


United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

<p>Project Title: Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao</p>	<p>Recipient UN Organization(s): UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women</p>
<p>Project Contact: Chetan Kumar (UNRCO/ UNDP); Camilo Montesa (UNDP); Maricel Aguilar (UN WOMEN); Julia Rees (UNICEF)</p> <p>Address: 30th floor, Yuchengco Tower 1, RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Metro Manila 1200, Philippines</p> <p>Telephone: +63 917 569 5295; + 1 201 675 9389</p> <p>E-mail: Chetan.kumar@undp.org; Camilo.Montesa@undp.org; jrees@unicef.org; maricel.aguilar@unwomen.org</p>	<p>Implementing Partner(s) – name & type (Government, CSO, etc):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process, Government of the Philippines (Government) • Government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao <p>Project Location: Philippines (Manila, Mindanao)</p>
<p>Project Description: <i>One sentence describing the project's scope and focus.</i></p> <p>Advance the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro by building the capacities of relevant actors to sustain peace through the mitigation of factors driving alienation and radicalization, and through a more inclusive peace process characterized by all-Moro dialogue and consensus.</p>	<p>Total Project Cost: 3, 000, 000 Peacebuilding Fund: 3, 000, 000*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allocated 1st tranche – 70%: USD: 2, 100, 000 • Conditional 2nd tranche – 30%: USD 900, 000 (to be released when all implementing partners agree that 80% of the first tranche has been spent). <p><i>*The overall approved budget and release of the second tranche is subject to decision by PBSO, and subject to the availability of PBF funds.</i></p> <p>Proposed Project Start Date: Sept. 15, 2017 Proposed Project End Date: March 15, 2019 Total duration (in months)¹: 18 months</p>

¹ The maximum duration of an IRF project is 18 months.



Gender Marker Score²: 2

Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective.

Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective.

Score 1 for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly.

Score 0 for projects that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality.

Project Outcomes:

Outcome 1: Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established.

Outputs:

- a. Platform for intra-Moro dialogue developed and implemented, including to achieve consensus on Bangsamoro legislation; Moro positions with regard to federalism; and on the constitution of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, including the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority; and special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the process for the development of a new federal dispensation for the Philippines;
- b. Roles of women, youth, and faith based leaderships in building peace enhanced.
- c. Support from the UN Country Team for the finalization and implementation of the Government's Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, including in partnership with the World Bank.

Outcome 2: Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.

Outputs:

- d. Role of women, youth and faith-based leaderships in preventing violent extremism enhanced, including through the development and dissemination of positive narratives in social media;
- e. Children and youth at reduced risk of association or re-association with armed groups through dialogue, counselling, enhanced life-skills and educational alternatives.

PBF Focus Areas³ which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select one*):

1.4, 2.1, 2.3

² PBSO monitors the inclusion of gender equality and women's empowerment all PBF projects, in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122, and as mandated by the Secretary-General in his Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding.

³ PBF Focus Areas are:

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

3: Revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3):


(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3)

Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/ PBF Secretariats)

IRF PROJECT DOCUMENT

<i>(for IRF-funded projects)</i>	
<p>Recipient UN Organization(s)⁴ <i>Titon Mitra, Country Director</i> Signature UNDP Date & Seal</p>	<p>Representative of National Authorities <i>Jesus "Jess" Dureza, Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process</i> Signature Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process Date & Seal</p> 
<p>Recipient UN Organization(s)⁵ <i>Lotta Sylwander, Country Representative</i> Signature UNICEF Date & Seal</p>	
<p>Recipient UN Organization(s)⁶ <i>Miwa Kato, Regional Representative</i> Signature UN Women Date & Seal</p>	
<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) Name of Representative Signature Peacebuilding Support Office, NY Date & Seal</p>	<p>Resident Coordinator (RC) <i>Ola Almgren, Resident Coordinator</i> Signature United Nations Philippines Date & Seal</p>

⁴ Please include signature block for each RUNO receiving funds under this IRF.

⁵ Please include signature block for each RUNO receiving funds under this IRF.

⁶ Please include signature block for each RUNO receiving funds under this IRF.

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Length: Max. 15 pages

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- b) Risk management
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Annex A: Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)

Annex B: Project Results Framework

PROJECT COMPONENTS:

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support

a) Peacebuilding context:

When President Rodrigo Roa Duterte took office in June 2016, a number of opportunities opened up to reinvigorate the peace processes pertaining to Bangsamoro in Mindanao. The President, hailing from Mindanao, had an extended history of contacts and relations with the key leaderships of the major rebel groups, and was already known for his efforts to reach out to Muslim Filipinos. He garnered the largest number of votes ever accorded by Muslim Filipinos to a presidential candidate.

President Duterte appointed a team with prior experience of peacemaking and peacebuilding to the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process. Within the first four months of his assuming office, the peace process with the MILF had been moved to the implementation phase following the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) 2014, and a wider range of Moro actors (and potential “spoilers” were they to be left out) had been brought into the process to establish a Bangsamoro autonomous entity through the establishment of an expanded and revamped Bangsamoro Transition Commission. In November, the Government lifted the arrest warrant against Nur Misuari, founder of the MNLF and currently head of one of its factions, thus allowing him to meet the President. A faction of the MNLF, claiming that the Government had abandoned the 1996 peace agreement in favor of the CAB with the MILF, had laid violent siege to Zamboanga City in Mindanao in 2013. Two hundred lives had been lost.

More widely, the President has promised to effectively devolve fiscal and political powers away from Manila and towards the regions—ideally as a part of an evolution towards a federal system—in a move that could remove one of the longer-term drivers of insurgency in the Philippines. Manila’s political and economic control over diverse regions has been an important cause of violent grievances. While Moro leadership has supported the President’s intent, it has also expressed concern that the drive to federalism might attenuate the implementation of the 1996 and 2014 peace agreements, and lead to a Bangsamoro region that does not enjoy special autonomy in relation to other regions. Despite these concerns, however, the overall mood is more optimistic than during the last two years of the Aquino administration.

This largely positive momentum will still require certain linked challenges to be addressed before the potential of the current political moment could be fully realized. Two challenges in particular will be key.

(i) Moro convergence:

The Duterte administration has insisted (given the fact that one of the factors that derailed the last autonomy legislation was division among key stakeholders in the Bangsamoro region on some of its elements) that the fractious Moro leadership should converge around a common version of a new “enabling law” in Congress to establish the Bangsamoro autonomous entity before such legislation will be tabled. However, there are currently two processes in place to draft this new law: an effort by a five member panel established by Nur Misuari in consultation with the Government to create a new version of the legislation that enabled the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) following the 1996 peace agreement; and an effort by the newly established Bangsamoro Transitional Commission (BTC) to prepare a new draft of the stalled Bangsamoro Basic Law. While the MNLF (Sema) has agreed to participate in the BTC, the MNLF (Misuari) has not. As there currently is no formal dialogue between the leaders of the two major MNLF wings as well as the MILF, converging these different processes will constitute a challenge. For its part, the Government has insisted that the Moro leaders converge, but may be left with the challenge of converging different draft statutes before enabling legislation is finally submitted to Congress.

Critical as the divisions among the leaders of the armed Moro fronts are, the wider community of Bangsamoro stakeholders has also not coalesced around a shared vision of governance in the autonomous entity. The ARMM continues to make efforts to reform and streamline current systems for governance, and will therefore be an important role-player in constituting a transitional government for the new autonomous entity. Equally critical role players will be the major political families who dominate politics in the region; heirs of the traditional ruling families, or sultanates; leaders of groups representing indigenous persons; faith-based leaderships; and youth groups that are increasingly alienated from the traditional political and religious standard-bearers of the Moro cause.

Currently there is no wider platform for dialogue that serves as complement to the formal peace processes and brings these actors together to develop a shared vision. However, several of them have been able to provide their inputs through engagements supported by the UN (particularly UNDP, UN WOMEN, and UNICEF) and by national advocates. The BTC is mandated to provide leadership for a more systematic approach to dialogue going forward, which will be needed if a critical mass of consensus is to be formed, and support by the partners to the peace process for the work of the Commission will be crucial. After its formal launch in March 2017, the BTC has constituted task forces to carry out outreach to critical stakeholders, including the sultanates, indigenous persons, and faith-based groups. However, a lot more may need to be done to achieve effective convergence.

Neither a move towards a federal system nor the formation of Bangsamoro will lead to a lasting peace if the two processes undermine each other. A constant engagement with the process of constitutional reform by Moro leaders is critical to ensuring that Bangsamoro obtains “special autonomy” in a federal dispensation as agreed to in the 1996 and 2014 peace agreements. Conversely, officials and legislators in Manila need to be fully cognizant of the Moro demand for special autonomy, and comprehensively engaged with all strands of Moro leadership as they develop the process of devolution. Failure on either side to engage in this manner could lead to discontent, and the potential for violence, continuing to simmer in southern Mindanao, as anything less than “special autonomy” will be seen as a betrayal of decades of armed Moro struggle for independence, and a sign of the failure of the Philippines to recognize the special identity and history of the Moros.

While a series of ad hoc dialogues and forums bringing together issues of Bangsamoro autonomy and federalism have been conducted with UNDP support, key segments of the Moro leadership have not yet engaged themselves or their constituents with the wider conversation on federalism. Conversely, much of the membership of Congress remains largely unfamiliar with the particular concerns or circumstances of the Moro population of southern Mindanao, and of the precedents for special autonomy. A more systematic and structured approach is therefore needed to increase both sides’ awareness of the key issues, and of the engagement with each other’s concerns, as well as of the risks of not doing so.

(ii) Prevention of violent extremism:

A number of “push” and “pull” factors have driven Moro youth, especially in the Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Sulu provinces of the ARMM, towards increasing alienation from traditional Moro leaderships, and in some instances to joining the still small but highly active radical groups that have claimed allegiance to various global extremist networks. The Maute Group, Abu Sayyaf Group and BIFF are among the most active and prominent of these. The former is responsible for the attack (as head of a coalition of extremist elements) on Marawi City in Lanao del Sur, ARMM, in May-June 2017 which has seen some 200, 000 people displaced, and over three hundred casualties. The same group also laid claim to a marketplace bombing in Davao that took fourteen lives in September 2016, while the ASG has taken to kidnapping well-off individuals (including tourists) in Mindanao for ransom, and beheading some if the ransom is not delivered on time. Neither practices a coherent political or religious ideology other than the promise of violence as an emancipator. An as-yet-undetermined percentage of the youth (and in some cases their commanders from the more mainstream Moro groups) joining these smaller factions are also combatants enlisted with the armed forces of the major Moro fronts—the MILF and MNLF. While the numbers are unclear but thought to be as yet small, this development has nevertheless rung alarm bells among the Moro leaderships, as the breakaway groups have displayed a greater degree of ingenuity and capacity than previously thought. Their ability to maintain social and political cohesion among their constituencies has been eroded, which in turn has raised the prospects of a return to violent conflict, but in a more fragmented and intractable setting, and with a plethora of horizontal conflicts than the traditional government-insurgent warfare. On the positive side, the more extreme elements have not yet been able to mobilize a large membership as Islam in Mindanao is of the same moderate variety as in the rest of the region. Traditional and religious leaders also hold sway in many communities. While conservative in orientation, they are resolutely opposed to extremism.

A fear shared by many mainstream Moro leaders is that the continued stalling of the process for the enactment of legislation for a new Bangsamoro will generate spiraling frustration that could lead to an expansion of the membership of the radical organizations. This is a critical push factor. Conversely, the lure of the opportunity to engage in heroic violence in defense of an Islamic ummah that is perceived as being globally threatened is an important pull factor. Many early analyses of emerging strands of violent extremism in Mindanao point to two crucial elements: Political and cultural alienation, rather than material deprivation, have been a more frequent cause for radicalization. Linked to this, the role of communities, families, peer groups and faith-based leaderships has been highlighted as being especially central to reducing alienation, preventing radicalization, and bringing those who have already been radicalized back into the fold. In addition, the impunity with which extremist groups have targeted communities, as well as excesses in responding to these attacks from the government, will have to be addressed within a wider framework for strengthening access to justice and rule of law in the affected areas.

The key challenge going forward is two-fold: Engaging susceptible groups, especially youth, to better understand the causes of alienation, and to then build on this understanding to design and implement initiatives that empower the affected communities and individuals to develop their own responses to radicalization. Crucial to this approach will be the role of credible intermediaries who are not seen as a threat by the target groups, and who can engage the latter on their own terms.

b) Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps:

On the basis of systematic conversations with key stakeholders facilitated by the Office of the Resident Coordinator and by UNDP, a number of catalytic actions have been identified by members of the UN Country Team, and some are under implementation. They could lead to a multiplier effect in terms of addressing the challenges indicated above, and especially by building the relevant capacities of national counterparts.

Moro convergence:

UNDP is currently supporting a group of “insider mediators” to engage in confidence-building among the Moro leadership. In partnership with the Clingendael Institute, the UN-EU global initiative on “inside mediation,” the Bangsamoro Study Group, and the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, UNDP has supported meetings of the group since August 2016. Participants have featured senior interlocutors from all major Moro armed groups (including the two largest MNLF factions), prominent political groups from the ARMM area, and groups representing women, indigenous persons, the Mindanao-based academic community, and faith-based leaderships. Specific steps have been charted towards converging the various peace agreements and generating a consensus version of the “enabling law” among the MILF and the two major MNLF factions, and towards the formation and implementation of an all-Moro dialogue platform. It is hoped that this convergence will facilitate the work of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (five commission members are also members of the “insider mediators” group), and also allow special autonomy for Bangsamoro, once it has been legislated, to be more smoothly integrated into the federalism track, and to also be translated harmoniously into an effective Bangsamoro autonomous entity.

UNDP, UNWOMEN, and UNICEF are currently supporting several dialogue initiatives designed to create a better understanding of the efforts required to sustain peace, and the role of diverse communities therein. Systematic thinking is also being encouraged as to how these different initiatives could be brought together into one platform for national dialogue. Beginning in the second quarter of 2017, both the BTC as well as UN-supported civic groups such as Friends of Peace will be assisted to work together to develop and implement a progressively coordinated and integrated series of dialogue forums that could potentially lead to a definitive platform to yield a multi-stakeholder consensus on governance for an autonomous Bangsamoro entity as well as its role and status in a federal system. The BTC is expected to engage more systematically with this issue once it has submitted its draft of the enabling law to the President in May.

Since the onset of the current administration, UNDP has supported the Institute for Autonomy and Governance and other entities to organize conversations around federalism, autonomy, and governance in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The conversations have also helped legislators to deepen their understanding of the links between federalism and Bangsamoro autonomy, especially in the context of the implementation of the

peace agreements with the Moro armed groups. UNDP, in partnership with DPA, is currently exploring methods to provide more sustained support—which can be formalized once and should the Congress approve formal mechanisms for carrying the process forward—for exchanges of ideas and options through national counterparts such as IAG around issues of federalism, autonomy, and governance reform. In February 2017, Senate President Koko Pimentel indicated that he would welcome targeted technical support from UNDP for legislators in better understanding the operational steps involved in transitioning from a unitary to a federal state. Assistance will also be provided for the Moro leadership in thinking through strategies and options with regard to positioning Moro autonomy and the implementation of the peace agreements within the ambit of governance reform. The goal of these different tracks of support will be to achieve an eventual convergence among relevant Congressional leadership and the leaderships of the MNLF and the MILF on the specific means through which special autonomy for Bangsamoro will be guaranteed in a federal system.

Prevention of violent extremism:

UNDP, UN WOMEN, and UNICEF are currently supporting local initiatives that aim to better understand and respond to the drivers of radicalization. Building on the results of this research, as well as the findings of prior research (example Drivers of Association, UNICEF 2016), they will support the following initiatives:

- i. In partnership with DPA, and following an agreement to this effect between ASG Jenca and Peace Secretary Jess Dureza, assist the Philippines to lead the crafting of a regional strategy for the prevention of violent extremism during the course of its ASEAN chair, and also a national plan of action.
- ii. Support the scaling up of participatory research, with the active involvement of youth groups, women, and faith-based leaders, so that a credible picture is developed of the factors that may be driving up the risks of violent extremism, and of the best approaches to mitigating these risks;
- ii. Assist (in partnership with UNV) with the development of an appropriately trained and capacitated, and credible, group of local intermediaries—drawn from among the ranks of women, youth and faith-based leaders in particular—who can reach out to disaffected individuals and communities and generate dialogue around addressing alienation through creative approaches to political and economic empowerment;
- iii. Assist faith-based leaderships to use social media and other creative means to generate new narratives, compatible with religious and traditional lifestyles, around constructive and peaceful approaches to political and economic empowerment;
- iv. Assist with systematic and visible inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, as well as outreach by the MILF to minorities and religious and civic leaderships;
- v. Assist all relevant stakeholders, and especially the GPH and the MILF, to integrate an effective early-warning-and-response system for anticipating and mitigating emerging risks of violence into their existing joint security architecture;

- vi. Work with national and regional development agencies—the National Economic Development Authority; the Mindanao Development Authority; the government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao; and the MILF’s Bangsamoro Development Agency—to identify approaches to better assist communities at risk with viable alternatives to violence, but in a manner that increases economic empowerment and participation in decision-making, and allows communities to design their own development priorities.
- vii. Support a community-based normalization programme to reduce risk of association and re-association of disengaged children including case follow up of those children already disengaged, ensuring education and life-skills opportunities for them, accelerating social development in their communities and strengthening local capacities for dialogue and communication on inclusive approaches.
- viii. Strengthen capacities of religious leaders to be able to deliver sermons on ‘peaceful jihad’ and other core messages based on Islamic teachings.
- ix. Support national actors and development partners to institute a joint mechanism for sharing analysis, and for coordinating support, so that efforts to counter violent extremism are complementary and lead to a critical mass of impact.

In March 2017, the Al Qalam Institute for Islamic Identities and Dialogue in South-East Asia at the Ateneo de Davao University, in partnership with UNDP, implemented a national experts’ meeting on the prevention of violent extremism. The meeting brought together representatives of faith-based groups, government, civil society, development partners, and academic institutions to reflect and analyze on the initial results from ongoing research, and to identify priority areas for short-term support. National and international experts offered comparative perspectives and lessons learned. Going forward, conclusions from the meeting will inform the implementation of support from the PBF.

Overall, planned support from the PBF is in line with the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on the Prevention of Violent Extremism.

Table 1 – Mapping of peacebuilding activities and gaps

Project outcome	Source of funding (Government / development partner)	Key Projects/ Activities	Duration of projects/activities	Budget in \$	Description of major gaps in the Outcome Area, programmatic or financial

<p><i>Participatory political processes established and popular endorsement ensured in support of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).</i></p>	<p><i>UN Peacebuilding Fund (implemented by UN WOMEN and UNDP)</i></p>	<p>National advocacy pool to promote Bangsamoro peace process established and operational. Capacity to track public opinion related to the peace process established and operational. Capacities of political parties in the Bangsamoro developed. Dialogue spaces are created to engage stakeholders critical of the peace process and ensure the inclusivity of the peace process. Women's leadership and participation in the transition process and new Bangsamoro institutions ensured.</p>	<p><i>Concluded in December 2016.</i></p>	<p><i>USD 1, 350, 000</i></p>	<p><i>Definitive MILF political engagement with the Congress, and political presence in Manila, not yet established.</i></p>
<p><i>Assessment of the critical needs of former child combatants, including gaps in education leading to radicalization.</i></p>	<p><i>UNICEF</i></p>	<p><i>Research to identify critical needs, and the linkages between educational gaps and radicalization.</i></p>	<p><i>Completed</i></p>	<p><i>USD 300, 000</i></p>	<p><i>Research findings now needs to be translated into programmatic activity.</i></p>
<p><i>Assessment of factors leading to alienation and radicalization among youth in select areas of Mindanao.</i></p>	<p><i>UNDP/ Ateneo de Davao University</i></p>	<p><i>Research to select areas of Mindanao through networks of young Muslim scholars to identify factors leading to alienation among their peers.</i></p>	<p><i>Ongoing</i></p>	<p><i>USD 100, 000</i></p>	<p><i>Research now needs to be translated into programmatic activity.</i></p>

c) Rationale for this IRF:

The Bangsamoro peace process is unlikely to move forward without a common Moro approach to autonomy, not just among the major rebel groups, but also among a wider set of critical political and economic actors. Without this convergence, it will be difficult for the Congress to introduce and pass an enabling law for the Bangsamoro. Similarly, dialogue

between the Congressional and Moro leaderships will be essential, as will be a wider conversation at the national level on the historic injustices against the Moro and on the means to remedy them. These initiatives will be expedited and have a significantly greater impact if women and youth participate in a substantive manner, and if the challenges to Moro leaderships from within—especially from violent radicals and the alienated—are mitigated and managed. Without these enabling factors, the CAB will not be implemented, and the peace process will likely remain stalled as the situation on the ground spirals into increasingly fragmented violence.

Due to political sensitivities, some initiatives in these areas cannot directly receive government funding. At the same time, they may be too politically contingent in the short-term—at least until they have gained wider momentum—for significant investment from development partners. Catalytic PBF support will therefore play a crucial role.

Once launched and sustained over a period of 6-12 months, these initiatives could then be supported over the medium-to-longer-term with additional assistance provided by resident donors. Among those expressing the possibility of additional support are Japan, the EU, and Australia, and especially for PVE.

While the Government of the Philippines is readying a new, multi-partner funding mechanism to address many shortfalls in wider peacebuilding arena, some urgent activities need to be supported in the interim and in the short-term in order to mitigate immediate risks. Even when the mechanism is fully operational, a number of these initiatives might require rapid, flexible, and informal support as political sensitivity and contingency will continue to be their core parameters.

In the interim, the Government of the Philippines has also requested support from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office for the design of the mechanism, and for the UN Resident Coordinator's office to initially host the secretariat for the mechanism once it is launched. This will ensure credibility among all key partners in the mechanism, and especially the MILF and the MNLF.

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2014, the search for peace had stalled primarily due to two factors: Many in Congress questioned either the constitutionality of the Bangsamoro Basic Law or the viability of an entity in Muslim Mindanao with greater autonomy than the current ARMM. Second, dissenting voices from the Bangsamoro area itself (representatives of certain groups representing indigenous persons and religious minorities, as well as factions of the Moro National Liberation Front) expressed themselves to legislators, thus adding to the move to stall the draft law.

While the President's drive towards a federal dispensation may mitigate some of these risks, they nevertheless remain, and under certain political circumstances, could loom even larger. A viable Moro convergence will still require a lot of work. Adding to these conventional risks is the more unconventional threat (for the Philippines at least) of violent extremism. A rapid spread of extremist ideologies, especially among the younger combatants of both the

MILF and the MNLF, could significantly and critically undermine crucial partners for the peace process.

The areas of intervention targeted through this IRF proposal should help catalyze actions and capacities to engage with these risks, and to help create a sense of forward momentum among an increasingly concerned and pessimistic constituency for the peace process.

In particular, and having drawn lessons from the failure of the last effort to get Bangsamoro legislation passed in Congress, this initiative will support a well-organized group of “insiders,” drawn from the senior ranks of the key players among the major Moro fronts as well as Congress, to engage the national political leadership around the passage of new the draft law. The previous IRF support for the 2015 bill included resources for the prior BTC as well as allied groups such as Friends of Peace for advocacy, and for the parties for communications, around the BBL, but not an active approach towards systematic support for key intermediaries who could insure it from unexpected challenges such as the Mamasapano incident, and also work in a coordinated manner to ensure its passage.

The implementation of the strategy laid out in this proposal will also benefit from a greater capacity on the part of the UN Resident Coordinator to provide political leadership. Unlike at the time of the implementation of the previous IRF grant, the Resident Coordinator is now supported full-time through a Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding, who plays a central role in the facilitation of political initiatives necessary for implementation of this IRF proposal. The advisor supports the RC to maintain a constant dialogue with critical institutions in the executive branch, including OPAPP and the executive office of the president; with the leaders of the Congress; and with the parties to the Bangsamoro peace process including the MILF, the MNLF, and the implementation panels. The RC is viewed as being above the fray of the push-and-pull for projects and programmes by different UNCT members, and is sought for his quiet counsel and political analysis by national counterparts. He will thus play a crucial role in advancing the implementation of the IRF project when needed. The core political strategy for the UN is the same as the theory of change outlined in section 2 below, and centers on providing spaces and capacities for the additional planning, multi-stakeholder dialogue, and substantive intermediary roles in advancing the peace process.

The proposal closely reflects consultations with key stakeholders on priority areas of action, or aims to provide further assistance for already well established and credible initiatives. The two priority outputs for the prevention of violent extremism that will be implemented through this proposal have been extensively highlighted in the research by Ateneo de Davao University supported by UNDP, and also in the national expert meeting on the prevention of violent extremism that was hosted by the university in March 2017. UNICEF’s research on the risks to radicalization faced by former child soldiers, and on which some of the proposed activities are based, has also provided similar pointers. Key activities proposed under these outputs have also been highlighted in meetings and consultations with key relevant institutions such as the government National Commission on Muslim Filipinos and the non-governmental Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy. Outputs pertaining to expanding the role of women, youth and minorities in peacebuilding are based on recommendations from government entities as well as leading civic organizations, whereas the role of intra-

Moro dialogue in leading to a lasting settlement of the Bangsamoro issue is highlight in the President's "roadmap to peace," and advocated by many among the wider Moro leadership themselves.

II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

a) Theory of Change

Given the analysis of risks presented above, the interventions proposed here should help to equip national and local actors to, in the first instance, re-engage those on the verge of being alienated and radicalized into positive contributions towards peace; expedite Moro convergence around new enabling legislation as well as on a common position on the parameters of Bangsamoro in a federal Philippines; and enable Congress to legislate in a mutually reinforcing manner on both federalism as well as Bangsamoro autonomy. They should also allow for a greater participation of youth and women in achieving these objectives.

In light of the ongoing UN support for addressing the critical challenges facing the prospects for lasting peace in the Philippines, assistance from the PBF will be utilized towards catalytic actions that will provide initial momentum for larger-scale initiatives by national counterparts, or lead to results that will impart greater forward momentum. Under current government plans, it is expected that these larger-scale initiatives will be implemented through the Financing Facility for Peace and Development in Mindanao which the Government has developed with support from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, and which is expected to be launched by September 2017. The Facility will be led by the government in coordination with the primary donors as well as its partners in the peace process. The office of the UN Resident Coordinator will support the implementation of the Facility secretariat.

The core theory of change for this IRF-supported proposal can be summarized as follows:

Greater dialogue among, participation by, and empowerment of all key stakeholders in Bangsamoro is likely to lead to a more effective and complete implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, as combined action by a wider group of stakeholders will not only expedite agreement, but also guarantee the stability of the peace process from contingent risks such as violent radicalization due to the collective efforts of multiple actors.

Needless to say, the approaches highlighted here will not mitigate all risks, and also may not lead to the desired results. However, the global experience of the implementation of peace agreements indicates that while an actual agreement may be negotiated among two or a very limited number of parties, their translation into effective governing arrangements requires the substantive participation of a wider group of actors, as well as ongoing multi-stakeholder dialogue to create more widespread ownership and to spread the responsibility for addressing contingent risks. Based on these "lessons learned," and also on the analyses conducted within the Philippines itself with regard to the peace process thus far, this proposal should increase the probability of achieving lasting peace in the Bangsamoro area.

b) **Project outcomes, activities, targets and sequencing:**

In particular, PBF support will be utilized towards achieving two outcomes, both of which (including the outputs under each) are detailed below:

Outcome 1: Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established.

Outputs:

Output 1: Platform for intra-Moro dialogue developed and implemented, including to achieve consensus on Bangsamoro legislation; Moro positions with regard to federalism; and on the constitution of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, especially the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority; and special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the process for the development of a new federal dispensation for the Philippines

Challenges addressed: The proposed output directly addresses the challenge of Moro convergence by providing for initiatives that can complement the work of the formal bodies of the peace process such as the BTC, and increase the prospects for a smoother, less fractious development, passage and implementation of the enabling law for Bangsamoro. If implemented on time, this output should also greatly increase the prospects for the passage of the enabling law in the Philippines Congress. Should the Congress adopt the “federalism” route in providing for special autonomy for Bangsamoro, this output will increase the chances for Moro positions in this regard being fully reflected in the federalism package.

Key activity 1: Assistance for the initiative of the “insider mediators” to converge the peace agreements of 1996 and 2014; support the development of a “consensus” draft of the legislation—including in the Congress—to establish the Bangsamoro autonomous entity; and facilitate agreement on the parameters of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, especially the BTA (to be implemented by UNDP in partnership with the Bangsamoro Study Group and the Bangsamoro Civil Society Consortium);

Key activity 2: Support for the development and implementation of a platform for Bangsamoro-wide multi-stakeholder dialogue (to be implemented by UNDP in partnership with the Bangsamoro Transition Commission and civic organizations) with a view to yielding consensus on the parameters and priorities for governance in Bangsamoro, as well as the status of the Bangsamoro autonomous entity in a new federal system;

Key activity 3: Facilitation of the development and implementation of a dialogue between Congressional leaders and the Moro leadership around the guaranteeing of special autonomy for Bangsamoro in any process of devolution, including through a federal system (to be implemented by UNDP in partnership with the Institute for Autonomy and Governance, the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy, other advocates, and the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process, and with the support of the UN DPA);

Key activity 4: Advocacy for special autonomy for Bangsamoro with leaders of the Congress and the wider national political spectrum by eminent persons, including those mobilized through the high-level Friends of Peace Group chaired by the Archbishop of Cotabato, and based on forums such as the “national youth conference” on this issue advocated by the Archbishop (to be implemented by UNDP in partnership with OPAPP, Friends of Peace and other advocates);

Output 2: Roles of women, youth, and indigenous persons in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamor enhanced.

Challenge addressed: The last process for the formulation of the Bangsamoro Basic Law as well as its consideration by Congress had been critiqued for not having fully taken the views and participation of women and youth into account, and this was provided as partial explanation for why it did not produce the expected groundswell of support. The implementation of this output should address this lacuna.

Key activity 1: Assistance for new thematic peace tables featuring women, youth, indigenous persons and other constituencies at the national and Bangsamoro level supported by the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process and the Implementing Panels for the CAB, with a particular focus on integrating recommendations from these peace tables into deliberations by Congress, the BTC, and the Panels (to be implemented by UNDP and UN Women in partnership with OPAPP and the Panels)

Key activity 2: Strengthening of women’s leadership towards greater participation in the peace process and transition infrastructures. Previously trained women leaders from the Bangsamoro will have conversations with Bangsamoro women of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao to collectively call for women’s participation in ceasefire, normalization and transition mechanisms and processes, as well as greater support for the implementation of the CAB and passage of the Bangsamoro enabling law.

Output 3: Support from the UN Country Team for the finalization and implementation of the Government’s Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, including in partnership with the World Bank.

Challenge addressed: Without an integrated programme offer with carefully aligned and coordinated activities, and integrated baselines and M&E, UN support for the implementation of the Peace and Development Framework may not lead to a critical mass of impact. Similarly, the catalytic support from the PBF for the implementation of the Framework, while implemented by three different agencies, will have to contribute to shared outputs, and will therefore require periodic and integrated assessment and M&E, as well as programme adjustments to avail of emerging opportunities and address risks.

Key Activity 1: The UN Country Team’s integrated programmatic offer in support of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peace and Development developed in coordination with the World Bank.

Key Activity 2: The Financing Facility for Peace and Development in Mindanao, the

Government's facility for implementing the Strategic Framework, successfully implemented with initial secretarial support from the UN Resident Coordinator's office.

Key Activity 3: The UN Country Team's capacity to integrate issues pertaining to women, peace, and security into programmes related to peacebuilding and to the prevention of violent extremism developed, and its implementation monitored.

Key activity 4: The implementation of PBF support for the Philippines effectively assessed, monitored, evaluated, and re-aligned with emerging risks and opportunities during the course of this project.

Outcome 2: Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.

Output 1: Role of women, youth and faith-based leaderships in preventing violent extremism enhanced, including through the development and dissemination of positive narratives in social media.

Challenge addressed: All current research indicates that women, youth, and faith-based leaders are the most critical entry points for addressing the drivers of violent extremism. If achieved, this output will help bring together a critical mass of activities by these groups to address some of the pull factors, especially on social media, that are driving vulnerable individuals and groups towards radicalization.

Key activity 1: Assistance for faith-based leaderships in Muslim Mindanao, including for MILF religious leaders, and for leaders of women's and youth groups, to use social media and other creative means to generate new narratives, compatible with religious and traditional lifestyles, around constructive and peaceful approaches to political and economic empowerment (to be implemented by UNICEF as well as by UNDP, in partnership with UNV, UN WOMEN, , the Ateneo de Davao University, the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy, and civic organizations);

Key activity 2: Support for civic representatives, with a priority on women, youth, and faith-based leaderships, from Philippines and the wider SE Asian region to engage government counterparts in a dialogue on the implementation of the "Manila Declaration" on the Prevention of Violent Extremism alongside the ASEAN Inter-Ministerial meeting on this subject expected to be held in the Philippines in October 2017 (to be implemented in partnership with OPAPP and the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy)

Key activity 3: Assistance with systematic and visible inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, as well as outreach by the MILF to minorities and religious and civic leaderships (to be implemented by UNDP, in partnership with the Ateneo de Davao University, the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy, the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process, and civic organizations);

Key activity 4: Engaging women and young women to prevent violent extremism.

Women from various sectors will be engaged to analyse the gender dimensions of violent extremism, its impact and roles that women and young women play to prevent violent extremism. Dialogues with other players in PVE will be conducted together with women to ensure non-militaristic, community-based PVE interventions.

Output 2: Children and youth at reduced risk of association or re-association with armed groups through dialogue, counselling, enhanced life skills and educational alternatives.

Challenge addressed: This output, if achieved, will help address the immediate challenge of the “push” factors—alienation; lack of opportunities for dialogue and for participation; weak access to essential social services including viable educational options—that are most evident in MILF communities, and lead to heightened risks of radicalization among especially vulnerable youth and children

Key activity 1: Assistance for the development of an appropriately trained and capacitated, and credible, group of local intermediaries—drawn from among the ranks of women, youth and faith-based leaders in particular—who can reach out to disaffected individuals and communities in Muslim Mindanao and generate dialogue around addressing alienation through creative approaches to political and economic empowerment; 15 highly capacitated intermediaries, hatted as national United Nations Volunteers, will form the core of the cadre (to be implemented by UNDP, in partnership with UNV, the Ateneo de Davao University, and civic organizations);

Key Activity 2: Support for dialogue initiatives facilitated by credible intermediaries (see key activity 1 above) to better understand the grievances behind alienation and radicalization; re-engage disaffected youth; and identify youth-led and viable alternatives for political and economic empowerment (to be implemented by UNDP in partnership with Ateneo de Davao University, and other academic institutions and civic organizations from Mindanao);

Key activity 3: Support for strengthened capacities for services for at-risk children and youth as well as their families, including for case follow-up/counselling, education options (including alternative learning systems), enhanced life-skills, e.g. “adolescent peace-builder”, as well as for health and nutrition services to their communities. (to be implemented by UNICEF, in partnership with the Office of the Regional Governor ARMM, DepEd ARMM, DILG ARMM, DoH ARMM, DSWD ARMM, Provincial and Local Government Units and civic organizations)

c) **Budget:** Provide the envisaged project budget, using the two tables below: (1) activity by activity budget and (2) UN Categories budget. Provide any additional remarks on the scale of the budget and value-for-money, referring to the Value for Money checklist.

Table 2: Project Activity Budget

Outcome/	Output name	Output	UN budget	Any remarks (e.g. on types
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Output number		budget by RUNO	category (see table below for list of categories)	of inputs provided or budget justification)
Outcome 1: Enabling Environment for CAB implementation				
Output 1.1	Moro convergence and intra-Moro dialogue, plus federalism and special autonomy	UNDP, USD 235, 000	2, 4, 5	Meeting, and planning and advocacy exercises of the insider mediators' group, with travel; planning and implementation of intra-Moro dialogue, with meetings, planning exercises, capacity development, and related travel; meetings and exchanges between Moro and Congressional leadership, with exercises and strategy sessions, capacity development, and travel.
Output 1.2	Role of women and youth in peacebuilding	UNDP, USD 311, 000 UN WOMEN, 139,500	1, 2, 4, 5, 7 2, 4, 5,7	Meetings of special "peace tables" for women, youth, and indigenous persons; creation of dialogue forums and networks around peace in Mindanao; meetings; capacity development; travel; operational capabilities for partners; staff time.
Output 1.3	Strengthening of UNCT and Government capacities	UNDP, 500, 000 (Secretariat for Mindanao Peace and Development Financing Facility hosted by RCO, USD 300, 000; RCO costs: USD 90, 000; PBF project	1, 4, 5, 7	Training and other capacity development exercises, including through consultants, and travel, including for M&E and assessment of risks and opportunities.

		evaluation, US\$110,000)		
Outcome 2: Prevention of Violent Extremism				
Output 2.1	Roles of women, youth, and faith-based leaderships	UNDP, USD 260,000 UNICEF, USD 130,000 UN WOMEN, 140,840	1, 2, 4, 5	Meetings; capacity development exercises; strategic planning by stakeholder groups; travel; staff time; web-based social media platforms.
Output 2.2	Alternatives for youth and children at risk, including through credible intermediaries	UNDP, USD 450,000; UNICEF, USD 637,267	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7	Meetings; travel; dialogue and planning forums; training and capacity development; staff time; small grants for dialogue and empowerment initiatives; development of roster and profiles.
GMS (7%)		UNDP, USD 122,920 UNICEF, USD 53,773 UN WOMEN, USD 19,700	8	Essential administrative and operational costs.
Total		USD 300,000,000		

Breakdown of costs for evaluation: Consultancies: USD 40,000; Travel: USD 30,000; Meetings/ workshops: USD 25,000; Publication/dissemination: USD 15,000

Table 3: Project budget by UN categories

(UNDP: USD 1,878,920; UNICEF: USD 821,040; UN WOMEN: 300,040)

Categories	UNICEF Tranche 1	UNICEF Tranche 2	UNDP Tranche 1	UNDP Tranche 2	UN Women Tranche 1	UN Women Tranche 2
1. Staff and other personnel	61,600	26,400	230,000	44,000	36,000	24,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	50,000	20,000	52,500	22,500	2,100	900
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	-	-	45,500	19,500	1,400	600
4. Contractual services	50,804	21,773	426,225	241,525	93,888	24,523
5. Travel	-	-	260,000	100,000	46,000	28,700
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	374,725	162,025	149,975	64,275	-	-
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	-	-	35,000	15,000	16,900	5,400
8. Evaluation			30,000	20,000	-	-
Sub-Total Project Costs	537,129	230,198	1,229,200	526,800	196,288	84,123
8. Indirect Support Costs*	37,599	16,114	86,044	36,876	13,740	5,889
TOTAL	574,728	246,312	1,315,244	563,676	210,028	90,012

The second tranche will be released when all implementing organisations have shared an overview that demonstrates at least 80% expenditure of the total budget for the first tranche.

d) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners:

	RUNO 1: UNICEF	Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)	Annual Regular Budget in \$	Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)
Previous calendar year	2016	Multiple sources	17, 400, 000	13, 700, 000
Current calendar year	2017	Multiple sources	21, 600, 000	15, 900, 000
	RUNO 2: UNDP			

Previous calendar year	2016	Multiple sources	20,000,000	12,000,000
Current calendar year	2017	Multiple sources	25,000,000	12,000,000
	RUNO 3: UN Women			
Previous calendar year	2016	Multiple sources	600,000	100,000
Current calendar year	2017	Multiple sources	600,000	100,000

III. Management and coordination

a) Project management:

The project will be implemented by UNDP, UNICEF, and UN WOMEN, with the relevant programme units in each entity providing the operational base. Contributions by UNV to project activities will be managed by UNDP.

The project will be overseen by a Project Board co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process. The Board will comprise of the representatives of the key implementing partners listed in the title page, and of the implementing agencies.

The Project Board will meet on a quarterly basis to review implementation and to provide strategic guidance for project implementation.

A Technical Advisory Group comprised of representatives of the UN Resident Coordinator, the UNDP Country Director, the UNICEF Resident Representative, and the UN WOMEN Regional Advisor on Governance, Peace, and Security, and the heads of the relevant programme teams in UNDP, UN WOMEN, and UNICEF, as well as from select implementing partners, will meet more frequently on a monthly basis to ensure coordination and provide more detailed guidance for project activities. The Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding deployed by DPA and UNDP will represent the UN Resident Coordinator in this group.

The Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding will provide overall day-to-day direction for the project, and expects to be spending fifty percent of his time managing this project. He will be the focal point towards PBF.

b) Risk management:

Table 5 – Risk management matrix

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
The primary risk for Outcome 1 will involve a failure of the Moro leadership to successfully engage each other and the Congress on an agreed-on path towards the BBL, and on bringing together the BBL and federalism tracks.	Medium	High	UNDP and UNRCO will endeavour to mitigate this risk by supporting parallel but complementary tracks, including through the “insider mediators” group, of informal dialogue among key Moro groups on the one hand, and between these groups and the Congress on the other.
The primary risk for Outcome 2 will be the global “pull” factors that may attract youth, including through social media, in greater numbers towards violent extremism. This could negate gains made through national and local efforts to prevent violent extremism.	Medium	Medium	UNDP and UNV, UNICEF will endeavour to mitigate this risk through an increased capacity for intermediaries to engage a wider group of disaffected individuals through social media, engage those most at apparent risk, and provide peer-to-peer and family-based counselling and guidance.

c) Monitoring & evaluation:

The Technical Advisory Group for the project, supported by the M&E teams of UNDP and UNICEF, will be responsible for a close and regular monitoring of project’s achievements vis-à-vis the targets stated in the results framework. The group will devise mitigation strategies where there are significant gaps.

The Project Board will provide overall supervision and accountability on behalf of the project’s partners and stakeholders. Board members will be encouraged to take a critical approach to the project’s achievements, and highlight relevant risks and gaps as they emerge, and recommend remedial measures.

Given the politically contingent and highly particular nature of project activities, an “Evaluation Committee” will be formed from among the members of the Project Board, and at least two Philippines-based organizations engaged in peacebuilding but who are not “implementation partners,” will assess project results and provide feedback. This will be done at the 14 month mark in the lifetime of the project. The selected organizations will produce two products: An assessment of the project’s record in achieving the indicated

results; and a more strategic but brief report on the evolving landscape of the peace process in the Philippines, and the risks and opportunities that the Project Board will need to bear in mind.

The Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding in the Resident Coordinator's office will coordinate all activities related to M&E, and also support the Project Board and the Technical Advisory Group in this regard.

Members of the Evaluation Committee and the Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding will undertake quarterly review activities through (i) convening implementing partners and key stakeholders in a shared space for a collective reflection on achievements and shortfalls; (ii) traveling to locations where the project is being implemented to assess impact on the ground.

Two experts, one national and one international, will accompany each of the quarterly evaluations and also assist with an end-of-project evaluation.

d) **Administrative arrangements**

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial

accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 November;
- Final (end of project) narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.


Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

Annex A: Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)



**PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT SUMMARY**

Project Number & Title:	PBF/ Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao	
Recipient UN Organization:	UNDP, UN Women, UNICEF	
Implementing Partner(s):	Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process, Philippines	
Location:	Philippines: Manila; Davao; Cotabato; Cagayan de Oro; Iligan	
Approved Project Budget:	USD 3 million	
Duration:	Planned Start Date: Sept 15 2017	Planned Completion: March 15 2019
Project Description:	Advance the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro by building the capacities of relevant actors to sustain peace through the mitigation of factors driving alienation and radicalization, and through a more inclusive peace process characterized by all-Moro dialogue and consensus.	
PBF Focus Area:	<i>1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):</i> (1.4) Political Dialogue; <i>2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):</i> (2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management; <i>3: Revitalize (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/ PBF Secretariats).</i>	
Project Outcome:	Project Outcomes: Outcome 1: Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established. Outcome 2: Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.	
Key Project Activities:	Platform for intra-Moro dialogue developed and implemented, including to achieve consensus on Bangsamoro legislation; Moro positions with regard to federalism; and on the constitution of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, including the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority; and special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the process for the development of a new federal	

	<p>dispensation for the Philippines;</p> <p>Roles of women, youth, and faith based leaderships in building peace enhanced.</p> <p>Support from the UN Country Team for the finalization and implementation of the Government's Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, including in partnership with the World Bank.</p> <p>Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.</p> <p>Role of women, youth and faith-based leaderships in preventing violent extremism enhanced, including through the development and dissemination of positive narratives in social media;</p> <p>Children and youth at reduced risk of association or re-association with armed groups through dialogue, counselling, enhanced life-skills and educational alternatives.</p>
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
Annex B: IRF Results Framework

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Milestones
<p>Outcome 1:</p> <p>Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established.</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 1a</p> <p>Intra-Moro consensus achieved, with the participation of youth, women, and minorities, on power-sharing and governance within the new autonomous Bangsamoro entity.</p> <p>Baseline: Consensus has not yet been achieved across the entire cross-section of Moro leadership.</p> <p>Target: Sufficient consensus achieved by November 2017, and reflected in the formation of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority, as well as the subsequent autonomous Bangsamoro entity, by end-2018.</p>	<p>Assessments and analysis by: The Insider Mediators' Group; Bangamoro Study Group; Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society; Leaderships of the MILF and the MNLF. Offices of the House Speaker and the Senate President; Bangsamoro Transition Commission; UNDP</p>	<p>2017: Consensus on core issues achieved among Moro leadership with the support of the Insider Mediators' Group, and under the formal leadership of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission</p> <p>2018: Consensus, especially on power-sharing, operationalized in the form of the structure and procedures of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority, with continuing support from the insider mediators and other relevant groups.</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 b</p> <p>Inputs from women and youth, as well as their direct participation, significantly enhanced in the process leading to the formation of the autonomous Bangsamoro entity, as well as in the overall implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangamoro.</p> <p>Baseline: No formal or systematic mechanism for participation by youth and women in the Bangsamoro peace process.</p> <p>Target: Systematic "peace tables" for women and youth established by end-2017 to accompany the Bangsamoro peace process, and their outputs fully reflected in the work of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority and the subsequent autonomous Bangsamoro entity by</p>	<p>Assessments and analysis by: Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process; Peace Implementation Panels; Bangsamoro Transition Commission; Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society; United Youth for Peace and Development; UN Women; UNDP</p>	<p>2017: At least two national peace tables for women and youth fully established, with clear methodologies for facilitation, participation, and synthesizing of inputs.</p> <p>2018: Outputs from the peace tables fully reflected in the work of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority, as well as that of other formal joint bodies of the peace process.</p>

		end-2018		
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1c</p> <p>UN Country Team fully equipped to support the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao.</p> <p>Baseline: No integrated baselines and indicators currently exist for UNCT support, which is ad hoc and has not been framed as an integrated programme offer.</p> <p>Target: Integrated programmatic offer developed by October 2017, and capacities related to women, peace and security developed and applied by end-2018.</p>	<p>Analysis and assessments from:</p> <p>UN Resident Coordinator's Office; Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process; World Bank</p>	<p>2017: UNCT programme offer finalized, and training/ capacity development pertaining to women, peace, and security completed.</p> <p>2018: Programme offer implemented through resources from the Mindanao Peace and Development Financing Facility, and elements pertaining to women, peace, and security integrated into all programmes supported by the facility.</p>
	<p>Output 1.1</p> <p>Platform for intra-Moro dialogue developed and implemented, including to achieve consensus on Bangsamoro legislation; Moro positions with regard to federalism; and on the constitution of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, including the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority; and special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the process for the development of a new federal dispensation for the Philippines.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1</p> <p>Insider mediators successfully able to support consensus on enabling legislation in Congress, and on the constitution of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority between the MILF and the MNLF.</p> <p>Baseline: Insider mediators have achieved convergence of the three peace agreements, and also developed an informal draft of the enabling law that reflects substantive convergence.</p> <p>Target: Consensus on the enabling law achieved by October 2017, and agreement on power sharing and joint governance in the BTA achieved by early 2018. Accompaniment for the formation and work of the BTA provided through 2018.</p>		<p>2017: Consensus on enabling law, and on the relationship between federalism and special autonomy, reached among Moro leadership, and in the Congress.</p> <p>2018: Agreement on power-sharing and joint governance in the BTA reached between MILF and MNLF, and reflected in the formation and work of the BTA.</p>
		Output Indicator 1.1.2		<p>2017: Platform established by end-</p>

		<p>Credible platform for intra-Moro dialogue constituted under the auspices of the BTC as appropriate, or otherwise, and sustained through the period of the formation of the autonomous Bangsamoro entity.</p> <p>Baseline: Platform does not exist.</p> <p>Target: Platform established by October 2017, and sustained throughout the duration of the project.</p>		<p>2017</p> <p>2018: Platform able to provide significant and sustained multi-stakeholder input into the formal peace process; the implementation of the CAB; and the formation and work of the BTA.</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 1.1.3 Special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the model for federalism or decentralization adopted by the Philippines Congress.</p> <p>Baseline: No systematic dialogue for integration of autonomy into a federal model.</p> <p>Target: Special autonomy considered by the Constitutional Committee by end-2017, and fully integrated into the federal or decentralization package by mid-2018.</p>		<p>2017: Issue of special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the work of the Constitutional Committee and other relevant committees.</p> <p>2018: On a contingent basis (the final timeline for the finalization and adoption of the federal devolution package and constitutional reform remains unclear), special autonomy fully integrated into constitutional reforms.</p>
	<p>Output 1.2</p> <p>Roles of women, youth, and faith based leaderships in supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro enhanced.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1</p> <p>Two national peace tables for youth and women developed, and outputs from the tables successfully integrated into the processes leading to the formation of the Bangsamoro autonomous entity.</p> <p>Baseline: Preliminary activities have been conducted, but systematic forums not yet launched.</p> <p>Target: Two national peace tables for youth and women are credibly</p>		<p>2017:</p> <p>Two national peace tables for youth and women launched, effectively facilitated, and able to develop methods for synthesizing diverse inputs and integrating them into formal processes.</p> <p>2018: Peace tables institutionalized and sustained as accompaniment to formal processes, including the</p>

		established by end-2017, and are sustained through the period of formation of the Bangsamoro autonomous entity.		constitution of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority.
		Output Indicator 1.2.2 Women able to participate in ceasefire, normalization and transition processes and mechanisms and pursue measures on women, peace and security Baseline: Dialogue and networking around women's leadership roles in the Bangsamoro autonomous entity has taken place in a sporadic and ad hoc manner, and not yielded a reliable capacity. Target: 200 trained women on the Bangsamoro peace process able to participate and pursue gender agenda in local decision-making processes and mechanisms		2017: Drawing on ongoing experiences in the Philippines and in the region, training and capacity building exercise for a hundred women leaders completed. 2018: Network for women's leadership constituted and sustained, and able to support women to play leadership roles in the BTA and in the private sector in the ARMM region, including in the context of the prevention of violent extremism.
	Output 1.3 Support from the UN Country Team for the finalization and implementation of the Government's Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, including in partnership with the World Bank	Output Indicator 1.3.1 Integrated programme offer in support of the Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao developed by the UN Country Team. Baseline: The programme offer exists in early draft stage, but will require further technical support from UNHQ, especially on cross-cutting issues, before being finalized. Target: Programme offer finalized by		2017: Development of the integrated programme offer, and capacity development on women, peace and security, completed. 2018: Integrated programme offer funded and implemented through the Mindanao Peace and Development Financing Facility, with specific components pertaining to gender integrated into individual

		August 2017.		agency initiatives.
		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.2</p> <p>UNCT members able to integrate issues related to women, peace, and security in all initiatives related to peacebuilding and to the prevention of violent extremism.</p> <p>Baseline: No systematic capacity outside UN Women and UNICEF.</p> <p>Target: Training of all relevant UNCT staff implemented by end-2017; and tool to guide programming developed and implemented by June 2018.</p>		See above.
		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.3</p> <p>The implementation of PBF support for the Philippines effectively assessed, monitored, evaluated, and re-aligned with emerging risks and opportunities during the course of this project.</p> <p>Baseline: The current phase of PBF support will commence on August 1 2017.</p> <p>Target: Effective implementation of PBF support by December 2018</p>		Continuous throughout 2017 and 2018.
<p>Outcome 2: Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2 a</p> <p>A least three credible online and physical forums established and sustained for dialogue between youth, women, and faith-based leaderships in communities at risk, and systematic dialogue established between government civil society on the issue of PVE.</p> <p>Baseline: No forums currently exist</p>	<p>Analysis and assessments done by: Al Qalam Institute for Islamic Identities and Dialogue in SE Asia; Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy; Mindanao State University; Darul Ifta of the</p>	<p>2017: Dialogue platforms and online forums established, and regional PVE meeting bringing together representatives from Government and civil society under Philippines' leadership implemented.</p> <p>2018: Dialogue platforms and online forums effectively facilitated,</p>

		<p>for systematic and broad-based dialogue.</p> <p>Target: At least three forums each, sustained by universities, in at least three of the five ARMM provinces, with each forum able to engage at least three hundred individuals (with half women, and half in the age group 18-35, in dialogue. Network for systematic dialogue between government and civil society in the Philippines established and able to drive the national PVE agenda by end-2018.</p>	<p>ARMM (top body bringing together the Islamic clergy in the ARMM area)</p>	<p>and able to garner progressively greater numbers of participants, with 300 being the minimum mark of effectiveness.</p> <p>Philippines' National Action Plan on PVE developed by the network constituted in the aftermath of the regional meeting.</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2 b Significant increase (with at least a hundred ulama across at least three ARMM provinces engaged) in numbers of ulama and madrasahs conveying messages of positive struggles for peace, social justice and inclusion, and in the number of individuals participating in these sermons and classes.</p> <p>Baseline: The top ulama institutions of ARMM have issued calls against violent extremism, but there is no evidence of impact, and the calls are not sustained.</p> <p>Target: At least 50% increase (equivalent to at least a hundred ulama across at least three ARMM provinces) in individual ulamas and madrasahs offering sermons or courses on peaceful struggle for social justice in at least three ARMM provinces (with at least two hundred—based in MILF camps—supported to develop such messages), and at least 50% increase, by end-2018, in the</p>	<p>Same as above.</p>	<p>2017: Capacity development for ulamas and madrasahs completed.</p> <p>2018: Ulama networks and the Darul Ifta supported to carry messages to at-risk communities, and to engage greater numbers of individuals in further propagating these messages, including to youth in MILF camps.</p>

		<p>numbers of participants in these sermons and courses; in addition, at least 10, 000 younger MILF combatants reached through these sermons and courses.</p>		
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2c</p> <p>No return to armed groups by underage adherents of these groups who have now been rehabilitated, and a significant increase in educational opportunities that reduce the risks of radicalization for these individuals</p> <p>Baseline: A hundred percent of rehabilitated youth, and a practically zero percent participation by these youth in educational opportunities that reduce the risks of radicalization.</p> <p>Target: At least eighty percent of rehabilitated children are prevented from rejoining armed groups, and at least 1000 individuals from this cohort are afforded opportunities for education that reduces the risk of radicalization.</p>	<p>Analysis and assessments by:</p> <p>Departments of Education and Social Welfare of the Government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and subsequently the Bangsamoro Transition Authority; UNICEF</p>	<p>2017-2018 Capacities for providing educational opportunities and psycho-social counseling developed in select educational institutions close to MILF areas.</p> <p>2018: Capacities applied to reach the indicated numerical targets.</p>
	<p>Output 2.1 Role of women, youth and faith-based leaderships in preventing violent extremism enhanced, including through the development and dissemination of positive narratives in social media</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.1.1 Number of youth in MILF communities reached with key messages on positive struggles for peace and social justice through religious leaders' sermons, and number of such leaders equipped to engage in this manner.</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: Training of 200 religious leaders completed by December 2017, and outreach to 10, 000 MILF youth conducted by these religious leaders by end-2018.</p>		<p>2017: Training package delivered with the assistance of Nadlatul Ulama from Indonesia, and delivered to 200 clerics.</p> <p>2018: At risk MILF youth identified with the assistance of the BIAF commander and the Grand Mufti, and engaged by the trained clerics around themes related to Islam and peaceful struggles for justice and inclusion.</p>

		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.2 At least two dialogue spaces, and one social media platform, established per province for three of the five provinces of ARMM, with the active participation of at least three hundred individuals—with a particular emphasis on youth and women (50% for both categories)—participating in each space/ platform.</p> <p>Baseline: The Davao-based Salam network, oriented towards youth, is currently the only such entity with rudimentary dialogue capabilities.</p> <p>Target: At least six dialogue platforms should be fully functional by mid-2018, with the rest reaching this status by end-2018.</p>		<p>2017: Dialogue forums and social media platforms established by select academic and civic institutions, building on ongoing initiatives such as Salaam.</p> <p>2018: Fully functioning platforms able to mobilize at least 300 individuals per platform into coherent conversations around themes pertaining to identity, dialogue, and positive struggle in the context of Islam.</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.3 Credible intermediaries successfully trained and deployed to facilitate the dialogue forums indicated 2.1.2, support research initiatives to better understand factors driving radicalization, and to conduct outreach to individuals and communities considered at risk (and to be able to sustain dialogue in at least 50% of such instances)</p> <p>Baseline: No intermediaries are currently deployed on the ground to work systematically with the affected communities.</p> <p>Target: In partnership with UN Volunteers, at least 15 intermediaries (5 women; 5 youth) will be trained and deployed by end 2018, and will support at least one research initiative in three select regions by end-2018; facilitate the dialogue</p>		<p>2017: Fifteen national UNVs recruited and trained.</p> <p>2018: National UNVs deployed in select areas to perform the indicated tasks.</p>

		platforms indicated in 2.1.2, and conduct outreach to at least a hundred individuals or communities considered at risk with the objective of sustaining dialogue with them by end-2018.		
		<p>Output indicator 2.1.4</p> <p>Support for civic representatives, with a priority on women, youth, and faith-based leaderships, from Philippines and the wider SE Asian region to engage government counterparts in a dialogue on the implementation of the "Manila Declaration" on the Prevention of Violent Extremism alongside the ASEAN Inter-Ministerial meeting on this subject expected to be held in the Philippines in October 2017 effectively implemented.</p> <p>Baseline: There is currently no systematic dialogue between governments and civil society in the Philippines and in the wider ASEAN region on the issue of PVE.</p> <p>Target: Regional meeting implemented by end-2017, and network to sustain dialogue between government and civil society institutionalized and sustained for the Philippines by end-2018.</p>		<p>2017:</p> <p>Regional meeting conducted in the Philippines with the assistance of the Philippines Centre for Islam and Democracy, and with both government and civil society representatives, and with the participation of women, youth, and faith-based leaderships.</p> <p>2018:</p> <p>Network formed through the regional meeting able to engage relevant governmental and civic bodies for the development of the Philippines National Plan of Action against PVE.</p>
	Output 2.2 Children and youth at risk of association or re-association with armed groups	<p>Output Indicator 2.2.1</p> <p>Percentage of disengaged children who have not re-associated with armed groups</p> <p>Baseline: 100% Target: 80%</p>		<p>2017:</p> <p>Specific vulnerabilities of disengaged children systematically mapped, including those seen as being at high risk of radicalization.</p> <p>2018:</p>

				Specifically identified children provided educational opportunities and psycho-social support.
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2</p> <p>Percentage of disengaged and at risk youth and children received culturally sensitive and flexible learning opportunities (education)</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1000</p>		<p>2017:</p> <p>Select educational institutions identified, and offered capacity development so as to provide especially tailored curricula for disengaged children.</p> <p>2018:</p> <p>Especially tailored curricula and opportunities provided to select children.</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.3</p> <p>Percentage of disengaged and at risk youth and children received psychosocial and life skills support</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1500</p>		<p>2017:</p> <p>Mapping of needs for provision of psychosocial and life skills completed, with a particular emphasis on MILF camps in high-risk areas.</p> <p>2018:</p> <p>Specifically tailored support packages developed and provided.</p>