustaining products, outcomes and effects to be made explicit plus provide the guidance towards upscaling the results of the project as appropriate. *By PMU/APAL/UNDP.*

[MTR RECOMMENDATION #17], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government: Recommendations above #17 referred to in the MTR should be followed by strengthening the narrative of the project to highlight its role in the acceleration of the NDC implementation in Tunisia along with a clear gender-mainstreaming plan. As part of this exercise, work is recommended that (where possible) inter-weave gender focused developmental issues (e.g.: NDC/Agenda 2030/Paris Agreement etc.) as a priority in the products and outcomes that result and seek to result out of the Project. *By PMU/PSC/APAL.*

Other **RECOMMENDATIONS** that constitute corrective actions include the following:

[RECOMMENDATION 6], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government: Improve project scoping and planning functions, both during design and regularly during implementation. In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project’s methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments -- including because some of the shortcomings observed seem to affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly.

[RECOMMENDATION 8], addressed to UNDP NCE Team: Put more thought into the ‘SMARTNESS’ of indicators and ensure that they are harmonized with the Tracking Tool. In the future, indicators that monitor both soft and hard adaptation measures should be harmonized with the Tracking Tool

¹⁰⁴ R1 had been initially made in September 2021, when the project still had a few months of implementation left. A new reading of reports with a gender lens could possibly influence the end-of-project report and the formulation of new pipeline projects. The project does not think it is realistic to propose this recommendation, but the TE maintains it for the record.

and make direct reference to it in the PRODOC's Results Framework. For measuring progress on the ground, on both soft and hard physical adaptation measures, indicator achievement should be illustrated by maps and aerial pictures that would demonstrate the progress and document it – ensuring better chances of sustainability of physical achievements on the ground. This stresses the importance of a consistent and systematically updated M&E System.

4.2) ACTIONS TO FOLLOW UP OR REINFORCE INITIAL BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT

By following the two **RECOMMENDATIONS** that follow are implemented, the immediate aftermath of project closure, stakeholders will likely see better chances of project sustainability materialize:

[RECOMMENDATION 7], addressed to Project Team (currently), and for future projects, UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government: Strengthen sustainability early, rather than too late in the project's lifetime. It is recommended that projects should begin the design of a project exit strategy early and through consistent actions that take into consideration the achievement made by the project. Such strategy should focus on correcting the project shortfalls and seek specific stakeholders for taking over strategic action and sustaining results, including when needed completing any outstanding outputs.

[RECOMMENDATION 9], addressed to Project Team and the Government: Improve information management and make useful and unclassified information and data generated by public funds available. It is recommended that considers the advantage of open data. GIS data, as a minimum should be made available by APAL to the public. Reports and studies as well. Sharing these data, information and knowledge for use in national sectoral and integrated planning is an important way of ensuring sustainability of results.

4.3) PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS UNDERLINING MAIN OBJECTIVES

As for specific and analytical **RECOMMENDATIONS** resulting from the TE, and concerning future projects, the following two are especially relevant and are considered **LESSONS** as well:

[RECOMMENDATION 2 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP CO: In the design of future adaptation projects in Tunisia, strategic actions that require time for maturing should be prioritized earlier in projects' lifetime. Therefore, all new projects should conduct strategic planning during the Inception Phase. In future projects, it should be possible to consider an earlier and higher prioritization of: (i) certain strategic studies; (ii) actions on the ground, especially those tagged as Ecosystem-Based Adaptation (EBA); and (iii) proposed changes to legislative processes. This is because these types of activities take a long time to reach maturity and show impact. This is because these types of activities take a long time to reach maturity and show impact. This is important because quite often projects rush through the inception phase without really prioritizing the sequence of strategic actions, without revising the Theory of Change. (This recommendation is also linked to R7 on the sustainability of results.)

[RECOMMENDATION 10 / LESSON]: Follow-up intervention(s), addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government. It is commendable that Government proceeds with its plans to carry out a follow-up intervention. Such an intervention should first create a bridge between the Coastal Resilience Project and the next in the form of a sustainability plan (Exit Strategy) – even though this should have been done earlier. The on-going study should have more focus on sectors where achievements were partially accomplished and also to address emerging issues. The issue of private sector engagement is clear gap to be addressed.

As for other **RECOMMENDATIONS** / **LESSONS** for future projects, we mention:

[RECOMMENDATION 11 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Development of a comprehensive M&E systems for the project and usable risk register. Train project staff in the use of the systems. UNDP's systems are improving but they are not integrated. Also, it is not clear how sound risk management practices will be integrated with Implementing Partners' systems, as UNDP reinforces the full NIM modality. Regardless, UNDP projects must have adequate means for monitoring and reporting and help with this integration.

[RECOMMENDATION 12 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Recruit project managers and project teams early, but make no compromise on the quality of HR. Also, robust capacity building programs in project management and accounting, especially during initial phase is needed.

[RECOMMENDATION 13 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Clear standard operating procedures outlining core functions in project management would be useful to avoid the type of arrangement that the coastal resilience project (technically linked to the implementing partner, but operationally linked to UNDP).

[RECOMMENDATION 14 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Project implementation officially starts by signature of the PRODOC. However, the actual project implementation always starts effectively with a delay typically of several months. This inaugural period of several months should be reflected and taken into account in project design. To the extent possible, the period of project mobilization should be attempted shortened.

[RECOMMENDATION 15 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Project indicators and targets must be SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant/realistic and Trackable/time-bound. If they are not, they create an administrative burden. Avoid vague indicators and indicators that are not measurable within the project implementation period and unrealistic targets.

[RECOMMENDATION 16 / LESSON], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government:

Continue to promote integrated approach in multi-sector projects, such as the Coastal Resilience one, even though it may be challenging.

4.4) BEST AND WORST PRACTICES IN ADDRESSING ISSUES RELATING TO RELEVANCE, PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESS

Herein we mention some of the practices that should be changed. As for the best practices, they have been highlighted throughout the report.

[RECOMMENDATION 3], addressed to UNDP NCE Team: Address the real reason behind requests for project Milestone Adjustments. In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. Some of the shortcomings observed seem to affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Efforts should instead go towards addressing the causes of delays, and also towards a realistic analysis of context and circumstances, improved planning and time scoping of time and resources needed across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective project mobilization and Inception Phase.

[RECOMMENDATION 4], addressed to the Project Team and/or UNDP CO: Consider the seriousness of extant factors in risk management and decision-making. As the pandemic extends its duration and grip in the world, either the project or UNDP should conduct a study to fully gauge the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on vulnerable populations, including those that are climatically vulnerable. The study could also assess if all measures of sanitary protection, including social distancing, and as

enforceable through UNDP projects, are sufficient to avoid further spreading the virus. In terms of approaches to project implementation different types of adaptations may be needed, including allowing the project more time.

[RECOMMENDATION 5], addressed to UNDP NCE Team, UNDP COs and the Government: Consider the seriousness of delays in project mobilization (from CEO Endorsement to the end of the Inception Phase). A recommendation to UNDP is to more actively monitor project startup processes, ensuring that a project team can be more promptly engaged, after the project document has been signed. If English is not the official language in the programming country, the PRODOC should be translated. Recruitments can be accelerated in different ways, preferably without compromising country ownership.

-oOo-

5) ANNEXES

ANNEX I) TOR

[[Inserted](#) at the end of the PDF file]

ANNEX II) TERMINAL EVALUATION (TE) TIMEFRAME

May 2021	June 2021	July 2021	August 2021	Sep-Oct 2021	November 2021
Inception	Inception Report 1 st version, followed by review	Inception Report, version 2	Preparing DEL3 and DEL2 in this order	DEL2 and DEL3 delivered on 03-Sep. Reports under analysis by UNDP. Tracking Tool delivered to the TE for review. Information on co-financing availed to the TE.	Presentation of DEL2 adjusted to the PSC (COFIL); DEL4 delivered with audit trail and. // End of Assignment //

ANNEX III) LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Table 12. Complete log of stakeholders interviewed in connection with the TE

Interview List
Briefing #1) Kick-Off Call: UNDP CO Tunisia and Project Team on 10-May-2021 Mr. Fadhel Bacchar, Project Manager, Project Team Ms. Alissar Chaker, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP CO Tunisia Ms. Faiza Elleuch, M&E Specialist, UNDP CO Tunisia Ms. Houwayda Foued, Project Officer, Project Team Mr. Ltaief Ben-Dermech, Project Assistant, Project Team
Interview #2) Project Team on 02-Jun-2021 Ms. Bochra Jaouani, Project Officer, Project Team
Interview #3) Direction Générale de l'Aménagement du Territoire/Ministère de l'Équipement, de l'Habitat et de l'Infrastructure on 02-Jun-2021 Ms. Hela Tlemceni, Chargée de suivi de l'étude sur le SDAZS/Membre du CoPil, Direction Générale de l'Aménagement du Territoire/Ministère de l'Équipement, de l'Habitat et de l'Infrastructure
Interview #3) Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral on 02-Jun-2021 Ms. Leila Ben Abdeladhim, Chargée de suivi de l'étude sur la GIZC, Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral
Interview #4) Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral on 04-Jun-2021 Mr. Adel Abdouli, Coordinateur National du projet, Agence de Protection et d'Aménagement du Littoral
Interview #5) UNDP (Regional) NCE Team on 07-Jun-2021 Ms. Ketî Chachibaïa, Regional Technical Advisor (RTA), UNDP (Regional) NCE Team
Interview #6) Commune de Djerba Ajim on 08-Jun-2021 Ms. Maroua Ben Azaïez, Architecte, Commune de Djerba Ajim
Interview #7) Experte indépendante on 08-Jun-2021 Ms. Afef Hammami Marrakchi, Juriste spécialiste en droit de l'environnement, Experte indépendante
Interview #8) Cabinet THETIS on 09-Jun-2021 Mr. Sami Bem Haj, Consultant chez Thétis-Conseil, Cabinet THETIS
Interview #9) Association Jlij pour l'Environnement Marin (AJEM Djerba) on 10-Jun-2021 Mr. Faïçal Ghzaïel, Chef du projet de l'ONG, Association Jlij pour l'Environnement Marin (AJEM Djerba) Mr. Sami Abdeljaouïed, Trésorier de l'ONG, Association Jlij pour l'Environnement Marin (AJEM Djerba)
Interview #10) Réseau RANDET on 10-Jun-2021 Mr. Boubaker Houmen, Membre du CoPil, Réseau RANDET
Interview #11) Association Tunisienne pour le Leadership, l'Auto-développement et la solidarité (ATLAS) on 10-Jun-2021 Ms. Mariem Mallek, Chef du projet de l'ONG, Association Tunisienne pour le Leadership, l'Auto-développement et la solidarité (ATLAS)
Interview #12) Groupement Inter-Professionnels des produits de la pêche (GIPP Djerba) on 10-Jun-2021 Ms. Samia Lamine, Chef du projet de l'ONG, Groupement Inter-Professionnels des produits de la pêche (GIPP Djerba)
Interview #13) Réseau Enfants de la Terre (RET) on 14-Jun-2021 Ms. Emna Sohlobji, Experte genre Experte indépendante) plus Membre de l'ONG RET, Réseau Enfants de la Terre (RET) Ms. Radhia Louhichi (delegated to Emna Sohlobji), Présidente de l'ONG, Réseau Enfants de la Terre (RET)
Interview #14) Commune de Kalaât El Andalouss on 16-Jun-2021 Ms. Fethy Bel Haj Hammouda, Maire, Commune de Kalaât El Andalouss
Interview #15) UNDP CO Tunisia on 22-Jun-2021 (postponed) Ms. Faiza Elleuch, M&E Specialist, UNDP CO Tunisia
Interview #16) UNDP CO Tunisia on 22-Jun-2021 Mr. Yousri Helal, Program Officer, UNDP CO Tunisia

Interview List**Interview #17) Project Team on 22-Jun-2021**

Mr. Fadhel Baccar, Project Manager, Project Team

Interview #19) Project Team on 03-Aug-2021

Mr. Fadhel Baccar, Project Manager, Project Team
 Ms. Bochra Jaouani, Project Officer, Project Team
 Ms. Houwayda Foued, Project Officer, Project Team
 Mr. Ltaief Ben-Dermech, Project Assistant, Project Team

Interview #18) Project Team on 08-Jul-2021

Mr. Fadhel Baccar, Project Manager, Project Team
 Ms. Bochra Jaouani, Project Officer, Project Team
 Ms. Houwayda Foued, Project Officer, Project Team
 Mr. Ltaief Ben-Dermech, Project Assistant, Project Team

Interview #20) UNDP (Regional) NCE Team on 13-Aug-2021 (second interview)

Ms. Ketil Chachibaia, Regional Technical Advisor (RTA), UNDP (Regional) NCE Team

Interview #21) CO Guinea-Bissau on 20-Aug-2021

Ms. Jihene Touil, Former Program Officer in UNDP Tunisia, now in UNDP Bissau, CO Guinea-Bissau

Interview #22) Project Team on 01-Sep-2021

Mr. Fadhel Baccar, Project Manager, Project Team
 Ms. Bochra Jaouani, Project Officer, Project Team

Prep Meeting #23) UNDP and Project preparatory meeting on 01-Nov-2021

Project Team and UNDP's M&E Specialist

Event #24) Project Steering Committee (PSC), multiple stakeholders, held on 03-Nov-2021

18 members of the Project Steering Committee, to which the presentation of findings was made. The participant's list and recording has been retained by the project

Interview #25) UNDP CO Tunisia on 12-Nov-2021

Ms. Faiza Elleuch, M&E Officer, UNDP CO Tunisia


The TE conducted to date **22 interviews** with **23 unique stakeholders** (including project team and UNDP) and **participated in one project event** (all listed in Table 12). Of the 22 unique stakeholders with whom the TE consultant has had direct contact with, **13 interviewees (61%) were female**. Yet, this is not necessarily a sign of strong female participation or leadership in the project. The complete stakeholder list from which the interviews were selected contained 42 names, **55% male**. Male stakeholders dominate some of the key positions – with exceptions. Interviews with them, including e.g. the director of APAL could not be held due to lack of agenda.

Most of the interviews in Table 12 lasted 45 min to 1h. One interview (with the former UNDP Program Officer) lasted 2h. Some important stakeholders (e.g. the RTA and the M&E Officer in the Tunisia CO) were interviewed twice. There otherwise were several formal interviews with the Project Team, some of them informal and for logistical purposes. Those were not registered in the log in Table 12.

Most interviews were recorded. Some stakeholders felt more at ease speaking off-record, but it was rare. Requests for prior permission for recording interviews were asked each time. Off-record statements remained off-record.

A working session with UNDP Tunisia happened on 01 November 2021 (correct date) and two days later the meeting with the Project Steering Committee (PSC/COPIIL) took place.


Box 7. Collection of screen pictures from selected stakeholder interviews (all remote)



The numbers in the picture above provide the reference to the interviewees' index in Table 12:

- #6) Ms. Maroua Ben Azaiez, Architecte, Commune de Djerba Ajim
- #7) Ms. Afef Hammami Marrakchi, Juriste spécialiste en droit de l'environnement, Experte indépendante
- #8) Mr. Sami Bem Haj, Consultant chez Thétis-Conseil, Cabinet Thetis
- #9) Mr. Faïçal Ghzaïel and Mr. Sami Abdeljaouied, Chef et Trésorier de l'ONG (respectivement), Association Ilij pour l'Environnement Marin (AJEM Djerba)
- #10) Mr. Boubaker Houmen, Membre du CoPil, Réseau RANDET
- #11) Ms. Mariem Mallek, Chef du projet, ONG Association Tunisienne pour le Leadership, l'Auto-développement et la solidarité (ATLAS)
- #12) Ms. Samia Lamine, Chef du projet de l'ONG, Groupement Inter-Professionnels des produits de la pêche (GIPP Djerba)
- #13) Ms. Emna Sohlobji, Experte genre Experte indépendante) plus Membre de l'ONG RET, Réseau Enfants de la Terre (RET)

Break-down of interviewed stakeholder per type



ANNEX IV) LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

AWP	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	Latest CDR
Communication supports	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	Project Documents
CPD_SP-UNDAF	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	Reports of studies
Mission Reports	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	Trainings
Monitoring reports	29-Apr-21 10:26 AM	File folder	
MTR	29-Aug-21 6:59 PM	File folder	
PIR	29-Aug-21 11:12 PM	File folder	
Project Documents	29-Aug-21 2:37 PM	File folder	
Quality Assurance	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	
Quarterly progress reports	10-Aug-21 3:33 PM	File folder	
Steering Committee	29-Apr-21 10:51 AM	File folder	
Technical reports	10-Aug-21 12:16 AM	File folder	

Other sources:

- CDRs, actually the latest for 2021 (dated 30-Nov) was availed.
- Audit reports: only the UNDP GEF portfolio level audit for 2020 was consulted, none at project level.
- Evidence on beneficiary count, preferably gender disaggregated: not availed, and likely not available.
- Proof of co-financing realization: evidence provided in October 2021, not as ‘proof’, but as indirect and rounded off information as reported by the project manager via email.
- Tracking Tool and supporting evidence for beneficiary count and physical realizations was only obtained indirectly through textual reporting in the PIRs, some meta-information in the Tracking Tools’ comments column, plus some pictorial evidence (social media, videos, photos), rather than cartographic or vetted information:
 - Beneficiary count broken down per gender *
 - ha of land (Area of wetlands with improved ecological conditions) *
 - ha of land (agricultural land which use recycled water) *
 - km of coast (Length of coast with stable dune fixation) *
 - km of coast (Number of kilometers of living shorelines implemented) *
 - numbers of hotels (possibly also the percentage over baseline of hotels, which use recycled water) *

[*] The social and environmental quality and the sustainability of the physical and other project outputs marked above cannot be verified within the scope of the TE, because of its remote character and its limitations in terms of number of days.

ANNEX V) EVALUATION QUESTION MATRIX

A set of questions referring have been drafted for guiding the evaluation. They are included below in a matrix with the aim of showing they relate to the standard TE criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact (Table 13).

Table 13. Evaluation Questions

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How is the Coastal Zone Adaptation Project different from a typical development project that caters for the development of the coastal zone? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High level indicators for the SCCF project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PIRs, MTR Stakeholder interview Other reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consult project reports and other documentation Query stakeholders (semi-structured interviews)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How has the project contributed to reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience in its sites? 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is the project still relevant vis-à-vis national and local priorities, 7 years after its design and the evolution of the socio-economic context? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Various documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dynamic context analysis, including by considering the impact of covid-19 in the project. Review of similar question in the MTR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has the Theory of change (TOC) presented in the results framework provides a relevant and appropriate vision that can serve as a basis for other initiatives? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence of an explicit and logic TOC in the project document TOC internalized by the project team TOC duly reflected in the structuring of the project strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Document 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assess the causal relationships among elements that compose the TOC, including the problem (addressed by the project), its causes, the long term solution, the barriers to the solution, core assumptions and the project's logframe elements. Review of similar question in the MTR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has gender equality and women's empowerment been taken into account and integrated from the design, taking into account the specificities of the country? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If applicable, indicators proposed in section 5.2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Various documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consult project reports and other documentation Query stakeholders (semi-structured interviews)
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do high level project indicators show that the outcomes have been achieved? (evaluator to assess based on experience and evidence) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All the relevant indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PIRs, MTR Stakeholder interview Other reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consult project reports and other documentation Query stakeholders (semi-structured interviews)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pose the questions above for each of the outcome to key stakeholders: the Project team, APAL, the beneficiaries, COPIL, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open ended questions to key stakeholders (qualitative assessment) 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were the results delivered by the project adequate and commensurate to the assistance provided within its timeframe? In what areas has the project been unable to achieve the expected results and why? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achievement of objective and outcome level indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PIRs, MTR Stakeholder interview Other reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of progress towards results. Examining evidence of delivery Analysis of timelines (already included in this report)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was gender equality and women's empowerment reflected in the products prepared by the project? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project reports and other production 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gendered analysis
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has UNDP quality assurance mechanism been effective, including hereunder the specialized technical advisory services provided by UNDP GEF (now re-branded NCE)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interview Other sources as needed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examining evidence

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verify budgets, execution reports, the prices paid for strategic studies, compared with the quality and content of those studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compare with other similar projects or with the “without the project” hypothesis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis of the use of funds
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have the partnership and procurement arrangements been conducive to achieving the goals of an efficiently implemented project? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-financing mobilized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-financing assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work with the project to compose the project’s co-financing table.
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the indications that tend to demonstrate the sustainability of results obtained by the project? To what extent has a sustainability strategy been elaborated or implemented? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open ended questions to key stakeholders. (qualitative assessment) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Query stakeholders (semi-structured interviews)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are the strategic and regulatory frameworks in place likely to ensure continuity of benefits? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected policies to focus on and query key informants.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent mechanisms and policies in place have allowed results to be sustainable in terms of gender equality, women’s empowerment, fundamental rights and human development? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder interview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected policies to focus on and query key informants.
Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there indications that the project has contributed to generating impacts in terms of adaptation to climate change and that what the project has delivered will last? (evaluator to assess based on experience and evidence and, if time permits, cross-verify against post-interview survey responses) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Generation of adaptation benefits, in light of identified climate risks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PIRs, MTR Other reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consult project reports and other documentation If there is time, query stakeholders through a brief post-interview questionnaires (only if viable, given language barriers), and analyze the responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on above questions and discussions with stakeholders and partners, how is the project’s impact on Gender be assessed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discussions with stakeholders and partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focus on the evaluation questions that include a gender aspect and draw conclusions.

ANNEX VI) QUESTIONNAIRE USED AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS

/ Refer to [Executive Summary](#) for the Summary of Results. /

Note: No fixed stakeholder questionnaire was used. Rather, the TE consultant adapted the Evaluation Questions (above) to the different interview situations.

ANNEX VII) EVALUATION CONSULTANT AGREEMENT FORM

[From TOR's Annex E]

ANNEX E: EVALUATION CONSULTANT CODE OF CONDUCT AND AGREEMENT FORM

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form⁶


Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: Fabiana Issler

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): UNPD Tunisia

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at *place* on *date* Rio de Janeiro, 03 Sep 2021

Signature: 

⁶www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

ANNEXED IN A SEPARATE FILE: TE AUDIT TRAIL

The full TE Audit Trail is an internal file of UNDP. It shows in details how the comments received on the draft TE report (DEL3 and DEL2) have (or have not) been incorporated into the final TE report (i.e. this report, DEL4).

[File availed to UNDP separately]

ANNEXED IN A SEPARATE FILE: TERMINAL GEF TRACKING TOOL

See appended file added to the FINAL TE Report with thorough review of the Terminal Tracking Tool by the TE consultant.

[[Appended to the PDF file](#)]

Terminal Evaluation Terms of Reference

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP support GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the project “Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia” (PIMS 4697).

The essentials of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

Project Title:	Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia			
GEF Project ID:	00089624		<u>at endorsement</u> <u>(Million US\$)</u>	<u>at completion</u> <u>(Million US\$)</u>
UNDP Project ID:	4697	GEF financing:	\$ 5,500,000	\$ 5,500,000
Country:	Tunisia	IA/EA own:		
Region:	Bizerte, Ariana, Medenine	Government:		
Focal Area:	Northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis and the Island of Djerba	Other:	UNDP 100,000 GEI 30,000	UNDP 114,318 GEI 30,000
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):		Total co-financing:	130,000	144,318
Executing Agency:	Coastal Protection and Planning Agency	Total Project Cost:	\$ 5 630,000	\$ 5 644, 318
Other Partners involved:	NGOs Municipalities	ProDoc Signature (date project began):		23/12/2014
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: 24/12/2019	Actual: 24/12/2020

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The project was designed to: 1. designed to support the Government of Tunisia in the design and implementation of baseline coastal adaptation measures on the ground in the northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis and the Island of Djerba by strengthening APAL's capacity to consider a whole approach system for coastal management for medium and long-term impacts of climate change as well as vulnerabilities across key sectors (tourism, agriculture, fisheries, water). and to facilitate the implementation of appropriate soft solutions in other interventions by giving APAL the expertise to exploit existing coastal monitoring data, consider climate change scenarios, generate risk-based assessments and recommend appropriate soft protection measures and monitoring schemes).

This project proposes a risk-based approach to Climate Change Adaptation by enabling flexible adaptation pathways, which will build resilience to climate change and provide maximum co-benefits. As tourism is a dominant source of revenue for the region, a set of economic instruments will be devised to signal the existing risks and drive future hotel and private residence development, including investments, away from vulnerable areas. With such an

Summary of Comments on ANNOTATED_FI_190421_Terminal-Evaluation-Terms-of- Reference-SCCF.pdf

Page: 1

Number: 1 Author: Fabiana Issler Date: 28-Apr-21 10:33:00 PM
English text not great.

Number: 2 Author: Fabiana Issler Date: 28-Apr-21 10:33:00 PM
Why only soft?

Pages: 1 through 4

Author: Fabiana Issler

Highlights in yellow and red in the next pages are aspects to pay attention to

approach, local development plans will be made more risk-based and climate compatible. Both the public and private sectors will serve as important catalysts for adaptation interventions and in supporting coastal monitoring.

Currently, the institutional framework for coastal management in Tunisia does not take into account the projections of climate change scenarios. Coastal protection interventions are usually reactive with a preference for hard engineering that integrates the risks of climate change only in a very limited way.

The costs and benefits of the adaptation of Tunisian coastal zones to climate change are poorly assessed and not considered in most of the current investment policies. Tunisia has insufficient resources to conduct adaptation projects that can bring benefits to the various business sectors settled on the coast and reduce simultaneously the risks associated with climate change. All these findings compromise the sustainable development in the coastal zone at the moment.

In response, the present project proposes an approach, allowing to integrate at the level of the programs and the strategies of development the consideration of the risk of climate change. The public and private sectors will be important catalysts for the interventions of adaptation and monitoring of the coastal zone.

The project support Tunisia to promote strategies, technologies and innovative financing options to address the risks of climate change and its impacts on the populations and the main socioeconomic sectors of the most vulnerable coastal zones.

The project proposes:

- The update of the regulatory and legislative frameworks to reduce the impacts of the effects of the CC on the coastal development and making the existing infrastructure more resilient. A particular attention will be granted to the creation of an environment conducive for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management which takes into account risks of climate change;
- The application of flexible and innovative measures of reduction of the risks linked to climate change such as protective measures (for example, restoration of dunes and wet zones) and best practices for the management of the water (for example, the controlled extraction of groundwater reserves to prevent intrusion of salt water) in line with the Integrated Coastal Zone Management;
- The provision of a better climate information for monitoring coastal hazards, early warning system and planning climate-resilient development;
- The mobilization of public and private funds for coastal adaptation projects in national and local level by making projects more bankable;
- The introduction of methods of risk transfer from the public and private sectors to ensure resilient management practices for long-term climate change in coastal areas.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHOD

An overall approach and method¹ for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the [UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects](#). A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (*fill in Annex C*). The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report. The evaluation should also have a gender lens and assess whether the project has had a negative, positive or neutral impact in terms of implementation, results and effects, including on the final beneficiaries, and propose areas for improvement for future projects.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts (Ministry of the Environment, Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL), Land-Use and Planning Department (DGAT), The Department of water resources (DGRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture (DGRE), Municipalities, ..), in particular the GEF operational focal point, as well as UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. **The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Tunisia**, including the following project sites (Ghar El Melh-Sidi Ali Mekki- Kalaât Landlous and Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum: stakeholders who have project responsibilities, including but not limited to members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), members of the Project Management Unit (PMU), officials from executing agencies and private sector investors, key experts and consultants in the subject areas and CSOs, etc.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual APR/PIR, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in [Annex B](#) of this Terms of Reference. All of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability should include gender lens.

Due to the pandemic situation and possible evolution, the consultant is asked to propose digital alternatives and solutions to hold the evaluation, as a part of its methodology.

EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see [Annex A](#)), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact**. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in [Annex D](#).

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	rating	2. IA& EA Execution	rating
M&E design at entry		Quality of UNDP Implementation	
M&E Plan Implementation		Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	
Overall quality of M&E		Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	

¹ For additional information on methods, see the [Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results](#), Chapter 7, pg. 163

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Stakeholders who have project responsibilities, including:

- members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC),
- members of the Project Management Unit (PMU),
- Officials from executing agencies
- Private sector investors
- key experts and consultants in the subject areas
- CSOs

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- Ministry of the Environment, Coastal Protection and Planning Agency (APAL)
- Land-Use and Planning Department (DGAT)
- Department of water resources (DGRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture (DGRE)
- Municipalities
- GEF operational focal point
- UNDP Country Office
- Project team
- UNDP GEF Technical Adviser (RTA)
- key stakeholders (?)

Project sites: Ghar El Melh-Sidi Ali Mekki- Kalaât Landlous and Djerba

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Who to interview acc. to TOR.

3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating
Relevance		Financial resources:	
Effectiveness		Socio-political:	
Efficiency		Institutional framework and governance:	
Overall Project Outcome Rating		Environmental :	
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	

PROJECT FINANCE / COFINANCE

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Co-financing (type/source)	UNDP own financing (mill. US\$)		Government (mill. US\$)		Partner Agency (mill. US\$)		Total (mill. US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In-kind support								
• Other								
Totals								

MAINSTREAMING

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

IMPACT

The evaluator will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.²

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions, recommendations** and **lessons**. Conclusions should build on findings and be based in evidence. Recommendations should be prioritized, specific,

² A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office: [ROTI Handbook 2009](#)

relevant, and targeted, with suggested implementers of the recommendations. Lessons should have wider applicability to other initiatives across the region, the area of intervention, and for the future.

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Tunisia. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluator and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluator. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluator to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

EVALUATION TIMEFRAME

The total duration of the evaluation will be 24 days according to the following plan:

Activity	Timing	Completion Date
Preparation	2 days	11 th September 2020
Evaluation Mission	10 days	05 th October 2020
Draft Evaluation Report	10 days	26 th October 2020
Final Report	2days	26 th November 2020

EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The evaluator is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
Inception Report	Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and detailed methodology	No later than 2 weeks before the evaluation mission.	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
Presentation	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP CO
Draft Final Report	Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes	Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, GEF OFPs
Final Report*	Revised report	Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft	Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC.

*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of (1- international evaluator). The consultant shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects. Experience with GEF financed projects is an advantage. (The evaluator selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities.

The evaluator must present the following qualifications:

- Post graduate degree (minimum master's degree or equivalent) in studies engineering, environmental science or management, climate change, economics or other closely related field

- Minimum 10 years of relevant professional experience
- Knowledge of UNDP and GEF
- Previous experience with results-based monitoring and evaluation methodologies;
- Technical knowledge in the targeted focal area(s)
- Excellent communication skills;
- Demonstrable analytical skills;
- Demonstrated understanding of issues related to gender; experience in gender sensitive evaluation and analysis;
- Fluency in written and spoken English.
- Fluent French in speaking and reading.

EVALUATION METHOD:

(See [Annex I](#))

EVALUATOR ETHICS

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the [UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'](#)

PAYMENT MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS

(this payment schedule is indicative, to be filled in by the CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based on their standard procurement procedures)

%	Milestone
10%	Following the approval of proposed methodology
60%	Following submission and approval of the 1ST draft terminal evaluation report
30%	Following submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report

Criteria for issuing the final payment of 30%³:

- The final TE report includes all requirements outlined in the TE TOR and is in accordance with the TE guidance.
- The final TE report is clearly written, logically organized, and is specific for this project (i.e. text has not been cut & pasted from other TE reports).
- The Audit Trail includes responses to and justification for each comment listed.

³ The Commissioning Unit is obligated to issue payments to the TE team as soon as the terms under the ToR are fulfilled. If there is an ongoing discussion regarding the quality and completeness of the final deliverables that cannot be resolved between the Commissioning Unit and the TE team, the Regional M&E Advisor and Vertical Fund Directorate will be consulted. If needed, the Commissioning Unit's senior management, Procurement Services Unit and Legal Support Office will be notified as well so that a decision can be made about whether or not to withhold payment of any amounts that may be due to the evaluator(s), suspend or terminate the contract and/or remove the individual contractor from any applicable rosters. See the UNDP Individual Contract Policy for further details:

https://poppp.undp.org/layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/UNDP_POPP_DOCUMENT_LIBRARY/Public/PSU_Individual%20Contract_Individual%20Contract%20Policy.docx&action=default

Application process

Recommended Presentation of Proposal:

- a) **Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability** using the [template](#)⁴ provided by UNDP;
- b) **CV** and a **Personal History Form (P11 form)**⁵;
- c) Brief description of **approach to work/technical proposal** of why the individual considers him/herself as the most suitable for the assignment, and a proposed methodology on how they will approach and complete the assignment; (max 1 page)
- d) **Financial Proposal** that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price and all other travel related costs (such as flight ticket, per diem, etc), supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template attached to the [Letter of Confirmation of Interest template](#). If an applicant is employed by an organization/company/institution, and he/she expects his/her employer to charge a management fee in the process of releasing him/her to UNDP under Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA), the applicant must indicate at this point, and ensure that all such costs are duly incorporated in the financial proposal submitted to UNDP.

All application materials should be submitted indicating the following reference "Consultant for Terminal Evaluation of *(Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia)*" by email at the following address ONLY: procurement.tn@undp.org by 31h of August at 4 pm Tunis local time. Incomplete applications will be excluded from further consideration.

UNDP applies a fair and transparent selection process that will take into account the competencies/skills of the applicants as well as their financial proposals. Qualified women and members of social minorities are encouraged to apply.

⁴<https://intranet.undp.org/unit/bom/psa/Support%20documents%20on%20C%20Guidelines/Template%20for%20Confirmation%20of%20Interest%20and%20Submission%20of%20Financial%20Proposal.docx>

⁵ http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Careers/P11_Personal_history_form.doc

Annex A: Project Logical Framework

This project will contribute to achieving the following Country Programme Outcome as defined in CPAP or CPD:

UNDAF/CPD Outcome # 4: By 2019, regional actors will manage efficiently, optimally, sustainably and inclusively the use of regional resources.

CPD output: 4.4. The frameworks and systems for improved disaster risk prevention and management are developed to enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems.

CPAP output 4.4.1: Participatory governance, which promotes prevention, preparedness and response to disasters and to the effects of climate change, is promoted.

Country Programme Outcome Indicators:

Number of regional development plans elaborated which integrate land use specifications and environmental aspects

Primary Applicable Key Environment and Sustainable Development Key Result Area (same as that on the cover page, circle one):

1.4.1 Number of countries with systems in place to access, deliver, monitor, report on and verify use of climate finance

1.4.2 Number of countries with comprehensive measures – plans, strategies, policies, programmes and budgets – implemented to achieve low-emission and climate-resilient development objectives

Applicable GEF Strategic Objective and Program:

Objective 2: Increase adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change, including variability, at local, national, regional and global level

Applicable GEF Expected Outcomes:

Outcome 2.1: Mainstreamed adaptation in broader development frameworks at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas

Outcome 2.2: Increased adaptive capacity to climate change in development sectors

Outcome 3.1: Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures

Applicable GEF Outcome Indicators:

- Number and type of development frameworks that include adaptation measures
- Number and type of natural resource assets created, maintained or improved to withstand conditions from climate variability and change
- Number and type of development frameworks and sectorial strategies that include specific budgets for adaptation actions

Description of Indicator	Baseline Level	End of project target level	Source of verification	Risks and Assumptions
Objective				

To promote innovative adaptation strategies, technologies and financing options to address the additional risks posed by climate change on populations and key socio-economic sectors in Tunisia's most vulnerable coastal areas

<p>1.Amount of public funds mobilised to support coastal adaptation</p>	<p>Tunisia's 2008 SNC coastal study indicated that the economic impact of climate change related SLR on agriculture and tourism is expected to cost 0.63% of the GDP/year, or approximately US\$1 billion. The current national coastal protection budget is limited at 10.4 m USD. This budget is being used to support site-specific projects, using predominantly hard engineering interventions, to reduce coastal erosion. Current interventions do not consider the use of an integrated approach to adapt to climate change (e.g., holistic watershed thinking or a Whole of Systems approach).</p> <p>1. BASELINE: Limited domestic financing mechanisms for coastal adaptation exist and no financing exists on</p>	<p>1.TARGET: By the end of the project, a disbursement of at least 10 m USD is accrued from public sources and earmarked for coastal adaptation</p>	<p>1. Government budget lines committed to coastal adaptation</p>	<p>ASSUMPTION: The Government of Tunisia has enough incentive to mobilise funds which can be effectively targeted towards coastal adaptation activities in a transparent manner with appropriate financial management</p> <p>ASSUMPTION: There is sufficient technical capacity within APAL for successful execution and implementation of the project</p>
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	<p>regional and local levels</p> <p>Furthermore, the issues of coastal erosion, submersion, salinization and flooding are exacerbated by a limited number of applied coastal adaptation responses which take into account the long-term implications of CC. Diversified, locally sourced and environmentally-friendly coastal protection technologies are required.</p>			<p>RISK; Water and coastal management strategies are made ineffective by an unanticipated increase in the frequency of flood events and drought which jeopardizes coastal protection and water conservation measures</p>
<p>2.Djerba: Percentage of coastal hotels working in cooperation with local municipalities to implement locally sourced, naturally available soft protection measures (e.g., sea grass and sand layering)</p>	<p>2. BASELINE: Only four hotels are employing soft protection measures to support coastal erosion (ganivelles and geotubes). However, such soft interventions are being made ad-hoc without an idea of upstream hydrological, ecological and geomorphological processes.</p>	<p>2. TARGET 50 coastal hotels in the targeted areas implementing soft protection measures in alignment with recommended adaptation options outlined in Djerba’s risk-based spatial management plan (Component 1)</p>	<p>2.APAL monitoring logs of soft, coastal adaptation measures in Djerba</p>	<p>RISK; Water and coastal management strategies are made ineffective by an unanticipated increase in the frequency of flood events and drought which jeopardizes coastal protection and water conservation measures</p> <p>RISK: Insufficient institutional engagement and coordination may prevent successful project delivery in the current transitional context in Tunisia</p>
<p>Outcome 1</p>				

Institutional capacity to plan for and respond to increasing climate change risks in coastal areas is improved

<p>1. Number and type of policy or legal frameworks informed by coastal dynamic modelling and adopted to account for coastal risks</p>	<p>1. BASELINE Currently, in Tunisia there have been no concrete steps taken to incorporate climate change (CC) risks into policy and legal frameworks governing coastal management. Spatial planning regulations, building codes and Environmental Impact Assessments do not consider anticipated impacts of CC and erosion and flooding risks on the built environment, especially in tourism districts. Current rules for setbacks for coastal development are not based on site-specific assessments and do not consider well-established risk (e.g., Sea Level Rise, SLR).</p>	<p>1. TARGET: at least three pieces of regulation governing coastal management (such as, the Maritime Public Domain (DPM), Environmental Impact Assessment (EIE), the Code of Planning and Urban Development (CATU) and the new Environment Code) updated to consider SLR, erosion and coastal flooding in their policies / legal frameworks</p>	<p>1. Review of the DPM, EIE, Code d'Environnement and the Code de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Urbanisme (CATU)</p>	<p>ASSUMPTION: Institutions have the will and ability to engage in long-term planning to mitigate potential coastal risks</p> <p>ASSUMPTION: Relevant Ministries have a vested interest to fully integrate coastal adaptation strategies into their long-term planning</p>
<p>2. Creation of a national ICZM inter-ministerial platform to facilitate the coastal adaptation</p>	<p>2. BASELINE Although Tunisia ratified the Barcelona Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) protocol, implementation of the ICZM in terms of actions has been slow. Currently, the</p>	<p>2. TARGET: Creation of a national ICZM inter-ministerial platform to coordinate projects, strategies and programmes involving the coastal zone on</p>	<p>2. Review on the coordination of agencies conducting ICZM projects/programme</p>	

	<p>regional MedPartnership programme is trying to integrate CC into national strategies to begin implementation of ICZM in Tunisia. However, there have been no on-the-ground implementations of ICZM. The Ministries are also not collaborating with the National Shore Protection and Planning Agency (APAL) when they are implementing coastal development activities. Tunisia therefore lacks a mechanism to coordinate projects, strategies and programmes involving the coastal zone on the national and regional levels. (Other regional level ICZM initiatives in the Mediterranean include the Global Water Partnership, PEGASO and UNESO-IHP.)</p>	<p>the national and regional levels and to facilitate decision-making on sustainable and climate resilient coastal development</p>		
<p>3. Number of risk-based spatial management plans used by the Municipalities of Houmet Essouk in Djerba and Sidi Ali Mekki in the</p>	<p>3. BASELINE Through the local Agenda 21 approach already applied in Tunisia, community informed sustainable planning is possible. However, a renewed</p>	<p>3. TARGET: 1 risk-based spatial management plan developed for the Municipalities of Houmet Essouk in Djerba and Sidi Ali Mekki in the</p>	<p>3. Land management plan updates (Local Agenda 21) for the municipalities of Houmet Essouk in Djerba and Sidi Ali Mekki in the northwest of the Gulf of Tunis</p>	

northwest of the Gulf of Tunis	local Agenda 21 which considers up to date coastal risks (erosion, SLR, flooding) is lacking in both sites of the project. Stakeholders have not been consulted about the current potential coastal risks in their region because there is no available risk planning tool to facilitate the application of options for ICZM and to develop site specific design criteria for sustainable development including appropriate adaptation strategies and flexible pathways.	northwest of the Gulf of Tunis detailing prioritized, cost-effective ICZM and adaptation strategies / flexible pathways, targeting the agricultural sector (northwest coast of the Gulf of Tunis site) and the tourism sector (Djerba)		
Outcome 2				
Climate change resilience of priority coastal areas enhanced through implementation and dissemination of innovative risk reduction measures covering 22 km of coast and 670 hectares of wetland and benefiting 150,000 inhabitants				
1. Number of soft adaptation measures implemented which improve coastal conditions by increasing resilience to absorb change as measured by the following: • Length of coast preserving public	1. BASELINE: Existing baseline actions and projects, such as under APAL's National Coastal Erosion Protection Programme, the ICZM project, and the KFW project consist mainly of reactive, end-of-pipeline solutions such as artificial	1. TARGET: • Djerba: Length preserving 10 km of coast public open space and natural ecosystems • Both sites: 670 hectares of wetlands with improved	1. Design and construction logs housed at APAL; National Tourism Board and Ministry of Agriculture records on the use of recycled water in hotels and on agricultural land in Djerba and in the	ASSUMPTION: Initial coastal vulnerability studies and technical assessments are accurate in their predictions of coastal impacts RISK: Works associated with coastal protection lead to unanticipated

<p>open space and natural ecosystems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Area of wetlands with improved ecological conditions • Length of coast with stable dune fixation • Number of kilometers of living shorelines implemented • Percentage increase in hotels and agricultural land which use recycled water 	<p>sand nourishment and 'hard' protection measures (e.g., shore embankment, breakwater construction). Although the MedWetCoast project offered encouraging sand dune rehabilitation results, rehabilitation solutions are not cost-effective because required materials must be imported. Similarly, APAL's experience with the installation of geotextile tubes in the El Mezraya zone indicated that materials are too fragile.</p> <p>Presently, 5 soft coastal protection and water management measures have been implemented in Djerba Ganivelles, dune stabilisation with native grasses, geotextile tubes, wind-breaking fences, water recycling and purification practices in some hotels)</p>	<p>ecological conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both sites: 20 Km of successful dune fixation • Ghar El Melh: 2 kilometres of living shorelines implemented • 5% increase in hotels and agricultural land which use recycled water 	<p>Northwest of the Gulf of Tunis</p>	<p>environmental impacts (e.g., eutrophication)</p>
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<p>2. Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) database with qualitative and quantitative indicators of soft coastal adaptation measures which contributes to the central coastal databank (SIAD)</p>	<p>2. BASELINE: No M&E system exists for adaptive coastal management: In spite of 13 years' experience with coastal preservation projects, the National Shore Protection and Planning Agency (APAL) lacks technical and operational capacity to measure adaptation in accordance with ICZM. Coastal developments have been evaluated based on photographs and not any quantifiable indicators that dictate long-term success. Also, APAL's developments themselves have been along limited reaches of coast, not accounting for interactions with the surrounding watershed and ecosystems.</p>	<p>2. TARGET: Establishment of a M&E database with qualitative and quantitative indicators of soft coastal adaptation measures which contributes to the central coastal databank (SIAD)</p>	<p>2. Observation/monitoring logs Annual M&E surveys; Project mid-term and terminal evaluations.</p>	
<p>3. Number of tide gauges and buoys installed to support coastal risk monitoring</p>	<p>3. In response to direct and indirect impacts from extreme weather conditions, the government has put an early warning system high on its agenda. Along the coast, alerts are</p>	<p>3. TARGET: Three (3) tide gauge and 1 buoy to be procured and installed.</p>	<p>3. Review of APAL's procurements for coastal monitoring</p>	

	<p>planned to be used for seismic disturbances (tsunamis), flooding, coastal surges, strong winds and marrobbios . As a first step towards improved observation and forecasting capacity, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment with support from the GIZ Climate Change Assistance Programme, developed a concept plan for a national climate change multi-hazard monitoring and early warning system. Some initiatives such as the Environment Energy Programme (PEE) and the Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP) (described in Section A.7) have provided coastal monitoring equipment to support alert generation. In spite of some point locations for observation and monitoring, the alerts and products from the regional center are not downscaled to suit Tunisia and updated</p>			
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	<p>by Tunisia specific observations.</p> <p>3. BASELINE:</p> <p>4 buoys and 2 tide gauges procured and installed through the AAP project. 4 buoys procured and installed through the PEE project.</p>			
<p>Outcome 3</p> <p>Innovative and sustainable economic instruments established to accelerate country-wide adoption and up scaling of proven coastal adaptation measures</p>				
<p>1. Publication of long-term financing strategies to guide APAL in how to mobilize funds for coastal adaptation</p>	<p>Tunisia's 2008 SNC Coastal study indicated that the total cost of adapting to a 0.5-meter SLR is approximately US\$1 billion. The Government of Tunisia currently has no financial mechanisms to cover the costs of SLR and erosion. Moreover, due to the difficulty in demonstrating cost-effective climate compatible measures to reduce water stress and impacts on coastal settlements, the Government does not have the knowledge on how to properly attract public and private financial</p>	<p>1.TARGET</p> <p>Publication of at least 1 long-term financing strategy to guide APAL in how to mobilize funds for coastal adaptation</p>	<p>1.Financing plan at the ministry level (Ministry of Equipment, Land Planning and Sustainable Development) earmarked for coastal adaptation</p>	<p>ASSUMPTION: Institutions working in coastal adaptation have sufficient capacity and incentive to mobilise and manage funds and new economic instruments for coastal adaptation</p> <p>RISK: Insurance companies are not willing and incentivized to study the feasibility of adapting disaster risk insurance</p> <p>RISK: NGOs/CSOs do not have sufficient financial literacy to manage small revolving fund or micro-grants for small-scale coastal adaptation projects</p>

	<p>mechanisms to support long-term coastal needs.</p> <p>1. BASELINE: No strategies which provide guidance on how to mobilise funds for coastal adaptation</p>			
<p>2. Percentage of APAL's budget provided to community members (including NGOs/CSOs) so that they can finance community-based coastal adaptation measures</p>	<p>2. BASELINE: Community-run coastal adaptation projects (with the support of local NGOs/CSOs) have had much success in Tunisia. During the Africa Adaptation Project (AAP) 7 NGOs developed Adaptation Action Plans with the goal of promoting climate change awareness. In spite of the solid collaboration between APAL and NGOs/CSOs, investment mechanisms to support community-based adaptation are limited in Tunisia. Consequently, there are no financial mechanisms to support sustainability of coastal adaptation activities in the long-term. NGO/CSO</p>	<p>2. TARGET 2% of APAL's budget supports community members or members of NGOs/CSOs to implement small adaptation projects (e.g., nursery development, sand dune fixation, etc.)</p>	<p>2. Funds available to NGOs/CSOs for coastal adaptation</p>	

	engagement in coastal rehabilitation is hindered by their lack of financial resources.			
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Annex B: List of Documents to be reviewed by the evaluator

- PIF
- UNDP Initiation Plan
- UNDP Project Document
- UNDP Environmental and Social Screening results
- Project Inception Report
- All Project Implementation Reports (PIR's)
- MTR report
- Quarterly progress reports and work plans of the various implementation task teams
- Audit reports
- Finalized GEF CCM Tracking Tool at CEO endorsement and midterm
- Oversight mission reports
- All monitoring reports prepared by the project
- Financial and Administration guidelines used by Project Management Unit
- reports of various studies elaborated in the framework of the project

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE:

- Project operational guidelines, manuals and systems
- UNDP country/countries programme document(s) Minutes of the Addressing climate change vulnerabilities and risks in vulnerable coastal areas of Tunisia Board Meetings and other meetings (i.e. Project Appraisal Committee meetings)

Annex C: Evaluation Questions

This is a generic list, to be further detailed with more specific questions by CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based on the particulars of the project.

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•

Annex D: Rating Scales

<p>Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution</p> <p>6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings 4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) 3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings 2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems 1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems</p>	<p>Sustainability ratings:</p> <p>4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3. Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks 1. Unlikely (U): severe risks</p>	<p>Relevance ratings</p> <p>2. Relevant (R) 1.. Not relevant (NR)</p> <p>Impact Ratings:</p> <p>3. Significant (S) 2. Minimal (M) 1. Negligible (N)</p>
<p>Additional ratings where relevant: Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A)</p>		

Annex E: Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct and Agreement Form

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form⁶

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: _____

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): _____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at *place* on *date*

Signature: _____

⁶www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

Annex F: Evaluation Report Outline⁷

- i. Opening page:
 - Title of UNDP supported GEF financed project
 - UNDP and GEF project ID#s.
 - Evaluation time frame and date of evaluation report
 - Region and countries included in the project
 - GEF Operational Program/Strategic Program
 - Implementing Partner and other project partners
 - Evaluation team members
 - Acknowledgements
- ii. Executive Summary
 - Project Summary Table
 - Project Description (brief)
 - Evaluation Rating Table
 - Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons
- iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
(See: UNDP Editorial Manual⁸)
1. Introduction
 - Purpose of the evaluation
 - Scope & Methodology
 - Structure of the evaluation report
2. Project description and development context
 - Project start and duration
 - Problems that the project sought to address
 - Immediate and development objectives of the project
 - Baseline Indicators established
 - Main stakeholders
 - Expected Results
3. Findings
(In addition to a descriptive assessment, all criteria marked with (*) must be rated⁹)
- 3.1 Project Design / Formulation
 - Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)
 - Assumptions and Risks
 - Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design
 - Planned stakeholder participation
 - Replication approach
 - UNDP comparative advantage
 - Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector
 - Management arrangements
- 3.2 Project Implementation
 - Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)
 - Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)

⁷The Report length should not exceed 40 pages in total (not including annexes).

⁸ UNDP Style Manual, Office of Communications, Partnerships Bureau, updated November 2008

⁹ Using a six-point rating scale: 6: Highly Satisfactory, 5: Satisfactory, 4: Marginally Satisfactory, 3: Marginally Unsatisfactory, 2: Unsatisfactory and 1: Highly Unsatisfactory, see section 3.5, page 37 for ratings explanations.

- Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management
 - Project Finance:
 - Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation (*)
 - UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution (*) coordination, and operational issues
- 3.3** Project Results
- Overall results (attainment of objectives) (*)
 - Relevance(*)
 - Effectiveness & Efficiency (*)
 - Country ownership
 - Mainstreaming
 - Sustainability (*)
 - Impact
- 4.** Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons
- Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project
 - Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project
 - Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives
 - Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success
- 5.** Annexes
- ToR
 - Itinerary
 - List of persons interviewed
 - Summary of field visits
 - List of documents reviewed
 - Evaluation Question Matrix
 - Questionnaire used and summary of results
 - Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form
 - *Annexed in a separate file:* TE Audit Trail
 - *Annexed in a separate file:* Terminal GEF Tracking Tool (if applicable)

Annex G: Evaluation Report Clearance Form

(to be completed by CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and included in the final document)

Evaluation Report Reviewed and Cleared by	
UNDP Country Office	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____
UNDP GEF RTA	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____

Annex H: TE Report audit trail

The following is a template for the evaluator to show how the received comments on the draft TE report have (or have not) been incorporated into the final TE report. This audit trail should be included as an annex in the final TE report.

To the comments received on (*date*) from the Terminal Evaluation of (*project name*) (UNDP PIMS #)

The following comments were provided in track changes to the draft Terminal Evaluation report; they are referenced by institution ("Author" column) and by comment number ("#" column):

Author	#	Para No./ comment location	Comment/Feedback on the draft TE report	Evaluator response and actions taken

Annex I : EVALUATION METHOD

The offers of individual consultants will be evaluated based on the combined scoring method:

- ✓ Technical qualifications (100 points max.) weight: 70%
- ✓ Financial bid (100 points max.) weight: 30%

A two-stage procedure will be utilised in evaluating the offers, with evaluation of the technical qualifications being completed prior to any financial bid being compared. Only the financial bids of the offerors who passed the minimum technical qualifications score of 70 points will be evaluated.

a) Criteria for evaluation of technical qualifications score:

#	Technical evaluation criterion	Highest possible technical qualifications score
1	<p>Post graduate degree in studies engineering, environmental science or management, climate change, economics or other closely related field</p> <p>Master's degree (minimum required): 10 points PhD: 15 points</p>	15 points
2	<p>Relevant work experience in the areas related to climate change and Integrated Coastal Zone Management s:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 years (minimum required): 10 points - More than 10 years 15 points 	15 points
3	<p>Relevant experience in projects evaluation/review based on result-based management evaluation methodologies and/or applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 projects (minimum required): 15 points - 3 projects: 20 points - 4 projects and more: 25 points <p>If the relevant experience (associated to criterion 2) does not exceed 2 projects and only in the case where at least one of these projects was conducted within United Nations system, additional 10 points will be added to the score related to this criterion.</p>	25 points

4	Relevant experience working with the GEF or GEF-evaluations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 specific experience (minimum required): 15 points - 2 specific experiences and more: 20 points 	20 points
5	Brief description of approach to work/technical proposal	25 points
TOTAL		100 points

Only the offerors who have attained a minimum technical qualification score of 70 points will be considered as technical qualified offerors.

b) Financial bid score:

- Only the offers which attained a minimum technical qualification score of 70 points will be qualified for financial bid comparison.
- Among these qualified offers, the score of 100 points will be attributed to the offer with lowest financial bid. The score of any other qualified offer is calculated using the following formula:
Financial bid score of the offer = (lowest financial bid / financial bid of the offer) * 100

c) Selection method and award criteria

The award of the contract shall be made to the individual consultant whose offer has been evaluated and determined as:

- Responsive/compliant/acceptable, and;
- Having received the highest score out of a pre-determined set of weighted technical qualifications and financial bid specific to the solicitation. The total score for each offeror will be calculated using the following formula: Total score = Technical qualifications score*70% + Financial bid score*30%

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