




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# PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

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*Photo on the cover: A man prays at dawn where a mausoleum once stood at the Three Saints Cemetery in Timbuktu, Mali. The site was destroyed by violent extremists during their seizure of the North in early 2012, Timbuktu, Mali , UN Photo/Marco Dormino*

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## PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

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### United Nations Development Programme Regional and Multi-Country Project Document

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**Project Title:**

Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.

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**Expected Regional Programme Outcome:**

Outcome 1: African Union and RECs deliver on their mandate, especially cross-cutting issues related to resilience building.

Outcome 3: Regional institutions sustain peace and build resilience to crises and shocks.

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**Expected Output(s):**

**Output 1** - *National PVE coordination and capacity: Target countries have strengthened capacities to develop, coordinate and implement national PVE strategies.*

**Output 2** - *Rule of law and security: National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.*

**Output 3** - *Disengagement and reintegration: Members of extremist groups are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.*

**Output 4** - *Socio-economic factors: 'At risk' youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas have improved socio-economic opportunities.*

**Output 5** - *Public awareness, dialogue and counter-narratives: The public (especially youth and communities) are enabled to counter violent narratives and extremist propaganda.*

**Output 6** - *Community resilience in response to violent extremism: Communities and religious institutions have the capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism*

**Output 7** - *Gender-specific engagements: Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.*

**Output 8** - *Research, policy and advocacy: Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.*

**Output 9** - *Regional level intervention: Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.*

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**Executing Entity:**

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Implementing Agencies:**

UNDP, African Union Commission, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Governments, Faith Associates, Universities/Research Institutions and Civil Society

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This six-year regional development project, which started in 2016, is designed to strengthen the development responses to mitigate the growth of violent extremism in Africa. It is the first phase of a long-term engagement by UNDP. It responds to the ever-increasing presence of violent extremist groups in Africa causing, in the words of former UN Security-General Ban Ki-moon, an ‘arc of upheaval and distress’. Violent extremism is having a devastating impact on the lives and livelihoods of populations across the continent – particularly the most vulnerable, and including youth, women and children.

The *Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism: A Development Approach* project is implemented at the country and regional level. At the regional level, the project supports the capacity of the African Union Commission (AUC) and Regional Economic Communities (IGAD and ECOWAS) to prevent and respond to violent extremism. At the country level, the project will be implemented in three categories of countries: ‘epicentre countries’ – Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia; ‘spillover countries’ – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia; and ‘at-risk’ countries – the Central African Republic, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Interventions have been initiated in 16 of these countries.

The project focuses on interventions in seven key areas: national Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism (PVE) coordination and capacity; rule of law and security; disengagement and reintegration; socio-economic factors; public awareness, dialogue and counter-narratives; community resilience; and gender-specific initiatives. Programming is informed by cutting-edge research published in September 2017 by UNDP – *Journey to Extremism in Africa* – which presents the largest set of primary data on the drivers and incentives of joining violent extremist groups, as expressed by recruits to the continent’s deadliest groups themselves. In addition, programming is supported by two cross-cutting activities: research, policy and advocacy; and, capacity-building for regional and sub-regional organizations. The project as a whole draws on UNDP’s expertise and capacities as they relate to drivers of violent extremism, for instance in addressing weak state capacity, poor service delivery, endemic marginalization and poverty, and lack of coordination at national and regional levels.

Programme Period Phase I:	2016-2017
Programme Period Phase II:	2018-2021
Key Result Area (Strategic Plan)	Tier 2 Outcome 3 Output 3.2.1 Output 3.2.2
Start date:	November 2015
End Date	December 2021
Management Arrangements	DIM

<b>Total resources utilized (Phase I)</b>	
UNDP	USD 4 M
Japan	USD 2 M
Netherlands	USD 816,000
Sweden	USD 2 M
UK	USD 428,000
<b>Total resources required (Phase II)</b>	
UNDP	USD 2 M
Sweden	USD 3 M
Netherlands	USD 6.19 M
Unfunded budget	USD 54.8 M

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Agreed by (Regional Bodies):

Agreed by (UNDP):





# Situation analysis 1

## 1.1 Overview

The growth of violent extremism and its devastating impacts are not only setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains in Africa, but threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come. Violent extremist attacks in Africa have reached unprecedented levels. From 2011 to early 2016, violent extremism caused 33,300 fatalities as well as widespread displacement, creating situations of pronounced and critical humanitarian need (see Figure 1).

Over the past eight years, consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region have resulted in the displacement of 2.3 million people, with 10.7 million people in need of emergency assistance.<sup>1</sup> As a result of Al Shabaab

activities there has been an estimated 25 percent drop in tourism in Kenya, a sector that provides a vital source of jobs and income for the country.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, following the increasing number of attacks by Boko Haram foreign direct investment flows into Nigeria declined by 21 percent between 2011 and 2012, further exacerbating the country's unemployment challenge.<sup>3</sup> Increasing levels of insecurity forced Cameroon to close its border with Nigeria, squeezing those whose livelihoods depend on cross-border informal trade. The impact on the lives and livelihoods of those who have lost family members, friends and colleagues in the multiple attacks that have taken place in market places, universities, places of worship and schools across Africa is immeasurable. As a result of increasing levels of violence and insecurity, many children and students are no longer able to attend school or university, undermining their quality of



A view of battle-damaged buildings and businesses along the deserted streets of Bakara Market in central Mogadishu, Somalia, August 2011, UN Photo/Stuart Price

life both now and in the future. Indeed, the phenomenon is disproportionately impacting the youth. Marginalised from political processes, lacking in viable employment options and suffering from an increasing sense of desperation, the youth can become ready targets for recruiters. In addition to the primary theatres of violent extremist activity in and around Somalia, in the Lake Chad region and in the Sahel, the rise of other groups with similar ideological leanings and violent manifestations is alarming.<sup>4</sup> Further, a number of African 'foreign fighters' are known to have travelled to Libya, Syria and Iraq, and, in a smaller number of cases, to Somalia and Nigeria, in support of violent extremist activity. Looking at the continent as a whole, security analysts are concerned with the prospect of cross-fertilization between Boko Haram, AQIM, Al Shabaab and other regional militant organizations as one high-risk scenario. The phenomenon shows every sign of growing, unless steps are taken now to address the drivers and enablers of violent extremism.

## 1.2 Summary of approach


This six-year regional development project, which started in 2016, has been developed to contribute to preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism across Africa. It is the first phase of a longer-term engagement by UNDP. In its design, it responds to three critical sets of factors shaping violent extremism on the continent. First, the project focuses on violent extremism inspired by certain distorted interpretations of Islam which are, in reality, attacks on Islam itself.<sup>5</sup> Whilst people of all religions have lost their lives and been affected by the rising insecurity and socio-economic impacts of violent extremism, as has been underscored by the former UN Secretary General, 'the vast majority of the victims are Muslims, across a broad arc of upheaval and distress.'<sup>6</sup>

Second, the project focuses on the regional dimensions

FIGURE 1 FATALITIES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS IN AFRICA 2000-2016

Number of fatalities/location of attacks resulting in fatalities  
 ● ● ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES  
 ● ● ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY OTHER GROUPS

Size of bubbles correspond to the number of fatalities in a single attack, with smaller sizes reflecting lower number of fatalities. The number of fatalities during the time period range from 1 to 400. The single attack with the highest number of fatalities took place in Nigeria in January 2015.



\*Number wounded in 2015 and 2016 not included \*\*Up to February 2016

Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD), University of Maryland (2000 – 2014) and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (2015 and 2016). Only confirmed cases of known perpetrators were used, classifying either as 'those associated with religious ideologies/fundamentalism' or 'other'. Bar graph only shows countries that experienced more than three fatalities over the time period. GTD dataset accessed in October 2015. ACLED database accessed in February 2016.



of the crisis. Violent extremism does not respect borders; far from it, it thrives on their porous nature, and on the incapacity of the state to monitor, curb or control the trafficking of people, weapons, drugs and goods. Indeed, the links between violent extremism and organized transnational networks of crime that also benefit from border insecurity are increasingly blurred. Those fleeing violence and insecurity are forced to cross multiple borders in search of safety and livelihoods. Too often in the African context addressing a problem within national borders has simply meant displacing it beyond them. An integrated regional response that helps coordinate the efforts of national governments and which supports the engagements led by regional and sub-regional organizations is imperative.

Third, the project articulates a development response to violent extremism. It is increasingly well recognised that security responses alone are proving insufficient despite short-term gains. While across the various settings affected, from the Sahel to east Africa, some successes in curbing some of the outward manifestations of violent extremism have resulted from military efforts, core drivers remain unresolved. And, military campaigns, when not conducted sensitively, can bolster extremist narratives concerning an international war against Islam by ‘non-believers’<sup>7</sup> and the reductionist and polarising discourse they seek to propagate. In many African countries the security approach has included a combination of increased

military operations, extra-judicial killings of ‘targeted’ individuals,<sup>8</sup> security crackdowns and increased ethnic profiling.<sup>9</sup> To pay for these activities, significant funds are often diverted away from development activities towards security policy, planning and operations. Combined, these elements exacerbate perceptions amongst marginalised populations that they are being victimised by the state, thereby increasing rather than decreasing levels of radicalization. Indeed, the security response is short-term, while the development response is long-term.

The project is, furthermore, underpinned by a theoretical response framework which maintains that individuals, ideology and institutions must be consistently engaged in a multi-faceted and multi-stakeholder intervention. The project is being implemented simultaneously at the regional and national levels to ensure coherence and maximize results. At the national level the project will be implemented in three categories’ of countries: ‘epicentre countries’ such as Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia where extremist groups are already active; ‘spillover countries’, where the ramification of extremist groups’ operations are being sorely felt on many levels, including in Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia, and in ‘at-risk’ countries which exhibit some of the same underlying and root causes of violent extremism as both epicentre and spill-over countries, including Central African Republic (CAR), Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. As of January 2017, intervention have been initiated in eleven of these countries under this project.

The project, which focuses on both prevention and response activities, targets interventions in seven key areas: national PVE coordination and capacity; rule of law and security; disengagement and reintegration; socio-economic factors; public awareness, dialogue and counter-narratives; community resilience; and gender-specific initiatives. Interventions in these key areas are underpinned and enhanced by two cross-cutting activities: research, policy and advocacy, and capacity-building for regional and sub-regional organizations. It should be noted that the project is designed to focus on the immediate and underlying causes of violent extremism, in a manner that draws on UNDP’s expertise and capacities, in regard to addressing weak state capacity, poor service delivery and endemic marginalization and poverty, as well as lack of coordination at the national and regional level.

Consequently, this project builds upon the work of the UN system as a whole and seeks to complement the work of

other actors working in this domain through partnerships, collaboration and coordination.<sup>10</sup> In 2014, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning violent extremism and called upon member states to support efforts to adopt longer-term solutions to address the underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism, including by empowering youth.<sup>11</sup> The resolution, which provides a basis for the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism that was presented to the UN General Assembly in late 2015, insists that an effective response will require ‘promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation.’<sup>12</sup> This project builds on the work being done on the Plan of Action and seeks to create conducive environments for its implementing, tailored to the African context. Furthermore, this project adheres to UNDP’s Strategic Plan [2018-2022] and is also fully tailored to respond to the priorities and aspirations articulated in the AU’s Agenda 2063.

The project is aligned with UNDP’s global strategy on PVE in order to ensure synergy and collaboration between global and regional work as well as to avoid duplication of effort. In addition, it contributes to UNDP’s overall strategic response strategy in the Sahel region.

The project is fully informed by this policy environment. Furthermore, it has been refined in light of the findings of the recently published *Journey to Extremism in Africa* study produced by UNDP in late-2017. This is a major output of the UNDP Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism: A Development Approach project to date, and was a complex two-year intervention explicitly designed to address knowledge and evidence gaps concerning violent extremism in Africa. The study – which launched in September 2017 amid widespread international and press interest – set out to empirically explore the biographic profiles and personal perspectives of Africans who have been both radicalized and recruited by violent extremist groups in order to shed further light on what shapes vulnerability to recruitment.<sup>13</sup> UNDP Africa’s *Journey to Extremism* study represents a unique contribution towards creating precisely such an evidence base concerning the drivers and incentives for recruitment in Africa. Its findings, which are woven into the project document below in relevant areas, directly inform the ongoing project across the activity areas envisaged, which have in some cases been adjusted and expanded since completion of UNDP’s *Journey to Extremism* study.<sup>14</sup>



*A Somali boy greets a soldier serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the town of Buur-Hakba. The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by AMISOM forces, has re-captured the town from extremist group Al-Shabaab, February 2013, Buur-Hakba, Somalia, UN Photo/Stuart Price*

## 2.1 What drives and enables violent extremism in Africa?

The drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex, context-specific and have religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. They defy easy analysis and understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete. The UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* study, undertaken from a political socialisation perspective<sup>15</sup>, provides critical insights into the personal motivation that drew individuals to join violent extremist groups in recent years across the continent, as summarised below.

Compounding the factors that are experienced and perceived by individuals attracted to violent extremism in Africa – as evidenced in the *Journey to Extremism* study – are other external dynamics, conflating at both regional and trans-national levels to foster conditions that can ignite and sustain the growth of violent extremism in Africa. At the trans-national and regional level, porous borders facilitate the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), people, drugs and goods that are vital for such groups, creating financing and profit opportunities and often blurring the distinction between violent armed groups and trans-national criminal networks. The high levels of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees is further destabilising the continent, exacerbating the vulnerability of already marginalised populations, and making refugee camps and on-the-move populations easy targets for radicalised groups.<sup>16</sup> Wider geo-political factors and conflicts in particular the upheaval in the Middle East compounds and feeds violent extremism in Africa in a number of ways.<sup>17</sup>

## 2.2 Why UNDP?

Violent extremism is posing a direct and manifest challenge to the gains enjoyed by many countries over recent years, threatening to stunt development outcomes for generations to come if left unchecked. The steep rise in violent extremist activity in Africa represents a significant challenge to global security and development overall. Just as violent extremism profoundly impacts the attainment of development goals, so the search for solutions must also

### Journey to Extremism in Africa: Key findings

Starting with the 'accident of geography' that is place of childhood, experiences related to living in highly peripheral regions of Africa – often borderlands and traditionally marginalized regions – begin to shape individuals' worldview and vulnerability. Long-standing realities of 'centre/periphery' divides have, if anything, been exacerbated by the recent economic growth enjoyed overall in Africa. The vulnerabilities of communities living in such areas (macro- and meso-level factors) were, in the journeys to extremism of the individuals interviewed, refracted through micro-level experiences of early childhood. These included a relative lack of exposure to people of other religions and ethnicities. Perception of childhood happiness was lower among those who went on to join violent extremist groups within the sample. The critical factor in explaining childhood unhappiness that correlates with future extremism is perceived lack of parental involvement in the child's life. Further, in environments where overall levels of literacy and education are low, individuals who later join violent extremist groups are found in this research to be particularly deprived in educational terms. Their experience of civic engagement in childhood was also low.

The Journey to Extremism findings also clearly differentiate between perceptions about religion and its significance as a reason for joining violent extremist groups, and actual religious literacy. Fifty-one percent of respondents selected religion as a reason for joining. However, as many as 57 percent of the respondents also admitted to limited or no understanding of religious texts. Indeed, higher than average years of religious schooling appears to have been a source of resilience. These findings challenge rising Islamophobic rhetoric that has intensified in response to violent extremism globally, and demonstrate that fostering greater understanding of religion, through methods that enable students to question and engage critically with teachings, is a key resource for PVE. Further, feeling that 'religion is under threat' was found to be a common perspective among many respondents. This sounds a warning that recruitment by violent extremist groups in Africa, using religion as a touchstone for other context-based grievances, can readily expand.

The research unequivocally underscores the relevance of economic factors as drivers of recruitment. The grievances associated with growing up in contexts where multidimensional poverty is high and far deeper than national averages, with the lived reality of unemployment

and underemployment, render 'economic factors' a major source of frustration identified by those who joined violent extremist groups. This is a key dimension of individuals' vulnerability to narratives that invite them to channel such grievances and associated desperation into the cause of extremism. If an individual was studying or working, it emerged that that he or she would be less likely to become a member of an extremist organization. Employment is the single most frequently cited 'immediate need' faced at the time of joining. Individuals who joined but were studying or employed (not in vulnerable employment) at the time of joining the organization took longer to take the decision to join than did counterparts either in vulnerable employment or unemployed. Respondents report uneven experiences in receiving salaries for being active members of violent extremist groups: some were paid above the local average, whereas at least 35 percent were not paid at all during their period of recruitment.

The research makes clear that a sense of grievance towards, and limited confidence in, government is widespread in the regions of Africa associated with the highest incidence of violent extremism. This may be an inevitable corollary of the life experience of growing up in the context of acute and relative multidimensional poverty, neglect and political marginalization affecting these areas. However, disaffection with government is highest by significant margins among the Journey to Extremism respondents who were recruited by violent extremist groups across several key indicators. These include: belief that government only looks after the interests of a few; low level of trust in government authorities; and experience, or willingness to report experience, of bribe-paying. Grievances against security actors, as well as politicians, are particularly marked, with an average of 78 percent rating low levels of trust in the police, politicians and military. Those most susceptible to recruitment express a significantly lower degree of confidence in the potential for democratic institutions to deliver progress or meaningful change. Meanwhile, positive experience of effective service provision is confirmed as a source of resilience: respondents who believed that governments' provision of education was either 'excellent' or 'improving' were less likely to be a member of a violent extremist group, within the sample.

The research specifically set out to discover what pushed a handful of individuals to join violent extremist groups, when many others facing similar sets of circumstances did not. This specific moment or factor is referred to as the 'tipping point'. The idea of a transformative trigger that pushes individuals decisively from the 'at-risk' category to actually taking the step of joining is substantiated by the Journey to Extremism data. A striking 71 percent pointed to 'government action', including 'killing of a family member or friend' or 'arrest of a

family member or friend', as the incident that prompted them to join. These findings throw into stark relief the question of how counter-terrorism and wider security functions of governments in at-risk environments conduct themselves with regard to human rights and due process. State security-actor conduct is revealed as a prominent accelerator of recruitment, rather than the reverse.

Forty-eight percent of respondents joined in less than a month from first contact with the organization in question, and 80 percent in less than a year. This speed of recruitment shows the depth of the vulnerability faced. Emotions of 'hope/excitement' and 'being part of something bigger' were high among those who joined, indicating the 'pull' of opportunity for radical change and rebellion against the status quo of circumstances that is presented by violent extremism. Despite the highly personal aspects of the journey to extremism, local community social networks were also influential. Indeed, the journey to extremism in Africa appears to rely significantly less heavily than in other regions on the Internet as a venue for recruitment.

The highly localized nature of recruitment that is suggested by the findings has important implications for response strategies and the search for solutions that are tailored to Africa's circumstances. The research found that respondents who were aware of initiatives to prevent people from joining slowed down the pace of recruitment. Forty-eight percent of those who joined violent extremist groups were aware of PVE initiatives, however identified distrust of those delivering these programmes as one of the primary reasons for not taking part.

Grievances against government and state security actors are particularly pronounced among those most vulnerable to recruitment, who also express deep-seated scepticism about the possibility of positive change. The speed with which recruitment has to date been shown to take place by this research illustrates the 'ripeness' for recruitment of those who do make the journey, and hence the depth of Africa's vulnerability. Although recruitment is largely highly localized, steadily increasing connectivity across Africa will enable recruitment to expand over time, perhaps leading to larger numbers of African foreign fighters joining theatres of conflict outside of their immediate environments. Indeed, there is a very real prospect of an even greater spread of violent extremism in Africa than has been witnessed in recent years, with further associated devastation and backsliding in development terms. This calls for concerted efforts both to guard against and transform it. See Annex 1 for infographic summary of findings.

**Source: UNDP (2017): *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment***



place development approaches at its centre. Development actors are therefore uniquely placed within the overall response architecture for tackling violent extremism and have an integral role to play in averting the threats posed by preventing and transforming it.

UNDP, as the lead development agency in the UN system with presence in all 54 countries in Africa as well as regional hubs in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Dakar, is uniquely placed to implement a project of this scale and scope. At the regional level UNDP has over 120 technical experts covering the areas of governance and rule of law, conflict prevention, gender, youth empowerment, livelihoods, coordination of development assistance and supporting the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition to presence in the project's 18 target countries, UNDP's regional technical capacities are being deployed to support the implementation process. UNDP also brings to this project decades-old established networks and partnerships with civil society, faith-based groups, the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, host governments and academic institutions to achieve the results articulated in this project. Furthermore, UNDP's impartiality makes it a unique operator in an extremely delicate and politically-sensitive area of work.


UNDP first initiated its work on violent extremism in Africa in 2014, proceeding to convene a series of global expert consultations, with the aim of creating a shared understanding of key issues, and to foster greater coherence amongst international development actors. Over 50 participants from around the world attended these events, including representatives from academia, research centres and civil society organizations, as well as partner institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); Islamic Development Bank (IDB); the European Union (EU); African Leadership Centre of Kings College, University of London in the United Kingdom (UK); and, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), the AUC; IGAD, the EU; as well as bilateral actors. Design of the Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism: A Development Approach project was further informed by wider UNDP-led experts meeting in Cameroon that examined the crises in Central Africa including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Northern Cameroon and Nigeria, as well as the evolving policy terrain and series of related UN Resolutions.

UNDP is already leveraging its development expertise as part of its overall response to violent extremism, to address

structural drivers; to support communities in implementing de-radicalization initiatives; and to help ensure that former members of violent extremist organizations are socio-economically reintegrated, among many other critical areas. Under this project, activities, focusing on the development of national PVE strategies, reintegration; and strengthening religious institutions, for instance, have been initiated in eleven of the sixteen target countries. See overleaf for an overview for on-going PVE activities at the national level of target countries. Recognising the regional dimension of violent extremism and the need to have a coordinated regional approach, UNDP has also supported the development of an IGAD strategy, to which relevant national strategies are aligned with, and work to develop one for LCB has been initiated.

It has also, as above, through the *Journey to Extremism* study, made an important contribution to the global knowledge base, advancing improved understanding across policy and research institutions about the nature of violent extremism in Africa. The *Journey to Extremism* report was complemented by a sister publication, *Stories of Survivors of Violent Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa*.<sup>18</sup> It is UNDP's intention that by generating better understanding of the factors that shape the incentive structure of individuals drawn into violent extremism in Africa, as well as its consequences, it will contribute to the emergence of a more effective set of interventions that better respond to, and help to transform, the current vulnerability faced.

## PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH ON-GOING NATIONAL ACTIVITIES 2016 - 2017



The boundaries and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

### CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

UNDP has initiated national discussions to develop national PVE strategy in CAR. Once finalised, UNDP intends to support the implementation of that strategy.

### MOROCCO

In collaboration with the Moroccan Government, and after a successful project targeting inmates' social reintegration, UNDP is currently developing new activities supporting the promotion of tolerance targeting youth and adolescents to manage frustrations and reinforce social cohesion

### SENEGAL

Through a national consultative process UNDP is developing a tailored intervention in Senegal as an "at-risk" country.

### SUDAN

In close collaboration with government and civil society UNDP interventions in Sudan focuses on facilitating disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration to counter re-occurrence and 'off-ramping' to prevent recruitment and radicalization. UNDP also supports continuation of in-depth research, strategic communications and advocacy, as well as gender and youth as its PVE programme pillars

### TANZANIA

As part of its integrated programming in Tanzania, UNDP is currently supporting the development of toolkits and curriculum for madrasa and mosques which is currently being piloted in Zanzibar and Tanga region. UNDP is also supporting the development of a national strategy on PVE.

### UGANDA

As part of its "at-risk" country strategy UNDP is supporting the development of a National PVE strategy that will subsequently inform its programming in Uganda.

### LIBYA

UNDP is in the process of initiating conversations with relevant stakeholders to develop a national PVE strategy.

### MALI

UNDP, in collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, provided technical support to develop the country's national PVE strategy. UNDP is currently in dialogue with the Government and partners to agree on how best to operationalise the national strategy.

### NIGERIA

UNDP is currently providing technical support in ensuring an inclusive and comprehensive Action Plan, aimed at ensuring implementation of the National PVE Strategy. UNDP has also finalised the development of a Project focusing on strengthening Government capacities to PVE; increasing livelihood opportunities for "at-risk" youth; enhancing community resilience to violent extremism; and widening its successful primary research initiative as part of UNDP's continental database on journey to extremism.

### SOMALIA

UNDP's PVE work in Somalia includes building Government capacities to implement national PVE strategy and to pilot a successful method for P/CVE intervention at the sub-national level and one that can be replicated and customized. UNDP is currently i) developing good practices on reintegration in the country; ii) supporting the provision of trainings to police and judicial officers; iii) establishing law clinics; and iv) providing training of religious and traditional leaders in the justice system.

### CAMEROON

UNDP's current activities include i) training of religious leaders, school teachers on curricula, peace building, tolerance and rule of law; ii) enhancing youth engagement and inclusion; and iii) addressing livelihood opportunities and skills training for youth.

### CHAD

UNDP, together with the G5 Sahel National Coordination Cell have completed National Conversations on PVE which came up with priority areas for the multi-year national programme as well as a National Strategy on PVE, all aligned to the Regional Programme and the UNISS.

### KENYA

UNDP's PVE work in Kenya focuses on addressing the immediate and underlying causes of radicalisation and violent extremism by supporting and complementing development-led pathways at national and county levels to promote alternative livelihood, challenges of public service delivery and endemic marginalization and poverty.

### MAURITANIA

UNDP is finalising a detailed research initiative on drivers of Violent Extremism in Mauritania that will inform its interventions.

### NIGER

UNDP is supporting the develop national PVE strategy in Niger. The national strategy will inform future programming in the country.

### TUNISIA

UNDP's PVE interventions in Tunisia focuses on two key areas; i) providing institutional support to establish effective mechanisms throughout the whole government to respond to the growth of Violent Extremism and enhance government coordination in this area; and ii) to strengthen the involvement of civil society and local stakeholders in the PVE agenda via evidence-based and locally tailored approaches and community policing.

**BURKINA FASO** and **ETHIOPIA** added as target countries on March 2018, after approval from the Board

# Programme Strategy: Prevent and Respond to Violent Extremism

3

## 3.1 Project strategy overview

This project is an on-going six-year multi-country and regional engagement designed to address the immediate and underlying factors that foster the growth of violent extremism. It leverages UNDP's expertise and capacities to address root causes of violent extremism, such as weak governance, under-development and marginalisation. It is anchored in a human security approach, which builds a conceptual link between human security and development i.e. 'a people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented response'.<sup>19</sup> The engagement is being implemented in partnership with national governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, bilateral donors, civil society organizations, media groups, faith-based groups and community representatives. The project strategy is informed by a theoretical framework, guidelines concerning particular engagements according to country categories, three different 'modes' of intervention, and eight intervention areas. The policy and programmatic responses are in addition informed by what is currently the largest set of primary data on the drivers and incentives for recruitment in Africa, as expressed by the recruits themselves. In each of the intervention areas, a mix of prevention-oriented and response-oriented activities will be implemented, depending on the nature of the issue being addressed. All interventions are thoroughly informed by the country context, as well as by international, regional and local policy, research and best practices.

## 3.2 Theoretical framework

The strategy is guided by a theoretical framework that informs the overall intervention and each of the result areas (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). On the basis of this theoretical framework all interventions will involve and address individuals, institutions and ideology to different degrees.

Some interventions will focus more predominantly on ideology, with a focus on 'meso' level (or group-level) interventions. This involves looking at how extremist narratives are being propagated, who they are targeting

and assessing the impact and potential for radicalization processes to begin. These engagements are designed to understand processes of manipulation and coercion, through engagement with formal and informal channels of communication (virtual and real) and with a view to intercept, counter and manage the impacts of ideologies designed to inspire acts of violence, especially amongst vulnerable populations. Interventions focused on ideology may seek to engage in inter- and intra-faith activities as a way to expose doctrinal fallacies and areas where religion is being manipulated to serve political ends and to justify violence.

Other interventions include aspects of response to ideologies, but will be focused more specifically on institutions, both formal and informal, thereby focusing on 'macro' (or societal) level dynamics. These engagements are designed to address areas where the weakness or absence of certain institutions facilitates the growth of violent extremism, with a view to strengthening their resilience. State institutions in this regard are particularly important: assisting governments to design and implement comprehensive and inclusive development-based responses to violent extremism – including enhancing effective governance in 'at risk' areas – is a major emphasis.

FIGURE 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK





FIGURE 3 PROGRAMME STRATEGY, RESPONSE AND ACTIVITIES

## Prevention and Response: Violent Extremism in Africa





Furthermore, state institutions such as prisons, which have become significant radicalization and recruitment locations, are a particular area of focus. The manner in which security agencies, and law enforcement and military specifically, respond to extremism is a critical component in the radicalization process that needs to be addressed, as underscored by the *Journey to Extremism* study. Other state institutions such as government schools, intelligence apparatus, political parties and parliaments also have vital roles to play and form an integral part of the programme strategy. However, the project also recognises that informal, quasi-formal and non-state institutions are equally important. Businesses, religious institutions, non-governmental organizations, elders, civil society organizations, social clubs and traditional community structures can all be engaged to prevent, hinder or stall radicalization processes. By strengthening both formal and informal institutions, interventions will strengthen state-society relations and ensure approaches are both holistic and inclusive.

Whilst addressing ideology and institutions is vital, interventions must also focus on key individuals in order to increase their chances of successfully reducing and addressing the growth of violent extremism. Certain individuals – and groups of individuals serve as facilitators, catalysts and active ‘agents’ of violent extremism. Others may be victims susceptible to recruitment, or providing the social network around such individuals. Interventions that target individuals are tailored to ensure that they prevent and hinder the growth of violent extremism.


### 3.3 Project approach

As an integral part of the UNDP Regional Programme for Africa, this project is informed by a) a rights-based approach, with particular attention to regional initiatives that benefit women, youth and other marginalised groups; (b) a sustainable human development approach and emphasis on capacity-development; and, (c) a collaborative stance which seeks to leverage, complement and build upon the work of other actors in this space.


#### Country-level engagement categories

Based on the current outlook for violent extremist expansion on the continent, three key clusters of countries form the focus of this engagement.


**‘Epicentre’** countries: Countries defined as being at the epicentre of the growth of violent extremism are those countries where violent extremist groups are already present and enacting regular attacks against innocent populations. Such groups are well-entrenched in these countries with significant sources of funding, expansive networks of recruiters, and relatively effective recruitment strategies. In such countries, this project places an equal focus on prevention and response. Engagements in epicentre countries will focus on Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia.



**‘Spill-over’** countries: Spill-over countries suffer from the effects of the presence and operations of violent extremist groups from a neighbouring country. As such, they experience regular violent attacks (such as gun-attacks, cattle raids, and land-razing) and experience the effects of increased numbers of refugees whose presence can feed into pre-existing tensions and conflicts. Poorly-managed borders and the increasingly blurred lines between trans-national networks of crime, armed groups and violent extremist groups further compound the dynamics of violent extremism. In such countries, the emphasis is on prevention, with many additional activities related to delivering an effective response to the problem. Engagements in spill-over countries will focus on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia.



**‘At-risk’** countries: Countries at risk of violent extremism exhibit some of the same socio-economic and governance-related factors as epicentre and spill-over countries, but have no violent extremist groups actively present in the country. However, some at-risk countries have small populations exhibiting some signs of radicalization and isolated attacks or incidents. Such countries are at risk due to national contextual factors, but also as a result of porous borders and the activities of trans-national criminal networks, and other ongoing crises and conflicts. In such countries, the focus is solely on prevention-related activities. Engagements in at-risk countries will focus on CAR, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.<sup>20</sup>



### 3.4 ‘Modes’ of intervention

This project will be implemented through three major modalities that will focus on country support; regional engagements and a policy, research and advocacy strategy; the first two represent levels of engagement, and the third is a cross-cutting strategy that will occur at regional level, and will benefit countries at the national level.

**Country support:** Support will be provided to all target countries through UNDP Country Offices – with activities currently underway in eleven of the sixteen target countries. Project interventions are tailored to local context and implemented at the national level by UNDP Country Offices and national partners.

**Regional engagement:** UNDP’s Regional Service Centre in Addis Ababa has begun to provide support to AU, IGAD and ECOWAS. Specifically, these entities are to be supported to develop joint and harmonised strategies on preventing and addressing violent extremism in the region, thereby enhancing inter-State cooperation on this issue. Lastly,

efforts will be undertaken to support existing joint platforms to ensure that on-going security-based discussions on how to address violent extremism are combined with development-based responses and discussions.

**Policy, research and advocacy:** There remain significant gaps in research, advocacy and policy. As has already begun with the ground-breaking *Journey to Extremism* report, the project will invest in research, coordination of research and enhance the distribution and dissemination of research and policy work to influence regional and national policy initiatives on responding to violent extremism. This will be done in close collaboration with the IGAD Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Terrorism in Djibouti.

### 3.5 Partnerships

This project builds on and seeks to complement the work of a wide range of other actors working in this space. More specifically, UNDP is committed to engaging such actors not simply as implementers but as active participants in the design and tailoring of the project, to ensure rigour, ownership and results. This will also help ensure a continuous process of cross-fertilisation and adaptation between our project and those of our partners. Below is a sample of the actors and initiatives with which this project has been designed to integrate:

**UN System:** This work builds on and advances the implementation of the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Furthermore, it leverages the knowledge and expertise of the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). The CTITF has led the development of the Southern African strategy on counter-terrorism and helped a number of countries to development national strategies.

**Regional and sub-regional organizations:** UNDP is building on its strong relationships with regional and sub-regional organizations across the African continent to help ensure coherence and complementary of programming in this area. Specifically, the project works with the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, and the IGAD Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti. Beyond the African continent, UNDP intends to work closely with the EU, amongst others.

**Bilateral actors/member states:** This project envisages collaboration with a wide range of member states who are already working extensively on issues related to violent extremism including Australia the UK, the US, etc.

**Civil society:** Partnerships and collaboration with civil society actors in all target countries is a critical modus operandi for this work. Collaboration with media outlets will be instrumental, including partnerships with Al-Jazeera, BBC, France 24, and regional and local media outlets. Religious entities also form a highly strategic partner in this project.

**Academia and think-tanks:** UNDP is already working with the Institute for Security Studies (Ethiopia), the University of Lancaster (UK), and Kings College, London. UNDP will expand partnerships with academia including those in Africa. African universities will be leveraged as important impartial platforms for bringing together diverse groups of young people to dialogue on sensitive issues.

### 3.6 Outputs and activities



#### Output 1 - National PVE coordination and capacity:

**Target countries have strengthened capacities to develop, coordinate and implement national strategies on PVE .**

Many countries that form part of this project lack the national PVE coordination structures or a coherent strategy, such as is required to effectively address the challenges posed by violent extremism. This output will therefore ensure that governments have the necessary structural framework and an accompanying national strategy, tailored to specific dynamics at the national levels, to prevent and respond to violent extremism. The national strategies developed will be used as models and best practices for the creation of consultative national strategies will be shared amongst the target countries.

In addition, the output will support governments to build the capacities required to effectively implement their national strategies. Noting the Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism position that a coherent architecture is essential for tackling threats posed by violent extremism and recognising that challenges to preventing and transforming threats posed by violent extremism are often amplified by the failure to develop regional wide approaches, this output will ensure that a coordinated approach is established, including coordination between and linking of regional and national strategies.

**Activity result 1.1 Targets countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have a national policy framework for preventing and responding to violent extremism in place. Governments will be supported put in place national strategies and legislation for preventing and responding to violent extremism. This activity will further facilitate the development of a PVE implementation strategy. Those with robust frameworks already in place will be assisted with the implementation of the strategies and legislation. These efforts will ensure that governments have robust frameworks for approaching the issue in a collaborative and coordinated manner. An informal cross-sector advisory group will be established**

to provide support to governments to address violent extremism; the group - established in select countries where there is political will - will advise decision-makers at the highest level of government on appropriate strategies, policies and responses, ensuring such responses are informed by the latest thinking and best practices on preventing and responding to violent extremism. This advisory group can also serve as an avenue for civil society to be able to share their views with decision-makers. To date, this project has allowed UNDP to initiate development of national PVE strategies in Chad, Tanzania and Uganda.

**Activity result 1.2 Target countries have national capacity for coordination and implementation of their national PVE strategies. Support will be provided to governments and other stakeholders to build capacities to effectively implement their national strategies. To ensure national and regional coordination, there will be a significant role for regional organizations in the development of national strategies so that regional standards influence national work across the continent.**



#### Output 2 - Rule of law and security:

**National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.**

Countries suffering from the growth of violent extremism often have rule of law systems ill-equipped to deal with this rising phenomenon or have failed to effectively implement the laws that are in place. Due to the non-conventional way extremists engage in violence, many states respond by going above the law. Such actions however easily feed into the narrative of extremists and exacerbate the perception amongst certain communities that they are treated unjustly by the state. Militarized responses to violent extremism, when conducted insensitively, therefore only serve to deepen long-standing mistrust and alienation, with governments' CT strategies often explicitly identified as a source of grievance. UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism in Africa* research unequivocally underscores this paradox

as it is playing out today in Africa. Moreover, due to the weaknesses of the criminal justice system and low awareness of the growth of extremism processes amongst prison officials, prisons are increasingly becoming a location for recruitment by violent extremist groups.

**Activity result 2.1 Criminal justice system in all countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) supported to deal with radicalization and violent extremism. This activity will help build the capacity of actors in the criminal justice chain – including police, investigators, detectives, instructors, judges, prosecutors etc – to deal with cases related to violent extremism and radicalization, through training, support and other programmes. It is vital that the whole criminal justice system works in tandem, so efforts will also be made to strengthen relationships between the police and judiciary. Support will also be provided to ensure those participating in criminal cases with individuals accused of involvement in violent extremism, including judges, witnesses and victims, are given adequate protection to prevent them from being targeted by extremist groups. De-radicalization programmes will also be developed and implemented in prisons, with significant attention paid to issues of gender.**

**Activity result 2.2 Build trust and confidence between law enforcement and communities in all target countries. Capacity-building will be provided to police on how to engage with communities, including through the adaptation of tools from the Police Training Facilities and review of police rules of engagement with the public. With a view to improving the relationships – and levels of trust – between police forces and communities and, therefore, to enhance the effectiveness of prevention and response, a series of crisis simulations will be developed to improve how local government, police and communities work together and respond following a crisis or attack; this will lead to the development of coherent operational response procedures. To further achieve this objective, community safety and neighbourhood policing plans will be developed between local government, police and communities.**

**Activity result 2.3 Dedicated training of security sector on human rights and rule of law. The Journey to Extremism research finding that state security-actor conduct is a prominent accelerator of recruitment suggest that a dramatic reappraisal of state security-**



focused interventions is urgently required, including more effective oversight of human rights compliance, rule of law and state accountability. In response to the finding, this activity will support the provision of trainings to the security sector on of human rights compliance, rule of law, citizens' participation and protection, and accountability of state security forces.

**Activity result 2.4 National human rights commissions supported to monitor the activities of the security side in responding to violent extremism and radicalisation.** To encourage a system of accountability, and in partnership with OHCHR, national and human rights commissions and chapters will be supported to monitor the activities of the security side in responding to violent extremism.




### Output 3 - Disengagement and reintegration:

**Members of extremist groups are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.**

Disengagement from violent extremist groups is a complex, delicate and multi-faceted process that requires careful planning and support, and is one of the first steps of an effective de-radicalization process. Those who wish to disengage often fear the dual consequence of being targeted by the police and military forces in their national home on the one hand, and of being targeted and possibly executed from the group they desire to leave on the other. These dynamics often prevent young people from leaving such groups, a situation which is sustaining and helping violent extremism to grow. However, the regret for having ever joined was expressed by a majority of interviewees in UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* research sample (see Figure 4). As a policy response, and in line with the New Way of Working (NWoW) through close collaboration with UNCT (especially around the Lake Chad Basin area), this activity will support creation of opportunities to disengage, including scaling-up amnesty and other exit opportunities for disillusioned recruits, investing in comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration services. This also means creating the right legislative framework, fostering clear

political commitment and building trust with those who wish to disengage while at the same time, ensuring that disengagement opportunities, amnesty and reintegration arrangements abide by international norms and standards.

FIGURE 4 'LOOKING BACK, WHAT CHANGES WOULD YOU WANT TO MAKE?' VOLUNTARY GROUP BY STATUS IN ORGANIZATION



**Activity result 3.1 Support to transitional/rehabilitation centres at national levels in epicentre and spill-over countries.** Pre-existing local and national transitional and rehabilitation centres will be provided with support to effectively rehabilitate those disengaging from extremist groups, including inputs on transitional justice mechanisms where relevant. Engagements of this nature will be tailored to the country context and the dynamics of rehabilitation of the country at hand. This intervention will ensure that such centres are equipped with effective de-radicalization strategies and curricula and informed by best practices. Through these centres, at-risk individuals will be provided with psycho-social support to prevent them being radicalized and/or to facilitate their reintegration. This part of the intervention will involve the development of curriculum for mentoring and Training of Trainers programmes and advice on appropriate livelihoods/employment opportunities – all under the supervision of national entities. This activity will leverage expertise from the IGAD Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in

Djibouti. So far, UNDP Sudan has initiated facilitating disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of former recruits to violent extremist groups in the country.

**Activity result 3.2 Community sensitization programmes developed to ensure stigmatization of disengaged members is lowered and communities are more ready to accept them.** In hot-spot areas, communities will be engaged in a series of dialogue processes and sensitization programmes to lower tensions and help ensure that those disengaging from violent extremist groups and their families are able to successfully reintegrate into their communities without stigma and discrimination.



### Output 4 - Socio-economic factors:

**At-risk youth and vulnerable populations in hot-spot areas have improved socio-economic opportunities.**

The UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* research underscores the relevance of economic factors as drivers of recruitment in Africa, as above. Employment, for instance, was the single most cited 'immediate need' faced at the time of joining. This is a key dimension of individuals' vulnerability to narratives that invite them to channel such grievances and associated desperation into the cause of extremism, especially when such factors are combined with poor governance and the absence of even basic service delivery. Youth are increasingly vulnerable as a result of low standards of education, which are failing to equip them for the competitive job market and making them easy targets for radicalization processes. Indeed, the nexus between literacy, numeracy and the growth of radicalization has been observed in many areas across sub-Saharan Africa, including in the Sahel, North-east Nigeria, North Cameroon, North-East Kenya and Somalia.


UNDP and many other actors are already actively working in this area to improve job opportunities, youth entrepreneurship programmes, skills-building activities, and levels of education etc., with a view to

lowering unemployment rates and improving livelihood opportunities. The problem is that such programmes are not currently targeted/tailored specifically towards those at risk and/or already engaged in the activities of violent extremist groups. Activities in this area will leverage existing programmes to ensure they are targeting vulnerable groups, especially in ungoverned spaces where such populations are particularly at risk. Where such interventions do not yet exist, this programme will help design interventions that fill in the gaps.

**Activity result 4.1 Detailed assessment of programming 'landscape' in key countries related to youth, skills-building, employment and livelihoods in target countries produced.** UNDP will conduct an analysis of all the programming related to employment and livelihoods currently being implemented by the UN, regional actors, NGOs, the private sector and others, as appropriate, exploring their relevance in real terms to reducing violent extremism. This mapping will also enable UNDP to identify its own programming needs to be adapted, tailored and/or better targeted to those at risk of radicalization processes on the one hand, and the ability to advise and support other actors to do the same on the other. Using the framework developed by UNDP as part of its partnership with the Government of the Netherlands (see Figure 5), this activity will encourage a cost-effective way to embed PVE specific and relevant programming into broader development programming while also addressing vulnerable populations in key 'hot spots' such as border areas and refugee camps. In target countries, UNDP will work with development partners and UN agencies to ensure that all development work is PVE relevant while minimising the temptation to repackage mainstream development as PVE.

**Activity result 4.2 New programmes created in areas where gaps are identified in all target countries.** Where gaps in employment and livelihoods programming do exist, new interventions will be designed that include skills-building, entrepreneurship, employment and other livelihoods opportunities targeting at-risk youth and other vulnerable populations in hot-spot areas. Efforts will also be made – where necessary – through mentorship and leadership initiatives to foster a sense of purpose and cohesion.

FIGURE 5 FRAMEWORK FOR CLARIFYING RELEVANCE OF ODA TO PVE



### Output 5 - Public awareness, dialogue and counter-narrative:

**The public (especially youth and communities) are enabled to counter violent narratives and extremist propaganda.**


Today's youth have grown up on-line with easy access to information and social media networks. The use of the Internet to disseminate violent imagery and to engage with vulnerable populations is well-documented. Social network platforms are being used to create networks that sustain the activities of such groups and to spread hateful ideologies and instigate violence. Mainstream media may have helped compound the problem by paying too much attention to violent extremists' 'sophisticated' use of social media, often airing their graphic promotional materials. In the case of Africa however, the journey to extremism appears to rely significantly less heavily than in other regions on the Internet as a venue for recruitment (See Figure 6).

Instead, UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* research suggests counter-messaging programmes must be contextualized in vernacular cultures, emphasize peer-group factors and influences and delivered through DVDs, SMS, radio and community centres, avoiding over-reliance on the Internet and drawing on trusted local organizations as 'messengers'.

**Activity Result 5.1 Ex-combatants are given a voice to speak out to deter others from joining.** Disengaged members can play a crucial part of the broader puzzle of decreasing the growth of violent extremism. They can provide vital sources of intelligence and serve as powerful messengers about the reality of life on the 'front-line' of such groups, which is often a marked departure from the narrative that convinced them to join. As *Journey to Extremism* research highlights, in Africa the messenger is just as important as the message itself. This activity will therefore take a localized approach to counter narratives by leveraging the perspectives and voices of former recruits as conduits for counter-messaging. This will include encouraging ex-combatants to speak to the populations at risk including in schools, universities and community centres, and through radio programmes, for example.

**Activity Result 5.2 Amplifying victim stories through national and local media to show the impact and devastation on ordinary people.** To increase public awareness around the destruction caused by violent extremism and to humanize its victims, the voices and stories of survivors and those impacted by violent extremism will be amplified through local media and other local means of communication. This activity will

FIGURE 6 FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE BY CATEGORY OF RESPONDENT AND COUNTRY OF INTERVIEW



also contribute to the strategies to deter recruitment. This activity builds on the UNDP's ongoing *Stories of Survivors* initiative, which is also part of this project. The aim of the initiative is to raise awareness of the human cost of violent extremism across the African continent with hopes that it will drive and inspire continued efforts to prevent it.

**Activity Result 5.3 Sponsor national and local debates to increase public awareness of challenges to preventing and responding to violent extremism.** To increase public awareness and stimulate public debate around the challenges posed by violent extremism, this activity will sponsor national and local debates on the topic. This will also give space for local communities to contribute to the discussions – moving the PVE conversation away from the security side and towards addressing the often localized drivers and incentives for joining violent extremist groups. UNDP will also leverage its Maendeleo Policy Forum platform to host debates and conversations.



### Output 6 - Community resilience:

**Communities and religious institutions have the capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism.**


Marginalized from political processes and suffering from the effects of under-development, poor service delivery and high levels of unemployment, many communities are extremely vulnerable to the activities and operations of violent extremist groups. UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* findings demonstrate that recruitment is ultimately a highly localized process, influenced though it may be by globalized ideas. Community peer groups (e.g. friends), as well as religious figures, play an important role in facilitating recruitment to violent extremism in Africa. Amongst the research sample, for instance, 50% were introduced to the organization by a friend; and another 17% were introduced by a religious figure (See Figure 7). Community level interventions therefore are vital to the response strategy. By empowering communities to be a vital part of the solution to the growth of violent extremism, this strategy will ensure communities are provided with the resources and support to serve as a life-line for those at-risk

of radicalization and those suffering from the consequences of radicalization. The strategy focuses on building the resilience of communities by engaging with key formal and informal institutions – such as the family unit and faith-based entities.

There is also consensus in much of the analysis of violent extremism that religion serves as a catalyst, often exploited by militant groups to legitimize the use of violence as a response to a wide array of grievances. While only a small fraction of individuals within pre-dominantly Muslim societies are mobilized by such narratives, ideological appeal is nonetheless compelling to those susceptible. UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* findings highlight the way in which dogma and indoctrination, rather than more in-depth religious study, influence susceptibility to recruitment within the sample, as summarised above.

FIGURE 7 'WHO INTRODUCED YOU TO THE ORGANIZATION?' VOLUNTARY GROUP

Multiple-answer question. Shows percent of individuals who selected the source of introduction.



**Activity result 6.1 Governance and capacities of mosques, madrassas and Imams integrated into the prevention/response initiatives.** Mosques, madrasa and Imam toolkits will be developed and adapted to the local context to ensure that they are effective standards to promote good governance, high standards of education/curriculum, training on effective governance, good leadership and safeguarding – all with a view to strengthening the resilience of religious institutions. Best practices under this activity will be



exchanged amongst target countries but they will be tailored to country contexts and cascaded through Training of Trainer programmes. The Piloting of this intervention is currently being implemented in Zanzibar and Tanga Region in Tanzania. Regional-wide incentive structures will be put in place to promote the development of resilient mosques and madrassas.

Part of this activity will also support the development of an Africa wide network of religious leaders from different sectors who will then, through a peer-to-peer mechanism, lead the provision of support for building capacity of religious institutions.

**Activity result 6.2 Inter and intra-religious tensions are lowered in targeted communities.** A series of inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues will be organised in key hot-spot areas to help lower tensions and raise awareness about radicalization processes. Where possible, traditional leaders will be leveraged to help reduce tensions and build inter-linkages within and between communities to strengthen resilience. In some contexts, this could involve setting up committees of wise-men/women.



### **Output 7 - Gender-specific engagements: Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.**

Radicalization and the dynamics of violent extremism affect men and women in different ways. Whilst young men appear to be more susceptible to joining such groups (as evidenced by the higher number of young men and boys), women serve as mothers, partners and friends of those radicalised and are increasingly being targeted and/or are choosing to serve as direct and indirect sources of support for these violent groups. There is evidence that women are being used increasingly for logistics, recruitment, political safeguarding, operations, suicide bombings and combat. Furthermore, women are vulnerable to being drugged, raped and physically or socially coerced to join such groups; once recruited, their conditions inside extremist groups leave them vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse. Lastly, just as young boys are highly susceptible to recruitment (there has been a dramatic increase in the

number of child soldiers being used by such groups), there is an alarming growth of gender-based violence justified on religious grounds, including targeted killings of women and girls.

While not explored in great detail in UNDP Africa's *Journey to Extremism* research due to access issues and females in the sample being associated with particular violent extremist groups and forms of recruitment (whether forced to join Boko Haram in Nigeria or, in a smaller number of cases, voluntary recruits to ISIL from Sudan), going forward, the project will further explore gender dynamics in relation to violent extremism in Africa, including as part of the country-specific analyses and with a dedicated thematic study.

However, recognizing that the spectrum of issues related to the different roles that women and girls can play in relation to violent extremism; the gendered impact of CT and PVE strategies; as well as the wider function of gendered ideologies that influence violent extremism, this project's engagement strategy will mainstream gender issues throughout all other activities. This strategy elaborates a gender-differentiated approach to the issue of violent extremism, thereby ensuring that the different drivers of radicalization amongst men and women, as well as the different needs are fully taken into consideration in such programming. It should be noted that gender issues are mainstreamed throughout all other activities in this project. This engagement strategy will focus on capacity-building, participation, protection and engagement.


**Activity result 7.1 Women and key individuals and groups are empowered to identify early signs of radicalization and capacitated to participate in initiatives at communities/national/regional level such as early-warning, regional and national strategy development/dialogues and community policing.** This will be undertaken with a culturally-sensitive and country-specific lens to enable women as well as key individuals and groups – such as community leaders, religious figures, youth representatives, businessmen/women and key women-leaders – identify and address the key signs of radicalization activities and processes. In addition, the development of close-knit neighbourhood watch associations/Peace and Security Committees that can prevent clandestine operations and serve as an early-warning network will

be supported.

The activity will also enable women and key individuals to become valuable players in the violent extremism paradigm from the household and community level. The activity will bring together local community representatives, women and police to help foster trust between them in order to create more effective prevention responses. Through a prevention lens, both women and men will be empowered through training, mentorship, effective dialogue skills and other forms of support to ensure effective dialogue and advocacy; through this activity young men and women will be identified as mentors and role models who can be engaged during capacity-building initiatives. Women will also be trained to serve as peer-to-peer supporters to assist other women at risk of recruitment or suffering from the impacts of violent extremism.

**Activity result 7.2 Psycho-social support is provided for families and victims in target countries.** As a curative measure, women and men whose spouses, family members or friends have joined violent extremist groups, will be provided with psycho-social support – including mentoring, counselling and peer-to-peer support. Support groups will be established where possible and desirable to suit the needs to specific groups. Support will also include capacity-building and guidance on the importance of reporting so as the affected individuals can better understand the judicial process and their rights.

**Activity result 7.3 Women and youth as agents of peace/ peace ambassadors.** At the regional level, women and youth will be trained and empowered to serve as agents of peace/peace ambassadors to bolster efforts to combat the growth of violent extremism. These individuals will be united at the regional level and provided with opportunities to network amongst themselves with a view to supporting one another's activities, while also being provided with training in capacity-building, mentoring and coaching – skills they will then pass onto others in their own communities (trainer of trainer approach).



### **Output 8 - Research, policy and advocacy: Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.**

While academic research on violent extremism does exist, it is not well-disseminated or actionable for policy-makers and practitioners and therefore does not get tailored and integrated into strategies and programming on the African continent. This is, in large part, due to the absence of networks that help link academics with policy-makers and practitioners, channels which could help direct research efforts to areas where vital gaps exist and where more research is needed.

Connecting academics with policy-makers and practitioners will solve part of the problem, in other areas more research on issues related to violent extremism in Africa will be required. Given the increasing threat posed by violent extremism and the upsurge in interest to find ways to prevent and respond to it, one of the risks is that there is a duplication of efforts, thereby undermining the efficacy of the response and wasting precious resources.

UNDP has already launched a USD100,000 per annum initiative dedicated to policy, research and advocacy and to encourage and support think-thanks and universities to do more research in this area. This research will complement work being undertaken by the UNDP Regional Service Centre, such as the *Journey to Extremism in Africa*, which charts not only the socio-economic family structure but also what compels an individual to reach the tipping point from radicalization to violence with a view to identifying potential entry-points for intervention. Current on-going UNDP research initiatives include the role of women in PVE and the economic cost of violent extremism in Africa. Partnerships will be established with key entities from in Africa, building on those already established with the Institute for Security Studies, the University of Lancaster and Kings College London.

**Activity results 8.1 Enhanced collaboration between African and international research and policy institutes.** This activity will facilitate the production of cutting-edge research and effective advocacy on de-radicalization and violent extremism in partnership with key think-tanks, policy institutes and academic institutions. Collaboration will focus on the exchange of best practices amongst experts, policy-makers, academics and practitioners.

**Activity result 8.2 Database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, created, regularly updated and available.** The database will serve as a key platform for bringing together existing research and initiatives on violent extremism, as well as researchers and practitioners. Information from the database will be made available on a request-basis and will serve the needs of policy-makers and practitioners working in this area. Support will be provided in this regard to the IGAD Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti.

**Activity result 8.3 Increased capacity at the regional level to monitor and disseminate information on preventing and responding to violent extremism.** A 2-3 persons unit will be formed to serve as a research team responsible for looking at regional and global trends on the growth of and responses to violent extremism. The team will be responsible for producing quarterly and annual reports and briefings for key partners and will be based at the IGAD Center of Excellence on Violent Extremism in Djibouti.



### *Output 9 - Regional level intervention:*

**Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.**

As previously underscored, a regional approach to the challenge of preventing and addressing the growth of violent extremism is imperative. The challenge does not

limit itself to national borders. Consequently, by supporting the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations and by facilitating active cooperation in planning, coordination and implementation of strategies related to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the above strategies in substantive areas are more likely to be effective.

**Activity result 9.1 Strategies of regional and sub-regional organizations for preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism updated or developed.** Support will be provided to regional and sub-regional organizations in order to help them develop and/or finalise their strategies on violent extremism, which will also be used to inform the development of relevant national legislation. All countries will be encouraged to coordinate their strategies with regional organizations and vice-versa. Most recently, through this project, UNDP supported the development of an IGAD Strategy on PVE and its national level activities with IGAD countries are aligned and coordinated with this regional strategy.

**Activity result 9.2 Responses to preventing and addressing violent extremism are effectively coordinated through increased shared information and planning.** UNDP will support the AUC and RECs to provide a convening platform in order to facilitate dialogue between regional, sub-regional and regional economic organizations. This initiative seeks to promote coordination and collaboration to enhance the effectiveness of responses and to address gaps in programming.

**Activity result 9.3 Support coordination and training capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations on countering violent extremism.** The AU, IGAD, ECOWAS and potentially other regional and sub-regional entities will be provided with ad hoc support to enhance research, coordination and training capacity. More specifically, UNDP will assist with the harmonising policy and strategies across the region and the development of a region-wide communications strategy on countering extremist propaganda and narratives.



FIGURE 8 PROJECT AREA OF ACTION

Outputs	Indicative Activities	Epicenter	Spillover	At-Risk	Partnerships				Regional level CSOs/ faith groups
		Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia	CAR, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda	AU	IGAD	ECOWAS	LCBC	
<b>Output 1 - National PVE coordination and capacity:</b> National PVE strategies and capacities are developed and linked to regional strategies.	1.1. Targets countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have national policy framework for preventing and responding to violent extremism in place.	●	●	●					
	1.2. Target countries have national capacity for coordination and implementation of their national PVE strategies.	●	●	●					
<b>Output 2 - Rule of law and security:</b> Criminal justice systems, human rights organisations and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.	2.1. Criminal justice system in all countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) supported to deal with radicalization and violent extremism.	●	●	●					
	2.2. Build trust and confidence between law enforcement and communities.	●	●	●					
	2.3. Dedicated training of security sector on human rights and rule of law.	●	●	●					
	2.4. National human rights commissions supported to monitor the activities of the security side in responding to violent extremism and radicalisation.	●	●	●					
<b>Output 3 - Disengage and reintegrate:</b> Members of extremist group are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.	3.1. Support to transitional/rehabilitation centres at national levels in epicentre and spill-over countries.	●	●						
	3.2. Community sensitization programmes developed to ensure stigmatization of disengaged members is lowered and communities are more ready to accept them.	●	●						
<b>Output 4 - Socio-economic:</b> At risk' youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas benefit from livelihood initiatives.	4.1. Detailed assessment of programming 'landscape' in key countries related to youth, skills-building, employment and livelihoods in epicenter, spillover and at-risk countries produced.	●	●	●					
	4.2. New programmes created in areas where gaps are identified in all target countries.	●	●	●					
<b>Output 5 - Public awareness, dialogue and counter-narrative:</b> Violent narratives and extremist propoganda are countered.	5.1. Ex-combatants are given a voice to speak out to deter others from joining.	●	●						●
	5.2. Amplifying victim stories through national and local media to show the impact and devastation on ordinary people.	●	●						●
	5.3. Sponsor national and local debates to increase public awareness of challenges to preventing and responding to violent extremism.	●	●						●
<b>Output 6 - Resilience of religious institutions to violent extremism:</b> Religious institutions have the capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism.	6.1. Governance and capacities of mosques, madrassas and Imams integrated into the prevention/response initiatives.	●	●	●					
	6.2. Inter and intra-religious tensions are lowered in targeted communities.	●	●	●					
<b>Output 7 - Gender-equality and women empowerment:</b> Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.	7.1. Women and key individuals and groups are empowered to identify early signs of radicalization and capacitated to participate in initiatives at communities/national/regional level such as early-warning, regional and national strategy development/dialogues and community policing.	●	●	●					
	7.2. Psycho-social support is provided for families and victims.	●	●						
	7.3. Women and youth as agents of peace/ peace ambassadors.								●
<b>Output 8 - Research, policy and advocacy:</b> Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.	8.1. Enhanced collaboration between African and international research and policy institutes.				●				●
	8.2. Database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, created, regularly updated and available.					●			
	8.3. Increased capacity at the regional level to monitor and disseminate information on preventing and responding to violent extremism.				●	●	●	●	●
<b>Output 9 - Regional level intervention:</b> Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.	9.1. Strategies of regional and sub-regional organizations for preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism updated or developed.				●	●	●		
	9.2. Responses to preventing and addressing violent extremism are effectively coordinated through increased shared information and planning.				●	●	●	●	●
	9.3. Support coordination and training capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations on countering violent extremism.				●	●	●	●	●

## Results and Resource Framework: Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa A Regional and Multi-country Project

Intended outcome as stated in the Regional Programme 2014-2017 Results Resource Framework: Outcome 3: Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict (SP outcome 5); while this is linked to Outcome 3, it is cross-cutting  
Intended outcome as stated in the Regional Programme 2018-2021 Results Resource Framework: Outcome 1: African Union and RECs deliver on their mandate, especially cross-cutting issues related to resilience-building; Outcome 3: Regional institutions sustain peace and build resilience to crises and shocks

Outcome indicators as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:  
1.1.1 Percentage of people who experienced a dispute and had access to a formal or informal dispute mechanism, considered affordable and just (disaggregated by sex to the extent possible).  
1.1.2 Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology.  
3.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age.

Applicable Key Result Areas (from 2014-17 Strategic Plan): Sustainable development pathways; inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience building.  
Applicable Key Result Areas (from 2018-21 Strategic Plan): Build resilience to shocks and crisis (Strategic Plan Outcome3); Accelerate structural transformation for sustainable development (Strategic Plan Outcome2)

Partnership Strategy: at the regional level the project will work with Regional civil society, RECs, IGAD, ECOWAS, AU, Universities, global and regional Faith Associations. At the national level, the project will work with governments, faith associations, universities, civil society, think-tanks.

Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa.

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	PROGRAMME LINKAGES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
<p><b>Output 1: [National PVE coordination and capacity]</b></p> <p><b>National PVE strategies and capacities are developed and linked to regional strategies</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of countries with preventing and responding to violent extremism incorporated into national strategies</b></p> <p><i>Source: Country offices (COs)</i> <i>Baseline (2014): 0</i> <i>Milestone (2016): 3 (Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria)</i> <i>Target (2021): 18</i></p> <p><b>2. Number of countries with preventing and responding to violent extremism action plans available and budgeted</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs</i> <i>Baselines (2014):</i> <i>Available Action Plans: 0</i> <i>Budgeted Action Plans: 0</i></p> <p><i>Milestones (2017):</i> <i>Available Action Plans: 3</i> <i>Budgeted Action Plans: 3</i></p> <p><i>Target:</i> <i>Available Action Plans: 18</i> <i>Budgeted Action Plans: 18</i></p>		<p><b>1.1 Target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have national strategies on preventing and responding to violent extremism in place.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide support to governments to develop national strategies on preventing and responding to violent extremism.</li> <li>Support provided to governments to use strategies to inform and finalise national legislation related to preventing and responding to violent extremism.</li> <li>Support is provided to governments to ensure strategies are informed by and in line with regional strategies</li> <li>Training programmes provided to different line ministries, police forces, civil society representatives, etc. on the different components of the strategy.</li> <li>Informal, cross-sector advisory group established to provide support to the President/Prime Minister on addressing violent extremism (in epicentre and spill-over countries).</li> </ul> <p><b>1.2 Target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have national capacity for coordination and implementation of their national PVE strategies.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide support to governments and relevant stakeholders to build capacity to implement national strategies</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 2: National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.</b></p> <p><b>Output 8: To ensure that national governments are cooperating at the regional level.</b></p>		12,300,000



<p><b>Output 2: [Rule of law and security]</b></p> <p><b>Criminal justice systems, human rights organizations and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p>1. <b>Percentage of trainees in the criminal justice system with a score of at least 75% in post training assessment provided by project</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs and training providers</i> <i>Baseline: 0%</i> <i>Targets: 80%</i></p> <p>2. <b>Number of reported human rights abuse incidents concerning misconduct by security forces</b></p> <p><i>Source: NHRIs, COs</i> <i>Baseline: TBD<sup>i</sup></i> <i>Targets: TBD</i></p> <p>3. <b>Number of recommendations from national human rights organizations acted upon by the government</b></p> <p><i>Source: NHRIs, COS</i> <i>Baseline: TBD<sup>ii</sup></i> <i>Targets: TBD</i></p> <p>4. <b>Number of monitoring reports related to preventing and violent extremism produced by national human rights organizations</b></p> <p><i>Source: NHRIs, COs</i> <i>Baseline: TBD<sup>iii</sup></i> <i>Targets: TBD</i></p>	<p><b>2.1 Criminal justice systems in all countries (epicentre, spill-over and at-risk) supported to deal with radicalisation and violent extremism.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Training programmes designed and implemented for police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers etc. on investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases and adapted to local context.</li> <li>▪ Support the development and implementation of protection schemes for personnel dealing with sensitive cases.</li> <li>▪ Gender-sensitive de-radicalisation programmes developed and implemented in prisons.</li> </ul> <p><b>2.2 Build trust and confidence between law enforcement and communities.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support provided to police to improve engagement with communities at the local level including local accountability and strengthening partnerships with all sections of communities including women, youth and children.</li> <li>▪ Series of crisis simulations developed to improve coordination and collaboration between local government, police and communities to work together following crisis/attack.</li> <li>▪ Development of community safety and neighbourhood policing plans on preventing and responding to violent extremism.</li> </ul> <p><b>2.3 Dedicated training of security sector on human rights and rule of law.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support the provision of trainings to law enforcement in target countries on due process and sensitivity trainings aimed at building trust with community.</li> </ul> <p><b>2.4 National human rights organisations supported to monitor the activities of the security side in responding to violent extremism and radicalisation.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National/local chapters of human rights groups are supported to build capacity to monitor activities of the security forces, including through the provision of trainings in reporting and access to communications outlets.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 5: To ensure that community safety and neighbourhood policing plans complement early-warning strategies and engage consistently with religious institutions.</b></p>	<p>UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), IGAD, ECOWAS, AUC.</p>	<p>9,000,000</p>
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<sup>i</sup>In early 2017 a mapping exercise of monitoring reports will take place, based on which the baselines and targets will be determined

<sup>ii</sup>Ibid

<sup>iii</sup>Ibid

<p><b>Output 3: [Disengage and reintegrate]</b></p> <p><b>Members of extremist groups are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. % of disengaged members of extremist members supported by the project who haven't re-joined violent extremist group 6 months after leaving a rehabilitation center.</b></p> <p><i>Source: Centers and COs</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Targets: 60%</i></p>	<p><b>3.1 Support to transitional/ rehabilitation centres at national levels in epicentre and spill-over countries</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Technical and advisory support provided to the local transitional/rehabilitation centres to effectively re-habilitate those disengaging from extremist groups, including advice and guidance on transitional justice mechanisms</li> <li>▪ Rehabilitation centres equipped with de-radicalization curriculums.</li> <li>▪ Disengaging and 'at-risk' individuals are provided with adequate psycho-social support to prevent them being radicalized and/or facilitate their reintegration</li> <li>▪ Development of curriculum for mentoring and establishment of case monitoring system.</li> <li>▪ Identify appropriate mentors. TOT for individuals in community who are providing mentoring.</li> <li>▪ Mentoring partnerships undertaken with religious institutions and communities.</li> </ul> <p><b>3.2 Community sensitization programmes developed to ensure stigmatization of disengaged members is lowered and communities are more willing to accept them.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide support to "hot-spot" communities to engage them in dialogue processes to ease tension and help promote resolution.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 1: To ensure policies and practices on disengagement and reintegration are in line with national strategy and legislation.</b></p> <p><b>Output 4: To ensure disengaged are part of livelihoods opportunities.</b></p> <p><b>Output 5: To ensure public awareness programmes are harmonised through the media and technology component of the project</b></p>	<p>Local government, religious institutions, civil society organizations, police, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/ the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), where appropriate.</p>	<p>10,300,000</p>
<p><b>Output 4: [Socio-economic]</b></p> <p><b>At risk' youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas benefit from livelihood initiatives.</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of at-risk youth benefiting from livelihood initiatives supported by the project.</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs</i>  <i>Baseline (2014): 0</i>  <i>Target: to be increase two-fold from milestone in 2017<sup>iv</sup></i></p>	<p><b>4.1 Detailed overview of programming 'landscape' in key countries related to youth, skills-building, employment and livelihoods in epicentre, spill-over and 'at risk' countries produced.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mapping of UN system, regional, government and non-governmental organizations, private sector, work on entrepreneurship, youth and livelihoods programmes [epicentre; spill-over and 'at-risk' countries].</li> <li>▪ Desk-based research and interviews on current programming related to youth, livelihoods, entrepreneurship and skills.</li> <li>▪ Tailor, extend and/or re-orient programmes to target violent extremism 'hot-spots' and vulnerable groups, especially youth, women and young boys/girls, IDPs, minority tribes and clans, and those who are disengaging from extremist groups.</li> <li>▪ Provide technical advice and guidance to existing relevant programmes (UN and non-UN actors) to support them to tailor and adapt their programming to prevent and address violent extremism.</li> <li>▪ Engage key actors in selected countries to coordinate strategies to help ensure maximum numbers of at-risk youth are targeted, and provide additional funding to reduce gaps in programming.</li> </ul> <p><b>4.2 New programmes created in areas where gaps are identified in target countries (epicentre; spill-over and 'at risk' countries).</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ New programmes designed with partners where gaps exist to target hot-spot areas for youth and vulnerable groups.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 3: On disengagement and reintegration to ensure livelihoods programming also targets youth who are disengaging from extremist groups; and to ensure that such populations are provided with counselling and mentoring.</b></p>	<p>UNICEF, ILO, AMSCO, Africa Skills Initiative, INGOs.</p>	<p>6,000,000</p>

<sup>iv</sup> Milestone for 2017 to be confirmed in early 2018



<p><b>Output 5: [Public awareness, dialogue and counter-narratives]</b></p> <p><b>Violent narratives and extremist propaganda are countered.</b></p> <p><b>Indicator:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of people reached through public awareness programmes including debates and survivor stories supported/created by this project</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs and partnering institutions/responsible parties</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Target: 35 million</i></p>		<p><b>5.1 Ex-combatants are given a voice to speak out to deter others from joining.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Invite disengaged members to speak to at-risk youth in schools, community centres, universities, etc.</li> <li>▪ Develop short documentaries and radio programmes on stories as told by disengaged members</li> <li>▪ Show documentaries in targeted engagements in schools, universities, religious centres, public events.</li> </ul> <p><b>5.2 Amplifying victim stories through national and local media to show the impact and devastation on ordinary people.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop short documentaries and radio programmes on stories of survivors, impact of terrorism on communities and livelihoods, the reality of the ‘front line’ as told by disengaged members, etc.</li> <li>▪ Show documentaries in targeted engagements in schools, universities, religious centres, public events.</li> <li>▪ Engage international, regional and local media networks to disseminate documentaries and facilitate regional debates.</li> </ul> <p><b>5.3 Sponsor national and local debates to increase public awareness of challenges to preventing and responding to violent extremism.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Engage with regional, national and local media to sponsor public debates around the responses to violent extremism.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 3: Those disengaging from extremist groups can be documented in programmes.</b></p>	<p>Al-Jazeera, BBC, France 24, local TV and radio networks/stations and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Office to the African Union.</p>	<p>4,700,000</p>
<p><b>Output 6: [Resilience of religious institutions to violent extremism]</b></p> <p><b>Religious institutions have the capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of religious institutions/ members mobilized for prevention of violent extremism (through signing the PVE Religious Charter)</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs, IIPC (International Interfaith Peace Corps)</i>  <i>Baseline (2014): 0</i>  <i>Milestone (2017): 100</i>  <i>Target: 250</i></p> <p><b>2. Percentage of religious institutions that achieved at least a ‘bronze’ certification in the implementation of the toolkit.</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Target: 75%</i></p>		<p><b>6.1 Governance and capacities of religious institutions integrated into the prevention/response</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop toolkit for institutions such as mosques, madrasas, Imams, etc. on effective standards to promote good governance, curriculum development, training on effective governance, building resilience against violent extremism and radicalisation, developing effective leadership and safeguarding.</li> <li>▪ Toolkit tailored to suit country contexts and cascaded through TOT programmes throughout country.</li> <li>▪ Develop regional-wide incentive structures (bronze, silver and gold certification) to improve resilience institutions such as mosques, madrasas, churches, etc.</li> <li>▪ Support the development of region-wide network of institutions such as mosques and madrasas, etc. against violent extremism.</li> </ul> <p><b>6.2 Inter and intra-religious tensions are lowered in targeted communities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Roll out of a series of inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues in key hot-spots.</li> <li>▪ Identify and work with traditional leaders where possible, forming committee of the wise where constructive.</li> <li>▪ Identify and train key spokespersons for media engagements.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Output 2: As strong community and local policing partnerships will be key to ensure the success of an early-warning system and will also contribute towards strengthening cohesiveness in communities.</b></p> <p><b>Output 3: Ensure harmonization between this programme on community resilience and the programme on disengagement and reintegration.</b></p>	<p>Local civil society organizations, religious groups. Faith Associates. Ministry of religious affairs, Adams Centre, inter-religious community of Kenya, IGAD, ECOWAS.</p>	<p>8,400,000</p>

<p><b>Output 7: [Gender-equality and women empowerment]</b></p> <p><b>Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.</b></p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of women benefitting from initiatives supported or created by the project to prevent and respond to violent extremism</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs, partnering institutions</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Target: 2000</i></p> <p><b>2. Number of women/youth supported by the project to engage as peace ambassadors at regional and national levels.</b></p> <p><i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Target: 50</i></p>		<p><b>7.1 Women and key individuals and groups are empowered to identify early signs of radicalization and capacitated to participate in initiatives at communities/national/regional level such as early-warning, regional and national strategy development/dialogues and community policing.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identify and train key spokespersons for media engagements.</li> <li>▪ Training and mentoring for women to identify the signs of radicalization and to participate in security and early-warning initiatives. Training also provided to enable women to serve as mentors in peer-to-peer programmes in affected/hot-spot areas.</li> <li>▪ Community support networks for women will be formed to address isolation and identify signs of radicalization.</li> <li>▪ Support women leaders to engage in regional and national dialogues and initiatives on violent extremism</li> </ul> <p><b>7.2 Psycho-social support is provided for families and victims.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Women and men whose spouses, family members of friends have joined extremist groups are provided with psycho-social support.</li> </ul> <p><b>7.3 Women and youth as agents of peace/peace ambassadors.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop skills of women and youth leaders at the regional level in order to serve as mentors, coaches and ambassadors in their communities</li> </ul>	<p>Linkages will be made with all outputs</p>	<p>UN-Women</p>	<p>5,200,000</p>
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<p><b>Output 8: [Cross-cutting programme One]</b></p> <p>Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.</p> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of quality research products supported by the project and/or through partnerships with global research, policy and advocacy entities on violent extremism</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs, RSCA, Partnering/responsible institutions</i></p> <p><i>Baseline (2014): 0</i> <i>Milestone (2017): 9</i> <i>Target: 20</i></p> <p><b>2. Number of people accessing the database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism</b></p> <p><i>Source: Readership measuring/downloading rates, RSCA</i> <i>Baseline: 0</i> <i>Milestone (2017): 4 million</i> <i>Target: 4 million</i></p>		<p><b>8.1 Enhanced collaboration between African and international research and policy institutes.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ \$100,000 annual grant launched and calls for applications sent to universities, think-tanks and other institutions in Africa and internationally.</li> <li>▪ Conduct research on gaps related to our understanding of violent extremism.</li> <li>▪ Convene workshop/seminar of experts, policy-makers, academics, practitioners etc. to exchange insights and best practices on preventing and addressing violent extremism.</li> </ul> <p><b>8.2 Database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, created, regularly updated and available.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop database to collect and disseminate research on preventing and responding to violent extremism.</li> <li>▪ Make information contained in database available upon request.</li> </ul> <p><b>8.3 Increased capacity at the regional level to monitor and disseminate information on preventing and responding to violent extremism.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Expert 'research team' formed at the centre on violent extremism in Djibouti.</li> <li>▪ Team undertakes research on trends, best practices and insights, and disseminates knowledge.</li> <li>▪ Produce annual report and quarterly briefings for key partners.</li> </ul>	<p>Linkages will be made with all outputs</p>	<p>Institute for Security Studies, the University of Lancaster and Kings College London, Princeton university, Columbia university, University of Addis Ababa, University of Mogadishu, Kaduna University, Bamako University, University of Dakar, University of Uppsala, Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Center. Oslo Governance Center</p>	<p>3,300,000</p>
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<p><b>Output 9: [Cross-cutting programme Two].</b></p> <p>Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.</p> <p><b>Indicators</b></p> <p><b>1. Number of regional coordination frameworks established and functioning.</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs, RECs</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Milestone (2017): 1 (IGAD)</i>  <i>Target: 4</i></p> <p><b>2. Number of national strategies that are informed by and aligned to regional strategies</b></p> <p><i>Source: COs</i>  <i>Baseline: 0</i>  <i>Milestone (2017): 2 (Kenya, Somalia)</i>  <i>Target: 18</i></p>		<p><b>9.1 Strategies of regional and sub-regional organizations for preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism developed or updated.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support regional and sub-regional organizations to develop, finalise and harmonise strategies.</li> <li>▪ Develop regional coordination frameworks</li> <li>▪ Domestic regional strategies at the national level.</li> </ul> <p><b>9.2 Responses to preventing and addressing violent extremism are effectively coordinated through increased shared information and planning.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide a convening platform for regional and sub-regional economic organizations to convene, promote coordination and collaboration and to address gaps.</li> </ul> <p><b>9.3 Support coordination and training capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations on countering violent extremism.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Assist with the development of a regional wide communications strategy/toolkit on countering extremist propaganda.</li> <li>▪ Training of trainers provided to requesting regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance understanding of and approaches to violent extremism as required.</li> </ul>	<p>Linkages will be made with all outputs</p>		<p>6,800,000</p>
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# Monitoring and evaluation plan | 5

In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans. In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans.

## Monitoring Plan

Monitoring activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected action
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly, or in the frequency stated for each indicator in the RRF.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.
Monitor project implementation	Field mission should be conducted on a regular basis to monitor the implementation of the project. The monitoring mission should include direct meetings and discussions with the stakeholders, among which beneficiaries should be targeted primarily.	At least quarterly	Detailed field mission reports should be developed, including specific recommendations to improve the project implementation.
Monitor and manage risks	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Project management identifies risks and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.
Annual project quality assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Strengths and weaknesses will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.
Review and make course corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision-making.	Quarterly	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.
Project report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually and at the end of the project (final report)	
Project review (Project Board)	The Project Board will hold project reviews to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan for the following year. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling-up and to distribute project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	Recommended quarterly. Mandatory at least annually	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.

## Evaluation Plan

Evaluation Title	Related Strategic Plan Outcome	RPD Outcome	Planned Completion Date	Key Evaluation Stakeholders	Cost and Source of Funding
Project Mid-Term Evaluation	Outcome 5	Outcome 3	December 2019	AU, IGAD, host governments	USD 150,000
Project final evaluation	Outcome 5	Outcome 3	October 2021	AU, IGAD, host governments	USD 150,000

# Management arrangements 6

This Regional Project Document is derived from the Regional Programme Document (RPD) as approved by the UNDP Executive Board. As such, this project is subject to the regional programme's business processes and accountability framework. This Project was prepared under the leadership of the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) and the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) through a consultative process involving the AU, RECs, development partners (the EU, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and United States), civil society, including faith-based organizations from Africa and globally, as well as research and academic institutions. The management arrangements detailed below reflect the fact that the project cuts across two geographical regions: UNDP-Arab States and Africa.

## Project board

A project board will be established in line with the oversight and accountability frameworks established by UNDP's Executive Board for the efficient and effective implementation of this project. The board serves as a vital element of the project's strategic advisory mechanism to deliver on institutional effectiveness - especially on transparency and accountability underpinned by Results-Based Management (RBM) and timely reporting to the relevant UNDP corporate oversight bodies on development results.

Consistent with this, the Board is broad-based, drawing from the full range of project stakeholders, among them: the inter-governmental regional bodies including the AUC, ECOWAS, LCBC and IGAD, donor partners, civil society organizations (CSOs) and UNDP (Corporate, Regional Service Centre and Country Offices). This participatory approach and due regard for ownership builds upon the consultative process employed during the formulation of this Project which involved all of these stakeholders in design, development and review of the final project document.

In ensuring that the development results of the Project are achieved (and aligned to UNDP's Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and the Regional Programme), the overarching

responsibility of the Project Board is to assist the RSC Director to carry-out their broad oversight responsibilities, especially with regard to accountability, monitoring and evaluation, strategic forward planning, overall RBM, quality assurance and risk management requirements as a whole. The Board will have the following key functions:

- a. Provide strategic advice on current and emerging development issues (economic, political, social) which could be addressed by the Project to ensure that (i) policy, programme advisory and capacity development support is responsive to addressing the development solutions, priorities and emerging challenges to radicalization and violent extremism in Africa and (ii) the initiatives of this Project are linked to and draw upon those from Regional and Country Programmes, whenever appropriate;
- b. Approve the annual work-plan for the regional project;
- c. Review past year's annual report on achievements, challenges, lessons learned and innovations and eventually reports from mid-term reviews/evaluations, and provide strategic advice on corrective actions, future direction, substantive scope and focus of the Project.


The project technical implementation will be led by a project manager, supported by a project team working under the supervision of the Regional Governance and Peace-building Cluster Leader. These entities will work closely with corresponding clusters in the Arab Region, who will take the lead on providing technical support to all RBAS countries included in the project. He/she will be responsible for achieving the respective project outputs, which will also contribute to the overall Regional Programme Outcomes.

The Project contains a combination of direct implementation and national execution elements, which will depend on partnerships with government and administrative counterparts, as well as I/NGO implementation modalities. The Project will include initiatives at the Regional and Country Office level. The RSC will be the lead in coordination and facilitation and will also be administratively responsible for the implementation of the whole project in partnership with participating Country Offices. At the national level, the respective Country Offices will lead implementation.

## Programme assurance

The programme assurance role supports the Project Board by carrying out objective and independent programme oversight and monitoring functions. This role ensures appropriate project management milestones are managed and completed. Project assurance takes place independently of the Programme Manager; therefore, the project board cannot delegate any of its assurance responsibilities to the programme manager.

FIGURE 9 PROJECT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE†



†The Chairmanship of the Board will rotate between the UNDP Amman hub and the Addis hub.



# Risk and Mitigation Strategy 7

Monitoring risk is an integral part of the Project. Initial potential risks have been identified and mitigation strategies proposed. On a regular basis, risk will be monitored, reviewed and if necessary new risks will be added and further mitigation strategies developed. Key to effective mitigation measures is strong direct staff presence on the ground and strengthened engagement with the beneficiary communities.

FIGURE 10 **PROBLEM TREE ANALYSIS**

#	Description and date identified	Type	Probability & impact	Countermeasures / Management response	Status
<b>Risks</b>					
1	Security for staff and beneficiaries involved in the programme. Date identified: 5/9/15	Operational	P: Likely (4) I: Critical (5)	Project will adjust activities to changes in the security situation. Regular monitoring of security environment and consultations with UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and country level UNCT's Reduce exposure through low-profile approach in sensitive areas; training of partners on security and safety measures; adapt communication strategy and visibility to the security risks; increased implementation through Service Contractors and NGOs. Regular community security assessments and inclusive dialogue processes to reduce risks, and take early programme mitigation measures if required	
2	Neighbouring communities which are not directly at risk feel excluded from programme with adverse effects. Date identified: 5/9/15	Strategic	P: Moderate (3) I: Moderate (3)	Open, consultative programme planning and development approach with geographical areas selected on the basis of clear criteria. Close coordination with key counterparts in each region including local authorities and stakeholders on key programme elements. Continuous engagement and monitoring of perceptions at the community level. Community needs and selection criteria are jointly determined through local committees.	
3	Perception that disengaged members are being rewarded for their perceived participation in violent extremist groups. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Moderate (3) I: Critical (5)	Close coordination with key counterparts in each region including local authorities on key programme elements. Continuous engagement and monitoring of perceptions at the community level. Awareness raising and communication campaigns will be a core area under the project to mitigate risks (they are part of the project strategy). Case management systems will inform the project if and when problems are likely to arise	
4	Lack of political will to balance law and order response with justice and development programmes (i.e. continuation of security-dominant response). Date identified: 5/9/15	Political	P: Severe (4) I: Severe (4)	Political dialogue with government counterparts from the outset. Maintenance of respectful, collaborative approach and transparency. Regular human rights monitoring with clear 'red lines' articulated in project documents.	
5	Lack of will/levels of fear on the part of religious institutions and religious figures to participate in programme. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Unlikely (2) I: Severe (4)	Open consultative programme planning and development approach, close coordination with key interlocutors including Ministry of Religious Affairs; national and local religious councils, inclusion of religious representatives in Project Board.	
6	Individuals revert back to extremist behaviour as a result of stigmatisation and other factors. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Severe (4) I: Moderate (3)	Ensure that the mentors are following closely their mentees (put in place robust case management systems with follow up after the end of the programme); conduct tracer surveys; regular communications with stakeholders; monitor closely attendance of beneficiaries; close collaboration with communities and local governments	
7	Limited national capacities to implement the project Date identified: 5/9/15	Operational	P: Moderate (3) I: Moderate (3)	Training on policy development and security sector governance. Support the Government(s) to convey and chair coordination meetings at State, regional, and district level. Initiate a capacity-building strategy. Facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience. International technical specialists to back-stop partners.	
8	Inability to adequately fund the programme and/or increased costs. Date identified: 5/9/15	Financial	P: Moderate (3) I: Critical (4)	Strengthening of relationships with bilateral donor partners, involving timely reporting, Regular meetings and alignment of programme priorities with articulated donor interests.	

Consistent with Article III of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA), the responsibility for the safety and security of the Implementing Partner and its personnel and property and of UNDP's property in the Implementing Partner's custody, rests with the Implementing Partner. To this end, the Implementing Partner shall:

- a. Put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
- b. Assume all risks and liabilities related to the implementing partner's security and the full implementation of the security plan.

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the Implementing Partner's obligations under this Project Document.

The Implementing Partner agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via [http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml). This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under/further to this Project Document.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> UN Deputy Secretary-General's remarks at Ministerial Roundtable on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region.

<sup>2</sup> Kenya Tourist Board June 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/africaandindianocean/kenya/11669880/Kenya-visitor-numbers-fall-25-percent-as-terrorism-hits-tourism.html>

<sup>3</sup> World Investment Report, Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Radicalization in Africa, Some Initiatives', UNDP Meeting on Radicalization, July 2015, page 4.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8408>

<sup>7</sup> Saltman, Erin Marie and Smith, Melanie, 'Till martyrdom do us part', Gender and the ISIS phenomenon', Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/jihad-comes-kenya?page=show>

<sup>9</sup> International Crisis Group, (Africa Briefing No. 85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January 2012), page 10.

<sup>10</sup> See section on Partnerships for more information.

<sup>11</sup> S/RES/2178/2014

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51084#.VjsbINrLIU>

<sup>13</sup> Available at: <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/>. See also <http://www.dailyjournal.net/2017/09/07/un-united-nations-young-african-extremists/>; <http://news.trust.org/item/20170907154106-rm8s2/>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/african-governments-actions-push-people-into-extremism-study-finds>; <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41186033>

<sup>14</sup> The research is based on a detailed and structured questionnaire exploring the life histories and personal perspectives on a range of personal, cultural, socio-economic and political issues administered to 718 individuals consisting of 495 individuals who voluntarily joined violent extremist groups; 78 individuals who were recruited by force; and a reference group which consisted of 145 individuals with no affiliation to violent extremist groups. The majority of interviews conducted were with former members at different levels of rank in two of the continent's primary violent extremist groups, namely Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, as well as African recruits to ISIL. Interviews with individuals who joined other organizations, specifically Al-Mourabitoun, MUJAO as well as Al-Qaida were also included. The reference group served as a basis for comparison along the primary sample's journey to extremism, providing an opportunity to identify possible hypotheses distinguishing the perspectives and experiences of those who joined against those who did not, despite prevailing similarities of life circumstances.

<sup>15</sup> Political socialization describes the process by which an individual "learns political relevant attitudinal dispositions and behaviour patterns"

<sup>16</sup> UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Aloa (2015), page 24.

<sup>18</sup> See <http://survivors-of-extremism.undp.org>

<sup>19</sup> General Assembly Resolution, 2012. See <http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org/humansecurity/files/hsu%20documents/GA%20Resolutions.pdf>



<sup>20</sup> The case of CAR is relatively unique on the African continent; the conflict has religious dimensions and is already fundamentally destabilizing the country. The country is at-risk of morphing into violent extremism of the nature we are targeting more specifically in the context of this engagement.

**Following Page: Profile Infographic of key findings from Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the tipping point for recruitment.**



# JOURNEY TO EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

As might be undertaken by an individual most at risk of recruitment by a violent extremist group in Africa, based on the key evidence produced by the Journey to Extremism project.





*“We must strive to be moved by a generosity of spirit that will enable us to outgrow the hatred and conflicts of the past.”*

*Nelson Mandela*



*Residents of Mogadishu enjoy Lido beach, while police stand guard outside a restaurant. Somalia. UN photo / Tobin Jones*



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**United Nations Development Programme  
Regional Bureau for Africa  
Regional Bureau for Arab States**