

**GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA  
&  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
&  
Department for International Development (DFID)**



**RWANDA: “PROGRAMME FOR STRENGTHENING  
GOOD GOVERNANCE”**

**Brief Description**

This project aims at strengthening accountability and responsiveness of key state players for delivering the EDPRS objectives. It is also meant to **enhance effectiveness and capacities of key national institutions, mandated to promote state accountability and responsiveness**”.

The project is built around a shared agenda between the Government of Rwanda, DFID and UNDP giving weight to the need for good governance – **in particular in the development of a responsive and accountable state**, a state which enters into a social contract with its citizens, listens to citizens’ voice, allows itself to be held accountable for the way in which it develops its policies and delivers its services, and a state which protects and upholds the rights of all. The basic assumption is that good governance is central to the development process, and that it needs state capability, responsiveness and accountability as prerequisites.

The organisations to be supported are: the Parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the National Election Commission (in year one of the programme) and the High Council of the Press (years 2-4 of the programme).

UNDAF Outcome(s)/Indicator(s)<sup>1</sup>:

- o **Good Governance enhanced and sustained**
- o International perceptions of governance (10 to 25<sup>th</sup> percentile 2005 WB)
- o Number of laws initiated and drafted by MPs
- o Number of capacity building initiatives provided to NHRC
- o Number of Treaty Body Reports submitted on time
- o Number of Districts and Sectors with crisis prevention & coordination committees in place

Expected Outcomes (Linkage to UNDAF CP Outcome)

- o A peaceful state where freedoms and human rights are fully protected and respected
- o Effective, accountable and transparent management of public resources and services at national and decentralized levels, People's participation in democratic processes and structures at national and decentralized levels

Expected Output(s)/Annual Targets:

- o Provide Technical Assistance to Parliament commissions
- o Support to the establishment of the parliamentary radio
- o Capacity building for the Ombudsman Office staff
- o Conduct surveys/studies on Corruption
- o Sensitization and public involvement in fighting corruption
- o Media and Communication campaigns
- o Human Rights Promotion & Human Rights Protection
- o Institutional Capacity strengthening
- o Organize and facilitate training of civic groups and grassroots leaders in conflict management
- o Electoral Civic Education

**Executing Entity:** United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Implementing Entities:** Parliament, Office of the Ombudsman, the National Human Rights Commission, the National Unity Reconciliation Commission, the National Electoral Commission, and the High Council of the Press.

**Other Responsible Partners:** MINECOFIN, and DFID

Programme Period: <b>2007- 2010</b>
Programme Component: <b>Fostering Democratic Governance</b>
Project Title: <b>Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Good Governance</b>
Project ID: <b>TBC</b>
Management Arrangement: <b>NEX</b>

Total Budget: <b>USD 10,259,856</b>
<u>Allocated resources</u>
o Government: <b>In kind contribution</b>
o DFID: <b>GBP 4.4M (US \$ 8,384,856)</b>
o UNDP: <b>USD\$ 1,875,000</b>



<sup>1</sup> For global/regional projects, this is not required

**SIGNATURE PAGE**

Country: **Rwanda**

Agreed by (Government): \_\_\_\_\_

Agreed by (Implementing agencies):

Parliament

The Office of the Ombudsman


The National Human Rights Commission

The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

The National Electoral Commission

The High Council of the Press

Agreed by (UNDP): \_\_\_\_\_



18 April 07



## RWANDA: "PROGRAMME FOR STRENGTHENING GOOD GOVERNANCE"

### Summary

- i. The Project Goal is "**Strengthened accountability and responsiveness of key state players for delivering the EDPRS objectives**".
- ii. Its purpose is to "**Enhance effectiveness and capacities of key national institutions, mandated to promote state accountability and responsiveness**".
- iii. The project's foundation is an agenda shared by the Government of Rwanda (GoR), DFID and UNDP, that effective governance is a vital part of the development process.
- iv. Rwanda's Vision 2020 has six pillars, the first being **Nation Building & Good Governance**, which "...seeks to put in place a strong and secure nation, with high standards of political and administrative governance". Since the late 1990s Rwanda has shown commitment to the governance agenda by establishing a number of organisations of good governance. In the past, these organisations have often lacked capacity, but recently there have been some positive trajectories of their organisational performance.
- v. The agenda around governance is shared with DFID. The UK's recent White Paper (WP3) 'Making Governance Work for the Poor' has argued that governance is central to the development process, and that it needs state capability, responsiveness and accountability (CAR) as prerequisites. CAR is a good framework to understand good governance, and whilst Rwanda has made progress against all three pillars, more attention in the post-genocide period has rightly been placed on building state capability. Mirroring this pattern DFID's programmes in Rwanda have tended to focus more on state capability, particularly with work on capacity building of the executive. DFID Rwanda now wants to engage with state actors who are not part of the executive, and who have roles consistent with improving responsiveness and accountability.
- vi. UNDP attaches similar importance to good governance (unpacked in a number of its Good Governance Practice Notes) and has a track record of supporting some organisations of good governance, including the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and Parliament. It wishes to continue this, working with partners who share similar objectives. DFID sees this, and the perception that UNDP is politically neutral as attractive, and agreement has been reached to form a partnership.
- vii. The organisations to be supported are: the Human Rights Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Office of the

Ombudsman, Parliament, the National Election Commission (in year one of the programme) and the High Council of the Press (years 2-4 of the programme).

- viii. The overall programme will be managed as a UNDP National Execution Project. It will run for four years. It has a budget of \$10.2 million dollars (US \$). DFID's contribution through the cost sharing agreement with UNDP will be in the region of \$8.38 million (about £4.4 million), which include financing a Strategic Adviser for the programme. UNDP will provide \$1.875 million.
- ix. However, the total DFID contribution to the project will be up to £ 5 million, of which the funds managed through UNDP NEX will be £4.4 million, while the remaining £0.6 will remain with DFID. A total of £0.1 from these funds will be used by DFID to pay the project design costs and £0.5 will be kept in contingency to be used as agreed between stakeholders during the life of the project.
- x. The focus of support for each targeted organisation will depend upon its needs. For example:
  - o The NURC and the HRC have reasonably good strategic plans and capacities to warrant targeted financial support to be disbursed against progress in areas of the strategic plan identified and agreed upon.
  - o Other organisations, such as the Ombudsman, will receive more traditional project support, including technical assistance.
  - o Parliament will receive technical assistance aimed at bolstering support to committee structures, while ensuring coordinated support with the World Bank funded programme managed by the Human Institute Development Agency (HIDA).
- xi. A variety of outcomes are envisaged, but a common denominator is development of effective and properly capacitated organisations able to fulfill their functions, thereby allowing greater state responsiveness and accountability.
- xii. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems will be developed during the initial six months of implementation. It is suggested that a third party can facilitate development of an M&E framework, and the Governance Advisory Council is one possible option in this regard, but it needs further consideration.



## Part I Situation Analysis

### 1.1. Background

The Government of Rwanda has, since the genocide of 1994, recognised the centrality of good governance in its own nation-building agenda. Pivotal to this is the recognition that the genocide was the culmination of long-standing, ongoing and chronic failures of governance, where the state simultaneously failed to deliver services or any of the pre-conditions of economic growth on the one hand, and manipulated its people to blame these failures on ethnic and socially divisive issues on the other.

In the period of transition that followed 1994 and concluded with parliamentary and presidential elections in 2003 the government set up a number of organisations of good governance, often watch-dog or regulatory bodies, independent of the executive. In 2002 it also produced a 'Good Governance Framework Paper' that aimed to bolster Rwanda's first PRSP in the area of good governance. These issues are discussed more fully in the Political Appraisal below.

In Rwanda, governance is likely to feature prominently in the EDPRS. Issues around the creation of an enabling and capable state have been given even greater focus. In the draft EDPRS, the first pillar is **Nation Building & Good Governance**, which "...seeks to put in place a strong and secured nation, with high standards of political and administrative governance". It sets out three policy areas that underpin this pillar, namely *Equitable, efficient and effective services delivered to all citizens in an environment of participation, accountability and empowerment*; *Good governance promoted, strengthened and enhanced (through democratization, rule of law, national reconciliation, justice and human rights)*; and **Building a strong and secure nation**: *(through oversight of issues related to security, defence, prevention of conflict and the fight against genocide ideology)*.

As is argued in the political appraisal of this project document the way in which many of these issues are tackled in Rwanda does take on a very country-specific dimension, not often understood by outside observers. Nevertheless, within this very particular context there is huge commitment by government to build an effective and responsive state, and to develop organisations such as Parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Commissions of National Unity & Reconciliation and Human Rights. Capacity in many of these organisations is limited; nevertheless, the effectiveness of those that have been in existence for some time is improving, indicative of the strong political will which backs them.

The Government of Rwanda's partners also see governance as central. DFID's Third White Paper on Development (WP3) "Making Governance work for the

poor" argues that poverty can only be tackled and overcome by the world's poorer countries if effective states are built which embody principles of good governance. This argument is not a new one; it has also been made within the context of NEPAD's "Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance", in the work of the OECD and is also a feature of the work of the Commission for Africa. DFID's White Paper argues that Good Governance requires three things. Firstly, there must be state capability, which is ability for leaders and governments to pursue their business effectively and get things done. The second requirement of good governance is responsiveness, which is the extent to which governments listen to the needs of their people, respond to what they are being told and uphold the rights of their citizens. The third requirement of good governance is accountability, which is the extent to which citizens, civil society and the private sector scrutinize public institutions, and hold them to account for their performance and the conduct of their business.

**UNDP** holds similar views. It has produced a number of practice notes on democratic governance, including ones on parliamentary development, anti-corruption, human rights, access to information, electoral systems & processes and public administration reform. Together, these practice notes support a policy framework that argues "...democratic governance is a key component in achieving the MDGs". It sees an efficient, responsive, transparent and accountable state as a central part of democratic governance, through the work of effective public administrations, through the checks and balances upheld through electoral processes where "... citizens can participate in decisions that affect their lives and hold their representatives accountable" and through the building of legislative, representative and oversight capacities of parliament. UNDP has also played a leading role in ensuring that the promotion and protection of Human Rights is integrated into the development process.

The views of DFID and UNDP are helping to shape growing consensus around the importance of governance. Increasingly, studies are showing that governance – the way in which a country governs itself, consults and makes decisions about its policies, manages its resources, resolves and mitigates risk of conflicts and enables a relationship between the state and its citizens is seen not as a luxury, but as one of the most important determining factors in whether or not human development can be enhanced and poverty eliminated.

It is not simply a matter of resources; some countries that have benefited from windfalls (e.g. as a result of natural resource exploitation) have not made progress in the elimination of poverty because good governance, taken forward by robust institutions, was absent.

In parallel to this it seems that research is indicating that good institutional performance has sustained and long-term impacts on economic growth, itself vital for the elimination of poverty. The predictability and even-handedness of institutional behavior seems to be particularly important. Where institutions are



apparently subject to outside influences that seem to affect their objectivity, for instance, this is thought to have an impact on long-term growth; where oversight or regulatory bodies favour an elite group, or seem to operate according to some principles of patronage, the potential for sustained growth seems to suffer. Conversely, societies governed by institutional frameworks that are steered by the rule of law, and where there is equality of all citizens before the law seem more likely to enjoy growth.

But effective institutions of this kind only emerge from long-running and sustained processes of interaction between the state and its citizens. It is a bringing together of these lines of thought which has prompted NEPAD to argue that development without pluralism, democracy, and the essential elements of good governance is simply **not possible**.

WP3 and other similar documents have prompted a review of the way in which donors have engaged in Rwanda. The question has been asked 'Are we doing all we can to help Rwanda develop all three of the requirements of good governance?'. In response, it has been concluded that whilst there is a sound track record of helping to support the first requirement of good governance, state capability, notably with capacity building activities within the executive, it has been noted that the other two requirements, responsiveness and accountability, have not received the attention they deserved from many donors, including DFID.

DFID has had a number of successful interventions in the area of building state capability, for example with engagements with the Ministry of Finance, Revenue Authority, National Statistics Office and the Ministry of Education. But whereas capability has fared well, the other two areas have featured in the country programme at best sporadically (e.g. support to electoral processes) but have not really been a main programme focus.

The reasons for UNDP and DFID joining forces are explored in the Approach section below. What is clear, however, is that the interventions are in accordance with both the vision set out in WP3 and UNDP's own policy framework on good governance, e.g. as spelt out in the UNDP practice notes.

## **1.2. The challenge to be addressed**

The challenge that this project addresses is one of how to constructively engage with an emerging governance agenda, shared by the Government of Rwanda and key partners, including DFID and UNDP. Specifically, the agenda advocates the strengthening of government **accountability** and **responsiveness**, with particular reference to delivering the objectives of Rwanda's second-generation PRSP, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS).



The Project Goal is **"Strengthened accountability and responsiveness of key state players for delivering the EDPRS objectives"**. Its purpose is to **"Enhance effectiveness and capacities of key national institutions, mandated to promote state accountability and responsiveness"**.

This project is built around the idea of a shared agenda. The argument is that increasingly the Government of Rwanda, DFID and UNDP are giving weight to the need for good governance – in particular in the development of a responsive and accountable state, a state which enters into a social contract with its citizens, listens to citizens' voice, allows itself to be held accountable for the way in which it develops its policies and delivers its services, and a state which protects and upholds the rights of all.

The publication of UK's recent White Paper (WP3) in particular, but a growing awareness of the importance of governance in general, has prompted both DFID and UNDP to look at their governance portfolios. In DFID's case there is a recognition that whilst state capacity has been well supported in its programming in Rwanda since 1999, with some notable successes at building capacity of the executive and executive agencies (MINECOFIN, Statistics, the Ministry of Education, the Rwanda Revenue Authority). But little has been done to improve capacities around responsiveness and accountability, leading to the conclusion that more work might be done with state actors (not part of the executive) who have particular responsibilities and roles in these areas. UNDP, meanwhile, already has engagements with some of these organisations, including parliament, the Human Rights Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the National Elections Commission. But it recognizes a need to intensify these engagements, perhaps through finding a partner who has a similar mandate.

Within the Rwandan context, supporting accountability and responsiveness is important but also presents particular challenges. It is important because accountability and responsiveness are essential traits of the kind of functional, effective and enabling state that the Government of Rwanda is now trying to create against the cruel legacy of the genocide. The genocide itself was the result of the most acute form of state failure imaginable, and the 'new' Rwanda is predicated upon doing the reverse of what marked the 'old' Rwanda – putting citizens first, connecting people and communities to government, cementing a social contract around a citizen-state dialogue.

But this is easier said than done. Historically, Rwandan society has only been 'democratic', at best, in a very narrow sense, and whilst ordinary people have been hugely accountable to their 'betters' in a rigidly hierarchical society, the notion of 'downward accountability' has played little part. Despite the apparent embracing of democratic ideals in post-colonial Rwanda, democratic values were never really promoted and inculcated. It is barely an exaggeration to say that democracy is still a fledgling concept in Rwanda. It is apparently fragile and, for a

number of complex reasons is built on consensus politics rather than the politics of contest.

And there are other substantial challenges. The most obvious challenge is one of building capacity, particularly in an environment where the state melted down completely less than fifteen years ago, taking with it the lives of many of the ablest public servants. Another challenge relates to the 'political' environment in which any capacity might operate. It is simplistic to argue that if capacity gaps at functionary level are plugged that all problems are solved. Debates about political freedom have rumbled on in Rwanda for some years, and have recently been given considerable prominence. Some feel that the Government of Rwanda has proved that it is, in fact, far from tolerant when it comes to allowing political debate, and the public expression of views that are contrary to government policy.

Given the context (both social and historical), what Government is mindful of is the enormous fragility of society, of the democratization agenda, and of the country as a whole. There is a fear amongst many that the enormous strides that the country, collectively, has made since 1994 could be put at risk. However, there are already signs of increasing openness and tolerance of government criticism in Rwanda. Media now appears to be far more independent than a few years ago. The Auditor- General has been forwarding to Parliament high quality reports, which identify a variety of weaknesses. These reports are hotly debated by the Parliamentarians. Such debates are frequently picked up by the local press.

This appears to be an appropriate time to work with the organisations responsible for ensuring government accountability and responsiveness. And the best way of supporting the accountability and responsiveness agenda is to help build the capacity of the main actors charged with taking forward this agenda, whilst at the same time engaging with government on issues around political freedom and pluralism.

In thinking through how to respond to these challenges, consideration has been given to what organisations are responsible within Government of Rwanda institutional frameworks for taking forward the accountability and responsiveness agenda, what capacity constraints they face and what is needed to help them deliver their mandates more effectively.

### **1.3. Project beneficiaries**

Throughout the project design a number of options have been considered, both in terms of modalities and in terms of institutions/organisations that might be supported.

The approach finally taken considers a number of rules of engagement, including building the capacity of complete institutional frameworks (rather than



organisations), aligning behind strategic plans and funding resource shortfalls where applicable. During implementation due attention will be paid to harmonizing and aligning with other donor-funded programmes with these institutions, e.g. the World Bank funded programme through HIDA. (These are explained in the 'Approach' section in 2.2. below).

The approach also takes on board the support of a number of organisations under the umbrella of one programme. What unites these organisations, quite obviously, is their role in promoting accountability and responsiveness. They are all non-executive bodies and all suffer from capacity constraints that hold back their ability to deliver their mandate. But similarly all operate within institutional frameworks that if properly capacitated and supported by continued political will, will serve to increase interactions between citizens and the state on a broad range of issues in the broader governance agenda.

The table below shows the organisations and institutions that the project will focus on, together with the outputs anticipated:

Table 1: Project Beneficiaries and anticipated outputs

Organisation	Output
Human Rights Commission	Appropriately capacitated HRC that has promoted and protected HRs in accordance with its Strategic Plan.
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission	Appropriately capacitated National Unity and Reconciliation Commission that has prevented conflict and reconciled Rwandans in accordance with its Strategic Plan.
Office of the Ombudsman	Appropriately capacitated Office of the Ombudsman that has prevented and fought corruption in accordance with its Strategic Plan.
Parliamentary Standing Committees (further consideration would be given during the initial six months of implementation in coordinating support with the ongoing World Bank funded programme through HIDA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Appropriately capacitated Parliamentary Technical Support Units headed by an International Team Leader that support parliament's ability to hold the state more accountable and responsive to the citizens.</li> <li>▪ Legislative Standing Committees technically supported so as to fulfil their mission.</li> <li>▪ A dedicated and functional media resource (radio station) to inform citizens of the work and activities of</li> </ul>



	parliament, its committees (and, by arrangement, organisations of good governance)
National Election Commission (Year 1 only)	Appropriately capacitated NEC that has delivered its constitutional mandate to oversee conduct of free and fair elections, and has promoted and strengthened formal democratic processes in Rwanda in accordance with internationally recognized standards.
High Council of the Press (Years 2 to 4)	An appropriated capacitated HCP which plays a role in both ensuring the independence but also the responsibility of the press, in accordance with internationally accepted professional standards

The project budget stands at just over \$10.2m (US dollars) and will be part-funded by UNDP (\$1.875 million), managed through a UNDP National Execution modality.

#### **1.4. What the funds will be spent on**

The programme addresses a number of issues relating to enhancing the capacity of a set of organisations charged with taking forward aspects of the accountability and responsiveness agenda. Where appropriate this is done through support of existing strategic plans.

In terms of outcomes, the programme will capacitate the organisations in question to better take forward their mandates. A particular feature has been improving the capacity of organisational outreach and the way in which organisations engages with citizens. These form the basis of a social contract between citizens and the state, where an effective and enabling state emerges from the interaction between people and state institutions which are increasingly disposed to be, and capable of being responsive and accountable.

These sorts of relationships are still in their infancy in Rwanda, but some recent developments, particularly around the Government's decentralization programme, are promising, and this programme will be an important contribution to these processes at a vital time in Rwanda's state building agenda.

The following paragraphs spell out a little more explicitly what funding will be spent on. An important principle during implementation will be to agree six-monthly forward work plans, so the following is only indicative at this stage. The

main areas of support by the project will consist of: training, technical assistance, studies and analytical work and communication support. The focus at this stage is generally on capacity building, which is seen as a key factor constraining the effectiveness of the targeted organisations. However, at an early stage in the first year of the project, a process will be set up to identify other possible factors in the external institutional environments which impact the work and effectiveness of these institutions. An independent consultant would support ongoing analysis of the institutional contexts, and identify issues which need to be included in the strategic plans of the institutions or discussed with other state actors. The consultant will provide initial inputs in the early stages of implementation.

**Human Rights Commission (HRC):** Three major areas will be funded. The HRC's strategic plan has been used as a platform, and an analysis of 'funding gaps' made. Most of these relating to **promotion of and education on human rights** can now be bridged by the project. Receiving, investigating and responding to human rights violations and citizens' complaints will be funded as a **protection** activity, as will some activities focused on the protection of children's' rights. A big part of further support will go towards financing **institutional capacity strengthening and stabilizing**.

**National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC):** A similar approach has been taken for the NURC, where a number of key unfunded mandates have been identified in the strategic plan. Activities identified as key such as training of the grassroots conflict management actors and conducting *ingando* will be part-funded under this programme. Activities related to internal staff strengthening in a number of areas will also be financed.

**The Parliament and the Parliamentary Standing Committees:** The principal challenge is how to increase parliamentary capacity to hear citizens' voices, hold the executive accountable, analyze policy and take forward appropriate legislative drafting. The project looks to build the capacity of the Technical Support Units (*Unité d'Appui aux Commissions*) serving all Standing Committees of the Parliament. The Committees play an important role in the institutional framework for accountability and responsiveness. As already mentioned support to Parliament will be coordinated with the ongoing HIDA programme. The team of national experts will be coached and supervised by an international Team Leader working for the first two years of the project. His or her activities will be phased out over this period. Priorities for supporting the Parliamentary committees will be established earlier on in the project.

Communication has been identified as a fundamental issue in this framework. In line with this, a **parliamentary radio facility** serving both chambers of parliament will be funded. This will be a main information portal for both houses, which will be able to disseminate information to a wide audience by radio. Proceedings of the houses themselves might be broadcast live. This facility is one that can also be used by the other commissions in this design framework, to communicate their programmes and activities to a wide public. Due



consideration would be given to ensuring that running costs of the radio station are picked up by Parliament before end of this project funding.

In view of the possibility of less than full utilization of the radio facility by the Parliament, particularly between the Parliamentary sessions, the Project will explore whether this facility can be shared by other organisations covered by the Project. During the appraisal discussion a suggestion was made to provide a TV channel in addition to the radio facility. Whilst the TV station will not be funded under this project, national stakeholders may wish to give further consideration to appraising the need and demand for a TV station over the coming years.

**Office of the Ombudsman:** Support will be given to targeted areas that are seen to be strengthening the fight against and prevention of corruption. Thus, funding will be invested in conducting studies on the state and level of corruption, media and communication campaigns aimed at informing and involving citizens in corruption prevention. More support will go towards sensitization particularly focusing on grassroots and national institutions. Exchange and twinning with other international institutions dealing in anti-corruption and accountability will also be financed. Finally, it is proposed that a short intervention be made to improve planning processes.

**The National Electoral Commission (NEC):** Whilst in some ways it would have been appropriate to fund NEC activities for the duration of the project, it is now suggested that donors – including but not restricted to UNDP and DFID, need to support a project – probably funded through a pool fund disbursed through a National Execution Project, to cover the whole spectrum of electoral democracy. This would include civic and voter education, support to the media and other initiatives as well as support to the NEC's capacity building plans and support to the logistics of elections themselves. This present project cannot hope to cover all of these themes (due to constraints in the resource envelope). Nevertheless, NEC is in need of continuing support, so a one-year NEC component has been included in this project as a transitional measure. Areas covered relate to things that are crucial for the preparation of 2008 elections. To make any significant and sustainable change on the performance and delivery on accountability and responsiveness by the other institutions under the governance framework, more funding, from more donors will have to be resourced to finance the remaining years of NEC's strategic plan 2007-2011. Inclusion of NEC into this framework recognizes the centrality of democratic processes (and therefore the key actors within the overall institutional framework) to the governance and accountability agenda. It is clear that without leaders elected democratically, through free and fair processes, the whole credibility of the governance agenda is at risk. At the same time, a more appropriate funding modality needs to be identified soon.

Under the current arrangement NEC will get partial funding for specific areas identified by the Commission as requiring urgent support for the fiscal year 2007. They include: computerization of the electoral process, development of training materials for civic education on voting specifically focusing on citizen



responsibility to vote and the accountability culture. Funding gaps under these sections in the NEC plan have been identified. Under the computerization only a portion of the electoral process funding gap will be financed because of limited resources. The funding gaps for the civic education activities will be covered under the governance framework programme. In particular, support for training of target groups such as women, youth, journalists and heads of schools and others will be provided.

This one-year intervention recognizes that support to the NEC, currently ongoing as part of a UNDP programmes needs to continue. But in one sense it is very much a 'bridging' initiative, because the NEC really needs to be at the centre of a parallel democratization programme, strategically focused to support democratic processes and its main actors (including the NEC itself, civil society and possibly the media). This needs to be a multi-donor project, and efforts will be made during Year 1 to move in the direction of multi-donor funded support to the NEC. While it is difficult to predict how soon this can be realized, but under the current project support to the NEC will cease at the end of Year 1.

**High Council of the Press (HCP):** The HCP will be supported in the second to fourth years of the programme after the completion of a current programme to elaborate a strategic plan. Support to the HCP will play a pivotal role in the governance and accountability process since freedom of expression and the press are key ingredients in generating public debate, holding leaders accountable for their actions, and above all building confidence among the Rwandans. As yet it is not possible to determine what areas might be covered, and exactly what modalities will be used. Much will depend on the outcomes of the strategic plan elaboration, a process that is currently underway. However, currently the HCP is still very much a new organisation; it is not yet possible to gauge its effectiveness, but it is fair to assume that it will face many challenges if it is to be effective.

### **1.5. Who will benefit?**

Immediate beneficiaries of the programme will of course be the organisations and institutions that have been selected for support. But the impact of a rise of capacity and effectiveness in these institutional frameworks will have a lasting impact on the poor and vulnerable in Rwandan society. Whilst much of the activity of this project is focused on the supply side of the state-citizen relationship, with a concentration on improving the capacity of state actors, due consideration has been given to support initiatives such as the commissions to interact and form better partnerships with civil society and improved communication by enhancing capacity around publicity and information dissemination.

This will lay the foundation for improved interaction between the state and its citizens over a wide range of issues, including the protection and promotion of

human rights, ongoing issues around reconciliation and holding the state accountable for the quality of its public service delivery.

## **Part II Strategy**

### **2. 1. Why is the programme structured in the way that it is?**

There are three questions to be answered when addressing issues of programme structure. The first is why this programme concentrates on particular organisations, and specifically why different organisations have been included under a single programme 'umbrella' – in other words 'who to support'. The second question is why the project is structured in the way it is vis-à-vis the modalities suggested – in other words 'how to support'. The third question is why a partnership between DFID and UNDP to support Government of Rwanda governance initiatives – in other words 'why a partnership between DFID and UNDP?'

### **2. 2. Who to support?**

Institutions to be supported are: the National Commission for Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the National Electoral Commission, the National Parliament, and the High Council of the Press.

The project concept note for this project has not set out detailed criteria for judging which institutions to support. The project has as its goal supporting developments in accountability and responsiveness, but that in itself is fairly broad.

Rwanda has recently been subject of a number of independent reviews by third parties. The recent APRM and the assessment for the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International are two examples. The Government of Rwanda has been disappointed – and concerned - by some of these reviews. Whilst the APRM report was fairly positive, it did have some specific misgivings about the capacity and strength of particular organisations of good governance (and, as a related point the opening of political space in the country). The CPI also raised concerns, and although questions about the methodology used have gone unanswered, the overall message is clear; there are those that felt that corruption is a growing problem in Rwanda.

Constructive partners of Rwanda want to help to address these shortcomings, to allow Rwanda to show positive trajectories of change when future reviews are undertaken. It is therefore to support institutions of good governance that are



associated with these concerns, by directly working with them to enhance their core capacities and by increasing their abilities to fulfill mandates.

But this broad principle has been given some extra focus. The aims of this programme are to enhance accountability and responsiveness, and thus an organization's mandate in relation to these principles has been vital in determining who gets support and who does not.

Many organisations can rightly claim to be working to promote good governance, and seek support to do so, but the critical issue with regard to this programme's design has been the extent to which accountability and responsiveness are really at the core of their mandate. The extent, for instance, that organisations help to amplify citizens' voice so that concerns are made known, or have a clear mandate to hold the executive accountable in an oversight role, or have a role of protecting rights of citizens, or work with communities to promote issues around reconciliation have all been critical when determining who to support.

Similarly, when scrutiny of possible interventions has revealed that raising state capability, rather than accountability and responsiveness, is at the core, these have been discounted. Raising overall capability is critical, but the focus of this project means that this is not an end in itself, but rather a means to taking forward the agendas of accountability and responsiveness.

Taking account of the above, the programme will support:

- The Human Rights Commission – as promoter and protector of human rights of Rwanda's citizens.
- The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission – as a promoter of national unity and reconciliation.
- The Office of the Ombudsman- as an agency that monitors transparency and compliance with regulation in all governmental bodies and public sectors
- The National Electoral Commission- as guarantor of free and fair democratic elections at all levels.
- The National Parliament- as legislator, overseer of the executive, enforcer and analyst of policy implementation and conduit for the voices of the people.
- The High Council of Press- as promoter of freedom of expression and information sharing

Throughout particular emphasis is given to building human capacity, but also strengthening institutional capacities relating to the maintenance of accountability mechanisms, the ability to communicate and promote work and the ability to interface with citizens.

### **2.3. How to support?**

The second question, having determined whom to support, is how to support them. As already mentioned the six-monthly forward work plans will be prepared



and approved and will form the basis for getting support under this project. It is useful to elaborate some of the rules of engagement that have been employed throughout the project design phase.

The first rule of engagement is to seek to **align behind the strategic plans of partner organisations** where these are realistic, robust and of a good standard. Assistance be given to things that feature in the strategic plan but which both remain unfunded but appear to be central to the entity's work, and a clear priority for them; it is clear that all potential partners in this area have significant shortfalls in financing.

Progress can then be monitored against the progress of strategic plan implementation. The joint obligations underpinning the programme's partnership centers on the achievement of particular parts of the strategic plan. The language will of course be the partner's own, and the commitment entered into will be the achievement of the plan they themselves have constructed. This ownership of the intervention is, as a result, the highest achievable.

This is the approach that has been taken with the HRC, NEC and NURC. All these organisations have robust strategic plans, and annualized plans emanating from them. Both can identify very clearly the shortfalls between what, in the strategic plans and annual plans, they want to achieve, and what, given Government of Rwanda financial contributions, they can actually fund. The intention is not to meet the entire funding gap, but to try and use the limited project funds for key priorities. This allowed us to look at the modality of financial contribution, allowing the organisations in question to pick up the slack.

It is important to note, here, that this funding is not untied or completely flexible. Funds will be disbursed so as to allow the conduct of certain activities, and further disbursements made according to progress. The financial appendix shows in some detail the activities to be funded during 2007, and plans for subsequent years will be agreed as part of project planning and implementation process.

With the Office of the Ombudsman we were not able to use this approach, as the strategic plans were not robust enough. In this case a projectised intervention, exploring themes identified as priorities in existing planning frameworks has been developed in close collaboration with the Ombudsman. To allow the migration from this approach to one of aligning behind strategic plans, and indeed to augment the planning process, some support has been included in year one to augmenting the strategic planning process.

With Parliament a similar approach is being followed, where the Parliament's own plans have been used as a base, but noting that posts have been unfilled, augmenting support to the Technical Support Units with the provision of technical assistance.

A second rule of engagement seeks to support **Institutional frameworks** rather than just **organisations** of good governance. The institutional framework is only as good as the weakest link in the accountability chain. Thus if, say, the Human Rights Commission were to be supported and its capacity improved, the impact will not be maximized if the sort of oversight and support given by the relevant parliamentary committee is lacking. In the programme design, therefore, we are proposing that as holistic a view of the institutional framework as possible be used, and that a number of stakeholders be strengthened within that framework. Thus engagement with parliamentary committees actually augments the capacity-building initiatives relating to the commissions, as the capacities the project is building in the secretariat will help both take the work of the commissions forward in parliament (through the work of the committees) but also allow the commissions to be held accountable.

A third rule of engagement is to consider the demand side in what could otherwise become a too heavily supply side project. The project design team realize that working on the demand side, especially with civil society, is at best very difficult in Rwanda. But some of the proposed interventions, at least in terms of monitoring and evaluation, should take account of how the key organisations interact with civil society. Where these feature in strategic plans of the commissions they have received support through project financial contributions.

A fourth rule is to harmonize with other similar initiatives in order to promote complementarity and avoid duplication. Finally, consideration has been given to focusing on sustainable capacity building through institutional development rather than capacity substitution. A focus on using partner strategic plans, together with seeing the deployment of technical assistance not as a panacea for all ills but as a means, in some instances, of allowing more long-term institutional development to take place has been key. Technical assistance has to be seen in the context of skills transfer (rather than simply 'doing the job'), and its effectiveness judged on the extent to which organisational and institutional performance improves in the medium term.

#### **2.4. Why a partnership between DFID and UNDP?**

In terms of why a partnership between DFID and UNDP, it is important to recognize that this programme is actually an alignment around a shared agenda, not just between DFID and UNDP, but also between both development partners and the Government of Rwanda. DFID has recognised the need to engage with state actors that are not part of the executive, but have roles to play in strengthening government accountability and responsiveness. There is recognition that engagement in these areas has not been given the priority given the overriding need to focus DFID support on building state capability following on from the effects of the genocide.



The case of UNDP is somewhat different. There has been a history of engaging with institutions and organisations of good governance that actually go beyond just building capability. There is, for example, a three year programme (2005-2008) of support to the Human Rights Commission, aimed at improving the HRC's management capacities (the capability requirement) but also increasing the effectiveness of HRC in the role of rights protector, educator and partner to civil society, all features of the accountability and responsiveness requirements. There is also a programme of support to a number of organisations that fall within a wider definition of the justice sector, including support to the Gacaca administration, Supreme Court, Parquet General, and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and a three-year programme "Good Governance for Poverty Reduction".

There is now a wish to engage more extensively with institutions of good governance in Rwanda. In UNDP's case, this is seen as a continuation of existing engagements and scaling-up its current efforts through a like-minded partner.

Meanwhile, from DFID's perspective, there are a number of advantages in joining UNDP. It is a demonstration that both partners are serious about delivering on the commitment around harmonisation contained in the Paris Declaration. But DFID also sees working with UNDP as offering particular advantages. It is a partner that has been engaged in these areas, which in the Rwandan context are sometimes sensitive, for some time. And there is a perception that UNDP, unlike bilateral donors, is an organisation that is politically neutral. This therefore strengthens the case not just to go into partnership with UNDP, but to actually align behind a UNDP-led project that follows the 'National Execution' model. Implementation details are set out in Section 3 below.

## **2.5. Involvement of key stakeholders**

All the beneficiaries have been widely consulted during the design phase of this project. Real effort has been made to reach consensus as to the needs of the organisations selected for support. Much of the dialogue has taken place around how strategic plans might be better mobilized, where applicable.

There have also been other stakeholders consulted. These are primarily other organisations of good governance that, for a variety of reasons, have been ruled out in terms of support through this intervention<sup>2</sup>.

Other donors who are active in this area have also been consulted. Attempts have been made to ensure that any interventions planned as part of this programme do not cut across support that is already ongoing / planned.

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<sup>2</sup> The main reasons are that building state capacity rather than responsiveness and accountability would be addressed, or that the links between this planned support and independent review are at best incidental.



One important group of stakeholders, the Rwandan citizens, was not consulted during the project design process. But the design allows for strengthening the two-way communication between the institutions identified for support and the citizens.

## **2.6. Lessons & Evaluation**

Several lessons emerge from various capacity building initiatives in Rwanda over the recent past, supported by DFID and other donors.

Firstly, sporadic support, as opposed to longer-term strategic engagement, is not likely to secure long-term sustainable solutions, particularly, it would seem, when supporting institutions of good governance. For instance support to the elections of 2003, and in particular the component focused on the NEC, was focused on a series of events (the two elections) rather than supporting longer-term trajectories and processes around the development of democratization in Rwanda. This project, in contrast, advocates sustained support, over a four-year timeframe, to such organisation.

The second point, but very much allied to the first is that institutional change takes time. This is evidenced by some of the long-standing interventions in DFID Rwanda's portfolio, including support to the Education sector and support to the Rwanda Revenue Authority. Partners therefore need to be realistic about the sort of results they can expect over the lifetime of the project. It is also critical to acknowledge the importance of engaging with political governance issues through ongoing dialogue, which is a fundamental part of DFID's wider programme.

## **Part III Management Arrangements**

### **3.1 Management Arrangements**

The project will be delivered in partnership between DFID and UNDP. Annex 3 sets out the management arrangements more fully. It will take the form of a UNDP National Execution project (NEX). DFID and UNDP will enter into a cost sharing agreement and UNDP will sign a memorandum of understanding with each of the national organisations that are being assisted by the programme.

Each stakeholder (both donor partners and beneficiaries) will then be represented to a Project Steering Committee (PSC), which will provide guidance and direction to the project. The ToRs of the PSC shall be agreed among the key stakeholders in the first six months of the Project.

There will be a project manager, who will be the accountable officer for the Project. The Project Manager will work under the overall direction and

supervision of the PSC. The ToRs for the Project Manager will be agreed in the initial meetings of the PSC. He/ She will be based in UNDP and paid from the project budget, who is able to track progress and undertake some of the day-to-day management around disbursement and activity support. He/She will report administratively and programmatically to UNDP for the day to day activities. He/She reports on project progress during Steering Committee meetings. This person will be the focal point for all coordination and review issues, and will serve the broader (multi-stakeholder) interest of the programme, not just those of UNDP. He or she will prepare progress reports, and provide the information needed to agree disbursement of funds. The triggers for disbursement will be the agreement of a forward plan every six months, augmented, once the programme is up and running, with progress reports (including expenditure against budgets) of the achievements of the last six months.

To facilitate the PM's role, each beneficiary organisation will have a focal person to whose job it will be to liaise with the PM and manage the information flows needed.

In order to respond to the intensity and diverse needs of technical specialist oversight, a Strategic Adviser will be recruited. He / she will spend 3 months in country every year for each year of the project. The Strategic Adviser will report to the Project Steering Committee as an independent expert, and the progress reports of the Strategic Adviser will inform the deliberations of the PSC and influence the contours of the six-monthly work plans which are to be approved by the PSC. The Terms of References for the Strategic Adviser will be agreed in the initial meetings of the PSC. The Terms of References will clarify the differences in the role of the Project Manager (which will be around management) and the Strategic Adviser (which will be of a substantive nature). There will nevertheless be UNDP and DFID joint responsibilities around professional advisory leads. The project manager will be the focal point, and will seek advice from both partner agencies with regard to obtaining the appropriate advisory inputs. Appropriate procedures for the Project Manager to access the advisory support in UNDP and DFID will be established at an early stage.

Five (5) per cent of DFID contributions into this pool will be taken by UNDP to cover general management services as the agreement signed between UNDP and DFID at the corporate level for cost sharing agreement between the two parties.

Project partners have agreed to take on the responsibility of maintaining the assets and services provided by the project after the end of the Project period.

This programme will be run as a UNDP National Execution Project (NEX). This is a set methodology, underpinned by a headquarters level agreement between UNDP and the Government of the United Kingdom (plus other donor countries). This programme covers all new and existing UNDP Governance support.



Overall financial management will rest with UNDP. Funds will be pooled into bank accounts in New York. There will be a cost-sharing agreement between DFID and UNDP, effectively an annex to the agreement currently existing between UNDP and Her Majesty's Government at HQ level.

Meanwhile a Memorandum of Understanding will be signed between UNDP and the Ministry of Finance (cementing the financial relationship), and agreements with each of the National Institutions to be covered by the programme. This will be underpinned by a UNDP project document, setting out objectives and management issues.

At the outset of the programme a Steering Committee will be established, comprising representatives of all stakeholders (both donor partners and national beneficiaries). This body will guide and direct the project. It will be this body that interacts with, and holds accountable the Programme Manager.

The Programme Manager will, on a day-to-day basis, manage the programme, liaising closely with the National Partners. A set of terms of reference, prepared by UNDP Rwanda, is attached. He/She will report administratively and programmatically to UNDP for the day to day activities. He/She reports on project progress during Steering Committee meetings

Each national partner will have a designated manager (a National Project Manager) as a focal point for co-ordination and communication. It will be the National Project Manager of each organisation that will request for disbursement of funding against agreed action plans. These plans will be agreed by the Steering Committee, who will also receive progress reports and the results of any monitoring and evaluation. Disbursement can be for multiple activities, including procurement, technical assistance and the funding of particular activities as set out in the work plan.

Initial disbursement will be made on agreement of a forward plan covering the first six months of the project; thereafter disbursement will be against satisfactory completion and delivery of the previous period's plan and agreement of the next period's plan.

Whereas the National Execution model is in many respects relatively flexible, there is no scope for changing financial arrangements. All disbursement will be through UN systems.

However, there is some flexibility when it comes to advisory inputs. In this area it is actually an over-burden to have UNDP as the advisory lead for all work streams, and similarly confusing if these duties are divided up amongst donor partners, organisation by organisation. It is therefore proposed that the Programme Manager takes responsibility for liaising closely with both donor partner organisations where advice is needed of a more technical nature.


The arrangements are shown in the diagram below. There will actually be six national Project Manager – one for each organisation to be supported. Information flows between the Steering Committee and Programme Manger will be two-way, the PM supplying information and compiling reports based on information supplied by national partners, and the Programme Committee conveying disbursement authorisation and requests for further information. Information flows between the PM and National Project Managers will be fluid. The National Project Managers will provide information such that the PM can keep abreast of all developments on a day-to-day basis.

**Diagram 1: Programme Management Arrangements**

**Programme Steering Committee**



**Programme Manager**





### **3.2. Timing**

The project will begin in April 2007, and the first year of support will be the remainder of 2007. Thereafter the project financial year will follow the calendar year, i.e. January 1<sup>st</sup>-December 31<sup>st</sup>. This is the financial year for UNDP. Disbursement from DFID to UNDP will be six-monthly.

There is a slight challenge regarding budgetary harmonisation with the financial years of amongst partners. Currently the Government of Rwanda financial year runs from 1st January, but from 2008 they will run from 1 July. It is therefore important that donors are as transparent as possible with funding obligations, and remain as predictable as possible so as to allow effective partner planning and budgeting. This is something that needs to be discussed further amongst partners.

### **3.3. Funding**

All figures are in US \$.

UNDP will be providing \$5 million per annum for four years, but the contribution for the first year will be adjusted pro-rata to meet the financial year, i.e. will be 75% of a full year's contribution, or \$375,000.

The budget has been prepared in US dollars, and the exchange rate used, for estimate purposes, is \$1.90. For the cost sharing agreement between with UNDP, DFID support to project implementation will be \$ 8.38 million (or approximately £4.4 million) as detailed in the table below. This amount includes the Strategic Adviser's costs (\$496,260 over 4 years). UNDP will manage this £4.4 million as part of the cost sharing agreement signed between UNDP and DFID through the NEX arrangement.

In addition, DFID will set aside a contingency of up to £0.5 million, which will be used for the benefit of the project and with the agreement of the PSC after the approved budget commitments have been utilized. To cover the project design costs, DFID has also set aside a total of £0.1. So the total amount of DFID support for the project will be to a maximum of £5 million over 4 years.

Of this total, a total of £ 4.4 will be provided to support the project as per the budget outlined above as part of the cost-sharing agreement signed with UNDP and managed through the NEX Modality. The remaining £0.6 will not be managed through the cost-sharing agreement under the NEX modality, but will remain with DFID and will be used as described in paragraph 87.

Budgets incorporated in this document, except for the first year of the Project, are indicative. Exception is made to HRC who will review their priorities and budget for the first year at the beginning of the Project. The Steering Committee

## Part IV Monitoring & Evaluation

### 4.1. Monitoring, Evaluation and reporting

1. The project logframe by itself is not sufficient to use as a monitoring framework. It is not sufficiently detailed to allow the identification of suitable milestones and allow the elaboration of benchmarks of performance.
2. There is a need to develop a proper monitoring and evaluation framework for the project. Unfortunately an M&E (monitoring and evaluation) framework has to be developed rather than borrowed or adapted from elsewhere, because there are no other governance M&E frameworks in operation in Rwanda. There is, for example, as yet no agreed EDPRS governance matrix.
3. The design of a stand-alone M&E framework has not been possible in the design phase because of time constraints. Such a framework needs to be carefully negotiated between stakeholders and partners. It is recommended that as soon as the outline of the project is agreed this is taken forward, so that organisation by organisation a sufficiently detailed framework emerges as a result of negotiation. Some of the objectively verifiable indicators that emerge from this process will also need to be inserted into the logframe; currently it is not possible to put in these OVIs without consultation with partners
4. A third party needs to take over the process of periodic monitoring and evaluation, and the Project Steering Committee will take a view on this. A complete set of requirements should be designed and agreed upon by the PSC. With these requirements, a suitable independent entity with a proven track record and demonstrated capacity need to be recruited to conduct the periodic monitoring. Institutions such as the National University of Butare, the Governance Advisory Council (GAC), and others are possible candidates to perform the monitoring. Resources are allocated in the budget to cover the related costs, so the project under the guidance of the PSC is to recruit the most appropriate entity through a competitive process that ensures quality and value.
5. It is recommended the project have (reasonably light touch) six-monthly reviews, in-depth annual reviews, and a comprehensive Mid term review in the third year. A proper Project Completion Report will be held at the conclusion of the programme.



7. The key external risks with high impact on fulfilling project purpose are withdrawal of political and financial support to the participatory organisations, but the probability of this is low. In case this risk is triggered, there would need to be a fundamental reassessment of the basis of DFID-UNDP support to the programme as set out in this document. The key internal risk is around genuine capacity development (with medium probability and high impact) of participatory organisations. The Project design has some built-in mitigation measures (including drawing on previous experience), but this will need regular monitoring.
8. Strategic plans are central to this programme, but an import issue to keep in view is that current plans will all expire over the life of this project. The assumption has been made that much of current activities and focus will be transferred into the new plans. The risk is that these organisations will totally refocus their activity. This is not likely, but needs to be kept in view through M&E processes. In other words, we are banking on at last broad vision surviving the transition from one plan to the next.
9. The judgment about the risks of corruption tends to err on the side that this will not be a major problem for this project, given both cultural context and GoR's zero tolerance on corruption.
10. There are inevitably risks around staff turnover. This can be particularly acute in Rwanda where the private sector is particularly buoyant. Turnover might therefore constrain the delivery of key services and affect implementation of key accountability and responsiveness initiatives identified in the strategic plans. It is not clear at this stage what can be done to mitigate these risks.
11. As Rwanda moves towards joining the East African Community some government institutions are likely to assume new roles and responsibilities to fit into the Community. Changing roles and responsibilities of these institutions will require new administrative staffing and adjustments. These changes could be a disruptive influence on the delivery of the governance programme. DFID and UNDP will work closely with the Government to minimize any disruptive risks that might arise during the implementation of the programme.
12. Unforeseen internal and external political shocks arising pose risks to the programme and government governance objectives. Although the government has undoubtedly strong state and security capabilities to manage any external and internal threats, the continued existence of genocider and armed groups hovering on the borders of Rwanda from neighbouring states is a risk to be kept in view. That said, at present the region is more stable than it has been for some time, and internally, although there is some fragility, the political situation appears stable. Ongoing analysis should track trajectories in these areas.

**Part VII. Results framework**

Rwanda Programme for Strengthening Good Governance

	<i>Narrative Summary</i>	<i>Objectively Verifiable indicators</i>	<i>Means of Verification</i>	<i>Risks/Assumptions</i>
<b>GOAL</b>	Strengthened accountability and responsiveness of key state players for delivering the EDPRS objectives.	All OVIs will be finalised by the end of the initial six months of implementation		
<b>PURPOSE</b>	Enhanced effectiveness and capacities of key national institutions, mandated to promote state accountability and responsiveness.	Objectively Verifiable indicators Increasing state effectiveness highlighted in APRM and other external review processes.	Means of Verification Policy and strategy documents on accountability and responsiveness	Risks/Assumptions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Other actors and national policies on responsiveness and accountability effective</li> <li>Continued political support to enhancing processes of accountability and state responsiveness.</li> </ul>

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<p><b>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission</b></p>	<p><b>1. Appropriately capacitated National Unity and Reconciliation Commission that has prevented conflict and reconciled Rwandans in accordance with its Strategic Plan.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased number of mediation, negotiation and reconciliation process evident in resolving disputes and differences at all levels;</li> <li>% of population sensitized on mediation and reconciliation mechanisms;</li> <li>Generated community-based mechanisms for conflict resolution;</li> <li>Number of research surveys conducted on unity and reconciliation.</li> </ul>	<p>Monthly and annual reports</p> <p>Reports of independent programme monitors</p> <p>Reports in media</p> <p>Reflection of unity and reconciliation issues in local government strategies, plans and performance agreements</p> <p>Reports of Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Full civil society and local government engagement developed and maintained;</li> <li>Involvement and support of all stakeholders</li> <li>Availability of required capabilities and capacity across civil society and grass roots groups</li> <li>Future iterations of NURC strategic plan realistic and an appropriate roadmap for the rollout of national reconciliation policy.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Office of the ombudsman</b></p>	<p><b>Appropriately capacitated Office of the Ombudsman that has prevented and fought corruption in accordance with its Strategic Plan.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved national performance in corruption perception index reviews of Transparency International</li> <li>#. of complaints handled by the Ombudsman</li> <li>Existence of information law established to regulate access to public information by citizens</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transparency International Reports, including Corruption Perception Index (CPI)</li> <li>National corruption index reports</li> <li>Reports of Auditor General</li> <li>Reports from Ombudsman's Office</li> <li>Media reports</li> <li>Reports of Parliamentary Petition Commission</li> <li>Reports of independent programme monitors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Anti-corruption laws, policies and measures being implemented and supported politically.</li> </ul>

ACTIVITIES	Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Risks/Assumptions
Human Rights Commission	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human Rights promoted through education and training of stakeholders</li> <li>Insurance of ratification of national and international HR obligations and reporting activities, conducted by the HRC in accordance with its Strategic Plan.</li> <li>HRC protects HR by ensuring that reported violations are pursued and investigated, and justice rendered to victims of HR violations</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of the training modules</li> <li>Roll out of training in 1545 sectors</li> <li>electd NGOs with 150persons per province per year trained</li> <li>240 local defence forces trained in 4 provinces;</li> <li>3000 copies of reports distributed nationwide</li> <li>three periodic reports</li> <li>regular media coverage of HRC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training modules manuals</li> <li>Training reports</li> <li>Press releases and media reports</li> <li>Annual and term reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consistent government financial support over the period, plus donor assistance, together sufficient to allow HRC to fulfil mandate and operationalise its strategic plan.</li> <li>Strong national and executive state institutions will continue to exist and allow institutional building</li> </ul>
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trains staff and installs monitoring and reporting software to report on and control NURC financial management processes.</li> <li>NURC organizes and facilitates training of civic groups and grassroots leaders in conflict management</li> <li>Peace Education for children programs developed and conducted.</li> <li>Builds an M&amp;E systems to monitor progress and measure impact of activities</li> <li>Design and implement a communication strategy</li> <li>Conducts <i>ingando</i> activities to promote co-existence and peace.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of trained staff; software procured, installed and accessed by staff;</li> <li># of civic groups trained</li> <li># of trainings conducted; # of children trained in peace education</li> <li>Regular and timely M&amp;E reports assessing progress against monitoring framework</li> <li>Communication strategy document produced</li> <li># of trainees</li> <li>Installation of software and equipment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>training report</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation reports from Independent Evaluation bodies</li> <li>Monitoring and evaluation plan document</li> <li>Annual progress reports</li> <li>software and equipment acceptance and training reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consistent government financial support over the period, plus donor assistance, together sufficient to allow NURC to fulfill mandate and operationalise its strategic plan.</li> <li>Absorptive capacity to use exhaust their budgets exist.</li> </ul>



Parliament	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide Technical Assistance in the areas of HR, Policy Analysis, Legal Affairs, and Conflict management to different Standing Committees of the legislative secretariats.</li> <li>2. Organise and facilitate international women conferences</li> <li>3. Conduct research on legal framework of poverty reduction in general and with particular reference to gender</li> <li>4. Initiate research bringing out gender discrepancies existing in laws</li> <li>5. Set up a communication agenda with the grassroots levels, community-based organizations and the private sector and negotiate a "headline" on gender issues.</li> <li>6. Organise advocacy campaigns to manage gender challenges and their effect on women.</li> <li>7. Integrate gender dimension into the Commissions' planning</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All Standing legislative Committees access expertise on legal research, policy analysis, human rights, conflict management and communication.</li> <li># of policy documents produced,</li> <li># of parliamentary hearings per annum</li> <li>Research reports</li> <li># of advocacy campaigns conducted</li> <li># of Rural women visits to the parliament</li> <li>Decreased proportion of poor women</li> <li>Legislative Commissions' plans conceived with gender indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consultants' reports</li> <li>Parliamentary reports.</li> <li>Research reports</li> <li>Conference reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuing political will to allow parliamentary bodies to exercise mandate.</li> </ul>
National Electoral Commission	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Design training modules</li> <li>2. Conduct civic training for different target groups.</li> <li>3. Computerization of the electoral process</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of training modules produced and used</li> <li>Training plans in place</li> <li># of people trained from target groups</li> <li>Computerized electoral system in place</li> <li>Training plans and modules in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training documents</li> <li>Training evaluation reports</li> <li>Fully operating electoral systems</li> <li>Consultants' report.</li> </ul>	<p>Continuing political will behind formal democratic processes, exemplified in political and financial support to NEC.</p> <p>Continuing support for civic voter education and working with civil society.</p> <p>Ability of NEC to take forward focus areas of strategic plan</p>
High Council of				

<sup>3</sup> Information to be filled in from the HCP Strategic Plan (not currently available).

## Annex 1: Programme Budget

### Total Consolidated Budget

	US \$ 2007	US \$ 2008	US \$ 2009	US \$ 2010	US \$ Total
UNDP Contribution	375,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	1,875,000
DFID Contribution	3,344,786	2,337,451	1,365,151	1,337,468	8,384,856
<b>Total Funds to be disbursed</b>	<b>3,719,786</b>	<b>2,837,451</b>	<b>1,865,151</b>	<b>1,837,468</b>	<b>10,259,856</b>

### Partners:

Human Rights Commission	463,468	203,562	180,198	180,198	1,027,426
Nat Unity & Reconciliation Commission	614,177	552,400	271,543	271,543	1,709,663
Office of the Ombudsman	563,318	372,410	372,410	372,410	1,680,548
Parliamentary Support	687,320	813,953	266,355	266,355	2,033,983
National Election Commission	926,396				926,396
High Council of the Press		500,000	400,000	400,000	1,300,000
Administration & Management:					



Human Rights Commission Budget

	US \$ 2007	US \$ 2008	US \$ 2009	US \$ 2010
<b>2. Human Rights Commission</b>				
<b>Major Activity 1. Human Rights Promotion</b>				
Activity 1.1.Design and produce training manuals	545			
Activity 1.2.Organise trainings, training of teachers on HR	6,091			
Activity 1.3.Organise and conduct training activities for religious leaders	6,122			
Activity 1.4.Identify participants, organise and conduct training of Private sector	5,681			
Activity 1.5.Organise and train HR and youth organizations	3,575			
Activity 1.6.Organise and train Community mediators (abunzi)	4,044			
Activity 1.7. Publication of HR messages in the press, calendars	6,066			
Activity 1.8.Writing and conducting HR discussions on radios	12,878			
Activity 1.9. Organising and conducting HR discussions on TV	5,818			
Activity 1.10.Organise international Human Rights Day(s)	1,317			
Activity 1.11.Organise Provincial and national level Human Rights Debates	6,226			
Activity 1.12.Sensitisation and education campaigns in prisons, national institutions, and ingando	13,678			
Activity 1.13.Organise nationwide drama competitions on HR	4,317			
Activity 1.14.Participation and contribute ideas and views on HR policy debates and process	3,455			
Activity 1.15.Training and support voluntary HR protectional and promotional activities	80,000			
Activity 1.16. Engage government to commit and implement national and international HR agreements	364			
Activity 1.17. Annual report production, multiplication & dissemination	12,818			
Activity 1.18. Organise African HR institutions conference	30,000			
Activity 1.19. Organise national meetings with national institutions on HR	5,106			

**National Unity and Reconciliation Budget**

<b>3. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission</b>	<b>2007</b>		<b>2008</b>		<b>2009</b>		<b>2010</b>	
	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>USD</b>
<b>Activity</b>								
Activity 1.1. Organise and conduct training for NURC staff to enhance competence & service delivery.	89,995							
Activity 1.2. Organize and facilitate training of civic groups and grassroots leaders in conflict management	300,000							
Activity 1.3. Conduct <i>ingando</i> activities to promote co-existence and peace.	200,000							
Activity 1.6. Design and Conduct Peace Education for children programs	24,182							
<b>Total NURC</b>	<b>614,177</b>	<b>552,400</b>	<b>271,543</b>	<b>271,543</b>	<b>271,543</b>	<b>271,543</b>	<b>271,543</b>	<b>271,543</b>



Activity 4.3. Dramas through radio and public	36,364		
Activity 4.4.Sectors office panels (416)	18,909		
Activity 4.5. Publication of <i>Umuvunyi</i> Journal (2000 copies quarterly)	50,909		
Activity 4.6.T-Shirts for VIP (advertising campaigns)-1000	13,636		
Activity 4.7. T-Shirts for non-VIP (5000 pieces)	45,455		
Activity 4.8.District Office panels (30)	2,182		
Activity 4.8.National Level Public Institutions office panels (80)	5,818		
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>277,818</b>		
<b>Major Activity 5. Exchange and Twinning programme activities</b>			
Activity 5.1. Exchange travels and twinning meetings with 6 countries	13,636		
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>13,636</b>		
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>563,318</b>	<b>372,410</b>	<b>372,410</b>

## National Election Commission

National Electoral Commission		2007
Description		Cost (USD)
Major Activity 1. NEC institutional strengthening		
Activity 1.1. Computerisation of the electoral process (half funding gap)		584,273
Major Activity 2. Electoral Civic Education		
Activity 2.1. development of training materials for civic education		342,123
<b>Total</b>		<b>926,396</b>

## Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and Evaluation					2007	2008	2009	2010
Description					USD			
Developing governance indicators			(Consultancy services)		15,000			
Designing evaluation tools					5,500			
Mid-year evaluations					16,000			
Annual evaluations					30,000			
Summative Evaluation	Programme				0			
<b>Sub-total</b>					<b>66,500</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>57,080</b>	<b>54,000</b>



<b>Risk</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Mitigation</b>
<p>1. Withdrawal of Government's Political support to Governance</p>	<p>High: The whole programme is built on an agenda shared by GoR, UNDP and DFID, that Governance is central to the development process. It is difficult to see how the programme could continue in the way envisaged without this.</p>	<p>Low: 'Nation Building and Good Governance' a primary pillar of the EDPRS (PRSP). Rwanda is also a key supporter of NEPAD and APRM processes. Changes only foreseeable through change of government, not likely in the life of this engagement.</p>	<p>Need for continuing dialogue between HMG and GoR (and, also, UNDP and GoR) to ensure that this commitment remains central to the agenda, and is delivered upon.</p>
<p>2. Failure of HRC, NURC to implement strategic plans as articulated once resourced by GoR &amp; partners.</p>	<p>Medium: Difficult to conceive that these commissions will make no progress if their plans are fully resourced. Partial progress is more of a possibility, thus the impact will be material but probably not high.</p>	<p>Medium: A slight leap of faith with this project is that these commissions will be able to absorb this extra funding. Plans are realistic and capacities within commissions seem better than in the past.</p>	<p>There is a need for robust M&amp;E to detect any implementation/absorption problems early. If the problems become material it is suggested that partners look at ways in which project can be refocused, e.g. by reverting to more traditional projectised TA approaches. But potential benefits around alignment and stakeholder empowerment currently outweigh risks identified.</p>
<p>3. Financial commitment by Government of Rwanda to commissions, organisations and institutions of good</p>	<p>High/Medium: Our support to all institutions, regardless of the modality used, is predicated</p>	<p>Medium: The main pressure affecting this will be the colossal challenge funding the</p>	<p>The partnership that underpins this project (including the shared vision) needs to be part of ongoing</p>

<b>Risk</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Mitigation</b>
6. Future iterations of strategic plans of commissions and institutions of good governance not useful foundation for support	High: This will have a high impact, particularly given the fact that in most cases the strategic plans (and each organisation will have a new iteration of its plan during the life of this project) are central to our intervention (e.g. though alignment in some cases)	Low: We have tested our assumption that plans will be based on same vision (and likely to have very similar content) with our partners. Many plans currently in place are of good quality (HRC, NURC) and it is unlikely that these improvements will slide	Where appropriate, support should be given to planning processes (as is being done with Office of the Ombudsman).  M&E processes also need to take a view of strategy development on an organisation-by-organisation basis as it occurs
7. Funding will not reach intended recipients or will be used for purposes other than intended due to corruption.	Medium/high: The effectiveness of the project could potentially be significantly reduced if corruption proved a problem.	Low: There is zero-tolerance to petty corruption on the part of GoR, and it is not a common phenomenon.	Disbursement subject to UNDP audit processes, and progress/impact assessment part of M&E process
8. Impact of project impeded by high staff turn-over (particularly amongst key personnel) in supported organisations	Medium: The impact of this could be significant, particularly in the case of key personnel operating at a strategic level, and personnel operating at a grass-roots level with long institutional memory	Medium: A fact of life in all aspects of the public service in Rwanda, particularly in the wake of private sector growth	Profile of organisations of good governance will rise through project, incentivising working with them somewhat. But other possible mitigating action (e.g. salary enhancements funded by donors) not recommended at present
9. Disruptive influence on the delivery of the governance programme caused by adjustments to institutional	Medium: If mandates change radically, so will strategic plans. This could affect the attainment of outputs and	Low: Unlikely to anticipate that real changes in mandate of any of the partner organisations supported	UNDP/HMG/GoR dialogue focused on transparency and 'early warning' regarding these issues. Consult regional experts to further

## Appendix 4

### TERMS OF REFERENCE for Programme Manager (As prepared by UNDP Rwanda)

**Position** : Project Manager  
**Contract Type** : ALD International (A3)  
**Duration** : One year renewable  
**Project** : Support to strengthening Democratic Governance  
**Duty Station** : Kigali, Rwanda  
**Deadline for Applications:** 20<sup>th</sup> April 2007

**Start Date** : 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007

#### **I – OBJECTIVE**

Build the capacity and empower the project support services team of the joint DFID-UNDP programme that will support strengthening the capacity of key statutory institutions responsible for promoting state accountability and responsiveness.

Assist each institutions mandate to promote state accountability and responsiveness in reviewing, re-structuring, and strengthening their role and enhance their effectiveness and capacities.

Ensure that the procedures, guidelines, standards including those of procurement are fully respected during the implementation of the project.

#### **II – BACKGROUND**

DFID and UNDP jointly designed a Programme to support the Government of Rwanda: Strengthening the Institutional framework for Good Governance. The major areas of interventions through the implementation of projects are:

- ✓ Support to the Parliament
- ✓ The Parliament and the Rwanda Women's Parliamentary Forum
- ✓ Support to the National Unit and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)
- ✓ Support to the National Electoral Commission (NEC)
- ✓ Support to the Office of the Ombudsman
- ✓ Human Rights Commission (HRC):
- ✓ High Council of the Press (HCP)



- r) Ensure that the project steering committee meetings are convened, at least on a quarterly basis, to report on project progress and approve subsequent activity/work plans;

#### **V – REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS**

- a) (Master's degree or equivalent) in management or relevant disciplines such International Relations, Public Policy or Administration, Political Economy, Governance or other related areas
- b) A university degree with a relevant combination of academic qualifications and substantial project management experience may be accepted in lieu of the advanced university degree;
- c) Specialized professional training in project management/development/implementation such as Prince2, Project Management Institute (PMI) certifications, or other internationally recognized project management certifications;
- d) Five years experience of project/programme management and administration with at least three of the five years attained progressively and at an International level;
- e) Demonstrated knowledge of the political environment and challenges facing democratic consolidation in developing countries
- f) Four years of professional experience working with the UNDP/UN System. Professional experience of working with other bilateral or multilateral donors may be accepted;
- g) Fully proficient computer skills and use of software and applications customized for project management such as Microsoft Project, ATLAS (ATLAS is UNDP's project and financial management enterprise resource planning application), or others;
- h) Knowledge of UNDP/UN procedures, rules, policies, regulations and practices;
- i) Working experience in a Great Lakes Region country can be an asset;
- j) Fluent in either English or French and working knowledge of the other.
- k) Good English drafting skills

#### **VI- COMPETENCIES**

- a) Proven track record of analytical and problem-solving skills;
- b) Strong leadership and co-ordination skills with sound team management;
- c) Ability to work under pressure on multiple activities concurrently through tight deadlines
- d) Ability to participate effectively in a team based, information sharing environment

#### **VII – DELIVERABLES**

By the end of the contracting period, the Programme Manager will have delivered the following:

## **ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED FORWARD IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME**

1. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems will be developed during the initial six months of implementation. It is suggested that a third party can facilitate development of an M&E framework, and the Governance Advisory Council is one possible option in this regard, but it needs further consideration.
2. A process will be set up to identify other possible factors in the external institutional environments which impact the work and effectiveness of these institutions. An independent consultant would support ongoing analysis of the institutional contexts, and identify issues which need to be included in the strategic plans of the institutions or discussed with other state actors. The consultant will provide initial inputs in the early stages of implementation.
3. DFID will make an initial disbursement of £ 500,000 to enable UNDP establish the project management arrangements and for the first allocations to beneficiary institutions.
4. The ToRs of the PSC shall be agreed among the key stakeholders as soon as possible. One of the first tasks for the PSC will be to agree a six month activity plan as the basis for early allocations to the beneficiary institutions (from the first disbursement of £500K) and for the second six monthly disbursement from DFID. The triggers for disbursement will be the agreement of a forward plan every six months.
5. Budgets incorporated in this document, except for the first year of the Project, are indicative. Exception is made to HRC who will review their priorities and budget for the first year at the beginning of the Project. The Steering Committee will take consensus of the constituent members for the budget priorities for the second year onwards.
6. The ToRs for the Project Manager will be agreed in the initial meetings of the PSC
7. Each beneficiary organisation will nominate a focal person who will liaise with the Project Manager and manage the information flows needed.

## **Media Guidelines for United Nations Officials**

### **United Nations Secretariat relations with the media**

#### **The policy**

1. The United Nations is committed to being open and transparent in its dealings with the press. It is in our interest to work with the media quickly and honestly, and to develop a coherent communications strategy based on those same principles. We should not only react to events but, where appropriate, project the Organization's point of view on important international developments. However, we must sometimes keep confidences--not to mislead or conceal, but to protect a diplomatic process. Our media policy must, therefore, balance the need to be open and the need to respect confidentiality.

#### **Speaking to the press**

2. The principal voice of the Organization is the Secretary-General. He speaks to the media frequently, at Headquarters and when travelling.

3. Media policy is an integral component of the broader communications and public information work of the Organization, headed by the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information. The Director of Communications in the Office of the Secretary-General is responsible for coordinating the development of a communications strategy that would help project to the world's media a coherent and consistent message for the Organization.

4. The Secretary-General's Spokesman and his staff speak to journalists on the Secretary-General's behalf throughout the day. The Spokesman gets his guidance directly from the Secretary-General and senior members of his staff. As the Spokesman's staff cannot be expert in all subjects, they seek the assistance of UN specialists--either to provide them with information that they can pass on to the press or to speak directly to the journalists themselves.

5. As a matter of principle, every member of the Secretariat may speak to the press, within limits:

- speak only with your area of competence and responsibility;
- provide facts, not opinions or comment;
- leave sensitive issues to officials who are specifically authorized to speak on them (see paragraph 6 below)

#### **Sensitive issues**

6. The number of officials speaking on sensitive issues is necessarily limited to:

- the Spokesman, on the basis of guidance;
- designated members of the Secretary-General's staff and Heads of Department, within their areas of competence;
- staff authorized by their Heads of Department, on the basis of guidance; and